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3] With only my mind 
to protect me 
I go into days C ... ] 
I think because 
my brain does it. 
I want bad ideas to stay 
in the mind to make 
pleasure without harm. 
5] I keep him [death] there with 
the pressure of my mind [ ... ] 
I keep my brain on so 
I do not fall into nothing C .. . J. 
6] [ ... ] I am afraid to stay 
on the earth [ ... ]. 
Facts stay in our mini 
until they run it. 
*) Inscriptions on an art-work, by Jenny Holzer, entitled 
"Laments" and consisting of seven tombstones and 
corresponding el ectronic panels, part of the exibi tion 
"Energies" organized by the Stedel i jk Museum, Amsterdam, 
in May 1990. The catalogue. is forthcoming. 
PREFACE 
The aim of the thesis is to defend the hypothesis that an anti-
Aristotelian interpretation of the genesis of the process of knowing 
provides an interesting and fruitful means to understand the human never-
ending search for knowl edge and to answer doubts concerning the reliabi li ty 
of human knowledge of external reality. Such statement requires an 
explanation. 
Three years ago I setted about developing a more general hypothesis 
that underlies this thesis, namely that hWlaIl knowledge is a reaction 
against reali ty. What I had in mind at that time was more a group of 
analogies or images than a proper theory. My essential aim was 
investigating the possibility of shifting the starting point of the process 
of knowing fran nan to reali ty . I wanted to see if the hypothesis coul d be 
justified that nan is constrained by reality to acquire intellectual 
knowledge. I wanted to argue that if it wasn't for an external pressure man 
would not pursue intellectual knowledge just for its own sake. According to 
this hypothesis man would be happy not to be invol ved in any process of 
knowing at all if this could be avoided. It is only a sort of inertial 
process that forces him to keep the process of knowing always open. The 
process of knowing is not due to an inborn natural desire for knowledge for 
its own sake, but to a haneostatic reaction. I had the vague idea that 
hunan knowledge, in what it differs fran aninal knowledge, could be a way 
of defending, IOCIre and more earnestly, the internal world, bui ld up by the 
mind, fran the external attaks conducted by reality. By developping this 
hypothesis I meant to open a valid path through which I could approach old 
probl ems in Episteoology. Indeed I thought that sane of the sol utions 
provided in Episteooloqy had been influenced by the Kantian exclusion of 
"why does nan search for knowledge ?" fran the list of the foundamental 
I 
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questions to be answered by Episteroology: "do we know sanething ?", and if 
so, "what do we know ?" and, for Kant, roost irrportant of them all ''how do 
we know sanething ?". 
Assuming that the process of knowing is a kind of relation between a 
human being and external real i ty , I begt.m to articul ate and support the 
general hypothesis about knowl edge as a reaction by investigating the 
question whether it was possible to analyze the nature of such a relation 
within Episteroology alone, or it was necessary to shift into a theoretical 
analysis carried on by Philosopphy of Language. It seemed that because of 
the revival of the real ism debate in Phi I osophy of Language and in Logic 
one could not take for granted that the nature of the process of knowing as 
a relation were essentially episteroological. My doctoral thesis for Rane 
Uni versi ty. was a defence of the pure episteroological nature of sane 
aspects of the realismrdebate, in contrast to Dummett's approach. Among the 
aspects belonging to an Epistemological investigation I recognized the 
nature of the episterrdc relation occurring between a Human Knowing SUbject 
and External Reality. 
After that work, I was ready to approach the second stage of the 
metatheoretical development of the hypothesis: whether, and if so, why the 
discussion of the genesis of the epistemic relation occurring between a 
HlII'\an Knowing SUbject and External Real i ty is a vi tal issue of 
Epistarological Studies. In the M.Phil. thesis2 I argued that the genesis 
of the process of knowing should require a special attention wi thin 
Epistarology because of the nature of the cartesian circle. In that work I 
supported the hypothesis that a solution of this latter challenge, due to 
the dangerous circularity between extension and criteria of knowledge, is 
made possible by an appeal to a partially metaphysical interpretation of 
1) Theoretical Options and Presuppositions of the Philosophical Analysis of H. Oummett, tesi 
di laurea in filosofia a.a. 87/88, Universita' di Rama. "La Sapienza". 
2) The Need for Gnoseology - Hypothesis for the Introduction of a Theory of the Genesis of the 
Process of Knowin9 as a Fundamental Branch of Philosophy of Knowledge, M.Phil. thesis, a.y. 
88/89, University of Warwick. 
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the genesis of the process of knowing. I labelled the branch of 
Epistanology that should develop this kind of investigation "Gnoseology". 
After having defended both the non-linguistic and then the 
episteroologically vi tal nature of Gnoseol ogy , the time had cane to deal 
with the last metatheoretical issue of my project. The new problem was that 
even if (i) the epistemi.c relation between a Ht.ITaIl Knowing Subject and 
External Reality has to be investigated by Epistemology; and even if (ii) 
in the Epistemological Studies the genesis of the process of knowing is a 
vital issue studied by Gnoseology, yet this does not imply that (iii) the 
genesis of the process of knowing has to be interpreted in tenns of a 
defensive reaction. On the contrary, the "Gnoseological" tradition provides 
us with a classic answer: the genesis of the process of knowing is due to 
the human, natural desire for Jmowledge tor its own sake. In this third 
thesis I investigate and defend the possibility of a substitution of such a 
"classic" interpretation with a rrore pragmatic one. 
This is the story of the origin of this work. Although the thesis, as 
an academic product, does not presuppose any knowledge of the previous 
works, I hope the reader will keep in nand the wider project of research of 
which it is a part. 
A detailed s1..l1Tllary of the contents is provided in the following 
introduction. Here I shall linat myself to specify that in order to support 
the value of my hypothesis, I've decided to follow the same procedure 
adopted in the M.Phil. thesis. I've approached the issue by focusing on a 
crucial problem in episteoology: the reliability of htmm Jmowledge in 
presenting a tai thful picture ot the world. I believe that what I shall 
call the "Aristotelian Postulate" - the idea that man has an inborn 
spontaneous tendency towards the acquisition of intellectual knowledge just 
for its own sake - plays a flIDdamental role in the fomulation of that 
problem. ,Thus I belive that a discussion of the same problem brings to 
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light all the fruitfulness of an al temative "postulate" which could not 
give rise to the same problem. 
The limit of this work will soon be clear. As a third part of a 
larger project of research, this thesis accomplishes only one task, that of 
supporting the importance and fruitfulness of an anti-Aristotelian 
foundation for a future Gnoseol ogy. It has not been my intention to give a 
full articulation of its implications. And although in the last chapter I 
have introduced sane tentative rerrarks that go in the direction of such an 
explication, I shall be contented here to reccmnend the whole approach, and 
to leave its full development to a future stage of the investigation. All 
I've been arguing for is the highly interesting value of the hypothesis 
that "intellectual knowledge is a reaction against reality". Having said 
this, I must also specify that with this work the metatheoretical part of 
the project is concluded. 
Turning fran the contents to the fornal aspects of the thesis, two 
points require sane further rerrarks, the method and the style of the work. 
The methodological approach I've adopted is partially analitic and 
partially historical. I've tried to anchor the logical fonnulations of my 
conclusions to scholarly justified bases. Aristotle is the case where this 
''rrethodology'' is IOOre obvious. As the work develops, it will becane clear 
that in respect to Aristotle the thesis proceeds between, hence tries to 
avoid the two extrane lines of a purely logical approach, that would use 
Aristotle alroost as a merely polemical label for a certain philosophical 
position, and a scholarly interpretation of his thought. I fear that to the 
eyes of a scholar and a historician my "analytic" use of the history of 
philosophy nay appear too nuch unscrupolous; and that to the eyes of an 
analytic philosopher it may seem that I loose ~self in the discussion of 
historical details which are not relevant to the epistemological nature of 
the issue. I can only hope that one and the other may came to appreciate 
the other side of the coin, namely the irrportance of being "analytically 
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minded" in the history of philosophy, and of being "historically grounded" 
in the analysis of theoretical issues. 
About the style, I have two more things to say. In writing this work 
I've been struggling to keep it within the acaderrrrc lirrdt of 100.000 words. 
In order to achieve this goal I've been forced to rely partially on the 
footnotes, where many issues that could not be pursued in the text are at 
least sketched. But I'm also aware that scxretimes I had to stop pursuing a 
certain thought any further. The reader may feel that this happens 
precisely when it would be extremely interesting to consider additional 
development of certain ideas. I apologize, and I can only pr~se that in a 
larger work this won't happen so often. 
The reader may also notice that the thesis looks like a mosaic that 
canes out of many little tesserae. Precision and minute analysis is one of 
the properties that characterize Analytitc Philosophy and that I've tried 
to apply. Whenever there has been an alternative between readability and 
precision of formulation, I've always opted in favour of the latter. This 
is the place to ask the reader for same good will, and a bit of an effort 
in following the less plain passages present in the text. Scxre of them may 
also be due to the fact that English is not my first language. I've tried 
to give a help to reader by listing the technical expressions that recur 
more frequently in the first Appendix. 
I hope that what I've argued for in this thesis won't struck the 
reader as carpletely new. As Shelling says, truth is the only thing men 
don't like to be the only owners, and I'm not an exception. On the 
contrary, I believe that good ideas live in more than one mind. And about 
being original, sane time ago I discovered that Cicero, Thanas Aquinas and 
Descartes all agreed on the fact that "there is nothing strange enough that 
has not been already said by a philosopher". If this is true, then carplete 
originali ty is sanething we cannot look for in phi 1 osophy. So I woul d be 
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very happy if Peirce's remark could apply to the present work: "if there is 
any novel ty in the suggestion I am about to make - and I IruSt confess I 
fear there is - it lies only in the juxtaposition of ideas" (Collected 
Papers, 7.642). 
I wish to acknowledge the kind help of Norrran Armstrong, Dr. Ciril 
Barret, Dr. Francesca cappelletti, Dr. Maria J. Frapolli, Dr. Gaetano 
Sabatini, Prof. Jim Tiles, Richard Van der Lagemaat, and especially of my 
tutor Prof. Susan Haack, and the Fondazione R.U.I and the British Academy 
for their financial support. 
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FIRSI' PART 
GEMEU. I NTROIXJCTION 
In the HetaphysicJ, Aristotle declares that one of the chief 
stages in the developnent of hunan knowledge is the fact that: 
"[ ... ] all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as 
they are, as they do about sel fTooving marionettes [ ... ]". 
Al though the whole context rrakes this statement less "cartesian" 
than it may sOt..ll'lCi, Aristotle seems to refer to a ccmron and crucial 
doubt that very likely everybody has entertained at least once in 
his/her life: "reality in itself nay be carpletely different fran what 
we take it to be". The group of problems arising fran this observation 
can be easily identified as one of the JOOSt in'portant, if not sinply the 
issue that is at the origin of a theory of knowledge. 
In order to forrrulate the content of this prirra facie Traunatic 
Doubt (henceforth also TO) with a good disposition to understand it, it 
is sufficient to invoke a generically positive perspective about the 
independent nature of external reality and a generically negative 
perspective about the nature of hunan knowledge. Roughly, in order to be 
able to entertain the Tral..lTBtic Doubt it is sufficient to hold that 
there is an external reality whose intrinsic properties are independent 
of my Imowledge of it (cntoloqical ccmnibnent), and that my knowledge is 
such that I 'm not equipped to grasp the intrinsic nature of external 
reality (epistsoolO9'ical camdtment). All this is very well as far as 
the content of TO is ccncemed. But in order to understand that general 
Doubt as Traunatic, and as being a disturbing dilemna for a hllT8ll 
)mowing subject (henceforth also HKS), the connection between the 
1) Met. 1,1, 98~13-1s. Classic text are quoted by title, more recent work are quoted by 
date of edition. 
2) see VI.s.s for a commentary of this passage. 
1 
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ontological and epistemological components is not sufficient. A further 
assurption is necessary, namely that a hllllaIl knowing subject wants or 
would like to know what reality in itself is or is not, or would not be 
satisfied by or happy with a knowledge of reality as this merely 
appears. This further carponent is strictly cormected to another 
Aristotelian dictun, the farrous incipit of the Metaphysics: 
"All men by nature desire to know·t3 • 
For reasons that I will make fully clear only in the third 
chapter, I shall sirrply call this third carponent of the Traurratic Doubt 
"the Aristotelian Postulate" (henceforth also AP)4. 
As soon as we advance a bi t further in the understanding of the 
Aristotelian Postulate, its theoretical value turns out to be 
noteworthy. Let me explain the point. 
As I said, the observation that reality in itself might be far 
fram what we believe it is, is one which possibly everybody has casually 
made at least once in his or her life. It is also such that just a few 
persons have been really curious to investigate seriously and at length. 
Indeed, we nay recognize saneone as a philosopher (or as saneone who has 
sane philosophical interests) by checking the quantity of time he or she 
might be ready to spend in thinking seriously about the possibility 
opened by that observation. In fact, the Tra\ll'Btic Doubt seems to be 
extremely annoying in different senses. 
SUperficially, it SeE!118 to be a mere speculative fantasy of a 
tired mind. And in this sense the doubt is imrediately dismissed by the 
great najority of people as a nonsense. The doubt is annoying because 
there seem to be better ways of employing our time and mental energies 
than by entertaining similar fancies. This reaction doesn't lead us too 
3) Het. 1.1. 9OsCi21-7. 
4) For a definition of the AP see D27 in IV.6.c. For an analysis of the Aristotelian 
dictum see chap. IV. 
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far and according to it there wouldn't be any need to write work like 
the present. I shall therefore dismiss it without further reason. 
Philosophically, the thought is disturbing (the Doubt is 
Trauratic) because it SeaTS to bring with it a rather unpleasant 
impression of displacement: it seems that if external reality in itself 
may be carpletely different fran the way we think it is, we are all 
prisoners of our mental world, in a more or less individual form of 
ontological solipsisnt. Or, to put it in another way, the Doubt presents 
ourselves as potential strangers to the world: we could be living our 
epistanic life on the border of it, outside its intrinsic nature, the 
"real" reality lying beyond the wall of our mind, and as such renaining 
forever unreachable. Fran the philosophical perspective, or sinply 
according to the Aristotelian Postulate, it follows that the thought is 
apparent.l y disturbing because we would be spootaneously interested in 
knowing what the nature of external reality is, what happens around us, 
and the thought, if there should be sane truth in it, is traunatic 
because it would frustrate this innate desire. The displacarent inherent 
the idea of an unknowable reality is a mental displacement. It acquires 
its full tra\.ITBtic inpact on the account of the fact that, though we 
live in the world as beings among other beings, we cannot Jmow the 
intrinsic nature of what we live in contact with, of what we eat, of 
what we enjoy, of what we fear. Shortly, the Traumatic Doubt leads to 
the unpleasant conclusion that we don't and cannot )mow the real nature 
of the world where we live, and this despite the brute fact that we live 
in it. This is the philosophical picture, grounded 00 the Aristotelian 
Postulate, that we receive fran the tradition. 
5) "SolipsiSJI" is generally used to refer to the state of a mind which has not the 
possibility of entering in contact with other .inds, whereas in this case it indicates the 
state of exclusion of a mind from the ontological intrinsic nature of external reality. 
This is why it can be BIOre or less "individual', depending on whether or not we endorse 
also a version of solipsism of the first type. 
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Now there might be different responses to the Trauratic Doubt. If 
I were to put rrdne bluntly, I would say that I don't believe we really 
mind about leaving reality out of our business. Ql the contrary, I 
believe that ''httran kind cannot bear very I1I1ch reality,6, and this in a 
sense that will be clarified only in the last chapter. There, I shall 
also make clear what makes my position different frcm the "superficial" 
one dismissed above. The hypothesis I will advocate is that it may be 
all for the best that reality in itself should remain uncovered to human 
beings. But there wi 11 be time in the future to support and specify 
these theses. At the rrarent, and all through the first part of this 
study, let me interpret the doubt that "reality might be cO'li'letely 
different frcm what we take it to be" as "disturbing" in a face-value 
sense of the tenn: we shall presuppose that man does not like this 
possibility and eventually he would like things to be otherwise, i.e. 
man would like to be (at least potentially) truly in full contact with 
external reality. 
An irrportant feature of the Doubt is in need of a clarification. I 
suspect it is quite natural, once the Trauratic Doubt has crossed our 
minds, to associate it with the loss of faith in a naive picture of the 
world caused by scientific discoveries. Seemingly, science, in a broad 
sense of the tenm, has put significant weight in favour of the Traumatic 
Doubt that reality in itself is in fact different fran the ordinary 
picture we have of it. And yet this is not what I suppose we really have 
in mind when we consider the disturbing thought radically enough (which 
probably means philosophically enough). For as lang as it is 1nrnan 
science which is discovering SaTe other portion of reality we didn't 
already know, then we are still confident to be able to grasp the final 
nature of it. For exanple even if we don't yet know of the underlyining 
nature of matter or its physical laws, we are still confident that there 
6) T.S.Eliot "Burnt Norton" in Four Ouartets «(1978], p.172. 
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is saneme else who )mows or who will be able to know in the future. 
This certainty has never been stranger than nowadays, despite the fact 
that scientists a<ini.t that we probably don't understand the intrinsic 
nature of reality rruch better than we did centuries ago. All this is to 
say that, though scientific discoveries, fran Copernicus to Einstein 
(but think also about those concerning the nature of man, fran Darwin to 
Freud) might be the first origin of the Traunatic Doubt, nevertheless 
they are still far fran representing the real issue. For when we think 
that external reality might be different fran what we take it to be, we 
may be referring to a very radical possibility: that human knowledge of 
the intrinsic properties of external reality could be consti tutianally 
iJTt)ossible, not just merely limited or partial or in need of 
developnent. 
It is mainly in these terms that the problem is a classic 
philosophical issue. In fact, the episteroological tum that we generally 
locate in Cartesian thought as the beginning of rrodem philosophy can be 
interpreted as revolving precisely upoo this dilemna, whether or not we 
can cane to discover the "real" nature of external reality, if it is not 
just a dream, or a devil jOke.7 
By characterizing the Traumatic Doubt in such broad terms as one 
of the central problems in episteroology, I JMan to explain why an 
exhaustive study of it and of its atterrpted solutions would be too 
ani>itious a task in this work, a task which certainly goes beyond nur 
capacities, and which is also not Il'\Y interest to achieve in this 
context. Here I shall be rather calcemed ally with a particular aspect 
of the whole dilemna, narrely its anthropological cQTl)Ol1ent, which I've 
called the Aristotelian Postulate. And this ooly fran a limited 
perspective, the task of introducing an anti-Aristotelian Postulate. All 
this can be strrmarized in very crude terms by saying that, aroong all the 
7) The radical separation between Knowing SUbject and Known Object is the other side of 
the issue. cf. Cassirer (1963]. 
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available solutiCXlS of the Traunatic Doubt, I believe it rray be 
interesting and productive to try the classic manoeuvre of dissolving 
the problem qua problem. In order to do so the possibility described by 
the disturbing thought might be taken seriously, but it should be 
rejected in its negative connotation, as being really disturbing in the 
sense above specified. If man is not interested in knowing the intrinsic 
nature of external reality then there is no reason to believe that a 
"phenanenal" knowledge of external reality is any worse than a 
"noll'!'lellal" one. Likewise, if the wall of our mind is not like that of a 
prison but like that of a castle than all the foregoing metaphors about 
''hunan displacement" ought to be reverted. And going a bit further, if 
man is interested in leaving reality outside the internal world of his 
mind as rruch as this is reasonably possible, then the presence of a gap 
between noumena and phenomena should be welcome rather than feared. 
Of course all this cannot be rratter of stipulation: we either 
recognize man as spontaneously interested in knowing just for the sake 
of knowledge or we don't, and we don't sirrply decide whether he is or is 
not. But surely a very quick investigation nay already shift the weight 
of the proof on the Aristotelian side. I don't really see the najority 
of people pursuing knowledge for its own sake as Aristotle seemed to. 
Al though I recognize that this is a very unfair way of contradicting 
Aristotle, it gives a first idea of what my purose is. of course the 
issue is far roore carpI ex than can be merel y sketched here, and 
certainly the key issue is not merely statistical. Indeed, the whole 
thesis is an attempt to make sense of the philosophical possibility of 
an anti-Aristotelian vision of man's interest in Jmowledge for the sake 
of his own peace of mind. As will be clear at the end of the second 
part, I won't even try to sketch what theory of knowledge could emerge 
fran this shift. I will feel already satisfied if, within the limits of 
-
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this work, I'm successful in supporting the value of such a theoretical 
proposal. 
Turning now to the way in which I have dealt with the issue, the 
present work is divided. into two parts. 
The three chapters that rrake up the first part represent the three 
phases through which I will introduce the discussion of the theoretical 
value of the AP. Therefore, they deal only with the epistemological and 
ontological carponents of the dilemna. What I intend to do in these 
three chapters is to show how it is possibl e to arri ve at the 
fonmulation of the Traumatic Doubt (chapters I and II) and to describe 
what solutions have been already attempted. (chapter III). In the second 
part I shall adopt the strategy of objecting the whole interpretation of 
the problem qua problem by adopting an anthropological point of view 
opposite to the Aristotelian. 
on the whole, I've adopted an oscillatory exposition (see scbeme.1 
below) : 
- in chapter I, first I state the issue about the rreaning of the real ism 
and anti-realism debate fram a very general perspective (1.1-2); then I 
proceed towards a distinction between, and clarification of ontological 
realism and episteroological realism (1. 3) , hence advancing fran the 
exposition of the former (1.4) to the exposition of the latter (1.5): 
- in chapter II, I rejoin the two forms of realism together in a 
nutually supporting cormection (what I've called "Ingenuous Realism", 
see II .1-2) • Assuning the breakdown of this global approach, I 
distinguish the two perspectives once roore, this time on a negative 
basis, and by proceeding fram the exposition 'of a refined version of 
episteroological anti-realism (II .3) to the exposition of a refined 
version of minimal ontological realism (II.4-5). The whole process leads 
to the 1 ast section (II. 6) where finally I sUlIllarize the concI usians of 
the foregoing analysis by spelling out the significance of the dilemma 
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expressed by the Doubt that "reality rray be different fran what we take 
it to be". In that section I shall label the whole problE!TI ilTl'licit in 
the TrallT\atic Doubt "the Perpetual Check of Reason". 
The detailed analysis carried on in the first two chapters is 
important not only for the sake of a clear understanding of the problE!TI, 
but also in order to render explicit the essential steps rrade in the 
process of its fonnulation. For in this way I will be able to sketch, 
in chapter III, all the main solutions that have been proposed to the 
TrallT\atic Doubt, as consisting in essential objections to the nature, or 
alternative approaches to the value of each of those steps. In other 
words, the third chapter unravels, as a pars destruens, the rrain 
operations carried out in the first two chapters, the pars costruens, in 
order to see what has been left iJ'T'{llicit in the fornulation of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason, and therefore what has been left untried in 
avoiding its final formulation. still following the oscillation between 
the ontological and the epistemological component, I first focus on the 
so-called metaphysical strategies and then an the epistemological. The 
chapter ends with the introduction of a third kind of strategy, those 
presenting the possibility of a revaluation of the gap between the world 
as it is in itself and as we know it. This will introduce the second 
part of the work. By that time I should have succeeded in showing that 
the abandonment of the AP is both a negletted and a potentially fruitful 
source of solutions of the dilemma. 
The first part of the thesis can be schanatically presented thus: 
lHE....FA'I'l'ERN OF .lHE.-INVESTIGATloo...l 
1.5 11.3 111.3 (epist. side) 
1.1-2--.1., I).l~ j).6_I!J.~ [).4-S 
1.4 l1..{-S . III.2 (ontol. side) 
I PART.INTROOOCTlOO 9 
Summarizing, the fundamental hypotheses supported throughout this 
scheme are: 
- one of the central problems of episteroology is the Trauratic Doubt 
according to which reality might be different fran what we take it to 
be; 
- the fo:rnulation of this problem inplies an epistsoological, an 
ontological and an anthropological carponent; 
- many solutions have been attempted to avoid its formulation with its 
consequences, but the anthropological side has been largely disregarded. 
The main reason for this is that ITDSt of the time the AP has been 
inplicitly accepted by the majority of the strategies. The AP is the 
cammon background of many different approaches to the problem; 
fran what it follows that 
- first, a sol uti an of the PerPetual Check of Reason working on its 
anthropological carpanent deserves at least as JTllch attention as the 
other two carponents, and 
- secondly, this goal may be fruitfully pursued by replacing the AP with 
an Anti-Aristotelian Postulate. 
The second part can be read as a roore detailed developnent of what 
otherwise would arrount to a secticn of the third chapter, that is of the 
anthropological strategy: 
- in chapter IV, I discuss the nature of the Aristotelian Postulate. 
First I analyse Aristotle's statement fran a scholarly (IV.2) and fran a 
historical point of view (IV.3-5); then I produce a logical definition 
of it (IV. 6); and finally I outline the consequent vision of man, that 
endorsed by the acceptance of the AP (IV. 7) ; 
_ in chapter V, I sketch a sunnary of the reasons that may be at work in 
the acceptance of the AP. First, I give a brief nap of them (V.2); then 
I focus roore in detail on the abductive reason for the AP, which is the 
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roost interesting of the epistaoological argure.nts (V .3);, the 
metaphysical argunents are sumrarized and discussed all together (V. 4); 
and the two trends are joined in the consideration of what I've called 
Boethius r paradox (V .5). The last reason for the AP considered is 
analogical, for it consists in a catparison of the process of knowing to 
that of IT'()tion (V. 6-7). The cone I usion of the chapter is that despite 
its deep historical roots there are no really convincing reasons to 
assume the theoretical validity of the AP; 
- in chapter VI, the longest of the thesis, I fomulate a PeirceislP 
alternative to the AP for the interpretation of the principle of the 
genesis of the process of knowing. I start by dismissing a trivial 
version of the anthropological strategy. Its discussion makes clear how 
an anthropological strategy nust be addressed if it wants to be 
effective (VI.2). Resunnng the discussion of the nature of the principle 
of the genesis of the process of knowing fran the analogical side, I 
then briefly resrark on the physical interpretation of the law of 
inertia, referring to Ockam, Buridan and Newton (VI.3). This will lead 
to the assessment of a rrore philosophical understanding of the same 
topic in Spinoza. In that section I try to bring to light the irrportance 
of a static and inertial picture of the natural tendency of human mind, 
and then to fOIlTlllate a first version of what I shall call "the 
Peirceish Postulate" (VI. 4). In the following two sections I point to 
sane historical references (VI.5) and to sane aspects of Peirce's 
philosophy (VI. 6) in order to provide the Peirceish Postulate with a 
broader epistemological basis. As I said earlier, I don't pretend this 
to be a development of a Peirceish Epistemology, and the remarks put 
forward there are to be understood as a mere sketch of a general 
orientation, not as a fully articulated theory. The anthropological 
8) This adjective was introduced by Sellars in (1968), p.140, instead of "Peircean", in 
order to mean "Peircean-like" (cf. Fisch (1986J I pp.429-42, especially p. 435). For a 
justification of its use in this work see VI.6. 
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strategy grounded em the Peirceish Postulate is tested in the last 
section (VI. 7), where I atterrpt to show that, according to such an anti-
Aristotelian Postulate, the Doubt is no longer Traumatic, and the 
Perpetual Check of Reason is no longer a negative phenanenon. The Open 
Conclusion introduces sane of the principal questions that a future work 
accepting the Peirceish Postulate should try to answer (VI.a). 
There are two final Appendices, one listing the definitions and 
abbreviations used in the work, the other focusing on sane aspects of 
Peirce's tholl9ht whose discussion could not be inserted in the final 
chapter. 
The second part can be schematically presented thus (where p stays 
for "perspective"): 
.nm.....PATI'ERN OF THE INVESTlGaTI<.ti....2 
(histor .p. ) (rretaphys.p.) 
V.4 IVi·~ IV.~ ~.6/7 
IV.2 
(scholarly p.) 
,V.l/21'V.s----.V.6/7- - - --t 
~ / (analogical p.) 
V.3 
(epist.p. ) 
.mE PATl'ml( OF mE INVES'tlGATlOO. 3 
(philos.p. ) 
VI.4 
-+ V. 6/7 ~VI .. 1/2 l~VI. 5/6--+ VI. 7 --I> VI. a 
(analogical p.) ~_ /' (epist.p.) 
~I.3 
scheme , 
(scientific p.) 
Sutmarizing, the fundamental hypotheses supported throughout 
scheme 2/3 are: 
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- ooe of the main ass\.l1l?tion in the theory of knowledge is the idea that 
man has an inborn and spontaneous tendency towards the acquisition of 
intellectual knowledge for its own sake (the AP); 
- the AP, al t~ largely accepted, does not have any strong ground of 
justification, apart fran various metaphysical hypotheses; 
- since one of the IOOre interesting reasons to accept the AP is the 
analogy between knowing and IOOVing; 
- then the possibility of elaborating an anti-Aristotelian Postulate can 
be introduced by working on the same dynamic analogy; 
- this can be done by shifting fran a dynamic to a static and inertial 
interpretatioo of the natural tendency of hunan mind; 
- such a static and inertial interpretation allows an understanding of 
the process of knowing as a process of defence, activated by the human 
mind in order to cope with real i ty and keep it outside her internal 
world; roore metaphorically, the limits of hUTall knowledge, previously 
interpreted as the walls of a "prison" becane those of a "castle"; 
- this Peirceish approach inplies the possibility of solving the 
TraUTatic Doubt qua TraUTatic. 
At canclusioo of this foreword two IOOre carments nust be added on 
the way I proceeded in introducing the discussion of the AP. 
First, the idea of elaborating a IOOre rigourous fOITllllatioo of the 
position for which reality in itself is unknowable, and therefore the 
idea of reinterpreting different epistE!l'OOlogies as attenpts to solve 
this problem is purely theoretical. I couldn I t be farer fran believing 
to have presented a scholarly interpretation of the authors mentioned in 
. chapter two and, above all, in chapter three. For this aspect the second 
part is not better. All this doesn It mean, however, that what I said 
there has no connection at all with the real status of the theories I 1m 
referring to. It is just that 11m considering IOOre inportant the 
I PART. I NTROtUCT I 00' 13 
theories than their owners, and I'm treating these latter not 
historically, but somehow as all sitting around the same table, facing 
the same problem lying in the centre. They speak to each other and it is 
necessary to aknowledge who speaks to whan, but that is probably the 
roost which can be scholarly obtained fran my approach. To give an 
exarrple: I shall ccnsider Berkley as giving an answer to a problem that 
I previously define Kantian. But by this I mean to say that on one hand 
the problem in question can be fornulated in its clearest features fran 
a Kantian perspective, and that on the other hand Berkley was not 
dealing with a different issue, but that his solution is one of the 
possible solutions that can be listed in front of the problem. Whenever 
possible I have made this limdt explicit in the text. 
Secondly, despite the fact that I'm very s~thetic to a Kantian 
approach to the unknowability of the intrinsic nature of external 
reality, and despite the fact that I shall use a Kantian fornulation of 
this problem in order to introduce other epistemologies in chapter 
three, chapters cne and two should not be taken as atterrpting a defence 
of Kant's position. Their nature, as will be obvious in a nanent, is 
highly stipulative, and their target is merely that of making explicit 
the essential steps necessary to \.D'l.derstand how we can cane to fornulate 
a Kantian versiCll of the dilerma about the tmknowability of external 
reality. I need this exposition in order to make clear how each step can 
be objected. And the first two chapters would be too easily cri ticisable 
if they were to be taken as also supporting what they are merely 
outlining. 
REALI9f AND ANTI-REALI~: A GmmAL FRAMaroRK 
"For all knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an 
iI1l>ressicm of pI easure in itself." 
Francis Bacon, Advancement of Learning, I,i,3. 
I. 1 I NTROOOCTIOO 
In order to entertain the Doubt that "reality may be crnpletely 
different fran what we take it to be" with sane seriousness, one needs to 
entertain at the same titre and wi th the same degree of urgency two separate 
theses: one ootological and positive and the other epistemological and 
negative. But having said this, one should not be tenpted to identify the 
two components too readily. In fact they are rather difficult to 
disentangled. What is needed is a careful and detailed examination, without 
which the whole Doubt will be just inarticulated, roore like a piece of pure 
metal than an alloy. This is why in this chapter I wish to provide the 
''blast furnace" where the "Doubt-alloy" is qoinq to be decarposed into its 
caJl>Ol1ents. In order to present the TD as due to the cari:>inaticm of an 
ootological and an episterooloqical thesis, a theoretical level nust be 
found where the cntological thesis can be really joined with the 
episterroloqical thesis. SUch a theoretical catroon level nust be not only 
terminological but above all calceptual. 
'ft\e realism-debate represents the cannon basis an which the two 
theses can be so fomulated as to Rake them interlock in the constitution 
of the theoretical content of the TO. Unfortunately, precisely because the 
realism-debate is in fact such a CaTl'OOll ground of coofrcntatioo for 
episterrological and ontological positions, it is also rather crowded. In 
order to nake roan for the merging of the two specific theses it will be 
14 
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necessary to clear up a certain area of it. In so doing I shall adapt the 
realism{anti-realism epistemological terrrdnology to the realism(anti-
realism ontological terminology (this point is made clear below). I shall 
proceed gradually, by making sane general remarks increasingly rrore 
specific. 
I • 2 D rsrINCTICBES RATIafIS 
Theoretical distinctions playa fundamental role in hUTaIl knowledge 
and in that specific field of it that is philosoph;. Once we are able to 
conceive a theoretical scheme, a conceptual organization or roore sinply 
same sort of pigeonhole system by means of which we distingudsh and order 
our thoughts, we generally feel that a good part of the mental work 
Jmowledge or tmderstanding consist of has been already donal. 
Like any other hllTBll activity, the production of valid theoretical 
distinctions requires a certain amount of mental effort and time. Hence, 
al though we may assune that they are developed and selected by a continuous 
process of adjustment - so that there is no theoretical distinction which 
nay be thought to be fixed for ever, without being susceptible at least of 
same iJrIlrovement - we nust also coosider that these roodifications are made 
ooly when the effort is either worthwhile or necessary. We nay inprove a 
theoretically satisfying distinctioo we still feel adequate just because it 
is easy to do so without nuch effort, or we may be forced to change a 
1) It is not necessary to refer to the conception of philosophy as analysis to endorse such a 
common view, see for example Grayling (1982], p.lS. A clear discussion of the issue is given 
by Passmore (1961], last chapter, and an historical example of the process is Plato's use of 
dialectics in his Dialogues. 
1) It is possible to connect this reasonable rellIar ks wi th the more controversial idea that 
theoretical distinctions are conditio sine qua non for having knowledge of something. And from 
this position it is also possible to 90 so far as to hold that we acquire new knowledge by 
recognizing. new thoughts (or. in a pre-Cartesian approach, new things) as belonging to one or 
another of our already established theoretical distinctions. This seems to be the position of 
Nicolas de Cusa. A radical version of Platonism consists in reducing to a matter of 
recognition also the acquisition of our theoretical distinctions (the process of recollection 
of ideas). 
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theoretical distinction because it is by now considered completely 
inadequate. 
Such a process of adjustment depends also upon the field of 
application of our theoretical distinctions and upon our chosen ends. The 
quality of a theoretical distinction is to be evaluated as adequate, good, 
valid, useful and the like according to a particular context and specific 
goals. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to detennine the relation 
between two different theoretical distinctions which are appliable to the 
same topic or that, up to a certain extent, overlap. For sometimes such a 
relation can be interpreted in terms of degree of approxirration - one 
distinction being for exanple less precise than the other - while sametimes 
we are facing just different ways of looking at the object of our 
investigation, which therefore are essentially incomparable. 
The relation between the goodness of theoretical distinctions, 
efforts necessary to change them and relative contexts and goals according 
to which they are arore or less appreciable is rrade more caTplicated by the 
fact that theoretical distinctions have a linguistic nature. Being palt of 
our language, they show a historically detennined nature. They rray change 
according to fashions or became more or less popular, and all this 
according to external factors not necessarily relevant to their 
epistE!l'OOlogical value. If it is easier to abolish a no longer useful 
theoretical distinction than to modify me which is only a bit too gross, 
this is so also because the theoretical distinction has been used for a 
arore or less lmg time within a linquistic cCl1lTl.Ulity that will passively 
"resist" the change, especially if this doesn't appear strictly necessary. 
Of course, it is always possible to modify our theoretical distinctions. It 
is just that any change is slowed down by the nature of language itself and 
ooly rarely me person has the power to move such an enonoous bcxiy of 
passive conventions. This is one of the principal reasons why appeals to 
philological meaning by an author can hardly change the use of a key word 
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which has taken sane distance fran its ancient roots. In speaking of 
changes of our linguistic theoretical distinctions it is a good attitude to 
remember that we are never working in laboratory conditions. 
As historical items, linquistic theoretical distinctions tend to 
became tradi tional. For this reason they can also be interpreted as narrow 
limi. ts constraining our thought. Their cuI tural history and the fact that 
they are not easily changeable can make them appear unshakeable points of 
reference, independent of our capacities of governing them. But in fact 
there is nothing dogmatic about them, and they can be just useful guide-
lines to start with in our investigations. philosophers, intellectuals and 
scientists are among those most responsible for any change or continuity in 
the "tradition" of our linguistic theoretical distinctions. 
If the above are the general features of theoretical distinctions, it 
is easy to recognize how extreme - both in a positive and in a negative 
sense - they becane in those particular kind of theoretical distinctions 
that are theoretical dichotanies. 
In particular, theoretical dichotanies are very powerful scherres 
because they can be easily nanaged, and carbined with a bivalent logic 
(when they are used or fomulated as disjunctioos) allow a quick and 
efficacious orqanizatian of any topic. On the other hand, their 
powerfulness is paid for in terms of lack of flexibility. ''FomVCmt ent " , 
''Right/Wrc:og'' , "Superf I uous/Essential " , ''Necessary/Contingent'' are good 
exarrples of powerful but not very flexible categories whereby we organize 
or pilot our thoughts. 
All this by way of preliminary. The previous renarks need now to be 
made more specific in order to introduce the particular type of theoretical 
dichotaI\Y we are concerned with in this chapter, vz. the philosophical 
dichotaI\Y between "realism" and "anti-realism". 
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1.3 A T~ICAL DlaIO'I'CMY: REALI~ VERSUS ANTI-REALI~ 
According to I. 2, "realism vs. anti -realism" is a philosophical 
dichotany which nay be supposed: 
(i) to have one or more different contexts of application and then at least 
one correlated target for each context, 
(ii) to be linguistic, historical and traditional, 
(iii) to be very power~ in terms of interpretation but not very flexible. 
Unfortunately, the use of the dichotanr "realism/anti -realism" is 
even roore probl erratic than others. Its pecul iar di fficul ty is that its 
utility is limited not only by its mere character of manicheist distinction 
- which, according to what has been said before, is a CaTlOOIl !imi t to all 
the dichotanies - but especially by its lack of clear criteria of 
applicatim. The use of the two labels to indicate a philosophical position 
with same acceptable approximation is rarely satisfying, not just because 
they are too crude (we are using them precisely for that reason), but 
principally because we lack sane precise, definite rreaninq for them, and 
hence sane standard rule of application. Unless it is sarehow corrected, 
this last feature can easily rrake the dichotany "realism vs. anti-realism" 
totally useless. In enploying similar distinctions in philosophy we may 
afford losinq sanething in terms of degree of accuracy if and only if we 
really acquire sanething else in terms of degree of llllClerstanding. And 
since the distinction "real ism vs. anti -real ism" as it stands does not 
satisfy this condition, unless there is a way to fix its meaning it may 
even be better not to use it at all than to be misled by its fluctuating 
character. 
There are good reasons, both historical and theoretical, why "real ism 
vs. anti-realism" is not a very adequate disjunction and generally needs to 
3) Whenever it is not misleading I shall drop the specification 'philosophical' and 
·linguistic·. I lIay also employ the three terms 'distinction' I 'dichotomy' and 'disjunction' 
interchangeably. 
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be inproved by nunerous further sub-distinctiQ'lS, in order to gain a 
specific meaning. Let me give a brief summary. 
a) Technical and Ordinary sense of the Dichotany. 
Like many other items of philosophical jargon, the disj\IDction 
"realism vs. anti-realism" has a non-philosophical root in ordinary 
language. Sane of the difficulties in its use are due to the fact that -
lirni ting ourselves to English - we see that a person is canoonly qualified 
as a realist, or as "showing a [great, robust and the like] sense of 
realism", in order to attribute to her a positive disposition, presunably 
the capacity of seeing, taking, or treating things as they really are 
(clearly in a non philosophical sense of this latter expression). For 
exarrple, no politician would seriously and without any rhetorical reason 
define himself as an anti-realist. At most, he will use the adjective 
"daydreamer" or even better "utopian" as underlining his capacity of going 
beyond the brute reality of facts, not against it. According to such an 
ordinary use, there is no distinction between being realist and being 
realistic. The Oxford English Dictionary, for exaq>le, associates the two 
terms, and it doesn't have any entry for "anti-realisnVrealist/realistic", 
which means that it considers the meaning of these latter corresponding in 
any case to the opposite meaning of realism{realist/realistic. 
Obviously, in philosophy there is no such association, and yet the 
dichotany suffers fran a sort of disturbing, misleading echo fran our 
ordinary usage. When we describe a philosopher as a "realist" it is rather 
easy to CCIlSider it a favourable camotatian, and the opposite may 
frequently happen with "anti-realist". We should also take care to notice 
that in sane cases of sub-specificatians of the two tenns, the "disturbing 
echo" may be seen cotUlterbalanced by an equal but opposite "disturbing 
echo" presents in other associated tenns like "naive" or "critical", e. 9 . 
in "naive realism" or in "critical anti-realism" etc. 
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b) Indexical Value of the Dichot~ in Philosophical Self-understanding. 
Partially linked to the ''misleading echo" is the indexical value 
that the two terms acquire in the process of philosophical self-
1.mderstanding. The sense of "being a realist/anti-realist" rray change 
according to the point of view of the author who is using the label. 
Philosophers, especially metaphysicians, rray conform to ordinary linguistic 
practice and as far as their own sel f-description is concerned they may 
tend to consider themselves realist/ic, despite how others label them. 
Consequently, as far as other thinkers are concerned, the same philosophers 
will label them anti -realist/ic. This is so for quite an obvious reason. 
If, in very crude tel"ll"B, the phi I osopher' s target can be said that of 
caning to deal with what is the real nature of a certain topic, then he 
will simply refuse to consider his work as anti-realist/ic; he will refuse 
to adnitt that his work does not see, take, or treat a certain topic as it 
really is. en the contrary, he will consider his work as closer than any 
other to such a target. 
c) Traditional Meanings of the DichotomY in the History of Philosophy. 
Despite (a) and (b), the dichotany "realism vs.anti-realism" has been 
used for so I CJn9 in the history of phi I osophy that nowadays we have 
inherited sane philosophical positions which traditiooally go tmder the 
labels "realism" or "anti-realism". However, instead of sinplifying the 
matter, these few, traditional understandings can make things worse. What 
nay happen is that once sane philosophical positions are roore or less 
l.U'lcontroversially recognized as traditional cases of realism or anti-
realism, say for exarrple Platonism vs. Naninalism, then sane other 
philosophical positions can be defined on the basis of these positions 
either by oppositicm or by analogy, but in many cases independently fran 
each other. In this way a certain philosophical position may be labelled 
"realist" or "anti-realist" only in a certain respect to a traditional form 
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of realism or anti -realism, without taking into aCCO\.Ult what other 
relations there might be between its reference and other philosophical 
positioos. For exanple, Materialism nay be presented as a form of 
mtological realism in so far as it is opposed to Idealism, and yet as a 
form of logical anti-realism, Le. as a form of Naninalism, insofar as it 
is opposed to Platonism. Obviously, the procedure gives rise to a wide 
range of possible sub-specifications, which contributes to make the whole 
distinction rather suspect. 
d) Contenporary Philosophy: Philosophical Use of the Dichotany. 
Problerrs due to (c) are further increased once we notice that the 
label "anti-realism" only came to denote a proper philosophical position as 
the result of the debate between classical and intuitianistic logic, that 
took place again under the aspect of antagonist theses about the theory of 
meaning. In the last two decades we have seen philosophers to refer to 
therrselves as "anti-realist'''. But we nust rernE!l'1"ber that ancient or Jrodern 
philosophers were referring to themselves e.g. as sceptics, naninalist or 
idealist, not as anti - realist. 'this 1 eads us to the 1 ast of the rrajor 
aspects of the history of the two terms, namely their meta-philosophical 
use. 
e) Canterrporary Philosophy: Meta-philosophical Use of the Di chot any . 
Philosophy is also its own history. For this reason philosophers have 
understood and sti 11 understand the meaning of "real ism" and "anti -real i sm" 
by tracing this dichotany in previous philosophers. And in so doing they 
4) The realism-debate in its manifold aspects is a continuous line that can be followed all 
throughout the history of western philosophy. The actual revival lIay be connected with the 
development of the philosophical debate both in philosophy of science and in philosophy of 
logic and language. In the former case a key-date is certainly the year 1982 with the three 
issues of Synthese concerning the realism-debate (cf. Passmore [1985], chap.4). In the latter 
case Dummett's philosophical production can be adopted as a parameter. The term 'anti-realism' 
appears in his work since Oummett [1959], but I think it has gained more of its popularity in 
the philosophical COIIIIIM.tnity only since the later seventies, after the three articles of 
Scruton, Wright and Strawson were published by the AristoteliBn SOciety (cf. (1976], [1976] 
and (1976/77] respectively) and Dummett's collection of articles appeared [1978]. 
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have contributed in ccnfusinq the matter. For meta-philosophical uses of 
"realism vs. anti-realism" re-interpret and re-label positions which 
perhaps didn't consider th€ll'Sel ves mder these terms, or perhaps were using 
the distinction against other posi tions, or perhaps were considering 
~hEmSelves exactly in the opposite way, according to different standards. 
The process of applying new standards to old positions is continuous, and 
produces through the centuries different traditions which again mayor may 
not agree on certain interpretations of certain other philosophical 
positions. Following the contaTpOrary debate between realism and anti-
realism in the philosophy of language, the tendency has been increased of 
adopting "realism" and "anti-realism" also to interpret philosophical 
positions of the past, as if they were really dealinq with the same issues 
we may be nowadays. The arbi trariness, together wi th the mdeniabl e 
usefulness of such a projection may be obvious, but certainly it is not 
always clear whether we are aware to what extent we are forcing history 
into extraneous schemes. 
The conclusion that can be drawn fran the previous renarks is that 
the semantic/conceptual area covered by the linguistic dichotcrny "realism 
vs. anti-realism" is heavily, ahoost totally dependent on the context of 
application. Many different approaches overlap and entangle, and the whole 
ground looks more like a battle-field than as a tidy garden. Fran this, 
however, it doesn't follow that any reference to the real ism-debate is 
hopeless and nust be necessarely abandoned. On the contrary, the nanifold 
terminological uses and the fact that philosophers so often still cane back 
to the realism-anti/realism dispute to move their first steps towards a 
better understandinq of different philosophical issues shows that a 
reference to the two tems and to their conceptual field can be meta-
theoretically very efficacious. The only proviso is that their meanings are 
unambiguously stated and their use regulated by sane stipulative 
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defini tions. This is the task of the next three sections. There I shall try 
to construct a rneaninq for the two tenns such as to ITBke them errployable 
within this research, i.e. useful to delineate the tetminological and 
conceptual cammon ground necessary in order to formulate the two compatible 
ontological and episteroological theses that make up the Traunatic Doubt. 
I • 4 TWO PHlLOSOFfllCAL ARFAS OF "REALI~". 
Ontology, epistemology, logic and philosophy of language 
all are concerned with "realism,6 as a theoretical position. Yet, it can be 
already questioned whether there are only four philosophical disciplines 
concerned with "realism". In particular, even at this stage of the issue 
philosophers disagree on whether there are really different forms of 
realism for each of epistemology, logic and language or, on the contrary, 
discussions in one or two of those areas should be reduced to discussions 
in the other one or twJ. Nowadays the tendency is to privilege philosophy 
of language, but Frege would probably opt for logic and H\11le or Kant roost 
likely for episteroology, whereas eventually a medieval philosopher like 
Albertus the Great would ask us to distinguish between logic and 
mathematics, in order to focus on the ~tological nature of the universals. 
Despi te these ftmdarnental disagreements, however, the rrajori ty of 
discussions about the nature of "real ism" agree at I east on the following 
basic distinction: 
5} I shall adopt the common solution of defining (forms of) ·anti-realis .. • on the basis of 
what I understand here by (forms of) "realism·. The full significance of this device will 
appear in the next chapter. 
6) Other philosophers lIIay even disagree on the reduction of the areas interested by the 
realism-debate to only four, perhaps wishing to add ethics, philosophy of politics, 
aesthetics, theology or philosophy of mind. However, while I'~ not sure about the possibility 
of a further reduction that would not imply any important loss, I'. rather confident that any 
other fon of philosophical realism can be correctly interpreted in tenls of ontological, 
epistemological, linguistic or logical realism. This is an assumption I won't try to support 
here. 
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- on the one hand there are forms of realism concerninq the nature (i.e. 
existence and propertied) of things, events, facts, i. e. the physical 
world (in an ordinary sense of "physical ") or external realitl, that is 
the debate ccncerning forms of ontological realism; 
- and on the other hand there are all the other forms of realism concerning 
human thoughts, knowledge, mental objects, logic or language - or what we 
may define the menta19 world or internal reality - that is foI'lT'S of realism 
in epistaoology I in logic and in philosophy of language, or at least, 
according to a reductionist approach, in ane of these areas. 
Despite its being only a first rough approximation, this basic 
distinction seems largelly acceptable. It can be explained and supported by 
the foll owing intui ti ve reasons. The terms "realism" and "anti -realism" are 
first introduced in order to label philosophical positions concerned with 
what kind of existence a certain x enjoys, say mental, real, phenanenal, 
timeless, in rei post rern etc.. Now our paradi!Jll of "existence", our 
touchstone for understandinq the nature of any kind of f·xistence, is the 
existence of things in the world arotmd us or like us. It would be 
exceedingly arduous to speak of the "existence of sanething" without 
referring back to this standard sense of "existence" we are acquainted 
with, i.e. that enjoyed by "what there is in the world"lO. starting fran 
7) Generally, by the term 'nature' I shall refer to both 'existence' and 'properties' or 
'characteristics' or 'features' of something. I shall assume, with Kant, that 'existence' is 
not a property or a quality of something but a sort of modal position among possible ways of 
being. If 'existence' should be considered a property then clause (ii) of D17 in 11.5 would be 
inconsistent. More specifically, it would be impossible to say that when we conceive the 
existence of an unknowable noumenal reality we are not contraddicting ourselves by determining 
somehow its nature, namely by attributing to it the 'property' of existence. 
S} The expression 'external reality' is better explained in the following sections. Here it is 
used to cover the meaning of 'external things', 'things external to us' and 'things external 
to our minds'. As Moore ([1959), p.129) says: '[These latter] have been used as equivalent to 
one another, and have, each of them, been used as if they needed no explanation. The origin of 
this usage I do not know. It occurs already in Descartes; and since he uses the expressions as 
if they needed no explanation, they had presumably been used with the same meaning before.' 
9} If someone should feel uneasy about the possibi Ii ty of such a use of 'mental' let me 
specify that my use of the terms in this context doesn't imply a commitment to the presence of 
a 'mind' as separated or different from a ·brain·. If asked, I should probably endorse some 
kind of dualist position, but this is not the point in question here, and as for the dualism 
between thought and language, the question can be left indeterminate. 
10) Cf. for example Moore (1953], chapter XII. 
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the asstJTptian of this paradi<;J1l, we generally distinguish between issues 
concerning realist or anti -realist positions about what we meet in the 
physical world - things, properties, qualities, events, facts, the world 
itselp1 - and issues concerning realist or anti-realist positions about 
what at the very beginning appear at least as h\.l1BIl m:mtal products or 
events, i.e. the mental world of logic, language and knowledge. In fact, 
the distinction introduced above nay be reduced, in very crude terms, to 
that between res extensa and res cogitans, or matter and thought. In the 
former case we start fram the paradigmatic existence of the physical world 
and then we progress by questioning whether it is really as it appears to 
us and what it is in itself. In the latter case we start fran a non-
paradigrratic existence of hU"fBIl mental products or events and then we 
wonder whether they nay enjoy also a "real" existence, and what their 
relation is with the external world, or whether they have any other non-
mental properties. 
According to 1.2, we may expect realism about the physical world to 
asStme rrany di fferent aspects. And in fact we have realist posi tiOllS on 
topics ranging fram the discussicn of the existence of external reality to 
the discussion of its logical-scientific features, fram the ootological 
dependence of the tmi verse on God's acticn to the dependence of the nature 
of objects and events em hunan mental projections and so on. Since my 
purpose in this chapter is producing a neat versicn of the realismrdebate 
that later will allow an analysis of the TD in terms of a problematic 
relation between the idea of a physical world with independent existence 
and properties and that of hunan knowledge with a limited nature, for the 
11) Cf. Moore [1959], p.l29 and ff. about Kant's distinction .between, the transcendent~l. and 
elaPirical sense of 'external reality' (Le. noulena and phYSlcal obJects). In an em~HTlcal 
sense, 'external reality' consists of 'things which Bre to be .et wjth in space'. These 
expressions are better understood in section S. 
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rranent let me introduce a quite broad definition of philosophical realism 
concerning the existence of the physical world:12 
DJ.} philosophical realism cmcerning the existence of the physical world 
=def. the philosophical positim according to which there is an external 
reality and its nature (i .e. existence and properties) is mi.nd-
independent .13 
In what follows I will refer to philosophical realism concerning the 
existence of the physical world as defined in 01 (or in its more elaborated 
version 06' see below) by the expression "ontological realism" (Rant.)' 
Rant. is one of the two basic fornulas that will help us in settling the 
issue of the relatim between the intrinsic nature and properties of 
external reality and the im/possibility of them being known by a HKS. 
Before considering a parallel definition of a version of philosophical 
realism in the field of "internal reality" let me make sane introductory 
ccmne.nts on D1 . 
At a first sight the definition of Rant. given by 01 may seem 
redundant: it claims that there is sanething like an external reality, and 
then that this external reality enjoys such and such existence (where the 
expressioo "such and such" is a way of parenthesizing for the rocment the 
questioo of the "mind-independent" clause) . Yet, the apparent verbose 
fornula is due to the ftmdamental distinction between the possibility of 
the existence of an external world and the nature of such an existence. As 
far as the former is concerned, 01 maintains that there is in fact an 
external world. In this respect DJ is to be understood as accepting Moore's 
proof of an external world.14 As for the latter questiCll, 01 doesn't limit 
12) Cf. for example Nagel [1986] I p.90. where he says: "I have at various points expressed 
commitment to a form of realiSM. and must now say more about it. In simple terms it is the 
view that the world is independent of our ainds. but the problea is to explain this clai. in a 
non trivial way which cannot be easily admitted by everyone. and thereby to show how it 
conflicts with a fon of idealism that it is held by many contemporaries philosophers' (my 
emphasis). SUch a starting point is very COImon, see for example also Putnam [1982]. p.141 who 
refers to Russell and Moore for the concept of ".ind-independent". 
13) "The real is what is unaffected by what we may think of it" Peirce (1958] 5.311. cf. also 
6.327. 
14) Cf. Moore [1959] 
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itself to speaking of the existence of an external world: it goes further 
by also specifying that the external world enjoys such and such existence 
and properties independently of sarething else, in the case of D1 the hunan 
'nd 15 nu • 
According to this distinction, ontological realism turns out to be 
dealing with two questions: the An-question, whether or not there is an 
external reality, and the Quanodo-questian, if there is, what sort of 
existence it has. For the ontological realist it is not enough to affinn 
the existence of an external reality, but it is also necessary to ensure 
that such an existence is independent of the existence of anything else. 
Scmeone JlBy rejoin that when we say that there is an external world we also 
generally inply that such an external world enjoys an ontologically 
independent existence. The answer is that it is better to distinguish the 
two questions explicitly. For such a distinctioo is not just rratter of 
fOrJJBl correctness but it becanes of vital iJrportance if we want to be able 
to understand forms of anti -realism like Idealism, which may accept the 
existence of an external world while denying that such an existence is 
independent of same other mental factors. 
As Moore [1959] reminds us by quoting Kant, expressions like 
"external things", "things external to us", "things external to our minds" 
carry with them an unavoidable aniliguity for: 
·sometimes it (they1 Han[s] something which exists as a thing in itself distinct 
from us, and sometimes something which merely belongs to external appearance (Kant. 
K.d.R.V., A 373) (p.l29) 
The different understandings of "external reality" (henceforth also 
~) in OJ. nay range between the two following extremes: on the one hand ffi 
may be intended as the "reality in itself" (the Kantian not.menoo) which 
lies beyond htl'lBll cognitive capacities; en the other hand m rray be 
intended sinply as "the reality we deal with", as it is present in our 
knowledge, opposite to dreams or illusions. Both senses can be justified 
15) Cf. Stroud (1984J, chap.3. 
G 
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and their distinction is or is not necessary only according to a specific 
position about epistemological realism. As we will see roore clearly in a 
m:ment, since ontological realism is supposed to present the point of view 
of canoon sense about the nature of the world, m ITllSt be assU'Tled to 
consist of instances of .the Cat1'OO11 reality we meet every-day, and as if, at 
least initially, everyday reality were identical with reality in itself 
(epistemological naive realism). 
Following the foregoing specifications, it is better to slightly 
rooclify D1 in order to (i) render roore evident that Ront. answers the An-
and the Quaoodo-questions, and (ii) to allow both the extreme 
interpretations of the expression "external reality" and consequently all 
the possible middle ways, thus: 
D2)Rant. =def. the philosophical position according to which 
(i) there is an external reality m; and (ii) a portion (greater than null, 
but not necessarily equal to all) of ER enjoys a mind-independent nature 
(i . e. existence and properties). 
For the Kantian philosopher only a "portien of external reality" is 
mind-independent, exactly that not.menal portioo which cannot be known, 
while for the naive realist all external reality is the reality in itself, 
mind-independent, and this is so exactly because he knows that this is so. 
In secticn 5 we shall see that D2 is rrore prahl ematic than it seans 
to be. But for the nanent, let us accept it with the proviso of sane 
further specifications, since I need now to introduce a general definition 
of what is generally meant by "realism" in the second area of the mental 
world. 
In the second vast area where the tenn "real ism" may occur to 
identify a philosophical position, viz. internal reality or the mental 
world, interpretatioos of different types of realism vary radically, 
according to the fundamental orientatien of the discussions of the topic 
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and of the interests of the philosophers16 • So that, like before, our first 
step will consist in individuatinq which perspective is IOOre adapted to the 
purpose of spelling out the thesis inplicit in the Trall'lBtic Doubt. 
Since the present analysis aims at an unequivocal fonmulatian of the 
role played by the problem of h1.lTlall cognitive access to the intrinsic 
nature of external reality in generating the 'I'D, I shall canfine rnysel f to 
the following three restrictions: 
i) speaking of realism (or anti-realism) in the epistemological field; 
ii) assuning that the epistarological field cancerns general, objective 
Jmowledge; 
iii) aiming the discussion of realism about objective knowledge to the 
understanding of the nature of the epistemic relatioo (Re)which may occur 
between a hman Jmowing subject (HKS) and external reality (m). I will 
define "epistemological realism" the position which 'cantenplates JOOre than 
any other the possibility that a HKS might know the intrinsic nature of m, 
and "epistarological anti-realism" the position which IOOre than any other 
doesn't. Just as I used ''R "for "onto! ogical realism" I shall use ant. 
''Rep.'' for "episteroological realism". Accordingly, our starting fotTl'llla for 
Rep. will be: 
D3) philosophical realism concerning the value of htllBIl knowledge =def. the 
philosophical position according to which a (normal) htlllall Jmowing subject 
(in the best case) has a perfect objective Jmowledge of the intrinsic 
nature (Le. the intrinsic existence and intrinsic properties) of external 
reality. 
Both the three restrictioos (i)/CHi) and D3 call for further 
explicatioos, and I will turn to them in sectioo 6. For the time being I 
shall presuppose a generic understanding of D3 in order to came back to a 
more detailed explanation of what I meant by ontological realism in ~/2' 
16) Cf. for eX811Ple Hirst [1967J, Horwich [1982J, Haack (1987), Dummett (1963) and (1982), 
Putnal (1976) Field [1982). J 
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I . 5 ONTOLOGICAL REALIfJof 
D2 defines Root. in rather intui ti ve tenrs. It represents the 
position we may accept should we casually say what we think about the 
existence and the properties of things and events in the world. Yet, as 
soon as we try to understand better its theoretical irrplications, its 
intuitiveness starts disappearing. The problem I'm referring to is not the 
well recognized problem that, since Root. as defined by D2 is a radical 
philosophical position, then it needs good supporting argunents if it is to 
withstand the usual sceptical attacks. As I remarked in the General 
Introduction, to raise this problem here would be cO'Jllletely out of 
context, since this kind of scepticism is thoroughly irrelevant to the 
issue. What I'm rather suggesting is that, before the question of the 
validity of Rant. can arise, we are faced by the difficulty of 
understanding what such a posi tion means, on the ground of D2' More 
explicitly, I want to suggest that under the light of a closer examination 
D2 turns out to be an inadequate definition of what we really mean when we 
are professing a cammon realist attitude towards external world. 
I believe the cause of this inadequacy is the introduction of the 
''mind-indeperx!ence'' clause, which is IOOre problematic than its vast 
popularity could induce us to believe. The use of the ''mind-independence'' 
underlies the tacit target of giving a definition of Root. on a purely 
ontological basis, that is at the level of a relation of ontological 
independence either arrong existences of entities, if you endorse the view 
that hunan minds are sare kind of enti ties, or between the existence of 
entities and the presence of noetic activities, if you endorse the view 
that hlllBll minds are sane kind of ftmctions or dispositions of human 
brains. My aim is to show that not only D2 but any such "purely 
ontological" defini tien of Root. fai 1 s to cope wi th the task of giving a 
proper definition of ontological realism, and that a proper understanding 
( 
l 
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of Ront . must be necessarily related to same broad understanding of Rep .. 
We shall see that this necessary episterological shift in the definition of 
cmtological real ism brings with it the inportant probl em of I eading to the 
fomulation of the TO. But more on this in due time. 
I • 5 • a "M IND INDEPElIDENCE" 
In order to cast sane light on the eli fficulties iJTt>lici t in D2 and 
particularly on how the ''mind-independence'' clause nay generate problems 
for the definition of Ront . we can limit our attention to (ii) of D2 • Let 
me first refornulate it rnore analytically. 
If we accept that in the case of ~-(ii) "to be x-independent" can be 
translated into "to be not affected by the presence or absence of x"; that 
in turn this latter can be translated into "to be ontologically independent 
of x"; and finally that this latter can be translated into "to be in a 
relation of ontological independence (Roi) to x" then we can refomulate 
the definition of Root. as the philosophical positiCll which holds that: 
~.1) ~-(i); and (ii) a portion (greater than null, but not necessarily 
equal to all) of m has a nature (i. e. existence and properties) that it is 
not affected by the presence or absence of a mind (M); 
that is: 
12.2) ~-(i); and (ii) a portion of m has a nature (Le. the existence 
and properties) that is ootologically independent of M; 
that is: 
In order to explain [Roi (m,M)] let me focus GIl the first and then 
an the secmd tenn of the relaticn. I shall argue that the universe of 
realities covered by m, as we usually intend this latter out of the 
17) I believe the question whether "being lind-independent" can be considered a relation at 
all can be answered positively following Brentano, who refers to the dependence of intentional 
objects on the thinker in terms of "relation-like'. Cf. Chisholm (1957J, p.146. 
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definitioo, is greater than the universe of realities covered by m, as 
this turns out fran the acceptance of the ''mind-independent'' clause. And 
therefore I shall criticise the use of the ''mind-independence'' clause for 
the definiticm of ootological realism as inadequate since it makes no 
justice to what we would casually accepts as ontological realism. 
Under the label m are ccmoonly gathered together both natural and 
historical objects, qual i ties, properties, facts or events. By "natural" I 
mean ''belonqing to the physical world" in a non technical sense of 
physical, and by "historical" (or "arificial ") I mean "resulting fran the 
presence of the animal hane sapiens on the earth" (or sanething very 
similar to these two statements). For exemple, by "external reality" we 
usually and noo-philosophically refer to trees, natural colours and the 
fact that it rains, and to houses, artificial colours, my trip to Rare, 
your being higher than me. Note that I've left l.D1determined whether or not 
by ER we refer to all the natural and historical objects, qualities, facts 
or events. For elt8lll>le ''hooliganism'' is a historical fact due to historical 
events, there are hooligan actions which take place and "hooligans" is a 
negati ve descriptioo whereby we may pick up a certain kind of football 
supporters, yet we may not consider ''hool iganism" an instance of "external 
reality", but JOOre readily a social phenanenoo, i.e. the result of the 
historical development of a certain portioo of external reality. Note also 
that I'm not specifying whether or not all the natural and historical 
objects, qualities, facts or events that we consider instances of external 
reality also beloog to that portion of ER which enjoys a mind-independent 
existence. All it is necessary to say on this point is that, according D2. 3 
at least sane of the natural and historical objects, qualities, facts or 
events are to be included within the portioo of ER which enjoys a full, 
independent existence. 
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°2 . 3 aI001.mts to an atterrpt of rraintaining the definition of Ront . at 
a purely ontological level. In order not to shift into an epistemological 
statement, 02.3 appeals to an ontological relation of independence (Roi) 
among existences, viz. the independence of m' s existence and its other 
eventual properties of M's existence and its other eventual properties. Why 
D2.3 tries to eschew the epistemological shift and why the possibility of 
an "ontological-level-only" definition of Rant. could be a desirable target 
are questions I shall try to answer at the end of this section. At the 
moment it is more important to realize the difficulties of such a proposal. 
In trying to avoid any reference to the epistemological field by 
means of the ''mind-independent'' clause, 02.3 inadequately captures our 
usual understanding of ontological realism with respect to the extension of 
an independent external reality. In fact, what is gained through the "mind-
independent" clause, viz. rraintenance of the ontological level, is less 
than what is lost, viz. a clear explanation and an adequate expression of 
what the mtological realist means by the other element of the relation, 
i.e. an independent external world. There are four problems introduced by 
the "ontological mind-independence" clause, and only the first three of 
them can be partially resolved, while the last forces us to sare 
epistemological rrodificatioo of 02.3' 
First of all, there are serious problems in tmcierstanding what a 
'WIld" is. We nay say, as a first approximation, that what 02.3 is 
obviously concerned with is a hunan mind. But even so, an already obscure 
C<Xlcept like that of a Ding an sicb is not nade clearer by an appeal to a 
very controversial concept like that of "hunan mind". If we are not sure 
about what we should understand by a hUlBIl mind or a world in itself or 
whether there exist such two things like a hunan mind and a world in itself 
at all, why should we be better off by speaking of a hunan mind-less world 
in itself? 
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A secmd difficul ty is that D2. 3 needs either to presuppose that the 
hunan mind is the only type of mind in the universe, or to add a 
supplementary specification about other possible non-human minds e.g. 
God's. otherwise Berkley might count as a an ontological realist, and one 
of the tasks of the definition is exactly avoiding such a possibility. 
But let us suppose that 02.3 asstmeS that the hunan mind is the only 
type mind there exists. Even if we should agree on a satisfying 
tmderstancling both of the concept of hunan mind in tenns of psychological, 
cognitive and intentional hunan capacities and of the concept of a world 
which is independent of such a noetic element, still sane fonn of 
ontological anti -realism in terms of ontological dependence of the world on 
the presence of hunan beings could slip into our accO\mt. Think for exanple 
of a philosophical position maintaining that the world is what it is 
because there is a continuous coommity of hunan souls, or h\.l1Bl1 wills, 
that guarantees its existence. The position sOtU'lds a bit too mystical to be 
seriously conterrplated by an analytic philosopher, the same philosopher 
who, however, seems to accept a clear fonn of intellectualism by speaking 
only in terms of "mind-independent". And yet, insofar as a soul or a will 
is different fran a mind, the posi tian should be accepted as not being 
necessarily incalgruous with our versioo of ontological realism, were we to 
stick to our ''mind-independent'' defini tiool8 • 
But the JOOSt serious problem is due to the fact that we cannot really 
carry on speaking in 02.3 only of a singular hunan mind, limiting ourselves 
to a sort of Cartesian doubt which concerns only mY own possibility of 
having created II1Y own world. The issue tackled by Root. goes beyald the 
problematic relatioo between me, the outside world and my im/possible 
mowledge of it. Rant. would like to be in clear opposition to forms of 
idealism not ooly a' la Berkley but also a' la Hegel. But whereas a 
18) Of course someone aay have the idea of re-defining our understanding of human ~inds so to 
enclose in the term eventually also the spiritual characteristics of human beings and cover 
also the case of the ontological spiritualist. But I think this would only weaken our 
definition, making the concept of ·hulan lind' too vague. 
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"subjective idealism" like Berkley's can be left outside Ront . - e.g. by the 
conjl.Dlction of (i) a clear understanding of what is my hunan mind, (ii) the 
ontological-independence relation Roi occurring between ER and my mind, 
and then (iii) the specification that there are only htl1BIl minds - this is 
not enough to stop a "speculative idealist" a' la Hegel fran calling 
himself an ontological realist. For he won't ever appeal to saneme's hunan 
mind but rraybe to nan's mind or to the Absolute Mind. 
It seems that because of this difficulty D2 • 3 is forced to enlarge 
the appeal to the characteristic of being independent of a h\.tTlaIl mind to 
all the possible mdndS. Unforttmately, after all these adjustments on the 
mtnd-side of the relation, 02.3 is no longer adequate to express what the 
ontological realist thought about the nature of the other element of the 
relation, Le. external reality. For in this new version 02 would hold 
that: 
04) Root. =def. the phi I osophical posi tion according to which (i) there is 
an external reality ER; and (ii) a portion (greater than null, but not 
necessarily equal to all) of m enjoys a minds-independent nature (Le. 
existence and properties); 
and the problem with D4 is that neither books nor cars can be interpreted 
as true exanples of such "full existing" realities. For they cannot be 
counted in that portion of m which is mind-independent, at least not 
carpletely. This difficulty requires a roore lengthy elucidation since it is 
the principal reason underlying my rejection of the a definition of Ront. 
in terms of ''mind-independence''. 
SUppose we have a sort of "ontological eraser" by means of which we 
eliminate fran our present world whatever has been sanehow determined in 
its being by same sort of human noetic activity since the beginning of the 
history of the hunan raceY~ If we stick to the "ootological eraser" policy 
implicit in 04' an enonnous portion of the world in itself, actually a lot 
19) I believe that the device of the ·ontological eraser· is less f and ful than it seems to 
be. but that it Materializes the procedure we tend to apply when asked in a non-philosophical 
context about what the world in itself is. 
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of what the ontological realist wishes to save, is lost. Not only are not 
cars and books objects cmpl etely independent of the existence or the 
activity of a human ndnd - which has previously conceived them, projected 
them and finally nade possible for than to be what they are - but also nuch 
else attributed to nature around us (suppose we are living in the centre of 
a city like London) would hardly withstand the "ndnd-independent" test. 
Most of us spend their lifes in highly ht.rnan-mind dependent environments. 
Hurran beings have changed the world so much that there is hardly anything 
in the world that hasn't been influenced by the noetic activity of 
gardeners, engineers, politicians, businessmen, soldiers etc .. The ozone-
problan in the atroosphere is a good exarrple. The problem is affecting the 
whole earth; it is easy to see how nowadays it would be difficult to find 
sanething whose nature hasn't been sanehow rooclified by the presence of 
hunan ndnds. As huren history advances the smaller is the portion of 
reality left untouched (m:>re or less indirectly) by the human ndnd. 
certainly, it nay be argued that there will always rerrain physical 
laws and rratter and "original and virgin" states of the world. And yet, the 
minds-less possible-world closer to the actual, to put it a' la Lewis, 
would be too far fran what the ontological realist meant when he first 
fonrulated Dl' Were we to follow D4 , Ront. would eventually concern only 
those parts or aspects of external reality which are tmaffected by the 
presence of h\.llBll minds in the world. And it is not easy to see how small 
this portion of m would be. In the end, we would be forced to accept the 
unhappy calclusial that by Rant. we cannot easily refer to what we wish, 
viz. historical objects like cars, books or this cayPuter, or historical 
events like Waterloo or Julies Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon. All the 
''historical'' aspects of external reality, in the sense of ''historical'' 
above specified, wen' t be covered by Rent.' since all these things or 
ClIAPl'ER I 37 
events are more or less cntologically dependent on htmm minds, either for 
their existence and/or for their properties.20 
SUch problems are due to the asstll'ptian of a definition of Ront. in 
tenns of a relation of "ontological independence" occurring between htmm 
minds, their noetic activity and external reality. It seems that the desire 
of maintaining the definition of Root. at an exclusively ontological level 
cannot be fulfilled and both the relation and the te:rns related IIllSt be 
revised if we want R 
-'"QOt. really express what the ccmnan-sense realist 
posi tion asserts. But, before we endorse the necessity of an 
"episteroological shift", we need to be sure that there are no other 
possible "ootological-level only" versions of our starting fOI1Tllla 01' The 
following examples show that any other attempt is likely to meet the same 
difficulties. 
We may try to pass-by the previous difficulties by substituting the 
"mind-independent" clause with a ''hunan beinqs '-existence-independent" 
clause. Moreover, we nay also try to increase our chances to pick up the 
right selection of 1m by adopting a SEmi -factual versiQ1 of J>.I21. In this 
way we obtain 0S. Sane versions of it may be: 
Ds) Rent. =d f. the philosophical position according to which 
(i); and (ii) a portim (different fran nothing, but not necessarily equal 
to all) of m is such that its nature (i .e. existence and properties), 
05.1) would be the same even if there weren't hunan beings within it; 
DS.2) would be the same even if hunan beings were catpletely different fran 
what they are now; 
05.3) wouldn't be affected by the disappearance of hunan beings. 
20) Of course there is a restricted· version of ontological realism that limiti n9 the 
quantification of "huln beings" to a SlaH number (if possible only one, .e) of human beings 
enlarges the domain of what is independent of the existence of this small selection of human 
beings so much as to include also ay car, this computer, the books I'. reading and the 
academic activity in .y department (and yet, still not my going to the university). In the 
text is obvious that when I '. speaking of human beings I '. referring to all of them, to the 
whole human race. 
21) I believe this is our best alternative. But see also (still in Moore [1959) Kant's-
Moore's version of D2 in terms of 'distinction of existence" ("things external to our minds" 
as equal to "things which exist as things in thelselves distinct frOM us"), and how it runs 
into the same unavoidable epistelological shift I've pointed out above in the text. 
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If this were not enough, we may also try to inprove the ''h1.l'llall minds-
independence" semi. -factual definitions by adopting a further, strong 
metaphysical posi tien en the time-dependence of any modal transfomation; 
to the effect that once sanething, that was possible, has happened, say a 
book has been written, such an event is irreversible and it makes either 
that thing, which is ontologically dependent on the event, or the event 
itself, ontologically independent of the hll1BIl being who, at the begirming, 
was responsibl e for its "ontological caning to be". 
Despite all these modifications, the crucial problems listed above in 
aid are not carpletely avoided. If there weren't hunan beings there 
wouldn't be houses; if hunan beings were different, houses wouldn't have 
the properties they have, if hllTBll beings should sOOdenly disappear, houses 
would start loosing the properties they have, decaying, and their existence 
would be definitely at risk. The conclusion is that houses are what they 
are because there are hlltBIl beings that wanted and built them as they are, 
and take care of them, preservinq their properties as these were projected. 
But according to our "entological eraser" we would have sane problems in 
counting houses as obvi ous instances of external real i ty. ''History'' rerrains 
in a sort of ontological linbo between what is fully independent of hunan 
minds and what is not. 
Even the proposal of including sane chronological considerations does 
not solve the problem. First, it can apply only to versions of 01105 
similar to DS. 3 ' as when saneone says that after hUTBll beill9s have written 
books, if they should disappear those book would not be affected by the 
event, and therefore those book have hecane physically independent of h1.l'llall 
minds or beings. But, secondly, not even the chronological inprovanent of 
DS.3 could work. As before, it does not take into accolUlt the fact that 
wi thout continuous h1.l1'Bl'l care and supervisicn historical real i ty would not 
last for very long. Without hunan beings artificial aspects of reality 
would not remain Unchanged for ever, like a frozen picture of the present 
CliAPl'm I 39 
world. Libraries would start decaying and books would be destroyed. To give 
another exarrple, although pollution is sanethinq that I would like to 
ccmsider "real", it would not stand the test of a chronological version of 
D5.3' for in fact it would be affected by the disappearance of huran kind. 
Moreover, as for the case of the use of the ''mind-independent'' definition, 
an appeal to semi-factual analyses of D1 aroounts to an explanation of what 
is already not clear in still more obscure terms. A send-factual 
explanation would inply an appeal to the semantics of possible worlds, but 
then an ontological ccmnitment whose general sense is exactly what we are 
trying to understand here. The proposal of a chronological improvement of 
the serrd-factual interpretations would only make things even more complex, 
by adding a very controversial metaphysical view about the nature of time 
to the already problematic send-factual understanding of what a rrdnds-less 
Ding an sich is. 
In conclusicn, the various versions of an "ootological-level only" 
definitioo of Root. are very tenpting and can even be partially 
illundnating, but their utility doesn't go further than a first intuitive 
level. For they all face the same problem: they have a conception of what 
is an independent external world narrower than the me we ordinarily have, 
and therefore cannot be taken to express the ordinary approach to 
ontological realism. 
If we really want to express the cannon position of an ontological 
realist in its initially intuitive features we are forced to sacrifice the 
aim of rraintaining the definitim of Root. at an exclusively ontological 
level. The point can be generally stated by referring to the thorny 
distinction between internal and external relaticns. A ''mind-independence'' 
relation is too close to being interpretable as an internal relation 
between mind and reality to be also El"lPloyable as the right touchstone for 
discriminating am:ng different instances of reality. Keeping ourselves at 
the level of an enpirical carm:n-sense we nust tum to such a relation that 
-
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it is roore likely to appear external, even under the light of a roore 
detailed enpiricist scrutiny.22 SUch an external relation can be obtained 
by invoking sane kind of episternological notim. 
I • 5 • b THE EPISTFlofOLOCHCAL SHIFT 
The failure of D1/5 urges us to a shift into the episteroological 
ar~3. We are induced to introduce an episteroological element as the 
second term of the relation, so that the relation Rei would acquire the 
characteristic of being external. I say "introduce" but I could have also 
said, perhaps IOOre precisely, "re-introduce". For in JOOdem philosophy the 
second term of the relation concerning Rant. is generally ''huran knowledge" 
or "perception,.24, not ''hunan minds" or "noetic activity". 
Provided we want to avoid the difficulties faced by the ''mindless'' 
clause, what we need is a technical term by means of which we can refer to 
different kinds of epistendc or doxastic activities, but that at the same 
time does not inply a ccmnibnent to the thesis of the independence of 
historical instances of m of hunan knowledge tout court. The term nust be 
such as to pick up any kind of human epistendc or doxastic activity that is 
not also "productive", that is not also an instance of "knowledge-how", not 
just in the linguistic sense but especially in the engineering sense of the 
expression. An exanple will help to illustrate the iJrportance of the 
specification. 
22) This reference to the internal/external relation issue is important in order to understand 
the idealistic strategy a9ainst the TO in III.3.c. This also explain the stress I've put on 
the "empiricist" kind of analysis I shall carryon in this context, still with an eye to the 
common-sense position. 
23) This is what is generally done by .any authors, even when they don't seem to realize such 
a shift, cf. for exalPle MOore himself in [1959J, p.132, 134-135, 144 and Nagel (1986J chapter 
VI. 
24) This is so not only in Berkeley's famous "esse est percipi", but also in Collingwood's 
arguMent in favour of the idea that "knowledge makes a difference to what is known", cf. Post 
[1965J and Donagan (1966). 
The carputer I'm workinq with is a practical achievement of htrnan 
mowledge. Its existence and its properties are due to that hunan 
tecimological knowledge which is airred at the physical production of an 
effect on, or of an object out of physical reality. But "technological" 
doesn't mean JTl.lch roore than "belonginq to a way of doing"; and if the term 
is used with a strong etymological meaning, then we have that this carputer 
has a nature which is strongly dependent on h\.l'nan "lmowledge-how". On the 
other hand, according to Rant. the nature of this carputer is not dependent 
on my or anyone else's perceptions, beliefs, or other epistemic/doxastic 
activities in terms of recognitioo.. Without denying that this ccrrputer is 
the product of human knowledge, the ontological realist wants to say that 
even if nolxxly e.g. perceives it or believes in its existence, its nature 
is not affected by such a lack of "perceptual or doxastic attention". Then, 
it seems that "acJmowledgment" is the best candidate for such a specific 
terminological task. 
First, according to the secood edi tion of the Oxford .Ehglish 
Dictionary, "acknowledgement" means also "knowledge", "recognition" and 
then "admission" and "formal declaration". Secondly, by adopting 
"aclmowl~t" we will be able to draw the distinction between the faot 
that the nature of this carputer is dependent 00 hunan Jmowl edge in the 
sense of ''know-how'', and the fact that it is also carpletely independent of 
hunan Jmowledge in the sense of "acknowl~t". Finally, the use of a 
term like "acJmowledgment" can also explain why philosophers have always 
been so fond of perceptual exenplificatioos of knowledge, particularly 
those visual, in the descripticn of intuitive versions of ontological 
realism. These perceptual eXel11?lifications represent an effective way of 
illustrating ootological realism in its roore naive clothes. They convey 
precisely that sense of Jmowledge as "admowledging" that I've been arguing 
to be essential for a satisfactory understanding of Rant.· 
I 
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Having said this, I shall use "acknowledgment" with a very broad 
meaning, such that it covers any epistemi.c or doxastic operations of a HKS 
(i.e. intuitim, logical construction, imaginatim, enpirical sensation, 
perception, rational elaboration, beliefs, faith etc.) insofar as these are 
not "tectmologically productive" in the sense above specifieciS • In this 
way the independence of m's nature of hunan acknowledgment indicates the 
independence of ER' s nature of being or not being known, but not of huren 
Imowledge tout court. According to Rant.' m's nature does not need to be 
recognized for what it is in order to be what it is. Its ontological status 
does not depend on the Kantian court of reasClll. By replacing ''mind'' with 
"acJmowledgment" we obtain lhe relation of acknowledgement-independence. By 
adopting this latter in the definition of ontological realism we can try to 
balance a sound distinction between internal and external relations with 
. 
the desire to advocate a "full" independent existence for external reality: 
06) Rant. =def. the philosophical position according to which (i) there is 
an external reality ER; and (ii) a portion (greater than null, but not 
necessarily equal to all) of ER has a nature (Le. existence and 
properties) independent of hman acknowledgment.26 
By the specification ''hunan'' 06 is meant to cover the acknowledgement of 
any hll"tBll being. 
I believe D6 express in more technical terms what we would casually 
assure to be an ordinary, carm:m-sense real ist position about the nature of 
external reality, al though it is sti 11 in need of a final refinement in 
order to be nade cmpletely tmequivocal. 
Echoing the problems seen above in aid, it is possible to insinuate 
that 06 is still too perndssive in respect to other forms of anti-realism. 
More specifically, it seems to be still possible for an ontological realist 
25) I fll not sure it is possible to divide neatly between instances of epistemic/doxastic 
activities which are non-technological or non-productive and instances that are technological 
or productive. Such a distinction can be liMited to the use a HKS makes of such instances. 
This is the reason why I specify ·insofar·. 
26) Cf. Peircefs version: .[ ... ) There are Teal things whose characters are entirely 
independent of our opinion about the •. • (5.384; AlY italics). Like the Berkeleian use of 
·perception·, I donft find ·opinion· satisfactory enough fOT limiting the meaning of Ront .' 
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to be confused with an idealist if this latter, while acceptinq the "h\.lTlaIl 
aclmowlecl9nent independence" clause of D6 should also endorse sane 
different view about the dependence of ER on same other possible factors, 
e.g. God's acknowled9nent, the Absolute Mind's cootinuous noetic activity 
etc •. In order to avoid this kind of problems D6 needs a closure-clause 
(OC) like the following: 
0:) the sarre portion of ER selected by (ii) in D6 is such that if its 
tEl'fPOral nature (i.e. its existence and properties) can partially depend on 
sare ulterior factor, it can only depend on a previous ht.rran physical 
activity or human technologically-productive knowledge. 
The specification introduced by "tenporal" eliminates the possibility 
of accepting any theological occasianalist position. It can also be droppe::i 
by those who dan' t believe that there is any sense in which the genesis of 
the external world can be dependent 00 a Divine Power in an a-tsrporal way. 
The closure-clause divides ER in two datains: iterrs of external 
reality whose nature can depend 00 hU1BIl physical or technological 
activity, and items of external reality whose nature doesn't. Roughly 
speaking, the former beloog to what I've called historical external 
reality, the latter to natural external reality. "Roughly speaking" 
because, for exaJll>le, it would be hard to draw a neat separation between 
those physical states enjoyed by my cat that are carpletely independent of 
my activities (like my buying his food), and those which are not. In any 
case, according to D6 and 0: both sets of items are antologically 
independent of hU1BIl aclmowledgment and cannot depend an any other nan-
physically or noo-technologically productive human factor. 
OC does not aim to a definite exclusion of the possibility of sane 
idealistic adaptatioo of D6' For example, if all an idealist wants to say 
is that there are large portialS of external reality whose existence or 
properties are artificial. Le. due to hll'TBll activities, then, according to 
0:, this is not matter of disagreement with the ootological realist. 'l'hanks 
to the epistarological shift, by the coo.j\.D1ctioo of D6 and 0: (D6+O::) we 
ClIAP'lD I 44 
can now asSt.l1le that this sense of "ootological dependence" is sinply no 
longer relevant to the characterization of ontological realism. 
The same reasooing in favour of the adoption of the "acknowledgment 
independent" clause could have not been adopted also for supporting the 
"mind independent" clause. By limiting the definition of R t to a mere 
on • 
ontological relation, the adoption of the ''mind independent" clause 
introduces too narrow limits for the conception of what an item of 
"independent external reality" is. The fact that 01105 work on a purely 
ontological level has the following two consequences. First, it renders the 
consideration that the nature of a book can be sanehow ontologically 
dependent on a huran mind a vital issue for a correct tmderstanding of 
Rant.· The possibi 1 i ty that sane objects are what they are because of the 
presence of huren minds becanes of central concern for such definitions. 
And secondly, precisely the same emphasis on a purely ontological level is 
also what makes the recognition of the possibility of ontological 
dependence of ~ 00 M an inportant obstacle for our characterizaticn of 
Ratt .. This is a difficulty that those definitions cannot disregard. In the 
end, ~/05 turn out to be so hyper-realist that they are forced to leave a 
large portian of what we would like to consider external reality out of our 
defini tim. 
Q1 the cootrary, D6+CC may seem to introouce too large botmdaries by 
the epistem::>logical shift, such that they also allow a special Jdnd of 
idealist to step inside. Yet, it is precisely the epistemological shift 
that renders the fact that the nature of historical items of ER can depend 
en a previoU9 h\.ltBJl physical activity or huran technologically-productive 
knowledge sufficiently irrelevant to the description of what an ontological 
realist wish to maintain in D6+CC. Once we have replaced "h\..l'l'Bll mind" with 
''hunan aclmowled~t", the frustrating possibility that mY book and your 
car could depend in sane sense 00 hunan minds or an their activities 
becanes a peripheral aspect of the issue. So nuch that if this is all the 
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idealist wants to rre.intain - and he could hardly maintain sanething very 
different while still accepting D6+<X - then he can be actnitted into the 
club of the ontological realists. The conjl.mction of D6 and CC states that 
there is an external reality~, that the nature of a portion, if not all, 
of this reality is independent of h\.lTBIl aclmowled~t, and that even if 
this part of this portion of m can be interpreted as depending on hunan 
Jmowledge-how or physical action, this is sinply not the issue at stake, 
for the only criterion of selection is now that of hunan-acknowledgment-
independence. According to D6+CC a book has the sarre ontological status of 
a star in a comer of the mi verse l.mtouched by hunan history. Hence Ront. 
concerns also my car, this carputer 11m writing with and my going to the 
lD'liversity everY-day. In this way the definition of Ront. is perfectly 
satisfying. In what follows I will assure that D6+CC is precisely what the 
ontological realist means when he is speaking casually of a mind-
independent world. For the sake of simplicity I will also avoid to specify 
the CC every time, yet the closure clause lTllSt be intended. inplicit in any 
fOIlO of ontological realism I will speak of. 
I . 5 . c TGmRDS '!HE TRAGmTIC DOOBT 
Time has cane to discuss what the epistemological shift consists in, 
and what its significance may be for a proper analysis of the Tratl'lBtic 
Doubt. 
Very briefly I in defining Rant.' D6 relies on the possibility of 
explaining what kind of existence ER enjoys in tenns of its independence of 
h1.l11Bll (non-technological) }mowing activities. The epistemological shift 
consists in such a reference to the "internal world": the external world is 
described as that which is independent of my acJmowledgment. If on the one 
hand we have seen that this reference is due to the necessi ty of a IOOre 
precise clarification of what the ontological realist has in mind, on the 
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other hand the epistemJlogical shift turns out to be the principal source 
of a substantial difficulty: it introduces the possibility of the Traumatic 
Doubt. 'l1rls is why "ootological-Ievel-cmly" definitions of Ront . are roore 
appealing than the epistemologically contarrdnated 06' 
Once roore, what is at stake is not sane version of the sceptical 
challenge. D1 as 06 can be assuned as a metaphysical hypothesis: both can 
be translated in "I assure that things are such that 01 (or 06)". None of 
them has to be translated in "1'm episteroologically justified in believing 
that it is the case that 01 (or °6)". So that none of them has to face the 
sceptical challenge ''How do you know that you are episteroologically 
justified in believing that it is the case that 01 (or 06) ?". Rather, the 
problEm is that while 01 speaks in terms of an CXltological gap between 
existences, 06 introduces, though very carefull y, a logical gap between the 
external and the internal worlds. 
The inportance of naintaining a definitioo of Rant. at an ontological 
level was that the distinction between the existence/properties of external 
reality and existence/properties of human minds relied on a third element -
namely the epistemJlogical possibility of establishing such a distinction -
without naking it part of the definiticn itself. Then Dl could still, with 
a certain force, let us ccnsider irrelevant to the definiticn of 
cmtological realism the problElTBtic distinction bet~een reality in itself 
and reality as it is known. But we have seen that the cmtological level can 
hardly be naintained. On the other hand, the episteroological shift 
represents a dangerous preliminary to the fomulation of the TraUTBtic 
Doubt. For by replacing the ''h\.l''l'SIl mind independent" with the ''hunan 
acJmowledgment independent", 06 introduces a referenCe to the independence 
of m of an "internal world". And once we shoUld aCcept to work with 06' 
the first forrrulation of a radical independence of external reality fran 
our acJmowledgement of it might easily give rise to the suspicion that 
there could be a larger gap between a phen~l Clll(l a nounenal reality. 
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This is the basis of the doubt: "if the ootological nature of reality in 
itself is carpletely independent of ~ acJmowledgment, then rraybe it is 
carpletely different fran what I take it to be". Contrary to °1 , 06 
insinuates the presence of a first microscopic fissure between the physical 
(external) and the mental (internal) worlds that opens the way to that 
rrajor fracture between external reali ty as it is in se and external reality 
as it is for HKS that leads to the final, tmrecoverable abyss of the 
Kantian dualism between two different realities of nounena and phenanena. 
It is inportant to pause on this inportant consequence of the 
episteroological shift, even if the issue will be discussed at full length 
in the next chapter. Put sirrply, the adoption of a 06-version of 
ootological realism brings about the two following problerrs: on the one 
hand, the problem of how we can know that the intrinsic nature of external 
reality is in fact independent of our acJmowledgment of any sort; and on 
the other hand the problem of whether we can be really sure that such an 
independence is not so radical as to render the intrinsic nature of ~ in 
fact epistemologically unreachable for HKS. In respect to such difficulties 
only two kinds of positicns are possible for a positive acceptance of 
Rant.' and both depend on an epistemological version of realism in respect 
to the nature of ht.l'lBIl knowledge. If we exchxfe the possibility of begging 
the questioo, the two alternatives to a sceptical attitude against Root. 
are: 
i} we can introduce the distinction between a (necessary) metaphysical 
peti tio principii and an episterrologioal asSllTPtion by introducing a 
distinction between ''knowledge'' (acJmowledgement) and "conception". The 
former could then be seen as the resul t of an epistemic process of knowing 
which mayor may not roodify/detennine its cootent, the second could be seen 
as the result of a noo-epistemic process like "cooceiving" or 
"presupposing" a certain feature of reality or a possible world. As we 
shall see in III.S.c, through these distinctions we arrive at the Kantian 
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position of an unknown reality as a limit concept. The fact that there is 
an external reality such that its nature (i.e. its existence and 
properties) is independent of hl.l1BIl acknowledgment is a conjecture, a 
limit-concept to which we arrive by means of a speculation that, by 
hypothesizing such a reality (noumenon), at the same time does not claim to 
mow it. Should we abandon the idea of knowledge as described in Rep. we 
could still save Rant. by adopting this Kantian approach; 
ii) we can assune a sufficiently powerful27 version of Rep. such that it 
consents to a version of the following reasoning: 
external reality is ontologically independent of huran acknowledgement 
because hunm beings can know that it is independent of hunan 
acknowledgement; and huran beings can know that ER is independent of h1.l1BIl 
acJmowledgement because they can grasp perfectly well what ER is, vz. in 
this case that its nature (Le. its existence and properties) is 
independent of their acJmowledginq it or not. 
The first alternative (i) operates by accepting a fom of dualism 
between what reality is for human beings and what reality is in itself, to 
the effect that the former has an epistarological and the latter has an 
ontological value. It s~ly tries to make the best out of the 
inpossibility of knowing the intrinsic nature of m. The second 
al ternative, m the other hand, operates on the basis of a strong form of 
monism, which ranges between the two following extremes: 
- either external reali ty as it is for hunan beings (Husserl' s colourful 
Lebenswelt) is sacrificed in favour of a ''better'' Jmowledge of it. And in 
this case the roost popular optioo is generally represented by what can be 
called scientism. According to a scientist positioo htlTBIl beings have a 
perfect Jmowledge of reality, reality is what it is independently of hunan 
27) ·Sufficiently powerful· is to be intended in respect of the task of supporting the 
ontological realist's intuition as expressed in (D6+CC). For example Moore's or Russell's 
theories of knowledge would be two weak versions of a R ·sufficiently powerful·. 
28) Cf. Putnal (1987] quoting Husserl and presenting Seffars (1966] as an important example of 
scientisa. 
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acJmowledgrnent and the Lebenswel t is a sort of epiphenanenon of the real 
reality known by the scientists; or, according to the opposite extreme of 
natism, 
- external reality as it is in itself is sacrificed to "external reality" 
as hunan beings are acquainted with. According to such an unreflective 
naive realism reality is exactly what I take it to be when I'm leading my 
daily life, and I have a perfect cognitive access to its intrinsic nature. 
The first perspective is the one I'm going to E!I11?loy in order to 
articulate the TO and analyze the possibility that external reality in se 
rray be different fran what we take it to be. The second alternative will be 
included in the list of candidates for a solution of the TO, and as such I 
wi 11 turn to it in II 1. 4 . a. For the present, however, the at tE!l11?t of 
providing a better tmderstanding of what was irrplicit in Rant. drives us 
towards the further necessity of giving a more detailed description of the 
epistemological side of the Doubt. 
1.6 EPIS'l'EH)LOGlCAL RElU.I~ 
In 1.3 I've given a definition of epistemological realism that in the 
next chapter will make possible an analysis of the TraUlBtic Doubt in teI11\9 
of a cmjunction of Rep. and of Ront. This "orientatim" of D3 has been 
rrade explicit by the assmption of the three restrictions i/iii. Their 
explanaticn will now introduce three further specifications of D3 that will 
give rise to a final refoonulatian of D3 in D9' 
I • 6 • a RFALI~ IN '!HE EPISTEK>LOGlCAL FIELD 
The first restricticn says that of the three possible sub-divisions 
of the secaxl area of the real ism-debate I shall focus an that 
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episteroological. By this I den It mean to endorse any thesis about the 
priority both of epistem:ic aspects of the realism debate over those logical 
or linguistic, or, in turn, of episteroology over logic or philosophy of 
language in respect to the same topic. I shall carpletely disregard the 
question whether or not some theoretical or empirical aspects of the debate 
should be reduced to some others. '!'he only "priority" endorsed by the 
decision to focus on Rep. is in respect to the goal of analysing the 
content of the Traunatic Doubt. In the Doubt "reality might be carpletely 
different fran what we take it to be" it is the (debate over) Rep. that is 
directly and principally called into question by (the debate. over) Rant. 
and vice versa, not any other logical or linguistic debate about logical or 
linguistic aspects of realism. Hence I shall be ooly concerned with the co-
ordination of Rep. and Rant •• This is all the first restriction is aimed to 
nake clear. 
I • 6 • b THE EPISTM>LOOlCAL FIELD ~S GmEW. OBJECTIVE KNCWLEOOE 
This second restriction is less plain than the former and therefore 
it relies a little IOOre en a stipulatioo. By "objective knowledge" I mean: 
- "public Imowledge", that is Imowledge which can be cClTlT'llIlicated and 
shared by any hl.l'lBIl subject (in this sense an ineffable intuition is not an 
instance of objective Imowledge); 
_ "potentially, propositional knowledge that, liable to sane consideration 
ccncerning its values of truth", that is knowledge that could be presented 
in form of true, false, or true/false-indeterminate - but not extraneous to 
any true-coosideratioos, like i.nperatives - propositioos which can be 
fomulated in terms of ''knowledge-that''; 
_ "rational knowledge", that is knowledge that can be supported by some (in 
a broad sense) logical argunent; 
and I den I t mean: 
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- "lmowledge which really describes the exact intrinsic nature of its 
object, independently of any interference caning fran the Jmowing subject" 
(a form of epistemological realism according to which "objective" is to be 
tmcierstood as "perfectly graspinq the nature of the Jmown object"); 
and not even: 
- "Jmowledge established and which is independent of the subject" (a 
Platonistic forrn of epistemological realism accordinq to which "objective" 
is to be 1.D'lderstood as "non determinate by the subject"). 
The additional specification "general" specifies that I'm not 
interested in determining objective Jmowledge as "perceptual", "rational", 
"linguistic" or the like, but I'm interested in the whole phenanenon of 
hUlBll Jmowledge. For exanple, if I should say that "hU'TSIl objective 
knowledge cannot grasp the intrinsic nature of ER" I should be interested 
in the consequence of this possibility, or in seeinq whether there is any 
good reason to think so, but not in determining whether this is so because 
of sane deficit in hwan perceptual knowledge, or in a limitinq application 
of mental categories etc. Whenever it is not necessary, I shall drop the 
specification "general", leavinq it as i.nplicit. 
In referring to tbe epistemological form of realism defined in D3 by 
means of the label "episteroological realism" I don't mean to say that this 
is the ooly possible form of episteroological realism we can have. This 
because at least two essential reasons. 
First, because there are other discussions of forms of objective 
epistE!fOOlogical realism that are concerned with aspects other than the 
possibility of an objective episteroological access to external reality. 
Think for example of the discussion about the relation between scientific 
and ordinary Jmowledqe. 
And secondly, because there may be other discussions of 
epistE!fOOlogical realism equally orientated towards the analysis of an 
epistemological access to external reality and yet not only, or not at all, 
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limited within the boundaries of "objective )mow I edge" . In a very broad 
sense Epistem:>logy can be concerned with any type of sources, processes and 
results of knowledge or )mowing, and objective knowledge as above intended 
is certainly far fran being the only form of Jmowledge that can be 
considered involved in making possible for HKS to have an access to 
external reality, think for exarrple of the phenanena of "revelation", or 
''mystic intuition" etc .. 
A1 though these specifications will be of a certain irrportance in the 
next chapter (see especially II.4.b), at the moment I find easier to assume 
the device of limiting the concept of "epistarology" here E!lT'(>loyed 
(epistem:>logy as the theory of general objective knowledge) than just to be 
forced to specify every time that we are working in a particular area of it 
(that certain area of epistem:>logical studies concerned with general 
objective Jmowledge). 
1.6. c THE DISCUSSlOO OF EPISTEM:>LOOlCAL RFALI~ AIMS AT UNDmsTANDING THE 
NA'IURE OF 'IHE EPISTEMIC REIATlOO B~ AN IDFAL HttfAN J<N<lolING SUBJECl' AND 
F.:K'l"ERmL REALI'n 
It should be clear now that when I say that I'm concerned with 
"realism about the relation between objective Jmowledge and external 
reali ty" I mean that I'm concerned with the questioo whether a HKS enjoys a 
particular epistemic access to an eventually independent ~ by rreans of 
objective Jmowledge. And that I dan't mean that I'm coocerned with the 
question whether objective knowledge enjoys a particular kind of 
existence.29 The issue doesn't need further explanaticm, but two other 
irrportant consideratioos can be made in connecticn with it. 
First, restrictim (iii) stresses once more why I don't generally 
need to distinguish between different types of Jmowl edge , or at least 
29) For this under standi n9 of the epistemological realiy-debate see for example Horwich 
[1982] . 
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between scientific and enpirical knowledge.30 CIlce it is tmderstood that 
the discussion of epistesrological realism is only concerned with the 
possibility of having sane kind of epistanological access to external 
reality in its intrinsic nature, the distinction within different types of 
mowledge becanes, if not insignificant, certainly rrarginal. Since "general 
objective knowledge" covers the danain of any possible knowledge that 
satisfies the broad standards above specified in (ii), the first problem 
faced by Rep. is whether any fonn of objective knowledge can play the role 
of such a perfect epistanic relation. And the question what such a form of 
objective Jmowledge would eventually be is secondary. 
Secondly, the distinction between "process of knowing" and ''knowledge 
as the resul t of the process of knowing" is necessary in order to introduce 
the concept of an epistemic relation (Re) between HKS and ER. On the grotmd 
of (iii) I shall asSLme that: 
- the process of knowing' 1 consists of an epistemic relation (Re) occurring 
between a Hunan Knowing SUbject and External Reality; that 
- the epistanic relation (Re) can be represented as a symmetric epistanic 
relation; and that 
- the occurrence of the process of knowing produces a certain resul t call ed 
R-knowledge; so that, given: 
1>]) {[Re (HKS,m)] =def. process of knowing} =def. P-knowing; 
and 
30) Empirical knowledge is that kind of knowledge consisting of all the occurrences of 
potential cases of knowledge that or propositional knowledge, conceivable - according to a 
bivalent logic - as either true or false about external reality in its more accessible for. to 
a human being. Where the specification "more accessible form" is lIIeant to exclude any 
reference to highly elaborated scientific instances of propositional knowledge, and to limit 
it to examples of common physical objects, their properties and ususl the events in which they 
play sOlIe role. Consequently, scientific knowledge can be interpreted as all the other 
potential cases of propositional knowledge not obtainable without a certain amount of 
theoretical elaboration (like the use of mathematics and precise measuring, the formulation of 
laws, the study of regularities, the method of hypothesis and deduction, or of inductive 
abstractions, etc.). . .. 
31) The process of knowing is n?t to be confus~d .Wlt~ the CognltJV8 processes. These latter 
are part of the process of knowlng as the COTKhtlO Slne qua non for the presence of any R-
knowled98 at all, but a full underst~nding of the pr?c~ss of knowing also includes a 
discussion of the ratio essendi botn of It and of the cognltlve processes. 
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Dg) [knowledgeresult] =def. R-knowledge; 
it follows that 
{[Re (HKS,m)] produces [knowledgeresult]} 
can be schematically reformulated thus: 
P-knowing produces R-Jmowledge. 
By defining ''Re'' as synmetric I don't mean that: 
i) the production of R-Jmowledqe is due both to the fact that "HKS is 
epistem:i.cally related to ER" and to the fact that ''ER is epistemically 
reI ated to HKS" means that: 
ii) the production of R-knowledge is due both to the fact that ''HKS has 
Jmowledge of ER" and to the fact that ''ER has knowledge [?] of HKS"; but 
rather, that (i) means that: 
iii) the production of R-Jmowledge is due to the fact that ''HKS and ER cane 
to be nutually epistemically interrelated to each other". 
According to 0." the process of knowing consists of HKS caning to be 
episterni.cally related to m - say by perfoIming cognitive processes and 
aiming to a certain target (fulfilment of sane curiosi ty, survival, desire 
to know, acquisition of a higher moral status etc.) - and of ER caning to 
be epistem:i.cally related to HKS, say by forcing HKS to perform sane 
cognitive processes, by sellSibly modifying his tabula rasa, by iJrpressing 
IlKS with sense-data, by activatinq his process of recall ectioo , and the 
like12 • 
32) A very sillilar distinction can be drawn by focusing on the result of the process of 
knowing: R-knowledge is generally seen as the result of both active and passive phases of the 
cognitive process (generally speaking, passive acquisition of data and active elaboration of 
theta). But the meaning of 'active' and 'passive' are understood from a HKS-centred approach, 
the 'active' phases of the cognitive process being interpreted as those depending on HKS. and 
the 'passive' phases interpreted as those not depending on HKS. D7 may also be understood as 
interpreting the 'passive' phases as those depending on the 'active' presence of fR. However 
the distinction is only ·very similar'. for the fact that R-knowledge can be interpreted as 
being due to active and passive phases of the cognitive processes is different frOll saying 
that they depend on active and passive phases of the process of knowing. Beside, this latter 
may be IDOre adequately seen as depending on active and re-active phases of the epistemic 
relation between HKS and ER. 
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I . 6 . d A RE- DEFINITlOO OF EPIS'l'lM)LOOlCAL RFALI~ 
The previous carrnents can help us to inprove the definition of 
epistesrological realism given by D3' 
A first i.rrprovement can be obtained by eliminating the two 
specifications in the brackets, i. e. "nonnal" and "in the best case". Their 
role is intuitive and it does not require any further explanation. In 
refomulating D3 "(normal) hllTlall knowing subject (in the best case)" can be 
directly reduced to "ideal HKS". 
A second improvement is more substantial. D3 interprets Rep. 
basically in terms of value of R-knowledge more than in terms of value of 
the process of knowing. This is not very precise and it will be better to 
JOOdify it. Let me first use a cacparison to explain why. 
SUppose we want to give a ccmnentary on a football game that is just 
finished with the victory of team A. SUppose that we want to say that A's 
victory is not due to fortuitous factors, but that A is really a better 
team than B. We have two ways of expressing A's superiori ty: 
i} we nay say that whenever A and B play a football garre the result is 
always A's victory (we may even be Jrore flexible by roodifying the absolute 
term "always" addill9 probabilistic or tendencies-clauses like 'c,oore often" 
"very likely" etc., this is not crucial for the exarrple); or 
ii} we may say that, whatever the result may be, in fact A plays better 
than B. 
This latter way of expressing ourselves is more adequate than the 
first in order to cC1Clvey what we mean by supporting A's superiority. By 
referring to the "process" of playing we can disregard rnore easily 
fortuitous factors. The supporters of a certain team nay still be justified 
in believing that their team plays better than any other despite the fact 
that it has lost every game of the charrpiooship. 
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If now we coopare the positicn of the epistemological realist with 
that of the supporter of the A team we can see why defining Rep. in terms 
of value of R-knowledge is inprecise. What the epistEmJ I ogica I realist 
wants to say is that, no natter what the specific result of the process of 
Jmowing is, the process of )mowing is such that HKS can )mow the intrinsic 
nature of ER. D3 expresses this concept by referring to the value of R-
mow I edge, but this is equivalent to say that a team is better than any 
other because of its victories: it may be largely true that if A wins all 
the games of the charrpionship then A pI ays better than any other teans, and 
yet it nay be that for sane accidental reasons a very weak team W wins the 
charrpianship even if everybody mows that W is not in fact the best team, 
and vice versa, that even if A is the best team, for sane accidental 
reasons it hasn't won the charrpianship. '!'he episteroological realist is 
interested in what eventually makes possible a perfect objective R-
mowledge of the intrinsic nature of ER, not in the real nature of the 
actual R-knowledge. Then he can avoid any accidental feature by referring 
to the process of mowing, not to its resul t • 
The importance of a refonnulation of D3 on the basis of the value of 
the process of Jmowing is further supported by the consideration of the 
shift that, eventually, the nature of the relation occurring between HKS 
and ER would suffer. In D3 the fact that we say that HKS ''has a perfect 
objective knowledge" of ER irrplicitly limits the possibilities (and 
therefore the interpretations) of Rep. to the capacities of HKS to reach 
external reality. This because Re can be seen as a me-way relation that 
nakes the task of the episteroological realist even IOOre difficult than it 
ought to be. By refornulating D3 on the basis of the value of the process 
of )mowing we can interpret Re as a symnetric relation between ER and HKS 
such that the "responsibi I i ty" for the val ue of the resul t of such a 
I t ' , h R Jmowledge falls both on the nature of htmm re a 1on, 1.e. lITSIl - , 
activity exercised an external reality and on the value of the activity of 
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external reality exercised on the hl.l1'BIl knowing subject. Think for exarrple 
of the Aristotelian doctrine whereby in a first stage the "passi ve 
intellectus" is so affected by the presence of an external reality as to 
became identical with the known object. 
The third and last adjustment of D3 consists in a clarification of 
the meaning of "perfect". The term specifies that, though there might be 
other kind of knowledge equally valid in grasping the intrinsic nature of 
m, there carmot be anythiIl9 better. For once the task of fully grasping 
the intrinsic nature of ER has been fulfilled, it can be only repeated but 
not surpassed. 
According to all the previous remarks D3 can be rrodified thus: 
D9) ~. =def. the philosophical positicn according to which the process of 
Jmowing is such as to make possible the production of HKS' perfect 
objective R-Jmowledge of the intrinsic nature (i.e. the intrinsic existence 
and intrinsic properties) of m. 
We can now proceed to consider the connection of Rant. and Rep.' in 
the next chapter. 
CHAPl'm II 
THE PmPE'lUAL CHECK OF RFMn'f 
"There are roore things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio 
than are dreamt in your Phi losophy" 
Shakespeare, Ham1 et. 
I I • 1 I N'lROWCTI 00 
Once it is conceived, the Trauratic Doubt calls for sane kind of 
response. As a propecieutic step towards the assessment of the possibl e 
replies, I suggested that the Trauratic Doubt could be decarposed into 
three carponents: the ontological, the epistemological and the 
anthropological. Uncovering the threefold nature of the 'I'D makes possible 
to diagnose the different kinds of responses it may give rise to, roore 
carefully. I shall discuss such replies depending en which of the three 
theoretical ccmnitrnents they call into question. For this purpose I divided 
this stu:iy into two parts. In the second part I will investigate the 
possibility of a "resoluticn" of the TO in terms of a refusal of its 
anthropological carpalent. Before, I mean to clarify the field by exploring 
the nature of the other two carpa:lents that make up the Doubt. In the 
previous chapter I've been outlining the limits within which the Doubt can 
be decarposed into its two cmstituents. I will now establish rrore 
precisely what the epistemological and the ontological theses aJ001.Ult to and 
how they can interlock together to give rise to the Doubt. 
58 
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Let me first recall that for each general form of realism we may 
stipulate that there is a corresponding general form of anti -real ism. 
Assttning that1 : 
0].0) (ontological Anti-realism =def. non-Rant.) =def. Anti-Rant.; 
and that 
011) (epistemological Anti-realism =def.non-Rep .) =def. Anti-Rep. 
we have that there are four possible ways of connecting Rant. and Rep.: 
A) Ront. + Rep. ; 
B} Rant. + Anti-Rep.; 
C} Anti-Root. + ReP.; and 
0) Anti-Rant. + Anti-Rep.' 
With a satisfying degree of approximation (A) can be qualified as the 
most general form of naive or metaphysical or dogmatic realism, (B) as a 
general version of Kantian realisnf, (C) is interpretable as Berkeley's 
anti-realism ("anti-materialism" or "subjective idealism"), and (0) as a 
radical sceptical posi tian, such as that resul ting fran the Carlesian-Derral. 
hypothesis. 
In this chapter I shall focus on (A) and (B), with the purpose of 
providing a final neat forrwlaticn of the Tramatic Doubt, tmder the label 
"Perpetual Check of Reason" (~). Like in the previous chapter, I shall 
proceed by means of successi ve approxinations. The merits of such a 
detailed examination will emerge in the next chapter. 
In section 2 I will discuss (A) as the coojunction of the two foms 
of realism defined in 06 and in 09' I shall call the product of Rant. D6 and 
Rep.D9 "Ingenuous Realism". Since the episteroological side of the 'I'D 
1) I shall also assume, for the sake of simplicity, that: 'to deny that p' is equivalent to 
'to say that _po. 
2) The reason why I define this position as "Kantian" becomes obvious in section 3. The reason 
why I define it "realism" instead of "anti-realism', when this position is, so to say, half 
realist (ontological side) and half anti -realist (epistelllOlogical side) has been implicitly 
given in 1.3, where I've said that the first connotation of the dichotomy realism/anti-realism 
is ontological. 
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consists of a negative thesis, in section 3 I will state what 
Epistemological Anti-realism turns out to be if Ingenuous Realism has to be 
considered untenable. As a repercussion, I will give a refomulation of 
Ontological Realism, in order to spell out how deeply the negative tum in 
the epistaoological side can affect Rant. (section 4 and 5). Finall y , I 
wi 11 draw together the threads of these two chapters by producing a final, 
measured version of the 'I'D as a particular interpretation of (B). I will 
label this logical reconstructioo of the TD the "Perpetual Check of Reason" 
(section 6). 
In the next chapter I will tum to the examination of (C) and (D) 
tmder the guise of two possible solutions of the ~ (ct. III.3.b; and 
IlLS). 
I I . 2 THE CCfiJUNCTICfi OF Rep. AND Ron t .: I NGEMJaJS REALISof 
Ordinarily, we rarely discard our faith in Ingenuous Realism, and 
even when we do, it is for very short nnrents. In phi I osophy, quite the 
opposite is true: we rarely believe in Ingenuous Realism, and even when we 
mentally entertain it as a serious possibility, generally it is only for a 
short time. We are used to looking at it roore as a rrere starting point for 
further speculatioos than as a doctrine that could turn out to be well 
supported. In this section I shall adopt this latter philosophical 
attitude. I will describe Ingenuous Realism as the first positioo that 
could arise out of the conjunction of epistesoological and ontological forms 
of realism. But I shall coosider ita theoretical optioo that almost 
imnediately fails to withstand sound criticism. I shall merely presuppose 
the necessi ty of the breakdown of Ingenuous Realism as a stage towards an 
accurate reconstruction of the genesis of the Traumatic Doubt. Hence, the 
hypothesis 11m subscribing to is that the possibility of the TD has its 
roots in the failure of Ingenuous Realism as a defensible philosophical 
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position. cnly if we are at a loss with our initial Ingenuous Realism can 
we seriously conceive of the possibility of a whole world lying behind the 
reality we are acquainted with. 
'!'here is an evident, strOI'l9 connection between ontological and 
episteroological forrrs of realism. Indeed the connection sketched in (A) can 
be so strict as to give rise to unified fornulations of what may be 
referred to as naive, metaphysical or dogmatic forms of realism. An eminent 
case is that of Putnam [1981].3 According to him: 
[metaphysical realism holds that] (0 the wor ld consists of some fixed totality of 
mind-independent objects. (iiJ There is exactly one true and complete description of 
'the way the world is'. (iii] Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation 
between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things. (p.49) 
We can take this specific version4 of [Ront. + Rep.] as representing 
the happy im tial condi tian of a lucky HKS who is not and maybe who is 
never going to be puzzled by philosophical doubts. 
Why such an edenic condition should be referred to as "naive" or 
'~taphysical'6 is understandable only in respect to two different 
theoretical perspectives. If we are mainly concerned with problems in the 
theory of errpirical knowledge and perception then we are JTK)re likely to 
3) It has been argued (cf. Field [1982) against Putnam's position that such a unification of 
RQnt . and Rep. in metaphysical realism is in fact obscure. I think that, even if the criticism 
mlght be partially correct in asking for a clearer distinction between what Field calls 
metaphysical realisml (i.e., mutatis mutandis, our ontological realism) and metaphysical 
realis.2 (i.e., mutatis MUtandis, our epistemological realism; Field in fact introduce also a 
metaphysical realism3 about the nature of the theory of truth employed, I believe this might 
be easily considered part of metaphysical realism2), it misses the central point I've tried to 
present in 1.4, i.e. that metaphysical realisml cannot be adequately defined in purely 
ontological ter,s, without SOlIe shift into metaphysical realislll2. For a further shift of 
Putnam towards interpreti"9 letaphysical realism in terms of metaphysical realism2 cf. Putnam 
(1982) . 
4) There are at least two elements that make Putnam's definition of metaphysical realism only 
a version of Ingenuous Realism: the references to a theory of truth as correspondence and to a 
theory of knowledge wor ki"9 withi n the conception of knowledge as essentially constituted by 
·representations·. 80th elements are probably the most common tools of Ingenuous Realism, but 
there .ight be other version of it which don't necessarily adopt such ·Putnamian route·. 
5) When our understanding of the connotation of Rin. as ·dogmatic realislII' cannot be reduced 
to what has been said in the text about the connotations 'metaphysical· and ·naive' this may 
be due to a certain ethical meaning implicit nOHadays in 'dogmatic·. Rin may be seen as 
dogaatic either because of its uncritical acceptance of merely prima facie oovious truths, or 
because of the prejudices it conveys against other different positions. And as dogmatic 
realisa R' n would seem to amount to a dangerous source of intolerance. 1 • 
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designate a version of (I~cct. + Rep.] as "naive". In this case [Ront . + 
Rep.] is naive caq;>ared to other, roore sophisticated theories. en the other 
hand, if we are mainly concerned with problE!fll9 regarding the nature of 
reference, of truth and the limits of ht.maIl epistanic capacities, then we 
are m:.>re likely to designate a version of [Ront. + Rep) by using the 
expression "metaphysical realism,6. In this case [Ront . + Rep.] is 
metaphysical because it may i.rrply an optimistic coorni tment to sane 
description of the Iiature of external reali ty , and to the epistemic 
relation which is possible to engage with it. Clearly by defining a version 
of [Rent. + Rep.] either as naive or as metaphysical we are inplicitly 
stressing respectively more on the nature of Rep. or m:.>re on the nature of 
Rant.. This is the reason why I shall opt in favour of a further term like 
"ingenuous" to label [Ront. + Rep.]. By definition, I will assure that its 
meaning won't rest upon one IOOre than upon the other side of the 
conjmction, so that: 
D12) [Rant. + Rep.l=def. Ingenuous Realism =def. Rin.· 
"Ingenuous" doesn't have all the historical irrplications of 
"metaphysical", and it shoul d be taken both as a mere synonym of "naive", 
and as a synthesis of the two tenns, thus covering the ontological and the 
episteroological meanings of both. 
The rrost general fomulation of Inqenuous Realism is obtainable by 
siJrply carmecting D6 and Dg. Being careful to leave the largest space of 
manoeuvre for different interpretations of such a conjunction, I would 
recommend the following definition: 
D13) Rin. =def. the philosophi.~l posi~ion. ac?ording to ~hich (~) there is 
an external reality ~; and (1.1) the 1ntnDS1C nature (l.e. eXl.stence and 
properties) of ~, both in its historical and in its natural aspects, is on 
the ontological side coopletely independent of HKS' acJmowledgrnent and on 
the epistemological side perfectly Jmowable by HKS, thanks to the nature of 
the process of )mowing. 
6) The overlapping of the two expressions shows once more the terminological difficulties 
inherent to the use of the dichotomy realism/anti-reslis •. 
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D13 records both that in the case of Ingenuous Realism, the portion 
of m ontoloqically independent of hunan acknowledgmEmt is identical with 
the whole ER, and that the process of knowing is such as to !Take possible 
HKS' perfect objective R-knowledge of the intrinsic nature of ER, in 
particular the fomulation of ~. itself. D13 requires two general 
cooments. 
First, it is irrportant to stress that D13 is not what we actually 
have in mind whi 1 e we are doing our shopping at Sainsbury's or whi I e we are 
thanking amt Francesca for her awful Christrras' present. D13 is a 
teclmical fomulation which aims at defining the content of a roore informal 
position. It is a logical attempt to bring to light what is only implicit 
in the ingenuous realist attitooe that, we generally agree, is tacitly 
assured in every-day life. 
Secondly, despite their lDrified fomulation in Rin. the relation 
between Rant. and Rep. should't be understood. as a necessary tie, such that 
if one fonn of realism would collapse then the other would as well. 
Al though in ~n. both Rant. and Rep. find their fullest application by 
being interlocked together in a mutually supporting circle, the two forms 
of realism still remain at least partially independent of each otheJ?'. So 
that a denial of the value of ~n. won't necessarily aroount to the 
acceptance of the radical sceptical position presented in (D). Depending on 
which side of ~n. is rejected we may opt for one or the other of the two 
alternatives (B) or (C). 
If anly saneone could really stick to it, there is nothing wrong with 
~, . In effect R· nakes life rruch easier and canfortable, and I'm ·~n. In. 
convinced that such advantages should not be mdervalued. The majority of 
hunan beings seem to endorse sane version of R.i. n. and al so this fact 
7} This also lIeans that in R'n ROJlt and Rep are coordinated, not subordinated one to the 
other. Not only R· should ~t'be lnterpreted as a reached theoretical position but rather as 
a presupposed sti~tlng point of view, but eventually its value should not be conceived as 
grounded either on epistemological or on ontological arguments. 
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should not be dismissed too quickly. So how does it happen that R. should 
-"1n. 
ever be abandooed ? A full investigation of the JOOSt acceptabl e answers 
that have been provided for this question goes far beyond the 1 imi. ts of 
this chapter. So let me just sketch what I would not accept as a good 
answer. 
We nay easily distinguish between prescriptive and factual reasons 
for disposing of ~n •. The ooly answers I would be ready to accept are 
those elaborated in terms of factual reasoos. Schenaticall y , the 
prescriptive reasons aIOOunt to a kind of philosophical exhortation. There 
is a sort of Platonic tendency that I seem to recognize e.g. in authors 
like Descartes, Sartre or Rorty, to invest the philosopher of the role of a 
leader, of the nan whose task is to cane back to the cave to set his 
fellows free fran their "dogmatic dreams", to urge them to go beyond the 
realm of mere appearances. The obvious challenge for this kind of approach 
is to demand a justificatioo for this attitude. We know that soon or later 
in the chain of his argunents such a philosopher will have to appeal to 
sane metaphysical or transcendent reasans, like the "true nature of nan" or 
the aim of "leading a worthy life". At that stage the point at stake 
becanes whether metaphysical reasoos can ever he forceful enough to 
motivate the abandon of our Ingenuous Realism. And alongside Peirce's anti-
cartesianism, I would say that they cannot. In fact ooe can really doubt of 
his naive knowledge of the world ooly because of sane actual reasons, call 
them practical, EIlFirical or factual. Scmecne nay cane to doubt the 
validity of Rin. because of new discoveries that change his picture of 
external reality, or because of the detection of errors in his knowledge 
there where he thought there couldn't be any and so on. Whatever the origin 
of the initial doubt nay be, a reasoning by analogy will easily accarplish 
the final target of discharging Rut.' The route followed by our suspicious 
. . ' t fIt' f "ea t' I ,e f ex-reahst can be 91 Veil ln et11\9 0 se ec 100 0 r eslan app es • I 
8) Cf. Oescartes [1984], 'Author's Reply to the Sixth Set of Objections', p.324. 
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the set of my beliefs is like a pile of apples, and I thought all of them 
were good, but now I discover that sane of them are not, then rraybe I 
wasn't only partially wrong in believing that all of them were good, maybe 
I was ccrrpletely wrong and all of them are bad. In one way or another a 
hunan )mowing subject may cane to doubt the val ue both of Rant. and of 
Rep.. In particular, he will no longer consider the rrutually supporting 
relation occurring between the two forms of realism a virtuous circularity 
to be trusted. Like a jealous person (,'maybe I'm being deceived or I'm 
wishfully deceiving myself, maybe m is not 'faithful' to me"), a HKS will 
became suspicious of all the evidences, if there are still any, in favour 
of Rin .. He then won't probably stop challenging and doubting his position 
tmtil his hanoonious every-day relation with external reality will be 
overcame. At this stage he will be ready to look for alternative proposals. 
As there may be different reasons to abandon Rin. so there rray be 
also different tennini after one departs fran Rin.. The one directly 
implicated by the formulation of the TO consists in B: the idea that there 
might be a more or less extended portion of reality which is beyond the 
capacities of hunan knowledge to grasp, i.e. [Rant. + Anti-Rep)· The 
arri val at a version of Kantian realism fran the ''breakdown'' of RJ.n. can be 
explained in coarse terms by invoking the scheme (AID). If RJ.n. is no 
longer acceptable for sane necessarily carpelling reasons, for exarrple a 
Humean criticism, then before embracing a radical sceptical position like 
(D) there is the alternative of abandoning or trying to inprove one or 
another of its carpanents, vz. either Rant. or Rep.· And at this point 
there are at least two reasons why, if something must be modified in Rin. 
the first attE!Jnl)t is going to concern Rep .• First, because we are sinply 
more reluctant to accept some fonm of Anti-Rant. than some fonm of Anti-
Rep •• We are more ready to conterrplate the possibility that there are sane 
sort (cf. the following section 4 both for a specification and a rrdtigatiOD 
of this clause) of lirrdts to how much of the intrinsic nature of external 
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reality hl.lTaIl knowledge can grasp, than to accept the rrore radical 
suggestion that there isn't an intrinsically independent external reality. 
The seccnd reason is that we are led to abandon Rin. by 
episternalogical considerations, and so it is natural to focus on the 
epistemological side of Rin. before trying any other alternative solution9 • 
Thus B seems to be the first position we encounter following the collapse 
of ~n •. However, let me rrake clear that it is not indispensable to accept 
a direct link between Ingenuous Realism and Kantian Realism (A and B), for 
my present purpose to proceed towards a a rigourous formulation of the TD, 
and for that purpose the development of the breakdown of A into a version 
of B can be introduced as merely stipulative. 
The departure fran (A) (Rin.' [Ront . + Rep.]) in favour of (B) 
([Ront . + Anti-Rep» aroounts to the substitution of Rep. by Anti-Rep.· 
T~ has care to elucidate what episterrological Anti-realism consists in, 
in order to be able, later, to understand how the departure fran Rep. 
infl uences the nature of Rant .. 
I I • 3 EPISTEHJLOOICAL ANTI - RFALI~ 
According to Rep. D9 the process of knowing is such that HKS has a 
perfect objective R-knowledge of the intrinsic nature of ER. As a first 
approxi.Iratioo, the definitian of epistarological Anti-realism could be 
tailored an Rep.' sinply by denying D9' in the following way: 
9) As Kant hi.self says, what led hill to investigate the nature of knowledge were the 
antinomies of pure reason, the fact that about the most important topic human k~wledge could 
equally be assertive or negative without there being an apparent way of solutIon. He even 
thought about beginning the Critique of Pure Reason with • [ ... J what I have entitled the 
'Antinomy of Pure Reason', which could have been done in colourful essays and would have given 
the reader a desire to get at the sources of this controversy' ([1967], p.96). However, it is 
not necessary to agree with me on the relation between the crisis of Rin. and the elaboration 
of a some version of Kantian realism. The final value of the hypothesis set forth in section 4 
does not rest upon this point, and eventually it may be just considered a way of introducing 
the contents of section 6. As I said above in the text, the purpose of these few remarks on 
Rin. is only. that of PTesenting a moTe problematic relation between Ront . and Rep. that is (8) 
[Ront . + AntI-Rep.)' 
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D14) Anti-Rep. =def. the philosophical position according to which the 
process of knowing is ~ such as to make possible the production of HKS' 
perfect objective R-knowledge of the intrinsic nature (Le. the intrinsic 
existence and intrinsic properties) of ER. 
By amending D14 we will obtain the final definition of Anti-Rep. in DIS' 
For this purpose I shall rarark, in tum, on four aspects of 014' 
First, 014 means that the nature of (at least ooe of) the three 
carponents of [Re (HKS,ER)] is such as to produce a significant hiatus 
between the ordo'renm and the ordo idearmJ°. According to Anti-Rep. the 
possibilities of huran knowledge are limited (as we shall see in a m:roent, 
either in a qualitative or quantitative sense) to a partial grasping only 
of a certain portim of m, so that it is conceivable that the infinite 
ordo rezun is in fact not ooly larger than, but also different fran the 
infinite ordo idearun. There would be an unknowable, ontological residut.m 
(if we refer to ''bigger'') or a1 ter (if we refer to "different") of ER, viz. 
the intrinsic nature of ER, which would remain beyond the limits of hman 
Jmowledge. 
The second renark concerns different ways of tmderstanding D14 in 
IOOre positive tetTl\9. To give sane exarrples, 014 could be taken to mean that 
''Re is a roodifying relation through which HKS can grasp only part of the 
intrinsic nature of ER", or that ''Re is a lOOdifying re1atioo which allows 
to IlKS only a (JOOre or less) partial access to the intrinsic nature of ER", 
or again that ''Re is a modifying relation by means of which a limited 
episternic contact between HKS and ER is possible". These, like other 
possible fomulations, have in CCJ1l'OOll the characteristic of 8'1'ploying a 
half metaphorical, half technical terminology. D14 avoids any carmitment to 
a particular episteroology by producing a merely negative formulation of 
Anti-Rep.' A more positive fonrulatioo of Anti-Rep. will be sufficiently 
generalised only by avoiding episteroological terminology that is too 
10) By these two Latin expressions obviously I don't suggest that ER is made of things (res) 
and R-knowledge of ideas (idea), but rather that there COileS to be a difference between the 
external world as it is in itself and the external world as it is for us. 
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specific. This is what rootivates the use of expressioos like "to grasp", 
"partial access" or "full contact".l1 SUppose, for exanple, that we were to 
adopt three traditional, epistaoologica1 terms like "representation" 
"description" and "correspondence" in order to say that: what D14 means is 
that Re is a modifying relation 
i) by means of which it is possible to produce a set of representatians 
that reflect or illustrate something different fram the intrinsic nature of 
~; or 
ii) that can produce a description in terms of cartesian ideas or Kantian 
judgments or post-Linguistic-Turn- propositions, of ER whose cootent are 
different fran the corresponding intrinsic nature of ~. 
We have seen that this is the way Putnam express himsel f. Yet none of these 
or similar purely tedmical versions is safe fram the criticism of being 
meaningful and intelligible only within a specific epistanologica1 
theory12, namely that which asSl..lTleS the same technical terminology. To 
limit our attention to the exanple already mentioned, in Putnam's case the 
adoption of too specific terrrdnology contributes to drive hLm to the rather 
queer assertion that a ccmoon posi tioo to all the metaphysical realists is 
a full camdtment to the theory of truth as correspaxience.13 Now this is 
true only within a certain theoretical cootexts. since in this chapter my 
principal target is the production of a general fOIlllllation of the 'I'D such 
that different epistemologies can be reinterpreted as different attempts to 
cope with it, it follows that in this context a partially metaphorical 
terrrnnology is inevitable. For only by this device it is possible to obtain 
a perspective wide enough, which in its turn nakes the whole nanoeuvre of 
the next chapter possible. 
11) It is important to keep in mind that by these metaphorical expressions I don't mean to 
refer only to "knowledge by acquaintance". 
12) In these two particular cases, the cri ticiSil could be that the formulation is wor ki ng 
within the modern conceptual scheme of knowledge as knowledge of some mental product shown in 
a foro interno. cf. Rorty [1979), first and second part. 
13) Cf. Putnam (1976], p.l77. 
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In this way we cane to the third rfll1'8rk I wish to make. When I :'laid 
earlier that D14' or any other c09Jlate versicn"J; refers to Re as to a 
modi tying reI atioo occurring between HJ(S and ~, by 'modi hinel' I mNUlt 
"al terinq" ard/or "selectillCJ". It is now of the utroost irrportance to 
understand that, in such a Kantian-l ike coot ext , '«roodi fyincJ" is to be 
intended fran the perspective of the final nature of the result of the 
actioo, not fran the perspective of the final nature of the object an which 
the actioo is exercised. The ''roodifyinq relatial" is not such because it 
affects m, alteritl9 its ootological status, but it is ''modifyill9'' in 
respect to the resul t of the process of knowing, that is R- know 1 edqe. If I 
see an object through a clistortifl9 qlass I ITBY casually say that "I see a 
roodified object" without wantinq to say that in fact "to see an object 
through a distortinq qlasa" nOOifie.s the object in itsel f. What I'm 
iJ'11)recisely sayinq is that my wearing those qlasses aroounts to entertain a 
''modifyil'l9 relatioo" with the object, whose iITBge turns out to be rrodHied. 
In the refinsnent of D14 we shall also take into account this "way of 
speakiIl9" . 
Finally, it is worth noticinq that a crucial characteristic of our 
understanding of Anti-Rep. is that it is likely to rest upon a certain 
interpretati en of the na t ure of Re' We say that I according to Anti -Rep. it 
is the epistemic relatim between HJ(S and m that does not allow a perfect 
qraspil'l9 of the intrinsic nature of m. And we don't stop here. For when we 
say that it is the nature of Re that prarpts the sort of "opeci ty" of h\.lT1lU\ 
knowledge 00 the accOlnt of which the received imaqe of external rNlity is 
not truly representative of what F.R is in itself, what we really mt"arl is 
that it is what ccmstitutes the cooditio sine qui! non of ~ to be such &I 
not to make possible Hl<S' perfect objective R-knowledqe of the intrinsic 
nature of m. And by the concU tio sine qua non of Re we have in mind the 
~tio sine qua non on the KKS' side, or insofar as HKS' role in Rep. is 
ccmcemed, rwnely hunan C'Q9Ili.tive processes. Hence, in describill9 the claim 
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of episteroological anti-realism we heavily rely an our understanding of the 
subjecti ve ccndi tio sine qua non of the process of knowing as such as to 
give rise to a distinction between ER in itself and ER as it is for HKS. 
This is perfectly in line with the roodem tradition, fran Descartes to 
Kant, yet it is irrportant to underline that things may be put differently. 
Indeed, there might be forms of Anti-Rep. arguing in terms of a rrajor or 
minor "disposition" of ER to "enter in contact with" IlKS. We may call than 
ontological readings of Anti-Res>.' In III.4.b we shall see how a possible 
Aristotelian or Scholastic solution of the Perpetual Check of Reason can 
start fram a criticism of the limit assumed by Anti-Rep. in focusing only 
on the epistemic hunan side of Rep., disregarding the ontological side.14 
We are now ready to refine the definition of Anti-Rep.' What llIJSt be 
preserved is the global significance of 014: it inplicitly presents HKS as 
epistemologically exiled fram ER in itself, and therefore as 
epistemologically relegated within his as-it-is-known-by-HKS ~5. In 
cruder terms, the roost inportant iRl>lication of 014 is that the world as 
IlKS knows it is just the world as it is for IlKS, that such a limit is 
intrinsic in the nature of h\.llBll knowledge and that there is no way of 
arriving at a vision of the world in itself as this could be obtained fram 
a God's eye perspective16 . This sense of being extraneous to the world, 
together with the previous cannents can be expressed by a final, not merely 
negati ve defini tian of Anti -Rep. thus: 
14) It can be pointed out that there .ight be theological versions of Anti-Rep. as well, (cf. 
the concept of Deus absconditus for exalllPle in Haritain [1959]), although, when ER is 
substituted by a Divinity then it is also generally presupposed that such a Divinity somehow 
desire to reveal him/herself to hulan beings. 
15) Note that this is true only for the epistemological relation with ER. As we shall see more 
carefully in the last section when HKS eats an apple what he is eating is a piece of reality 
in itself, not just his modified known piece of ER as it is for hi. (which is all he can know 
he is eating). 
16) This theistic reference to God's eye in this context is .ore than an epistemological 
(,COns de plrler, cf. Westphal [1968J section I ("Kant's Theism and the Thing in Itself"). 
, 
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D1S) Anti-~. =def. the philosophical position according to which (i) 
htman cognihve processes (Le. the subjective conditio sine qua non for 
there being sanething an epistemi.c relation between HKS and ER) are such· as 
to me possible only a modifying episterological relation Re between HKS 
and m; and (ii) Re, in turn, is such as never to enable HKS to cane to 
grasp episteroologically the intrinsic nature of ER; Re can provide HKS only 
with a grasp of ER as this is according to HKS' epistemdc perspective. 
Given the prerequisite of a non-technical terminology above 
specified, in DIS I've opted in favour of the tenn "to grasp" and its 
cognate "grasping". Despite its vagueness, it is a half technical word in 
episteroology, and thanks to its un-specific nature it can serve (cf. Q.E.D. 
second edition) for any of the following more specific terms, through which 
any episteroological theory can certainly recognise itself: to asStlTle, to 
believe, to comprehend, to estimate, to gather, to imagine, to infer, to 
know, to observe, to percei ve, to prestrre, to real ise, to recognise, to 
think, to understand. 
Although ~5 preserves the same level of generality of D14' it no 
longer claims that it is the nature of the process of knowing in general 
that is responsible for the inpossibility of Rep.; rather, D1S stresses 
specifically the nature of Re, and in Re stresses the nature of the 
subjective conditio sine qua non of Re, viz. hunan cognitive processes. The 
importance of this shift will be fully manifest in the next chapter. 
According to DIS what HKS is episteroologically in touch with is 
different fran what m is in i tsel f. We need now to cane back to Ront. as 
defined by D6 to see what happesn to it once it is accepted Anti-Rep. as 
defined by ~S. 
I I • 4 ONTOLOOlCAL RFALISM: A KANTIAN vmslOO 
I suggested earlier both that a clear understanding of ontological 
realism dependents an a partially epistemological formulation of its 
definiticn and that cntological and episteroological forms of realism, 
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despite their coonectien, should be still considered independent of each 
other. There seems to >be a cantradcliction irrplicit in these two statements, 
a contraddiction that would be brought to light by the substitution of R 
ep. 
with Anti-~p.' For it appears now that either Rant. should not be 
fomulated on an epistElTOlogical basis, or that if it is, then the shift of 
the epistaoological cmpanent fran realism to anti-realism will bring about 
the collapse of the whole edifice. Forttmately, things are a bit rrore 
carplex and allow a way out fran the inpasse. 
Q1e difficulty is easy to raoove. The suggestion that there is no 
alternative to an epistemological definition of ontological realism implies 
only that sane kind of epistE!fOOlogical notion has to be errployed in the 
defini tian of Ront ., not that such epistemological notions have to be 
necessarily realist. The fact that we are replacing Rep. by Anti-Rep. does 
not alter the fact that we can still use Anti-Rep. as an epistemological 
notion in order to fomulate Rant.' 
A second aspect of the issue is roore problematic. In debating the 
terminological side of the question, saneone may wish to rise a more 
philosophical difficulty: how is it possible to fonrulate sanething like 
Rent. once we have recognized that h'llTBIl knowledge is not good enough to 
enable us to have a clear grasp of the intrinsic nature of external reality 
? Aren't we sirrply contradicting ourselves in accepting both Anti-Rep. and 
then Rant. ? In different fonn, it is the well known problem of asserting 
the presence of a nounenal reality while endorsing the view that htllBIl 
Jmowledqe concerns only phenanenal aspects of it. But then, we can sirrply 
adopt a solution similar to that put forward in such case: although we need 
to invoke some epistemological notions regarding the relation between HKS 
and m for an accurate fornulatiCl1 of Rant.' nevertheless Rant. is, or IlIlSt 
be understood as a metaphysical hypothesis about the antological status of 
External Reality and not an epistemological hypothesis endorsing a certain 
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description of ~. This crucial distinction can be better drawn if we refer 
back to what has been said in 1.4. 
In I.4 I indicated that, generally speaking, there might be only two 
ways of presenting Ront . according to an epistE!l'OOlogical perspective: we 
can either suppose that we perfectly know that ''Ront.'' or we can suppose to 
be able to conceive that ''Rant.''. The first alternative presupposes a 
strong version of Rep., and I said that if we should have given up realism 
in the epistaoological field, the latter option would have been the only 
left open. After the failure of ~n. and the substitution of Rep. by Anti-
Rep. we are now in the position of assuning that, we can only conceive that 
''Ront .''. What is the inportant difference between conceiving and knowing 
that ''R " ? onto . 
There might be uses of "to conceive" according to which there is no 
difference between the acti vi ty of conceiving, thinking or knowing that 
rJ7. On the other hand "to conceive" can mean more precisely "to 
conjecture", "to assune", "to estimate", "to expect", "to presune", "to 
imagine" "to hypothesize", "to entertain". The tenn is used here according 
to this family of meanings. To suppose that we are able to conceive that 
'fog " with a certain degree of assent, am:nmts to claiming that we are 
"'Ont. 
able to hypothesise that ''Root.'' an rather justified grounds. In order to 
fomulate Root. sane episterrological notions are still required. 
difference is that in this case the reference to the episteroological field 
does not inply that we also mow the content of the hypothesis, but onlY 
17) Cf. Nagel (1986), chap.b. Nagel's .exposition i.s .rather confusing ~n .more than o~e . topi~; 
Particularly, I found his way of speakIng of the llmlts of human capaCItIes of concelvln9 ( 1 
"thinking about", seeing that he equates the two expre~sions) an indep~ndent, u~kn~wn exter~~r 
reality, rather misleading. Unless we assume a restTlcted sense of to conceIve (say, f 
example, "the activity of thinking about x ending with a perfect grasping of the nature on 
x"), it is not clear in what sense Nagel speaks of the illPOssibility of conceiving. ~s 
unknowable independent world. Indeed, the ~hol~ exposftion se~ms to ~e in. a precao~is 
equilibriul between "qualitative" and "quantltatlve~ ePlstemol?9lcal antl-real1~m (for \is 
distinction see above in the text). However, as I lnterpret hUI, many other poInts of t 
chapter find an echo in his position, basically a sort of Kantian approach. 
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that we are able to capture a meaningful fomulation of it. And this latter 
goal can be achieved even by e.g. a merely analogical procedurJ8. 
If now we recall the definition of Rant. we can see that there is no 
conflict between: 
a) supposing to be entitled to hypothesise that "there is an external 
reali ty a portioo of which has an intrinsic nature independent of hunan 
acknowl edgment"; and 
b) the fact that eventually "the nature of hUTBll knowledge (which includes 
also hunan "acknowledgment") may be such as not to allow an insight into 
the intrinsic nature of mil. 
Although we have been able to refonmulate Anti-Rep. in more positive 
terms than the mere denial of D9" yet the acceptance of Anti -Rep. as 
defined by 1>].4 forces Rant. to speak only in mere negative terms of the 
possibility of an external reality with an intrinsic existence and 
properties. As we ascend the levels of knowledge, the penultimate step, 
that of the epistemological anti-realist, may be formulated positively in 
terms of a description of a certain state of affairs, but the last step, 
that of a minimal ontological realism, can only be foIII'lllated negatively; 
there is an tmbridgeable gulf between HKS and m, and we can conceive only 
roe side of the knowledge-bridge, that strongly based 00 Anti-Rep.' Its 
fo~lation must be necessarely negative, to the effect that Ront. can only 
speak of "the other side of the bridge" as an .1.JDknown m in itself, 
epistemically .w.reachable by HKB. 
I shall return to this issue shortly (section 5.a), but for now I 
will just say that, given Anti-Rep.' Ront. is limited to support the 
existence of an independent m in the guise of a metaphysical hypothesis 
about a factual possibility. Rant. is a metaphysical ass~tian which needs 
same epistemological notioos and terrrdnology in order to be fonmulated. I 
18) The whole distinction refers to one of "Kant's basic teaching, that we can think 
[hypothesise] IIOre than we can know" (Westphal [1968]. p.126). See also chapter I note 9 for 
the i.portance of avoiding considering "existence" a property of something. 
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sa" t . " t beca has Y asSump 100 no use Rant. to be considered a petitio principii 
lacking all justification, but in order to stress that, according to Rant., 
not only do we suspect that there may be a portion of external reality 
which has a nature independent of our hU'TBl1 acknowledgment, but that we are 
sUPPOSed to be fully convinced of it. We have just seen that this is 
possible without entering into contradiction with the lirrUted potentiality 
of h\.lTlaIl knowledge sketched by Anti-Rep.' 
Given the fact that it is still meaningful to speak of Rant. even if 
we are holding sane version of Anti-Rep., we may proceed by distinguishing 
two ways in which the intrinsic nature of m may be unknowable by hl.l1lall 
Jmowing subjects. 
Let me first stress that Anti-Rep. does not assert that "'ER' is 
unknowable in itself", but that "'ER in itself' is unknowable". The 
"unknowability" of m does not belong to the nature of rn in itself, that 
is it is not a property of ER independently of hunan knowing subjects. It 
is only a way of representing the result of the failure of hl.l1lall cognitive 
processes to grasp the intrinsic nature of m. It is inportant to keep this 
distinction in mind, for otherwise the tmknowability of the intrinsic 
properties of ER in i tsel f seems once again plainly contradictory, or at 
any rate in need of an exception, namely that all the intrinsic properties 
of m are unknowable but this very peculiar property, that of having an 
unknowable nature. We attribute the property of being unknowable directly 
to m in itself just as as a facans de parler. The ''tmknowability'' of m 
belongs to the episte.roological danain of HKS'knowledge, as sanething that 
is merely thinkable as existent, not to the ontological dana in of ER's 
intrinsic nature. 
Once this is borne in mind, then the failure of hunan Jmowledge to 
grasp the intrinsic nature of m may be seen as due either to the 
quantitative or to the qualitative limits of hunan knowledge. It may be 
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either the case that HKS fails to grasp the intrinsic nature of ER because 
at the historical time tx he has an insufficient knowledge of the intrinsic 
nature of ER; or that, no matter how far HKS' knowledge goes, and therefore 
how highly ct.mllative hunan knowledge is supposed to be, a HKS will never 
be able to grasp the intrinsic nature of ER, not even partially. In the 
first case we may assume that the intrinsic nature of ER is like a virgin 
territory that still needs to be explored, that is in fact potentially 
Jmowable, and that eventually is already, partially known. There nay be 
different degrees in which the intrinsic nature of ER is not yet known, but 
this is onl y because of contingent hunan cogn.i ti ve faul ts or 1 imi ts, and 
both of them could be progressively surpassed. Frem an optimistic 
perspective the problem of a full grasp of the intrinsic nature of ER could 
be reduced to just a matter of time, whereas frem a relatively IOOre 
pessimistic one it would becane a natter of an ideal tendency: there is no 
end to the search, and despite the fact that we are actually advancing in 
the territory, the exploration has only an ideal limit. Either rectified or 
not by this last Peircean19 proviso, this is the way in which strawson, for 
exarrple, presents his version of Kantian E!I'I'Pirical realisnf°. I believe 
that the label "quantitative version of Kantian realism" captures the 
essential core of this position. A quantitative version of Kantian realism 
is characterized by the use of tert'lXlral qualifiers like "already", "not 
yet" I and "still" as correctives in the descriptim of the actual relation 
between hunan Jmowledge and the intrinsic nature of reality. 
The second option is far JOOre radical, and it is the one which is 
relevant to the fomulation of the TD. Let me call it, in correspondence 
with "quantitative version" a qualitative version of Kantian realism. To 
illustrate the difference between quantitative and qualitative versions of 
19) The ideal conception of a final true description of the world is spread all through 
Peirce's work. Cf. for a clear statement of it in tens of a possible version of KantiSlll 
. Pei rce [1871), section 2. 
20) Cf. Strawson [1966) and [1979). For a critical discussion, cf. a9ain Nagel [1986), pp.99-
105. 
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Kantian realism we may imagine ER as a geometric three-dimensional solid, 
and HKS as a cartootwo dimensional figure living an its surface. He lives 
in a two-dimensional world and can only experience all objects in so far as 
they enter into his own two-dimensional space. Though he can walk on the 
surfaces of the solid and can explore as much surface as he wants he will 
never discover what there is under it. There is a third dimensional world 
whose existence he can only presuppose, whose real nature shall remain 
forever 1.Dlknowable to hint!. For a qualitative version of Kantian realism 
the tmknowability of m is a matter of qualitative structure of htJTal1 
cognitive processes, and the problem is not with the intrinsic nature of 
that portion of ER we haven't al ready cane across, but mainl y wi th what we 
have already "encountered" in everyday life. Qualitative Kantian realism 
supposes that there is a constitutionally unfillable gap between what HKS 
knows of m and the intrinsic nature of ER. 
The qualitative version of Kantian realism not only is much rrore 
problematic than the quantitative, it is also more interesting and the one 
relevant to the present context. We have presupposed the breakdown of ~n. 
in order to proceed towards a more detailed fomulation of the Traunati 
Doubt. Now what we are interested in is the possibility that our knowledge 
of that portion of ER we are already acqvainted with, may in fact present 
us with a picture of m rather different fran what ER is in itself, and 
that this may happen inevitably. The readiness to entertain the Traunatic 
Doubt reflects a strong pessimistic view about the possibility for h1..l1laD 
knowledge to grasp the intrinsic nature of ER, and this is Anti-Rep. as it 
is interpreted by a qualitative version of Kantian realism. A qualitative 
reading of Anti -Rep. 1 eads us to endorse the view that HKS is presented 
only with a product of the process of )mowing whose nature has been also, 
if not essentially, ccostituted by the epistemic relation Re itself, and 
21) It must be remembered, that all this speaking in terms of spatial metaphors not only is 
close to the Kantian fashion (see Strawson's criticism in [1966]) but it also put a 
significative stress on the impOrtance of the elements of the transcendental aesthetics that 
make empirical experience possible, space and time. 
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that human cognitive processes establish only a modifying episterrdc 
relation between HKS and ER. A direct consequence of accepting the 
hypothesis that Re is a rrodi fying relation between HKS and ER on the 
account of the modifying nature of the subjective c~tio sine qua nan of 
the P-knowing, is the attribution to human cognitive processes of a 
consti tuti ve function in regard to the nature of the product of the process 
of knowing. According to a qualitative version of Kantian realism, the 
nature and the contents of R-knowledge are constituted by the rrodifying 
activity of the subjective conditio sine qua non of Re, and can be seen as 
standing, like a clouded glass, between HKS and ER.22 The precise extent of 
"opacity" can be left unspecified, provided that it is arrple enough to 
justify the conjecture that reality in iteself is different frcm reality as 
it is known by lOO3 ("ER in itself t known ER"). 
Fran an ontological point of view both versions irrply a form of 
dualism. The former, between the portion of ER which has been al ready known 
and the portion of ER which has not yet been known, the latter between what 
can be known of ER and what carmot be, that is between ER in itself and ER 
as it is for HKS. Only this latter can be considered to be the proper 
carponent of the TO, for it is ooly a qualitative version of Anti-Rep. 
that, without necessarily endorsing a radical ontological separation 
between ER in itself and ER as it is known by HKS (as if there were two 
actual distinct worlds), depicts the whole ER as having a twofold nature: 
nounenal and phenanena123 . 
Introducing this terminology takes us into the field of Kantian 
scholarshiif4. Since I have ccmni.tted myself to using the expression 
22) The "dark-glass· metaphor can be used provided it is realized that it may be misleading in 
stressing more on the selective than on the altering character of Re· 
23) This lonistic position is "regularly emphasized by those sympathetic to Kant's theory", 
cf. Westphal [1968), note 8, p.120. Kant very often speaks in ambiguous (if not opposite) 
terms, of nou.enal and phenaeenal objects, or of a nou.enal world and a phenomenal world (cf. 
for an indication of these passages Westphal [1968], pp.120-1 and footnotes). For a very clear 
statement of a lonistic interpretation cf. Priest [1987a), p.110-l. 
24) It is enough to consider that the Kantian Lexicon (Eisler [1971) contai ns more than two 
pages of Kantian quotations under the entrance " NOUIe non " . Many problem with the Kantian 
termi nology and the consequent conceptual disti nctions seem to be reducible to the problem 
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"version of Kantian realism", instead of the trore direct ''Kantian realism", 
in the following section I shall focus only on those aspects of the 
"nottnenon"-issue that are essential for the purposes of section 6. It is 
because I fcnmd the content of it close enough to what Rant says that I I ve 
not adopted the solution of labeling the positiOn so delineated "Pseudo-
Kantian'~S. This option, however, is left open to those who should feel 
less confident on such association. 
I 1.5 ON'roLOOlCAL RFALI~: MINIMAL ONTOLOOlCAL RFALISoI 
In order to rrake possibl e a precise use of the tenn "noumenon" and of 
the conceptual distinction that it brings with it, certain aspects of the 
not.rnenon-issue deserve sane specifications. These will introduce an 
additional roodificatian of the definition of Ontological Realism once Anti-
R has been taken on board. A-ep. 
First, the Kantian distinction nounenan/phenanenon presupposes that 
hy referring to the unknowable m in itself by means of the term 
l'nounenan" , we are not in fact sarehow in a contradictory manner 
detennining the nature of m in i tsel f , despite the limi. ts of our 
knowledge. IWounenon" is like a label for a variable we don It )mow the 
val ue of, and as after having call ed the variabl e "x" we haven I t said very 
rruch about it, so the intrinsic nature of ER is not grasped 
epistemologically any better because we define it "nol.lTleIlal". I'Nounenon" is 
a ltmdting-concept, a purely negative expression to refer to what remains 
already seen in the previous chapter, namely to the twofold nature of ontological realism, 
which never goes disjointed by its epistemological aspects. More specifically, in Kant one of 
the main problelll is that the theoretical value of " noumenon " has both an ontological and 
epistemological sides, cf. Heerbote [1974], p.166. As for the wide range of scholarly 
interpretations, cf. beside the works quoted by Westphal (1968), pp.120-1 and footnotes, the 
classic Kemp Smith (1923), pp.404-424. Schrader (1949), Graubau [1963), the articles by 
Krausser, Heerbote and Rescher in Beck (1974), Strawson [1975J, part IV and his criticism by 
Srzednicki [1984), to which I would subscribe. Hintikka [1974], and Hartnack [1987). 
25) Two Alore scholarly discussions of the followi n9 issues which I'm very sympathetic to are 
Westphal [1968J and Rescher [1974]. 
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unknown to HKS. The Greek origin of the term ("noeisthai" means "the 
objects of the Nous", "what is thinkable")' associates its semantical value 
to that of "speculation". We define as "nounenon" or "nounena" only that 
which is a matter of speculation, or better of a conceivable hypothesis. 
Secondly, the possibility of a plural form of the term, 
not.menan/nounena, may let saneone think that if the ''Jmowable m for us" is 
interpretable as a set of phenanena or phenanenal objects, similarly the 
"tmknowable ER in itself" can be thought of as a set of nounena, or 
not.rnenal objects. I believe that there are good reasons not to share such a 
one-to-one relation between nounena and phenanena, thouqh this step is 
taken by Kant hirnsel f in sare placeS26 • First of all it is rather 
problematic to accept the hypothesis that behind each object is lurking its 
correspondent not.menCll, since it would be very easy to draw paradoxical 
conclusions by working on the divisible nurber of actual objects. Moreover, 
a one-to-one interpretation would very easily led us to an overcrowded 
universe, which being a mere nOll1'Je1laI copy of the actual phenanenal world 
would not withstand the application of Ockarn's razor. Secondly, and in 
relation to this latter difficulty, the organization of a not.menal m in 
nounena appears a plain violation of the limits posed by the 
epistemological anti-realist position: it already amounts to a step into 
the danain of the nature of m in itself. Therefore, I shall use "nounenan" 
and "notmena" indifferently, to refer globally to an indistinct external 
reality in itself together with its own unknowable, hypothetical, intrinsic 
properties. 
As for the relation occurring between noumenal and phenomenal 
external reality, I shall 1 imi t mysel f to stipulate that I will use 
"nounenal m" in order to refer to ''ER in i tsel f", and that by "ER in 
itself" I mean the ontological root or basis which makes possible there 
being sanething like an "m for HKS". 27 Phenanenal ER can either be seen as 
26) cf. note 23 above. 
27) Cf. Rescher [1974]. 
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the ontological side of the result of the epistemic relatim between 
NOlI1lel'lal 1m and 1iKS, that is the ontological side of R-knowledge or of what 
we take the reality to be according to our R-knowledge; or as the epistanic 
epiphenOO'lel'lon of 1m in itself. Then, I shall adopt the following equations: 
016) 1m with its intrinsic existence and intrinsic properties =def. ER as 
it is in itself (or in se or an sich) =def. Nounenal ER =def. mIl; 
and 
~ 7) ER as it is known by HKS =def. ER as it is for HKS =def. Phenanenal ER 
=def. ERP. 
According to them, the distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative versions of Kantian realism can be re-expressed as two 
different interpretations of clause (ii) in D6' "A portion (greater than 
null, but not necessarily less than all) of ER has a nature (i.e. existence 
and properties) independent on hunan acknowledgment" in the case of a 
quanti tati ve version of Kantian realism is interpreted as meaning that: 
(iLa) "[it is possible to know that] all ER has a nature (i.e. existence 
and properties) independent of hunan acknowled~t"; 
it is only that we don't know yet, at least not carpletely, what this is. A 
quantitative version of Kantian realism does not admit a final dualism 
between mIl and ~P; 
whereas in the case of a qualitative version of Kantian realism the same 
clause is to be interpreted as meaning: 
(ii-b) "[it is possible only to hypothesise that] on the one hand ERP has a 
nature (Le. existence and properties) dependent of hunan acknowledgment, 
and on the other hand ~ has a nature (i.e. existence and properties) 
independent of hunan acknowledgment". 
Since the general process of acknowledging an indeterminate ER is 
also partially constitutive of the nature of what is HKS' knowledge of what 
~ is, then ~ is to be distinguished in mP and mIl. The presence of this 
latter IJIlSt be hypothesized in order to understand what phenanenal ER is a 
, 
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phenanenan of, that is in order to anchor antologically what is the result 
of the modifying activity of the conditio sine qua non of Re (ERP) to an 
independent m (mIl) .28 
Up to here we have equipped ourselves wi th a description of the 
essential conditions according to which 015 makes a re-interpretation of 
ontological realism both possible and necessary. Sumarizing all the 
adjustments in a cancl usi ve redefinition of Ront., we have that: 
l>}.S) Rant. =def. the philosophical position according to which (i) there is 
an external reality, m; (ii) the portion of ER which enjoys an intrinsic 
nature (Le. intrinsic existence and intrinsic properties) independent of 
hunan acknowledc;Jneflt is only conceivable as existent, but it is not 
knowable (ERn); (iii) the portion of m which is knowable is merely 
I 
phenanenal and in a significant degree its nature depends on the subjective I 
conditio sine qua nan of the P-knowing (ERP); and (iv) it is inpossible to 
I estinBte how different the nature of ERP is fran the nature of ERn. I 
I 
According to DIS none of the two questions ontological realism has 
been supposed to deal with can have a definite and posi ti ve answer. The An-
questicn (whether or not there is an external reality) is answered 
hypothetically: we can only presuppose that there is a notmenal ER behind 
the phenanenal ~ we lmow. The Quaoodo-questian (if there is, what sort of 
existence it has) is answered in a negative way, just by saying that 
eventually the existence of mn does not depend on hunan knowledge. Not 
only don't we know mil and at JOOSt can we merely hypothesise that there is 
sanething like mIl, but we cannot even calceive its intrinsic properties 
and eval uate how far is mP fran !Fl. 
Certainly this is a very meagre version of Root •. I shall refer to it 
as to the minimal ontological versicm of realism (minirral Rant.> for, if we 
should eliminate the appeal to the existence of a nounenal ER, Rant. as 
defined by DIS could sil11?ly aroount to a version of idealism. 
28}At this proposal it is possible to paraphrase Peirce ('[Duns Scotus] was separated from 
nominalism only by the division of an hair', (1871], p.l4) by saying that Kant's 
transcendental idealism is separated from German Classic Idealism only by the division of that 
subtle hair which is the appeal to the concept of ooul1lenon. 
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I 1.6 THE CONJUNCTION OF ANTI-Rep. AND MINIMAL Ront.: THE PERPETUAL 
CHECK OF RFASON 
The necessity of taking into account Anti-Rep. in the definition of 
Rant. has now led us to the threshold of the fomulation of the Tral.lTlatic 
Doubt. Endorsing a definition of Rant. as that given by DI8 already goes a 
lang way towards JOOtivating the doubt that "reality in itself may be 
carpletely different fran what we take it to be". According to ([Anti-
Rep. DIS ] + [Rant. DI8]), in so far as ER is antologically independent of 
HKS it is also \.U'lknowable for HI<S (mIl) and in so far as HKS knows ER, ER 
is not ontologically independent of HKS (ERP). The relations between HI<S 
and ER are complicated by the fact that, in all his other activities, lets 
say when HKS is in any other existential relation [Rexist. 1 with ER, HKS 
rrust be supposed to be in contact with mil and not wi th ERP. I've al ready 
given the example of eating, but many others can be thought, involving same 
action done by HKS and affecting same portion of external reality. Consider 
for example driving one's car. According to ([Anti-Rep. DIS] + [Ront. DIS]), 
when he is driving his car, a HKS is epistEJOOlogically in contact with 
phenanena belcnging to ERP, but what he also handles, and mmoeuvres is in 
itself a portion of ~. The puzzling thing is that his Jmowledge as it 
aspires to grasp the nounenal reality will always find itself falling 
short; it will always be "huran Jmowledge" and therefore ERP. 
It wi 11 be useful to give a graphic stmnary of the whol e ''machine'' 
that coostitues the content of the ro. The following pattern will be our 
basic reference: 
(epistemological level) 
mn(DIS) 
~~~------------~ J Rei {DlS Rexist. (ontological level) 
L--------------! 
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At the roore fundamental, ontological level HKS is fully in contact 
with mIl and he nay be sirrply presented as part of it. It is fran this 
perspective that HKS can conceive the gap existing at the epistemological 
level between ERP and mIl. Yet this gap is to remain episteroologically 
unfillable, for the very nature of Re is at the sarre time what produces it 
and what RBkes it inevitable. The result is that every time HKS extends Re 
in the attenpt to grasp mIl, that is every time HKS tries to advance his 
knowledge in order to go beyond ERP, ~ slips away, and remains ever 
elusive. 
It should be now evident why I've chosen the expression "Perpetual 
Check of Reason,~9 to label the logical reconstruction of the contents of 
the Traunatic Doubt. SUppose that the process of knowing is 1 ike a chess-
game with HKS and ER as the two players. HKS can be interpreted neither as 
losing nor as winning the game: he does not obtain a full grasp of the 
intrinsic nature of ER, but he cannot even say how far he is fran it, for 
he cannot tell if mP and mn are nuch the sarre or utterly different. The 
game is drawn because HKS cannot avoid the si tuatiCll of "Perpetual Check" 
in which he himself has put ER. Exactly when he is close to checkmate ER 
(full grasp of the intrinsic nature of m) m makes a further move which 
in'pedes the capture of the King (its intrinsic nature). HKS and ER play an 
infini te sequence of rooves, without HKS ever going closer to the end of the 
game. 
A deeper insight into the nature of the Perpetual Check of Reason can 
be gained by means of a parallel with a rrathenatical pseudo-paradox.30 
Suppose we are asked to either accept or refuse the idea that there 
is at least ane possible natural mIlDer N which in fact has never been 
29) 'In Chess and other related games a situ~tion in which one player ~a~not prevent ;he other 
frOi Rlaking an unli.ited sequence of checkIng lIoves (and thus obtalnlng a draw). O.E.O., 
second edition. 
30) This paradox is tailored on Berry's Paradox, cf. Russell (1910), book I, p.61: "the least 
integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllabes'j or Black's version: "the least integer 
not named in this book' in Black (1933), p.98. 
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thought in the past, is in fact not thought at the present rranent and wi 11 
in fact never been thought in the future. SUppose also that we accept this 
idea, at a first it seems reasonable to suggest that there is at least one 
possible natural nurber in the infinite set of natural n1..lrbers, to which 
apply such a negative description. Do we really know at least one example 
of it ? Since the exanple is so construed as to rrake ''being in fact never 
thought" the individuating property of N, and since the foregoing question 
aroounts to a request to mentally fonrulate N, it is obvious that we cannot 
give a positive answer. The very act of giving an exarrple is self 
contradictory. Apparently the striking conclusion is that we are able to 
think of something like a never-thought possible natural number N, but we 
are not able to 1mow it. The only process through which N can be 
individuated is also the same process through which the peculiar nature of 
N is irremediably lost. 
The example can even go a bit further than this. For it is possible 
to give a non-contradictory Russellian definite description of a never-
thought N, provided that such a definite description individuates one and 
only one N without however mentioning it. This can be done in the following 
way:' 
i) suppose that all the natural nunbers after a certain extension are too 
big to be in fact ever thought, in the past in the present and in the 
future; 
ii) suppose that a nmber like x (where x is a specific fomulation of ane 
natural nUTber, say for exanple 1) belongs to this set of never-thought N; 
iii) suppose it was in fact a never-thought N and that it would have 
remained so if we had not thought it now; by thinking it now - just say 
"11" - we have praTPtly excluded it fran the set; 
iv) suppose now that exactly the same happens for x+2: (for the same value 
of x): we think "3!" and so we lose it as a good exarrple; 
the last step consists in saying that: 
-
v) a possible natural nUTber N which in fact has never been thought in the 
past, is in fact not thought at the present rrarent and wi 11 in fact never 
been thought in the future is "the possible natural nurber N occurring 
between "!!" and "3!"". This latter is a definite description. 
Many features of this pseudo-paradox may throw sane light on what I 
mean by the Perpetual Check of Reason. Exactly what makes it a pseudo-
paradox - i.e. a certain amount of mathematical platonism implicit in the 
assumption that there are numbers existing independently of the possibility 
of being thought or fomulated by saneone - renders it close to the actual 
situation we face in the nOllOOIlon-issue: we are presupposing that there is 
an ER with intrinsic properties but which no matter what we do will always 
remain hidden fran us. 
SUppose that, for the sake of exerrplication, we do accept a strong 
Platonist view about the nature of natural numers, so that we let 
ourselves be caught in the paradox. The problem we face is that despite the 
fact that we are convinced of the external existence of N and we are also 
able to indicate it in a negative way, as soon as we try to grasp it, to 
naninate it, we are left with nothing: the object of our search disappears, 
and we need to move a bit further to reach another natural nU"lber which 
still has the property of being, so to say, fomulatim-free. In the 
mathenatical exarrple this happens because "to think N" means "to modify the 
property of N of not being thought". Hence the occurring ''roodifying 
relatim" is "roodifying" in a strmger sense than that assuned above. 
''Modifying'' is to be intended here in respect to its object and not just in 
respect to its resul t . This however, can anI y reinforce the analogy: we 
have the same feeling of frustration about the nollt1ef1al m and the 
unknowable N. such a frustration is worse than the delusion fel t because of 
the disappearing of a mere mirage. For we are left with the conviction that 
there is an independent external reality (there is a natural nUTber) which 
has a proper existence and eventually its own intrinsic properties, and yet 
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we cannot reach it. The sarre "instrunent" we are using to grasp the nature 
~ is such as to nullify our efforts and prevent a positive final result. 
Let me now draw the cone! usion of this chapter. I've started by 
saying that I would have followed a step-hy-step procedure in order to 
outline each important stage in the rising of the Traumatic Doubt. In six 
sections we have travelled through the fonmulatians of the epistemological 
and the ontological ccrrponents of the 'I'D. The final result has been that 
the content of the 'I'D is gi ven by the canbination of a form of 
epistemological anti-realism like Anti-Rep.DIS with a fonn of ontological 
min:i.nal realism like Ront . 018. I have re-Iabelled the cCJTl)lex picture 
caning out of analysis the Perpetual Check of Reason. Throughout the 
chapter I've presupposed an implicit acceptance of the Aristotelian 
Postulate as this has been sketchly described in the General Introduction. 
There I made clear that, unless we also asStlne the Aristotelian Postulate, 
the qualitative version of Kantian realism is not yet sufficient to produce 
that unpalatable irrpression of displacement that we take for granted when 
we understand the Doubt qua Traunatic. It is only by assumng the 
intellectualist desire for knowledge for its won sake that the Perpetual 
Check of Reason becanes frustrating: the nature of the subjective cooditio 
sine qua nm of Re (hunan cognitive processes) is such as to lead to a 
cmflict between HKS' desire to know the intrinsic nature of m and the 
i.npossibility to satisfy such desire. What I shall argue in the second part 
of this study is that, following the analogy with chess, a draw in terms of 
Perpetual Check can be a very good result, if only we could understand that 
HKS is not playing with the white, but with the black. Out of the analogy, 
I shall advocate that if Jmowledge is no longer interpreted as a free 
spontaneous activity of HKS aimed at the "epistemic possession" of ER, but 
as a reaction against the presence of m as sanethil1g' opposing IlKS, then 
the possibility of leaving ~ outside the wall of our intellectual Troy 
aIAPl'ER I I 88 
should be seen as a great achievement. But this is anticipating too much. 
For the nanent we can sirrply accept the idea that the Perpetual Check of 
Reasoo is a highly negative irrpasse that any philosophy risks, and as such 
an unpleasant cooclusion that a philosophical doctrine, if possible, would 
like to avoid. From this perspective ([Anti-Rep. DIS] + [Rant.DI8]) is to be 
tmcierstood as one of the crucial problems of episteroology, such that any 
respectable theory of knowledge nust both determine its position in respect 
to it and try to escape. This is what we are going to see in the next 
chapter . 
• 
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METAFHYSICAL AND EPIS'I'EM)LOGlCAL S'lRATroIES AGAINST THE PERPE'!U.AL CHECK OF 
REASON 
"Modeste tamen et cirCllllSpecto judicio de tantis viris pronuntiandll1l est" 
Quintilian 
I I 1.1 INTROOOCTION 
In the previous two chapters I have dwelt an the analysis of the TD 
enough to render its epistaro/antological contents sufficiently explicit 
and clear. Time has cane now to tum to the third and final stage of the 
first part of this study, namely a general survey of the main solutions 
anteposed to the Perpetual Check of Reason. This chapter is organized into 
five further sections. In section two I will lay down the general map of 
the principal strategies available against the ~. '!'he last chapter has 
ended by showing the ontological consequences of accepting an Anti-realist 
epistemological position. Thus it is worth starting this chapter by 
deepening the investigation of the cntological side of the issue a bit 
further. In section three we shall see what happens to the PeR once 
interpretations and additional modificatioos of the ontological cooponent 
of the PCR challenge the validity of its ''minirrBl ontological realism". 
Subsequently, alongside the oscillating method adopted in the previous 
chapters, in section four I will concentrate on the episteroological side of 
the issue. And obviously a discussicn of a possible positive 
reinterpretation of the PCR is to be left for the fifth section, where it 
will have the function of introducing the criticism of the Aristotelian 
89 
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Postulate, which is a similar attempt to give a positive reading of the 
PCR. In section six I will smmarize the principal conclusions of the 
entire investigation. 
There are several reasons that induce me to postpone the discussion 
of the Aristotelian Postulate untill after a wide survey of the other main 
attmpts to solve the Perpetual Check of Reasoo. First, the need of a 
further analysis of the internal logical structure of the Perpetual Check 
of Reason. This chapter definitely concludes the general discussion of the 
PCR and provides us with a final, articulated understanding of the nature 
of the problem. Secondly, the importance of introducing the idea that the 
PCR can be opposed fran more than one side. By disrrantling the fOl111Lllation 
of the PCR and by showing what criticiSfl'S could be made against each step 
which has been made to construct it, the investigation conducted in this 
chapter prepares the ground for the second part of the work. Thirdly, and 
more specifically, two final tasks will be accomplished here: proving that 
the PCR is of the utJoost irrportance in the history of episteroology - I 
shall be able to show how different theories of knowledge can be directly 
re-interpreted as attE!llFts to avoid, solve or dissol ve the PCR - and 
indicating that all the attempts of solution of the PCR (i.e. most of the 
theories of )mowledge) , despite their radical differences, have been 
substantially united by the Aristotelian Postulate, which represents their 
cornman, tacit and never challenged assumption. 
The chapter is a sort of hinge between the first and the second part 
of the work. It will lead us fran the fomulation of the Perpetual Check of 
Reascn to the analysis of the Aristotelian Postulate as one of its main 
sources. 
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I I I . 2 THE GmElU\L FRAMDlOOK 
The cancl usion of the analysis of the perne;ual· Check of Reason in 
II.6 has been that the acceptance of ([Anti-Rep I] + ~Qflt DIS]) inplies 
the acceptance of a gap (G) occurring between ERP and ERu, 'such that HKS 
can be only antologically but not episteroologically in full contact with 
the intrinsic nature of ER. The source of the Perpetual Check of Reason 
turns out to consist in the possibility of there being a difference G 
between m as it is in itself and ER as it is for HKS. Only if such a gap 
is first thought to be possible then is it also possible to endorse its 
actual presence. In order to be able to wonder that "reality in itself may 
be carpletely different fran what we take it to be" we rrust have already 
ass1.lnE!d that "reality in itself could be carpletely different fran what we 
take it to be". All this can be graphically represented by slightly 
modifying Scheme.4: 
(Anti-R_- DIS + R DIS) = 
--epa -1)Ilt. 
(epistemological level) 
/Re~+-G_ ER" 
~Roi~ 
(ontological level) 
(in this context (Rexist.) can be dropped) 
Accordingly, the key-issue for any philosophical theory which would 
like to avoid the cone I usions of the Perpetual Check of Reason turns out to 
be the presence of the gap G between mP and ~, and the possibility of 
avoiding it. 
Clearly enough, there may be three different attitudes towards G and 
so three fundamental strategies against the Perpetual Check of Reason. G 
nay be seen as either avoidable or as unavoidable. In the former case G can 
be seen avoidable in two principal ways, in so far as it is due to a 
particular (but according to the theories which endorse this kind of 
strategy against the Perpetual Check of Reason we should say "wrong") 
interpretation of Re or of Rei' However the elimination is conducted, a 
Jrodification of Re or of Rei rrust necessarily lead to the institution of 
(the possibility of) both an ootological and an epistem:>logical "full 
contact" between HKS and m. In the latter case, that is if G is thought to 
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be unavoidable, then a different re-interpretatioo of it nay be attenpted. 
Sin~e in this context I don't mean to deal with the Aristotelian Postulate, 
I will assure that any philosophical theory would try either to eliminate G 
ontologically or episteroologically, or to diminishes its significance as 
nuch as possible. Only the anthropological strategy will attenpt a radical 
re-interpretation of G in positive terms, but we shall see this in the 
second part of the work. 
The first strategy starts fran the possibility of eliminating G by 
means of a revision of the ontological source of the gap. Briefly, the idea 
in this case is that since G is caused by the presence of an ontological 
independence between knower and known (Rei (m,HKS» as interpreted by 
Ront. 018, then G could be rerooved, and the PCR would be avoided, as soon as 
we dispose of the dualism between mP and mIl due to the relation Rei' As 
we will see, this strategy can be properly called metaphysical, and it IlBY 
consist in three different versions of Idealism, Plato's, Berkeley's and 
Hegel's. For in order to support the hypothesis that there is no gap 
between m P and mIl we nay roodify Rei (m,HKS) so as to: 
a) eliminate the presupposition that HKS is primarily related with m 
(Plato's Idealism); or 
b) eliminate m (Berkeley's Idealism); or 
c) eliminate the presupposition that there is an lIDcrossable and 
unresolvable distinction and therefore any fixed, external relation between 
ER and HItS (Hegel's Idealism). 
The second strategy ccnsiders the presence of G to be caused by the 
presence of the process of knowing (i. e. Re (HKS, ER» as this is 
interpreted bv Anti-R DlS. Therefore it will concern the possibility of 
.z ep. 
eliminating G, hence of solving the Perpetual Check of Reason, by modifying 
sane aspects of Re (HKS, ER). This strategy can be properly called 
epistEfll)logical, and it consists in reconciling the process of knowing with 
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the possibility of grasping the intrinsic nature of ER, in such a way as to 
eliminate the episteroological dualism between mP and mI1. In order to 
avoid the dualist conclusion that the product of the process of knowing 
(Le. R-knowledge) is such as to present to HKS an mP which is different 
fran mI1 it is possible to vindicate three general forms of episterrological 
realism. For it is possibl e to hold that there isn't any G occurring 
between ERP and mI1: 
a) because the nature of the subjective cooditio sine qua non of P-knowinq, 
i . e. the nature of hunan cogni ti ve processes, is such as to put HKS in 
direct contact wi th the nature of ER; or 
b) because the nature of the ontic conditio sine qua nan of P-knowing, Le. 
the nature of the influence of ER on HKS (cf. end of 11.3) is such as to 
present HKS with the intrinsic nature of ER; or 
c) because there is a third element, extraneous to p-knowing, that 
guarantees that in fact (ERP = mIl). 
According to (a) and (b) G is eliminated because mP is episteroologically 
equivalent to mD, according to (c) G is eliminated because a third 
element, different fran ERP and mIl, guarantees that they are equivalent. 
'lbe third strategy is that which presents the most disparate 
solutions. Fran an abstract point of view, once the limits of hunan 
objective knowledge have been recognized as tmavoidable, there might be two 
kinds of interpretation of G. The first interpretation of G is "positive": 
the basic idea is that of trying to revalue the epistennc limits shown by 
hU"lBIl objective knowledge, against the sceptical attitude. This task is 
accooplished by finding a possible role that such limits may positively 
play within a context wider than that generated by the aim of knowing the 
intrinsic nature of ER. I shall mention two principal proposals under this 
al ternati ve: Kant's regW ati ve use of Reason and Vi co 's ccmnendati on in 
favour of historical Jmowledge (the "verun ipst.m factun"). 
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There can be two addresses for a "negati veil interpretation of the 
~. On one hand it may be thought that the dualism between ERP and ~ 
proves strongly enough that there is nothing positive in hunan knowledge 
tout court. Eventually this alternative leads to the foIlTlllation of various 
versions of scepticism. On the other hand it nay be thought that the same 
limits make clear that at least btman objective knowledge must be replaced 
by sane other kind of knowledge. Again, eventually this position leads to 
irratiooalism, where by "irrationalism" is to be intended both "a-
rationalism" and "anti -rationalism". According to one or the other of these 
two senses, a phi 1 osopher wi 11 ei ther urge us to overcane the I imi. ts of our 
objective knowledge in order to acquire a more fundamental, and 
supplementary intuition of the intrinsic nature of reality, or he will 
invite us to refuse our objective knowledge in favour of an alternative 
epistenac access to the same reality. 
Since sane versial of irraticmalism can still aroount to a real 
attarpt to avoid the Perpetual Check of Reason, only the first negative 
interpretation leading to the fornulation of a sceptical view is generally 
considered the deleterious face of the Tra\JTlatic Doubt, as if the 
acceptance of the PCR necessarily inplied a radical form of scepticism. 
Because the negative interpretations of the ~ are the consequences of the 
first and most direct attitude towards the Traunatic Doubt, I will refer to 
the positive interpretations of it as re-interpretations or "revaluations" 
of the significance of the PCR and discuss them in the end. 
Before I begin the examdnation of the strategies against the PCR, I 
need to specify the several limits within which I will lead my 
investigation. The distinctions I shall draw represent a very schematic way 
of putting the issue. In fact the three basic strategies listed above are 
by no means necessarily al temative or even so clearly distinguished in 
different philosophers. It is tmPortant that the possibility of alternative 
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interconnections is borne in mind in order not to lU'ldervalue the deep 
complexity of the actual answers that have been provided in the course of 
the history of philosophy. I stress this aspect here because in what 
follows I shall disregard any global perspective by assUTling a rrore 
restricted approach. On the one hand, I focus just on each of the three 
possible nanoeuvres, leaving to the taste of the reader to arrange any 
eventual conjlU'lction of them in broader strategies. And on the other hand I 
will also be able to tackle only the main aspects of the topic in a very 
st.lTl1'ary way, presenting just. the bare outlines of possible solutions to the 
PCR. Clearly, in discussing the different solutions of the Perpetual Check 
of Reason I will draw a sort of developnent of episteroological theories 
only strictly in respect to the Traunatic Doubt. This rreans that on many 
other points, all extremely important for the history of epistemology, the 
exposition, when not lacking any reference at all, will be necessarily 
insufficient. Sane of the central theoretical issues I won It be able to 
take into aCCOlU'lt are: the distinction between ilanorphic, iconic and 
propositional rrodels of knowledge; the distinction between knowledge how, 
that, of, about, by acquaintance; the characterization of knowledge before 
and after Ockam (knowledge of universals and Jmowledge of particulars), 
before and after Descartes (Jmowledge of sanething and representative 
knowledge) and before and after Wittgenstein (representative-mental 
knowledge and propositional-linguistic knowledge). The situation is not 
different on the historical side, which will also suffer severe 
restrictions. Since the investigation concerns mainly the logical nature of 
possible solutions of the PeR I will quote authors and philosophical 
theories solely to indicate sane eminent places where I believe it is 
possible to recognize similar (if not identical) positions. By such a 
cursory approach I don't mean to reduce authors and philosophical theories 
to siJtl)lified schemes. I will largely disregard the scholarly aspects of 
the theories or authors I will quote, both for reasons of limits and of 
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opporhmity. Personally I'm satisfied by the way I've matched the logic and 
the history of the issue, but those who feel tnleasy about that may adopt 
the device of relabelling "Hegel's theory" as ''H-theory'' I "Kant's position" 
as ''K-position'' and so on. I wouldn't mind doing this in the exposition, if 
it were not that in this way the chapter would lose too nuch in terms of 
readability, and on the other hand it would not acquire enough in 
appropriateness to justify this further increment of an already difficult 
paraphernalia of definitions and abbreviations. I' also won't state the 
criticisms that could be rooved to each solution of the PCR. Such a 
restriction is justified not only by the fact that this is not the proper 
place for a history of epistemology nor would there be space enough for 
such a 1 engthy discussion; it is al so rooti vated by the additional and 
essential fact that, although I'm proposing it as a new solution of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason, I'd like to present the criticism of the 
Aristotelian Postulate as only one alternative among others, and as such, 
as a solution that eventually could be associated and interlocked with 
previous solutions. 
These are the limits of the exposition that should be kept in nrind 
while reading this chapter. I thought that the quotation fran Quintilian 
stated the point as clearly as I wished. 
I I 1.3 THE ME'I'APHYSlCAL STRAT.eX;Y: IDFALIs-fS 
The metaphysical strategy consists essentially in making the notion 
of an external reality existing in itself, independently of any previous or 
further spiritual, mental or logical factor, EIlPty. If the independent 
existence of the second element related by Roi' i.e. of m, disappears, 
then there won't be any further probl ems about a gap between real i ty in 
itself and reality as it is )mown by HKB. A metaphysical refusal of the 
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Perpetual Check of Reason operates by accepting the clause that there is an 
external reality HKS is in contact with, while rejecting the secand, anti-
htl1'BIli.st clause, this being in terms either of rnind/s-independence or of 
acknowledgment-independence. It is for this reasan that a metaphysical 
strategy is also essentially idealist: in terms of Rant. its proposal 
amounts to accepting the same positive answer given by the realist to the 
An-question yet JOOdifying in different ways the answer to the Quaoodo-
questicn. 
As I've al ready rrenti aned, there are three main ways whereby the 
idealist requirement about (H), that is about a sanehow-dependentIy 
existent reality, can be fulfilled. The first possibility consists in 
maintaining the distinction between ERP and FFl, but inverting their 
"positions" in respect to HRS. The secand consists in eliminating ER 
reducing all that is real to the existence of HKS and of mental activity. 
The last possibility consists in eliminating the presupposition that there 
are sanething like two distinct elements HKS and ER related by sanething 
• 
else like Rei or Re as external relatioos. 
I I!. 3. a IDFALlfM: PrATO'S STRATOOY 
In very crude terms, one of the possibl e ways of tmderstanding the 
presence of G is to interpret it as due to the presence of a ''Jrore real" 
reality (ER'l) behind the reality which appears to HKS (ERP). If the 
distinction between ERP and mIl nust be kept, a possible solution in order 
to avoid the disruptive consequences of the presence of G nay be that of 
inverting the positions of ERP and ERD in respect to HKS. This inversion of 
places is obtainable by means of the assurption of a nounenal world rnn 
which is at the same time: 
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(i) (antologically) the ontological matrix of external reality within which 
HKS lives his life (i. e. ~p); and 
(ii) (epistemologically) already cognitively mastered by HKS. 
If HKS has been fully in contact with FR1 and external reality ERP is 
merely a copy of it, then G assumes a completely different value: the gap 
no longer occurs between mP as it is known by HKS and ~ which is 
tmknowable, but between a perfect, irnrutable reality which is known by HKS 
(a Platonist mIl) and its concrete, E'f'I'Pirical "realization", only 
approximately "real" (a Platonist world of appearances or mP) and as such 
onl y approximatel y knowabl e. In other words, HKS is supposed to have been 
in contact with the ontological matrix of external reality, and whatever in 
external reality is different fran the picture HKS has of it, it is a 
"fault" of external reality itself, which is il'J'1?erfect, incamplete or 
second-rate. It follows that there is nothing wrong in trying to convince 
the man of the street that reality in itself is different fran what he 
believes it to be, for in fact the Reality is only nounenal, and it is that 
Reality we either recollect in our minds, or partially recoqni.ze as 
eperating in the world as its paradi«;11\. 
Historically, I suspect that the significant change ("change" in 
respect to our present perspective) in the posi ti ons of ERP and mIl in 
regard to HKS had the fundamental consequence of reI egating to the Heaven 
the perfectioo and precision of mathematics and logic for centuries (ct. 
Koyre's ingenious essay [1948]). It was only with the second hal f of the 
XVI century, the technological developrents (measures of space and time by 
means of instrunents) in connection with a new cultural at:m:>sphere 
(enployment of these measures and of calculations) that ~ started 
disappearing fran the horizon of what was already known or at least 
knowable by HKS, and ERP kept approaching HKS as what HKS was really in 
contact with. If this theoretical IOOvement by which mP ends by being the 
first and unique epistemological environment within which HKS leads his 
i 
d 
I 
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mental life begun with Descartes, it was with Kant that it had its final 
recognition. 
Since the Platonist solution shifts EFl closer to HKS and ERP in the 
place where ~ was according to the PCR, the Platonist strategy can be 
graphicall r interpreted as Jrod:i fying Scheme. 5 thus: 
The scheme shows that: 
i) the relation between ER'l and JmP is such that the former is no longer 
logically ''behind'' but ''before'' the latter, and the nature of ERP is to be 
understood as phenanenal not only in an episteroological sense, but also 
antologically, ERP being just a copy or a shadow of mn; 
ii) the relation between HKS and JmP is similar to that presupposed by the 
PCR: ERP nay still be in a relation of ontological independence of HKS' 
acJmowl ed9nerlt ; and HKS nay have only a partial Jmowledge of mP• The main 
difference is in the relation between HKS and mIl, for 
iii) the relation between HKS and mIl is such that mn is ontologically 
independent of IlKS' Jmowledge, but HKS has an epistemically privileged 
access (whatever this may be, say recollectioo, Jmowledge by acquaintance, 
intuitim etc.) to its intrinsic nature. This explains the need to 
distinguish between ReI and Re2. However ReI is cancei ved, HKS is in 
harmony wi th ~. 
But then, isn't this form of Platonism just an episteroological 
solutim of the Perpetual Check of Reasan, and as such, shouldn't it be 
1 
1) This graphic representation of Plato's strategy can be see as a re-interpretation of his ~ 
"theory of the Ii ne". cf. RepubJi c VI. 508a-Slle. i 
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discussed in the next sectioo ? 4J.h! question is due to the obvious key-role 
played in (iii) by the epistanically privileged access, and yet it relies 
on a misunderstanding. As I've had occasioo to repeat more than once in 
chapter II, any posi tioo about the realism-debate cannot be purely 
ontological, but only mainly or basically ontological. And this seans to be 
the case with Plato's Idealism, where it is the ontological device which is 
the central issuef. The episteroo1ogica1 relation between HKS and mIl 
assumes a central role only after the substitution of the positions of ~ 
and mP has been conceived. And this manoeuvre is possible only owing to an 
mto1ogical hypothesis, viz. that working in terms of matrix and copy. I 
shall briefly tum to the Platonist privileged access to mIl in section 
III.4.a. For the manent, it will be sufficient to say that Neoplatonic 
versions of this strategy will more and IOOre stress the ontological 
irrportance of the speculative process of "stepping back" or "ascensio" 
towards the source of the phenanenal III.ll titudes of our world. Cognitive1y, 
nan is supposed to go back to the matrix of the universe by going 
"backwards" throuqh all those phases that the developnent of Being has 
graduallly passed through going "onwards". 
I I 1.3. b IDFALI9-I: BmKELEY'S STRA'l'fDY 
The second alternative we have at hand is probably the IOOSt direct: 
we may calSider the gap G occurring between ERP and mn as depending on the 
errooeouB presupposition that there is sanething like m existing 
independently of HKS. The hypothesis may run sanething like this: 
2) A similar but opposite discourse is valid for the Aristotelian distinction between matter 
and form: I would interpret this ontological strategy as depending on the epistemological 
solution of the peR in terlls of activity of ER on HKS' intellectus passivus or tabula rasa. 
This is the reason why I list Aristotle's strategy among those epistemological, in section 3. 
Needles to re.ind that all this speaking about logical priority between episteMology and 
ontology in these or other authors is strictly depending on the perspective assumed in this 
context. 
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a) as lang as we asstrne a dualism between knower and known, between knowing 
acti vi ty on one side and )mown object on the other, it wi 11 be al ways 
possible 
a.i) to suspect that the two elements don't coincide, for there is no fODm 
of dual ism that doesn't open the way to pI ural ism; and therefore 
a.H) to irrply that the result of the knowing activity is sanehow, yet 
seriously, different fran what the known object is in itself; but, 
b) if this dualism should turn out to be ill grolmded, if it would be 
possible to replace it by a strong form of lOOl1.ism according to which, at 
the end of the day external reality can be reduced to sane Il'eIltal product, 
then 
c) we would have eliminated the possibility of the presence of G, and a 
fortiori we would have established the vanity of the Traumatic Doubt. 
Hence an idealist'3 solution of the PCR may be obtained by sil'l1'ly disposing 
of the central assllTPtion of Roi ' for there is no such problem as that 
caused by the presence of G - i. e. there is no roan for the Tra\.llla.tic Doubt 
- if there is no such thing as an independent reali ty m. Since the 
solution still accepts the first clause of Rant.' i.e. that there is an 
external reali ty, it may be reinterpreted as catFressing mn onto ERP. And 
since ERP doesn't have an existence independent of HKS' epistemdc activity, 
the relation Rei is made equal to Re. It is easy to recognize a version of 
Berkeley's Idealism in this strategyi. Schenatically we have that: 
3) Apparently, it is easier to elaborate an idealist version of monism which stands up, than a 
physicalist or materialist equivalent, perhaps because the former has the only lilit of its 
internal coherence, while the latter, if it wants to appear credible, must deal with the 
empirical evidence that there are human beings whose mental life can be hardly reduced to pure 
matter without some residue. By way of aside let me suggest that Aristotle's hypothesis about 
the intellectus passivu5 affected by external reality may partially represent a ·materialist· 
counter-part of Berkeley's all-mental world. 
4) Since Berkeley's project is to confront Locke's ·extreme· empiricism, he ends by shari~ 
with Locke the same Aristotelian-Thomistic assumption whereby any knowledge has its source in 
perception ("nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu·) to the effect that his 
main concern is with a perception-less ("un-perceived·) external reality, which is only a 
special case of the acknowledgement-less external reality seen in 06. For the importance of 
the more ample perspective introduced by a formulation in terms of ·acknowledgement· (as this 
has been technically used in this context) instead of the more limited ·perception· cf. for 
example the Platonist approach of Leibniz [1765]. books 1 and 2 (especially the concept of 
i nnatenes). ;j 
:J 
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BfflKEI·p;y 's S'IRATEXlY 
(ontological level) = (epistemological level) /i=Re"-. 
(ReP. + Anti-Rant.) HKS mP = ERn .. ~ :;'ER.n I (ontologicallevel~ %iL- ..... 
SchalliL1 
In The Principles of HtI1B1l Knowledge (paragraph 87) Berkeley 
expresses the central issue of his work in a way strikingly s~lar to that 
used here to fonmulate the PCR: 
'Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of 
them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of 
our reach to determine. So that, for ought we know [II.J may be only phantoms and 
vain chimeras, and not at all agree with the real things, existing in rerum natura 
[see next chapter for the importance of this 'natura' in classic philosophy]. All 
this follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the 
former have a subsistence without the mind, or unperceived.' 
To the English reader Berkeley's idealism is certainly the most well 
known of the three idealisms exposed in this section - even if it has been 
considered more as a polemic reference than as an interesting or fruitful 
theory in itself - and therefore it is not necessary to spend too nuch time 
in presenting his solution. Let me just cast sane light en two features 
which are JOOSt relevant this centeno 
First, it will be r€!llE!fTi:>ered that this is the second time we have 
encolmtered Berkel ey' s idealism, for he has al ready been quoted in the 
introductien of the previous chapter (cf. II.~.C). There I said that the 
possibility of cenjoininq a version of epistemological realism with a 
versicn of antological anti -realisnf could be presented as a possible 
solution of the PCR. Now Scheme 7 above makes explicit this possibility, by 
5) By way of aside it is worth noticing that, because Berkeley's theory presents the existence 
of the world as depending on a continuous activity of God's Mind one of the crucial problem 
that Berkeley saw as relevant to his theory was the correspondent undervaluation of the nature 
of miracles (where by 'miracle' is generally understood the exceptional intervention of a 
Divinity into the affairs of the physical world). Obviously the issue can be hardly seen as an 
interesting proble. nowadays, and yet its vital importance for Berkeley should not be 
undervalued. In fact, Berkeley discusses it as the second theological objection in paragraph 
84 and interestingly enough he fails to answer it. 
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substituting (Anti-Rep .DIS + Ront. DIS ) of Schane S with (Rep. + Anti-
Ront.>· 
Secondly, Berkeley argues that his theory precludes scepticism by 
rerooving its very basic assmption: that there are things independent of 
the mind, and of which HKS' knowledge can give a poor representatiarf. In 
Berkeley m is the result of the interplay between God's and man's minds so 
that the intrinsic nature of it is siI1l?ly mental and cannot escape man's 
full carprehension. In order to re-establish our confidence in Rep. 
Berkeley proposes to shift the negation (ANTI-) fran Rep. to Rant.' Then 
the Berkeleian strategy may be interpreted as prompted by that conjunction 
of the ~ with a sceptical outccrne whose possibility I have sketched 
above, in the first section. Like in Plato's case, also in Berkeley's 
strategy the episteroological calpCIlent has a very inportant role but the 
ontological solutioo is the central point. Although in virtue of this shift 
Berkeley's idealism can really avoid the Perpetual Check of Reason, to the 
great majority of philosophers it has very often appeared too high a price 
to pay for episterological realism, a radical solution that camdts an 
"ontological realist suicide" just in order to avoid the epistE!fOOlogical 
stabbing of the sceptic. 
1II-3.c IDFALIEM: H&;El.'S STRA'lmY 
The last possible solution we need to consider under the label 
''metaphysical'' consists in the elimination of the very idea of an external 
relatioo between HKS and m. As far as I understand it, this further 
hypothesis can be fomulated in the following way. The source of the 
presence of G as essentially problE!l'1'Btic does not lie in the nature of F]t, 
or in that of HKS or in any special, further feature of their relation; the 
6) Cf. paragraphs 85-156, particularly 85-91. 
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real problem lies in the original, misleading assUT(?tion made when we speak 
of the existence of an external reality and of the possibility of knowing 
it. This ass\.l1l?tion consists of an an uncri tical acceptance of the 
unresoluble dichotany between HKS and ER as the essential condition for any 
possible, meaningful speech about knowledge and reality. It is because we 
already, wrongly accept the idea that on one side there is HKS and on the 
other side there is m that we are forced to face the problem of re-
connecting them, both at the ontological and at the epistemological level. 
As lang as both elEm::!Ilts are seen (as they should be) as mere parts of a 
whole tmity, which can be called the Absolute (as the union of everything, 
which doesn't leave anything outside of it, not even the logical 
possibility of its negation) they can also be seen as mere stages of the 
developnent of this Absolute. Knowledge is nothing less than the 
rranifestatian of the Absolute on the episteroological side, nothing less 
than the self-knowledqe of the Absolute, whereas external reality, man 
incltded, represents the emtological developnent of the same Absolute. But 
then we have that the onto-logical and the episteroo-logical are just two 
perspectives fran which the logical developrent of the Absolute in its 
dialectic phases can be reconstructed. And the presence of G marks only a 
m:mentary phase in the dialectical developrelt of the total knowledge of 
the Absolute. It is sirrply senseless to keep on speaking about an 
unknowable reality in itself, once the logical dialectic of the Absolute 
has taken place, as if there could real~y be sanething that is independent 
fran the whole. 
I demit pretend that the previous fomulation will make the argunent 
rrore palatable than it generally is to an errpirically-educated reader. I 
believe only that it makes the whole strategy recognizable as 
foundamentally Hegelian, and if not plausible at least understandable. But 
let me quote in full what Hegel says in the Introduction of the 
Phenanenology of Hind: 
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It is natural to suppose that, before philosophy enters upon its subject proper [ ... J 
it is necessary to come first to an understandi n9 concerni n9 knowledge, which is 
looked upon as an instrument, by which to take possession of the Absolute (in this 
context we may read it, 'external reality') or as the means through which to get a 
sight of it. [ ... J This apprehensiveness (i.e. our concern about there being 
different types of knowledge, one better than another, and about the possibility of 
chosing the wrong one) is sure to pass even into the conviction that the whole 
enterpr ise which sets out to secure for consciousness by mea ns of know ledge what 
exists per se, is in its very nature absurd; and that between knowledge and the 
Absolute (i.e. 'external reality) there lies a boundary which completely cuts off the 
one from the other. For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of 
absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an 
instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in 
the process, and has in view, a moulding and an alteration of it. Or, again, if 
knowledge is not an instrument which we actively employ, but a kind of passive medium 
through which the light of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it 
as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. [ ... J Meanwhile, if the 
fear of falling into error [i.e. into the error of accepting an improper instrument 
or medium] introduces an element of distrust into science, which without any scruples 
of that sort goes to work and actually does know, it is not easy to understand why, 
conversely, a distrust should not be placed in this very distrust, and why we should 
not take care lest the fear of error is not just the initial error. As a matter of 
fact, the fear presupposes something, indeed a great deal [ ... J. It starts with ideas 
of knowledge as an instrument and as a medium; and presuppos(!S a distinction of 
ourselves from this knowledge. More especially it takes for granted that the Absolute 
stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from 
the Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by 
being outside the Absolute is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true 
[ ... J. This conclusion [i.e.the resolution of the peR by means of a reconciliation of 
knowledge and the Absolute] comes from the fact that the Absolute alone is true or 
that the Truth alone is absolute. (pp.131-133; all the italics are mine, apart from 
'per se'). 
Although a scheme for this last foon of Idealism is less useful than 
for those above, the following graphical representation may be of same help 
in understanding the disappearance of G: 
Absolute 
/l~l clia-;;;ctic~ 
HKS + mP +- - G - ----- HKS + EFl 
(epistemological level) (ontological level) 
The core of Hegel's strategy can be identified in the famous equation 
between reality and rationality, and on its basis it is understandable how 
it can be presented as a possible solution of the PeR. If there is no real 
7) The relevance and closeness of Hegel '.s though~ to th~ issue 0: the P.CR should n~t be a 
surprise, once we remember that Hegel IS reactIng agaInst Kant s duallsm, and thIS last 
r 
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distinction between HKS and ~ and between ~ and Roi then all that remains 
is the internal articulaticn of all-there-can-be, the Absolute, and 
appearances as well as contradictions are absorbed in its dialectical 
roovementJ3. Hegel's panlogism has its roots in Greek phi losophy and as such 
it is a secularization of Berkeley's theological idealism, which still has 
a sanewhat medieval flavour. His noticn of the Absolute and of its 
dialectic developnent remains in a precarious equilibritm between atheism 
and fideism. 
There is a deep cannecticn between Hegel's anti-epistemological 
strategy and his dialectical logic; this latter plays the central role 
reserved for episteroology in previous fonns of idealism. As for the 
episteroological aspects in the foregoing cases, the Hegelian dialectics is 
a consequence, not the cause of the strategy. The particular nature of the 
Hegelian sol uti on is due to his strong program of "internalization" of all 
the possible relations. As such, the approach he develops turns out to be 
strongly anti-Kantian and hence anti-cartesian. It is not by chance that 
Hegel ties his system with the rrore classic notion of an articulated 
harmony between knower and known (see next chapter), in antepositicn to the 
dualist findings of the JOOdem traditicn. This is also the main reason why 
pragmatists such as Dewey and Peirce find his philosophy somehow appealing, 
no matter how different their philosophical doctrines are in other respect. 
-----
represents the most mature elaboration of the consequences of the acceptance of the traumatic 
doubt. Cf. Hegel [1802), part A, and [1977), Hyppolite (1946) and Lamb (1980). 
e) This articulation of the stages of development of the Absolute through the dialectical 
logic of resolutions of contradictions is the fundamental, ingenious difference between 
Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute and his predecessors like Spinoza or Shelling. In [1968], 
pp.364-9, Hegel criticizes Berkeley because he would have merely eliMinated one element of the 
relation Knowing Subject/Known Object instead of radically re-interpreting it. 
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I I I • 3 • d METAPHYSICAL STRATmIES: CCWCLUSlOO 
At the end of this brief journey through the possible atterrpts to 
avoid the Perpetual Check of Reason on a metaphysical grotmci, it is worth 
outlining sane general aspects of the idealist rranoeuvre. Seemingly, of the 
three alternatives, the Platonist is the one which shares the largest 
Cat100ll theoretical background with a supporter of the PCR. For it may be 
reduced to an atterrpt to avoid the conclusion of this latter only by 
shifting the elements which carpO\.md it. The Berkeleian is the roost 
vulnerable, for it appeals to the same epistaoological and ontological 
paraphernalia errployed by the PeR (especially enpirical notions), and tries 
to use it in a very COtmter intuitive way. And finally, the Hegelian 
strategy is the most speculative: it stands radically out of the tradition, 
re-inventing its own logic of contradiction in order to cope with the gap 
between mP and mIl. All of than try to deal with the Trauratic Doubt that 
reality in itself may be carpletely different fran what we take it to be by 
reroving the minimal ontological realism that such an observation would 
require. One of the roost significant consequences of this strategy is a 
decisi ve ccnmi. tment in favour of a IOOnistic approach, against the 
problematic dualism professed by the Perpetual Check of Reason. This 
moDistic solution is pursued either by the elindnation of the cotmterpart 
of HKS and his knowing activity i.e. m (Berkeley, and in a certain sense 
also Schopenhauer for example), or by the introduction of a third element 
(world of ideas, the Absolute) whereby to reconcile the dualist contrast 
between mP and ~ (Plato and Hegel). 
Since it atterl'l>ts to E!lTpty the notion of mil I any idealist strategy 
can be no longer understood as speaking of a notmenal external reality in a 
Kantian sense, that is as unknowable. Properly speaking, we need to employ 
a roore Platanistic understanding of the terminology, where nounenal will 
mean "non-errpirical", ''knowable by means of an intellectual act" or "object 
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Cognizable ooly by means of speculation or intuition". The fact that, 
despite their strong ootological nature, the idealist solutions are not 
comprehensible without taking into account their epistemological 
cotmterparts reminds us of the second possible way of eliminating G, namely 
by working on the epistemological side. This is the topic I'm going to turn 
to in the next section. 
I I 1.4 THE EPISTEH:>LOGlCAL STRATIDY 
We have seen that the rretaphysical strategy revol ves upon the 
possibility of disposing of G by eliminating the relation of ontological 
independence between HKS and ~, that is by mxtifying the assurption of Roi 
by the minimal ontological realism. Turning now to the epistemological 
strategy, let me restate that this latter focuses an the validity of an 
episteroological anti -realist interpretation of the process of knowing. 
While arguing in different ways against it, any epistemological strategy 
will try to iIrprove the fomula [Re(HKS,m)] in such a way as to make 
possible a "full cootact" between HKS and ~. The final target is that of 
equating the epistaoological coot act between IlKS and m {Re} with the 
parallel, full ootological contact already existent between the two (Roi)' 
Hence, any epistemological strategy coocentrates on the possibility of 
reaching a better cooception of the relation occurring between HKS and ER 
(~). Graphically speaking this is to say that, by adopting an 
epistemological strategy the elimination of G - a resolution of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason - is obtained or simply attempted by stretching 
Re up to the same "extension" as Roi' and not, as before, by a metaphysical 
reduction of Rei to the same "extension" as Re' 
Obviously, there may be many ways of realizing this "extension", and 
I shall proceed by merely outlining those aspects of the issue that are 
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more relevant to the project of this research. Accordingly, the three 
possibilities albic, mentioned in section nI.2, represent the three 
general perspectives fran which the "extension" of the episterrological 
relation between HKS and ER can be pursued. Let me first ill ustrate them by 
means of an analogy. 
Suppose we want to combine two elements x and y. Essentially, there 
are three ftmdamental ways for them to cane together: (a) element x goes 
towards element y; or (b) element y goes towards element x; or (c) elements 
x and y meet each other in the middle. SUppose now that x = hunan knowledge 
and y = the intrinsic nature of external reality. It follows that, analogy 
aside, episteroological strategies that try to eliminate G, i. e. the 
distance between x and y, by irrproving or roodifying sare aspects of [Re 
(HKS, ER)] can be grouped in three ftmdamental families, depending on 
whether they try to support the hypothesis that: 
a) the process of knowing is such as to put HKS in full contact with the 
intrinsic nature of ER so that mP = mIl (i.e. x encounters y in y's 
place); or 
b) the process of knowing is such that owing to it ER shows its intrinsic 
nature to HKS, so that ~ = mP (i.e. y encounters x in x's place); or 
c) there is a third element, which nust be included in the process of 
knowing, that guarantees that ERP = mIl (Le. x and y meet in a third 
place) . 
This threefold distinction explains what I meant early in section 
1I1.2 when I said that the first epistemological strategy (a) concentrates 
on HKS, being ccncemed with the nature of the subjective cooditio sine qua 
nan of Re, that is the nature of hunan cognitive processes; the second 
epistemological strategy (b) concentrates on m, being concemed with the 
nature of the mtic conditio sine qua nan of Re, that is the nature of the 
influence of ER on HKS; and that the third epistemological strategy (c) 
concentrates on the introduction of a third element in [Re(HKB,ER)], a 
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third element that would guarantee that in fact ERP = ERO. But let me now 
be rrore specific. 
I I I . 4 . a THE ~IVE CXWDITIO SINE CPA New OF R e . 
Members of the first famdly (a) of epistemological strategies try to 
avoid the Perpetual Check of Reason by opposing what they consider two key-
assumptions tmplicit in the formulation of the Traumatic Doubt. The first 
ass\..lJl>tion consists in conceiving htlTlaIl cogni ti ve processes as having a 
qualitatively rrodifying nature. This issue has been already faced in II.3,a 
and 11.4 and it is not necessary to go over it again. Suffice it to recall 
that if, cootrary to what the Kantian approach maintains, we are to 
concei ve the hlll'BIl cogni ti ve processes as enabl ing an ideal HKS to grasp 
the intrinsic nature of ER perfectly well, then obviously no theoretical 
space is left for the occurrence of a gap G between ER as it is for HKS 
(ERP) and ER as it is in itself (mIl), and a fortiori there won't be 
anything like the Perpetual Check of Reason. 
The second presuppasi tian is represented by the view that when HJ<S 
knows ER, what HKS is episteroologically aware of, in contact with or in 
possesim of, is in fact a third, epistemic intermediary, let us call it E-
i, that occurs between HKS and ER. This new as~t of the issue deserves 
sane attention. 
According to the members of this first famdly of strategies the PCR 
is made possible by the fact that the supporter of the Traunatic Doubt 
works within the limits of a conception of mcwledge as an indirect 
grasping of the nature of m through E-i. Depending on the theory taken 
into consideratim, this third element E-i can be differently characterized 
" 
." " ' d "" pts" "proposl' tl' ons", "sense-data", as representat 1 OIlS , 1 eas cance , 
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" h " and p enanena so on. Very generally, the argunent holds that the problem 
lies in inferring fram: 
i) the possibility of conceiving P-Jmowing as a process concerning the 
nature of ER but that produces a third element E-i that is then what HKS is 
aware of or really Jmows; both 
ii) the possibility of challenging the capacity of E-i t<> grasp the 
intrinsic nature of ER; and therefore 
iii) the possibility of sharing an epistemological anti-realist perspective 
grounded on a hypothetical difference G occurring between ER as it is in 
itself (ERn) and ER as it is known by HKS (ERP = E-i). 
The epistemological opposer of the PCR would argue that as long as we can 
suppose that there is sanething like E-i between HKS and ER, then it is 
always possible for sceptical doubt to slip into our conception of hU'1\an 
knowledge. If we can suppose (i) then it is always possible to infer (ii) 
fram (i) and (iii) fram (li), ending with an identification of E-i with ERP 
and a radical challenge of the capacity of (E-i = ERP) to grasp the 
intrinsic nature of mfl. If we accept that our knowledge of the world is 
mediated by sense data or mental representations, for example, it is always 
possible to challenge the value of sense data or mental representations and 
their veracity with respect to the intrinsic nature of a certain portion of 
reality on which they depend. 
Once the problematic core of the Perpetual Check of Reason has been 
so individuated, the strategy revolves around the possibility of avoiding 
(ii) and (iii) not just by arguing against the logical possibility of 
inferring (ii/iii) fran (i), an inference which may be differently and 
largely defended by the sceptical anti-realist, but by eliminating (i) 
itself. The idea being that without (i) - i.e. without a. conception of 
Jmowledge as an indirect apprehension or awareness of ER - there wouldn't 
be (ii/iii), that is there wouldn't be a distinction between ~ and E-i, 
so there wouldn't be any possibl e identification of E-i with ERP, and 
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therefore a fortiori there wouldn't be anything like G; and without G the 
Perpetual dleck of Reasoo could be avoided. 
In order to achieve this task, two different solutions are available; 
they can be briefly introduced as different tmderstandings of the clause 
"then" in (i). The first consists in a twofold interpretatioo of "then" as 
entailing, logically speaking, not only an occurrence of E-i after the 
process of mowing (post-knowing), but also before it (ante-knowing). 
Accordingly, 00 the one hand HKS is supposed to be aware of an E-i whose 
presence occurs episteroologically after the P-knowing; and on the other 
hand the same E-i way be supposed to occur ontologically before the P-
knowing, and in such a way as to guarantee that E-i puts HKS in contact 
with the intrinsic nature of ~. All this recalls the scholastic solution 
of the debate about the nature of universals, and obviously it is only a 
version of the Platonist solution we have already seen above. Hence I woo't 
dwell upm it. 
The second solution is rrore properly episteroological, and the rest of 
this sub-secticn is concerned with it. It operates by denying any 
significative theoretical value to "then", as if it were really supporting 
a before/after distinction in the process of acquiring knowledge of ~. 
According to this approach it is not the case that first there is the P-
knwing whereby R-knowledge canes to be fomulated and then there is an 
additional fom of acquisition of this R-knowledge, hut that knowing and 
being aware of what is known are ooe and the same process. Hence, the first 
epistemological therapy against the Traumatic Doubt way be constituted by 
different forms of Direct Realisr3, whereby 
(i) IlKS is supposed to be epistemically in direct cootact with m; 
9) The expressions direct and indirect realism primarily occur in theory of perception, where 
they indicate alternative approaches to the nature of sense-data or the possible role of the 
given (cf. Dancy (1985), cnap.10). Because of the different and more ample perspective of this 
context - both are referred to the possibility of grasping the intrinsic nature of ER - the 
two labels are used here without any sense of opposition. This is the reason why I don't 
consider the epistemological anti -realist component of the PCR as due to a form of i ndi rect 
realis., but only to a conception of knowledge as indirect. ·Indirect realism· will be used in 
(c) to refer to the last family of solutions. 
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(ii) the occurrence of E-i is avoided; and 
(iii) what HKS knows is ~ itself, not his perceptual or mental 
representatioos of it (E-i = ERP) occurring in a sort of m:=mtal foro 
internJO. 
Schanatically, direct realism can be illustrated thus: 
~OFDlRECT~ 
(epistelOOlog~ R.,-=::--:-..... 
HKS (E-1 = ERP) .. - G - - .... ERn 
(ontological ~ - Roi ~ 
According to sane sort of Direct Realism, both E-i and ERP disappear, 
and in this way the fundamental el irnination of the gap G between ERP and 
rnn is achieved. Since the elimination of (E-i = ERP) is obtained by 
working on the nature of hunan cognitive processes - that is on what is the 
condi tio sine qua noo, on the Hl<S' side of the existence of sanething like 
P-knowing - this type of solution is to be considered episteroological. 
Epi steroo I ogical strategies in favour of sane form of direct realism 
have two foundamental orientaticcs: there are strategies that try to 
ill1?rove the conception of hunan cognitive processes in respect to enpirical 
knowledgetl - an the ground of the acceptance of the Thanistic axian to the 
effect that any knowledge has its first source in perception - and 
strategies that try to inprove the conception of htl'TSIl cogni ti ve processes 
in respect to a priori knowledge - on the grotmci of the acceptance of the 
supremacy of intuitiCil and/or logical reasoning over perceptioo. Forms of 
Platonism or roore generally of Innatism, often folU'ld in rationalist 
philosophers like Leihriz, cannot be understood without also taking into 
10) Rorty [1980] has become by now the locus classicus to refer to for an exposition of the 
story of knowledge as indirect apprehension of an E-i occurring in a foro interno. 
11) Remembering that the PCR was due to the assumption of a qualitative version of KanUan 
realism, the quantitative version of Kantian realism we saw in II.4 can be considered as 
depending on this type of epistemological strategies, cf. what Dancy (1985), chap. 10 says 
about Strawson (1979) (naive direct realism), and about Sellars [1963], ch.3 (scientific 
........... ~direct realiSID). 
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account the possibility of an a priori direct grasping of the intrinsic 
nature of ER. More specifically, in Plato's case it is possible to believe 
that Jmowledge of the intrinsic nature of m is a form of recollection; 
that the process of recollection is a direct and perfect apprehension of an 
"idea"; that the "idea" is a perfect ontological model of ER; and 
consequently, that we can have direct Jmowledge of ER. 
I I 1.4. b THE OOTIC awDITIO SINE (tVA NON OF Re 
''Vasari tells of Donatello at work on his Zuccooe looking at it 
suddenly and threatening the stone with a dreadful curse, "Speak, 
speak - favella, favella, che ti venga il cacasangue !"12 
Donatello probably 'meant that the statue was so well realized as to 
be alroost alive, and as if its only defect was that of lacking the mastery 
of a language. In the present context this anecdote may be useful in order 
to introduce the second famdly of epistemological solutions of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason, those concerned with the epistemological role 
that is supposed to be played by the ontic conditio sine qua non of Re, 
i.e. the actual presence of m in (Re (RRS, m» and its influence on HKS. 
Fran the perspective of this type of strategies, the idea that 
"reality in itself may be ccrrpletely different fran what we take it to be" 
relies 00 the flagrant erroneous assmptian that, like Donatello's Zuccone, 
reality in itself doesn't speak to HKS, at least not loudly enough to be 
heard. Suppose there are two people A and B one of whan (A) questions the 
other (B) about his name. Suppose B never answers. There may be thousands 
of cl ues whereby the investigator A may cane to guess B' s correct narre -
fran what saneone else says about the silent B, to the initials on B's 
shirt, to a name written on B's diary or en the mail B has received etc. -
and yet A will never be sure he is not wrong. of course all the 
difficul ties lie in the fact that B doesn't say anything. But now suppose 
12) &olbrich (1989), p.S1, quoting Vasari, Vite, 11,404. 
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also that B speaks freely: the whole problem would substantially13 
disappear, for B would now answer A. Aloogside this parallelism, our second 
type of episteoological opponent of the PCR believes that the Traunatic 
Doubt can be conceived and taken seriously only as a consequence of an 
erroneous asstl'T'ption: that HKS and ER are not engaged in a nutual 
"conversation" . Only if HKS and ER are considered mutually strangers, 
episteroologically \nU'elated since the very beginning of the process of 
knowing, can the problem of their conjunction arise. Herbers of this family 
of strategies try to sol ve the PCR by supporting the hypothesis that 
sanehow the statue is alive and does speak, at least clearly enough to 
state its intrinsic nature. Fran an epistarological point of view, this is 
in line with the idealist ontological strategy in favour of a IOOre 
harmonious conception of the relation between knower and known. 
A clear statement of this strategy is given by Aristotle in De Anima 
II,4,s14 • On the whole, this second kind of episteroological strategy 
advocates that: 
i) there exists an active role of ER on HKS' mind, intellect, brain or 
reason; 
ii) this kind of influence is conceivable as occurring chiefly at the level 
of the senses, whose affection would inform sanehcM HKS' mind, intellect, 
brain or reason; and therefore 
iii) there is a first passive role of HKS' mind, intellect, brain or reason 
in respect to the acquisition of first data about the intrinsic nature of 
ER. 
13) ·Substantially· because there Might be oth~r kind of problems concerni~g t~e ~r?pe~ way of 
formulating the right questions and understanding the consequent answers ( relIabIlity). . 
14) A discussion of the isomorphist thesis is given by Sellars [1963), chap. 2. For Its 
importance in contemporary American philosophy cf. Chisholm [1982], pp.177-178. The crisis of 
the ismorphist approach to the foundation of a theory of knowledge starts with Ockam and ends 
with Cusanus (cf. Watts (1982]. pp.224-225). and it is related to the crisis of the 
Aristotelian metaphysics of matter and fori 
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The strategy may be represented thus: 
.THE ARIS'lUl'l:ao.IAN-saIQLASTIC-LQCKEAN ~ 
(epistemological level) Re 
HRS~mp~n 
(cntOlogical):ven Rei --'" 
Scheme 10 shows that the solution of the PCR is obtained by 
el iminating ERP, and therefore G, thanks to an inversion of the arrow 
characterizing the epistemological relation occurring between HKS and ~. 
Unfortunately, despite the sketchy descriptioo, it is easy to see 
that this strategy immediately encounters some serious problems that render 
it less appealing than it seerrs to be. For, metaphors aside, it is not very 
clear what ITl.lSt be tmderstood by the "somehow" introduced above, or what 
this sort of "revelation" of m to HKS would consist in. One of the most 
faJOOus application of scheme 10 is Locke's hypothesis about the initial 
passivity of a hunan mind and the consequent iJ1llression it receives fran 
m15 , an hypothesis that in turn ITllSt be connected to the 
Aristotelian/Scholastic conjecture about the presence of an isaoorphism 
between a Jmowing mind and a known object during the first stage of the 
process of knowing, that would allow this latter to iJ1llress its foms en 
the former. 
In conclusion, the epistemological strategies that stress on the role 
of ER wi thin the process of Imowing operate the "extensioo" of Re by 
arguing in favour of an active role of m in respect to HKS: it is the 
fonner that goes to encounter the latter. OUr 
Aristotelian/Scholastic/Lockean opponent of the ~ still considers Re a 
lJ1.ltual relation, but he conceives its occurrence as due first to an action 
of m on HKS and only after an answer of HKS to m. 
15) ·If it be asked, why Locke attached so much ilPOrtance to this doctrine [i.e. that in the 
perception of simple ideas our lind is lIereiy passive], the answer is that he conceived this 
passivity as a guarantee, and, indeed, the only possible guarantee, that there is nothing 
arbitrary in the ultimate data of cognition· (Gibson [1960], p.61). 
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I I I • 4 • c THE EXTERNAL GUARANTEE 
The third and last family of epistanological strategies is concerned 
with the hypothesis that HKS'knowledge and the intrinsic nature of ER can 
be made to join each other in a third, middle place. The fundamental idea, 
in this case, is that the Perpetual Check of Reason is made possibl e by a 
siqnificant anissian regarding a third element, let me call it E3, such 
that if it were taken into account it would eliminate the gap G occurring 
between ~p and ~. OUr Uri rd opponent of the ~ may hold sanethinq like 
this: 
i) the presence of G between ERP and mIl is caused by the interpretation of 
Re as a modifying relation; 
ii) this interpretation, in turn, is possible only because the 
significative role of E3 - whose function is to guarantee that in fact ERP 
grasps veridically the intrinsic nature of mn - is disregarded; and that 
iii) once E3 is taken into account, Re can be discovered to be not 
necessarily a roodifying relation that prexiuces an ERP that is substantially 
different fran mn, i.e. that suOOtantially doesn't grasp the intrinsic 
nature of ~. 
The canclusioo is that thanks to the presence of E3 mP can be discovered 
to be an adequate representation of mn and in this way G may be 
eliminated. of course the therapy sirrply consists in re-introducing sane 
crucial consideration about E3. This can be done in di fferent ways. 
Depending an the theory in question, the identification of E3 may vary fran 
God, like in Descartes, to a third realm of ideas or truths, to episternic 
criteria. Like in the case of the different interpretations of E-i this is 
not very inportant in this context. What is relevant to the present 
expositicn is that E-3 occurs between mP and mn as an epistarological 
bridge, not between mP and HKS as an ontological bridge, like in Plato's 
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strategy. So, roughly speaking, HI<S produces mP and E3 guarantees that 
there isn't any gap G between mP and mIl. 
So this last family of epistaoological strategies can be graphically 
represented thus: 
.'IHE~IML~ 
(epistemological level) Re E3 ~~G~~ 
(ontological level) Roi~ 
ERP represents the place where HKS and ERn "encounter" each other. It 
is obtained thanks to the epistemic activity of HKS, but its goodness as a 
trustworthy image of ~ is guaranteed by E3. With a classic metaphor we 
may say that E3 synchronises the ordo idearun wi th the orda rert.lJl. 
I I I • 4. d EPIS'I'EM)LOGICAL STRATEXHES: COOCLUSION 
Just as the idealist strategies shared sane canoon features aroong 
themsel ves, we find that the epistemological strategies too share 
tmderlying characteristics. The rrost evident is sti 11 a radical anti-
dualist tendency. '!'his is not attacked necessarily in the name of serne kind 
of roonism, for as in the case of I II. 4. c the dualism of the PeR can be 
overcame by means of the introduction of a third element. What is central 
is that the dualist opposition of m as it is known by HI<S and ER as it is 
in itself is sanehow opposed and resolved. Another characteristic may be 
individuated in a limit shared by all the alternatives: none of than 
elindnates the logical possibility of the PCR. They support hypotheses to 
the effect that the ~ would not in fact occur, not that it is not 
conceivable that it would not occur in theory. 
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With the exposition of the epistemological strategies the first and 
central part of this chapter is concluded. The strategies I'm going to 
portray in the next section can be grouped in a lTllch less lUliform and 
tmique typology. They should be seen, especially the Kantian solution, as 
already going half way towards naking conceivable the radical 
reinterpretation of the PCR in terms of refusal of its anthropological 
carponen t . 
I I I • 5 ALTERNATIVE STRATEXHES 
Up to here we have seen how the original Scheme 5 could be 
differently modified in its internal organization so to avoid the presence 
of G between ERP and mJl. By means of metaphysical and episterrological 
strategies we have put our finger on the delicate mechanism that leads to 
the prcxiuctim of the Traunatic Doubt and, if only in a very sketchy way, 
we have learnt how to roodify the mechanism itself in such a way as to 
obtain the wanted resul t: the avoidance of the PCR. In the previous 
section, the suspicion was introduced that the mechanism in itself could be 
incarplete, and in need of sane supplementary element that could nake it 
work properly. Time has came now to develop this suggestion by considering 
those strategies that opt for the possibility of placing another 
''mechanism'' beside the one represented in scheme 5. 'l1lese strategies, once 
again three, all start fran the characterization of the Perpetual Check of 
Reason as sanething mavoidable, as a necessary inescapable result of the 
occurrence of an epistemi.c relation like Re between HK5 and m, yet they 
draw different consequences fran such assmption. Let me start fran the 
roost radical of them. 
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I I I . 5 . a SCEPrICI9t 
In 11.1 I said that forms of scepticism like Gorgia's or Protagora's, 
or even like that entertained by Descartes, could be reinterpreted as forns 
of reaction against the presence of the ~. That this is so should now be 
evident. In this context Scepticism in its pure form (Le. as free frem any 
vein of irrationalism, see next sub-section) will consist in the attitude 
of doubt wi th respect to the possibi 1 i ty of knowing the intrinsic nature of 
m. As such, it may represent the roost direct and natural consequence of 
the acceptance of the existence of a gap G occurring between ER as it is 
for HKS and ER as it is in itself. It is for this reason that the Tratmatic 
Doubt is ccmronl y regarded as a sceptical chall enge (cf. above II 1. 2 and 
I II .3. b): scepti cism and the perpetual Check of Reason may be judged to be 
the two sides of the same coin. The JOOSt direct consequence of the 
sceptical attitude can be this only: the abandonment of any epistemological 
enterprise. Through the sceptical arrplifier, the radicalization of the 
suspicion that "reality in itself may be carpletely different frem what we 
take it to be" ends with the elimination of any interest either in a theory 
of knowledge or in a theory of reality. Obviously there is no need for a 
pictorial illustraticn that would be either identical with scheme S or 
sinply errpty. 
I I I . S. b IRRATIOOALI94 
A further, less radical but still negative option open to those who 
accept the inevitability of the PCR is represented by the attenpt of 
escaping fran the epistemological limits within which the PCR has been 
forrrulated, by appealing to other sources of knowledge. It will be 
remembered that in I.S.b - while exposing the kind of perspective whereby 
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the following sectiCl'lS had to be understood - I put forward the proposal of 
restricting the epistemological field only to general objective knowledge, 
intending by this to exclude, aroong other things, any consider~tion about 
forns of Jmowledge like mystical intuition. The role and the validity of 
that restricticn could be now contested. The lines of the reasoning may be 
simply put thus: 
i) if we assume the possibility of investigating the nature of ER by means 
of objective knowledge only; and then 
ii) we discover that this assurption leads to the inevitable presence of a 
gap G occurring between ERp and Elm, and eventually to the consequent 
sceptical conclusion; then 
iii) supposing that either meta-theoretically we still want to overcame G 
and therefore the vicious circle that leads us to the PCR, or that 
theoretically we still believe that HKS really grasps the intrinsic nature 
of ER; then 
iv) we could try to find a better epistemi.c approach that may allow to IlKS 
to grasp perfectly the intrinsic nature of ER. 
Generally speaking this privileged access is indicated in same form 
of intuition, Which has the properties of being (a) personal; (b) 
flIDdamental in respect to any other Jmowledge; (c) epistarologically 
lD'lShakabl e, an intuitioo may be defined "sure", "doubtl ess" , 
"incontestable", "certain", "infallible", "inarguable", "incontrovertible", 
"indisputable" , "indubitable", "irrefutable", ''tmdeniable'' , 
"tmquestianable"; and finally (d) representative of a direct access to the 
intrinsic nature of m16 . Strategies belonging to this family don't resolve 
the ~ by merely stipulating the presence of sane sort of intuition (a 
manoeuvre that would be extremely odd), but rather the opposite: for it is 
because this kind of strategies assune that intuition plays a central role 
16) Under this respect, intuitionists are strictly linked with supporters of objective 
knowledge as a direct grasping of the nature of ER. It is not by chance that both approaches 
are characterized by a large use of visual Metaphors. 
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in huran knowledge that the whole issue of the PCR doesn't arise within 
their contexts. SUch strategies can be call ed "intui tionistic", provided we 
make use of precauticmary quotaticn-marks in order to distinguish them fran 
the meta-nathematical posi ticn label I ed "Intuitionism" . "Intui tionistic 
strategies" can be visually imagined by adding a further relaticn to the 
scheme 5, abbreviated by Rint.' a relation that goes beyond Re , overcomes 
ERP and puts HJ(S directly in contact with mn: 
'mE "IN'IVITlOOI~~ 
(level of privileged access) R ~~~~nt." 
HKS ERP .... - G- - ..... ERn 
(ontOlogical~Roi~ 
The field of "intuitionistic" theories is a jungle which luckily 
enough we don't need to enter. The essential indications of the kind of 
strategies that could be elaborated by adopting same conception of 
intuition are irraginable. But I believe it is worth remarkinq on two 
aspects of the issue relevant to the present discussion. 
First, it rray be irrportant to distinguish at least two rrain families 
of strategies: those supporting anti-ratimal forms of intuitionism, such 
as Bergson's, and those supporting super-rational forms of intuitionism, 
very CallOOn in rrodern phi losophers I ike Descartes, Spinoza, Leihni z, or 
Locke, but still in fashion also aroong contenporary philosophers like 
Husserl. According to the former, intui tim is another, better road to 
apprehend the intrinsic nature of ER, and it is irreconcilable with that 
fonn of public, argumentative, rational knowledge that has been considered 
the only subject of epistE!l'OOI09l' up to now tmder the label of "objective 
knowledge". This is not true as far as the latter fonn of "intuitionism" is 
concerned. For in this case a certain kind of intuition is just the last 
step (or the first, depending on the point of view) that has to be made 
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after having gone all over the general objective knowledge, in order to 
grasp the first principles of the nature of reality. Then, strictly 
speaking, only the former l1B.y be fully considered to belong to this 
section, for the latter may roore easily be assimilated to those foms of 
direct apprehension of the intrinsic nature of m sketched tmder the label 
of Direct Realism in 111.4.a. 
Secondly, according to scme authors and primarily to Kant, intuition 
can be a way of knowing-prcxiucing the object known. This is Kant's notion 
of intellectual intuition which, unlike the sensible intuition, is not 
passive in respect to its object, and while it knows it also prcxiuces the 
object known. It is very CatTT'Oll to find this kind of intuition among 
idealists like FichtJ7 or Schelling. Obviously for theories working with 
this kind of intuition there is no problem of a gap between mP and mIl for 
the activity of knowing is also the activity of "positing" the reality that 
has been known. I shall care back to this connectioo between knowing and 
doing in the next sub-sectim for scme further remarks. 
1 I I • 5 • c RE.VALUAT100 
We hare finally arrived at the last kind of attitude that it is 
possible to adopt in respect to the ~: acceptance of the dualism between 
mP and mIl united with an attenpt to make the best out of it. More than a 
reactioo against the eventuality that "reality in itself may be coopletely 
different fran what we take it to be" this attitude represents a 
resignation to that possibility, which is accepted as a repugnant matter of 
fact. What rrakes it different fran a mere case of scepticism is a certain 
value that this last strategy tries to attribute to the irreparable dualism 
endorsed by the Traumatic Doubt. Two alternatives are possible and in fact 
17} See for example Fichte [1987). The second book is a perfect introduction to the idealist 
approach to the nature of knowledge. 
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have been historically developed: a regulative use of the hypothetical 
presence of ~ and of our presuneci desire to know it; and a restriction of 
the coocept of real knowledge only to cases of knowledge concerning 
history. 
The first alternative is Kant's and has a link with the 
epistemological side of the issue. After the Humean breakdown of R p Kant e . 
reinterprets the relation between knower and known as if it were this 
latter that has to be adapted to the former. In order to support the value 
of objective knowledge Kant is forced to assune that reality is knowable 
only insofar as it can be adapted to the mental categories of the HKB. 
However, in this way the intrinsic nature of ER remains hidden, and 
knowledge becanes constitutive knowledge of phenanena. Like Midas, who at 
the begirming wanted to transform everything in gold by the touch of his 
body, the Kantian knower dies because of "notrnenal starvation". Kant wanted 
to avoid the HlJllea11 paradoxical conclusions and ended with digging an 
episteroological abyss between HKS and m. The regulative use of the ideas 
of Reasoo (Le. of the futile atterrpts to know what ~ is in itself, 
over caning our phenanenal knowledge of it) is introduced to terrper the 
overwhelming effect of the limits irrposed on HKS' Jmowledge: hunan 
knowledge is supposed to be driven by the desire to know sanething that in 
fact wi II never be known. Rep. and the consequent perfect grasp of the 
intrinsic nature of ER rerrains unreachable, and yet it has the function of 
praooting new researches. A scheme for the Kantian strategy will be: 
mE KANTIAN STRATmY 
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A perfect grasp of the intrinsic nature of ~ is a mirage rather than 
a realisable goal: mlike Peirce, fran a Kantian perspective a final 
perfect knowledqe of ~ in itself is not even logically acini.ssible, and the 
dualism between ~p and mIl is final and will never be S\U1TOlD'lte&8. Yet, G 
is l.mderstood as the origin of a challenge, of an everlasting tendency 
towards a perfect knowledge of mn, as producing not just a negative 
feeling of alienation, but a positive tensioo towards a carplete full 
knowledge of the world.19 
The second alternative is Vico's and it has a certain connection with 
the ontological side of the issue. It will be rerneni:lered that in discussing 
the nature of ontological realism in I. 4 sane radical problems have arisen 
about the adequacy of the "mind-independent" clause. Very briefly, it has 
seemed that by adopting that clause to define ontological realism too many 
aspects of ER happen to be left outside of our picture, namely those 
historical (as opposed to natural) aspects of ~ that an ontological 
realist has been supposed to be willing to include in his conception of an 
independently existent, external reality. A Vichian strategy tray now be 
considered to depend on the distinction, introduced in that occasion, 
between natural and historical reality. The basic idea is that real 
knowledge of the intrinsic existence and properties of sanething is 
possible only when this scmething belongs to historical reality. More 
clearly, a Vi chi an reaction to the ~ may arrount to saying that if, on the 
cne hand, it is true that the PCR makes evident the irrpossibility of 
obtaining a full knowledge of ~, this is true only in so far as natural 
~ is concerned. For, on the other hand, the PCR would also leave open the 
possibility of a perfect knowledge of :mIl in so far as historical ER is 
18) Very roughly, if we eliminate also the positive reading of the dualism between ERP and ERn 
then we obtai n Schopenhauer's vision of the relation between HKS and ER. On the other hand, 
German IdealiSil started as a reaction against the Kantian dualism between nou/llena and 
phenomena, both by means of the concept of a creative intuition and by the introduction of the 
concept of Absolute and its dialectical development. 
19) Nowadays this kind of strategy may be partially recognized a operating in I neo-Kantian I 
authors like Putnam and Goodlan. 
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concerned. If we have real knowledge of sanething only if we know the 
principles and the causes according to which that sanething is that 
sanething and not sanething else, natural m falls beyond our capacities, 
and the actual danain of hunan knowledge (and therefore of episteoology) 
remains historical ER. With the last graphic representation we have: 
(epistemological level) 
(historical m) (natural m) 
~Re~ r Re ER~.G_ERP HKS 'ERP..--G--..ERn 
I "'---=---. ~ "----- ~ I %i  ~i (ontological level) 
'------------.J 
It nust be a<initted that the reasoning has sane force. The Traunatic 
Doubt was supposed to concern the possibility of a significant gap between 
m in itself and m as it is for HKS, and certainly this gap, even if 
adnitted in the natural field, could hardly find any justification in 
respect to historical m. In this latter case HKS is both the knower and 
the maker (i .e. the ontological ratio essendi) of ~, and this identity 
(the same identi ty expressed by the dicbm "verun ipslIl\ fact un") makes 
possible that, in the best cases of mowledge, there won't be any G between 
historical ERP and historical ERO. 
For the supporter of the Vichean strategy the fact that in science 
disciplines like physics or chemistry enjoy a higher consideration than 
sociology or anthropology may not be a difficulty. For in the fonner case 
we would be in coot act only with abstract constructions that don't have 
anything to do with the intrinsic nature of the world, while in the latter 
case the inprecision and approximation of the resul ts would show a roore 
fruitful degree of closeness to the intrinsic nature of historical reality. 
A Vichian philosopher may sinply argue that adequacy to logico-rnathE!fTBtical 
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precision is not an absolute criterion to judge how close we are to 
grasping the intrinsic nature of mIl. 
I I I . 6 CCfiCLUSlOO 
I said in the introduction that in this chapter I meant to achieve 
several tasks. I wished to complete the analysis of the PCR, to introduce 
the second part of this study by sketching the principal strategies adopted 
to oppose it and, consequentially, to show the centrality of the PCR in the 
history of episteroology. In this final section I'd like to discuss this 
last point, so let me first s\..lT1lBrize the rrain cone 1 usions of this chapter. 
In this chapter I have considered the main al temati ve perspectives 
whose assumption could render the formulation of the PCR avoidable. Since I 
have exposed the theoretical content of the ~ as a particular resul t of 
the inference: if [{Anti-Rep. DIS) + {Rant. DIS)] then [G (ERP,ERO»), each 
al ternative has been introduced as if it concerned a single aspect of this 
fomula. In a short list, we have seen that, according to different 
perspectives the Perpetual Check of Reason could not occur because: 
i) there is an ontoiogically and epistEmOlogically ''better'' mD closer to 
HKS than ER; 
ii) even if not (i), there is nothing like an .m independent of HKS; 
iii) even if not (i)-(ii), there is not a real distinctioo between HKS and 
ER; 
iv) even if not (i)-(iii), HKS has a direct access to mn; 
v) even if not (i)-(iv) there is direct influence of ER on IlKS; 
vi) even if not (i) - (v), there is a third el ement which guarantees that HKS 
is in full contact with ER. 
In sections III.3.d and III.4.d I underlined that all these 
alternatives share a ccmoon anti-dualist tendency. 
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It will be rerrtellDered that when I tried to make explicit why the 
Doubt is traumatic, I suggested that to the ontological and to the 
episteroological had to be added a third carponent, condensable in the view 
that a gap between reality as it is in itself and reality as it is known by 
us is sanething negative, that, if possible, should be avoided by any 
means. We may now realize that the acceptance of the Aristotelian Postulate 
is expressed in the opposition to the possibility of a dualism between ERP 
and mn, that is against the occurrence of G. In this sense the 
Aristotelian dictun "all men by nature desire to know" may be translated as 
"all men by nature desire to get rid of Gil. Hence it will appear also clear 
that all the alternatives fram (i) to (vi), in so far as they are united by 
a strenuous anti-dualism, they uncritically presuppose the validity of the 
Aristotelian Postulate. Not only do none of the hypotheses focus on the 
possibility of working an this third component in order to solve the PCR, 
but each one can be seen to be rrotivated in its research by a rrore or less 
irrplicit s}'JJPathy towards the AP. Far fran recognizinq its problerratic role 
in the fonnulatian of the Traumatic Doubt, the epistemo-ontological 
strategies start fram the assmption of the AP. It is because all of them 
regard the occurrence of G as a highly negative phenanenon that they make 
any atterrpt to avoid the conditions that render its appearance possible.20 
Only in sectioo IlLS have we been faced by the possibility of acceptiIl9 
the inevitability of the dualism introduced by the Perpetual Check of 
Reasan, together with a more positive cansideratioo of it. So that to the 
previous list we may add: 
vii) even if not (i)-(vi), it is possible to give a a roore positive 
understanding of the gap occurring between ERP and ERO. 
We have seen that this first, timid proposal is not yet radical 
enough to avoid a feeling of regret for the loss of Jmowledge of mn and 
20) On t~ R1etatheoretical possibility of justifyi n9 the content of the AP because otherwise 
there wouldn't be philosophers who would try to avoid the Perpetual Check of reason see 
chapter v. 
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yet it already opens the way to a roore drastic approach. For, despite the 
fact that also (vii) still accepts the Aristotelian Postulate, it 
introduces the idea that it is possible to have a different valuation of 
the TO "reality may be carpletely different fran what we take it to be". It 
is by usinq this hint as a bridge that I shall enter into the second part 
of this work, where the possibility of "dissolvinq" the Perpetual Check of 
Reason is pursued by focusing on its third carponent, the Aristotelian 
Postulate. 
SECnID PART 
GENERAL I N'I'ROOOCTIOO 
With the previous chapter the first part of this study has been 
concluded. Having a deeper mastery of the different aspects of the 
problem we are dealing with, we can turn to the principal issue of the 
research: the rejection of the Aristotelian Postulate as a solution of 
the Perpetual Check of Reason. The three following chapters are intended 
as a large and IOOre detailed exposition of one of the possible solutions 
of the Traunatic Doubt. In this sense the s\.lTll'lary of the next three 
chapters nay have appeared sirrply as a further Section of chapter 3. In 
order to present a fresh start, let me sllltl'larize what conclusions we 
~ve achieved so far, and present the hypothesis I'm going to support in 
this sec<md part of the work. 
I've started this investigation by saying that one of the crucial 
question in the theory of mowledge is represented by the possibility of 
there being a gap between what external reality is in itself and what 
external reality is for a hunan being who knows it. In the first part 
I've repeatly said that in order to give same credit to the hypothesis 
that "reality JlBy be carpletely different fran what we take it to be" I 
we need to give sane credi t both to the hypothesis that there is 
sarething I ike an independent external real i ty and that sanehow our 
cognitive processes are not good enough to grasp its intrinsic 
properties. And in order to consider this possible state of affairs 
really problematic we rrust presuppose that we desire to know what the 
intrinsic nature of m is. In the first and the second chapter I have 
articulated these contents in same detail. In the third chapter I've 
sketched how the ~ could be solved by adopting sane modification of 
its fo~latian both an the ontological and on the epistemological side. 
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This is useful to introduce now the main hypothesis of this second part, 
namely that the elirrdnatian of the Aristotelian Postulate may amount to 
a reinterpretation of the Perpetual Check. 
The hypothesis can be intuitively stated by sirrply saying that if 
we have an explosive mechanism made of three cooponents, in order to 
avoid the explosion it is sufficient to deactivate or tarrper with one of 
the three carponents, either the timer, the explosive or the detonator. 
The possibility of "deactivating" the Trauratic Doubt by means of an 
anti-Aristotelian hypothesis relies on two presuppositions: 
i) that desire for Jmowledge just for its own sake is a conditio sine 
qua non of the TO; and 
ii) that such desire is not a necessary principle of the genesis of the 
process of knowing (even if it nay be a sufficient principle) and can be 
substituted by a better principle. 
It is only by asstrning (i) and (ii) that it can be argued that: 
iii) the substitution of the AP with a Peirceish Postulate (henceforth 
also PP) may 8IOO\.U'lt to a resolution of the 'I'D. 
The first ass\..ITption is easy to explain and difficult to argue: 
failing in grasping the intrinsic nature of external reality looks like 
a failure if and ooly if we presuppose an interest in grasping the 
intrinsic nature of external reality. In other words, a failure is a 
failure only 00 the gro\.U'ld of an expectation or a project. It is only 
out of a desire or a plan, or an intention to do A that there can be 
sanething like a frustration consequent to the incapacity of doing A. 
This is precisely the third condition presupposed by the fornulation of 
the Perpetual Check of Reason qua a probl em, that is qua Trauratic 
Doubt, and precisely what the inplicit assllTPtion of the Aristotelian 
Postulate copes with it. Without presupposing a desire to Jmow the 
intrinsic nature of ER for its own sake, the incapacity or impossibility 
to grasp FFl wouldn't look like a failure. 
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The second ass1.lli>tion calls for an introductory explanation. Apart 
,.fran being the conditio sine qua nan of the Traurratic Doubt, the AP is 
also a principle which is supposed to be sufficient to explain why a HKS 
activates his cognitive processes in order to know ER, i.e. it is also 
supposed to give the ratio essendi of the process of knowing, at any 
rate as far as the production of intellectual knowledge is concerned. 
According to the AP a HKS is supposed to exercise his cogni ti ve 
processes in the attempt to know the intrinsic nature of ER because he 
is interested in knowing the intrinsic nature of ER just for its own 
sake. I shall argue that, although the assurption of the AP can be a 
sufficient explaination of why HKS activates his cognitive processes in 
order to know ER at an intellectual level, it does not present the 
necessary ratio essendi of the P-knowil19 and can be substituted by sane 
other hypothesis. 
The three chapters that consti tute the second part of this work 
concern (ii) and (iii). In chapter 4 I will analyse the nature of the AP 
as carefully as I've described the nature of the other two cooponents of 
the TO in chapter one and two. In chapter 5 I wi 11 survey the main 
reasons there nay be to support the acceptance of the AP. We shall see 
that none of these reasons are sufficient for adopting the AP. And 
finally, in chapter 6 I will put forward an alternative hypothesis about 
the ratio essendi of p-knowil19 whose assurption will lead to the 
reinterpretation of the Perpetual Check of Reason qua a problem. 
THE FClMJLATICfl OF '!HE ARIS'IUl'ELIAN POSTULATE 
"Sleep on, 
Blest pair; and 0 yet happiest if we seek 
no happiest state, and know to know no more" 
Mil ton, Paradise Lost, IV, lines 773-5. 
IV.1 INTROOOCTION 
At the very beginning of this investigation (cf. the General 
Introduction to the First Part) I said that the Aristotelian Postulate is 
synthesized in Aristotle's dictum: 
AGS) "pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregontai phusei"; (Met.!. I, 908a 21, 
where AGS henceforth r~nds us that it is Aristotle's own Greek Sentence 
in question). 
In discussing the nature of the AP, its role in a theory of knowledge and 
its theoretical validity, we need to realize that such rough identification 
was put forward only in order to provide an approximate line of reasoning, 
provisional, but now in need of a considerable refinement. 
To start with, let me say that in the Corpus Aristotelicus there is 
nothing like a full-hlooded fomulation or endorserent of the AP. Not even 
the first Book of the Metaphysics, where we find AGS, really represents an 
exposi tion of "the Aristotelian Postulate". The AP as the ratio essendi of 
the genesis of the P-knowing, as the conditio sine qua non of the TRamatio 
Doubt, hence as the reference of my oriticism, is a logical construct, only 
the roots of whioh can be accredited to Aristotle. 
This should not be surprising. Like other philosophical theses that 
have never been thought to be in need of a plain fomulation in order to 
recei ve full support, it nay even be the case that the AP has never been 
advocated by any philosopher in that mclothed form in which I shall 
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present it. Indeed, the fact that so many different solutions of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason all have turned out tacitly to assune the AP 
leads to the conclusion, that the AP needs to be extracted fran the 
background of the history of epistemology, where we cannot find it in any 
"ready-to-be-argued" form. This nay seem to affect the significance of the 
Postulate and the central role I'd like to ascribe to it in respect both to 
the genesis of the process of knowing and to that of the TraU"IBtic Doubt. 
For what is the point of building up such amour against an enemy that has 
never existed in reality? Isn't the AP a mere spectre whose c~ng in life 
is due only to the perspective adopted in this work, an unjustified 
idiosyncrasy which we would be better rid of ? The answers should be clear, 
for the questions show a misunderstanding of the real nature of the issue 
and an incapacity of addressing it proper! y. Al though fran a narrow 
philological point of view the AP can in fact emerge as an artificial 
construction, its theoretical content can be found spread all throughout 
the mainstream of the western episteroological tradition, within which the 
irrportance of the AP is altogether undeniable. The logical presence and 
influence of the AP, though clothed in different guises, nay be recognized 
as continuous, fran Aristotle to Descartes, fran Thanas Aquinas to Hegel, 
fram Husserl and Heidegger to Wittgenstein (at least in so far as we still 
recognize an episteroology in these two latter authors).1 The point has 
already been made clear in chapter 3 and here it is not necessary or 
opport1.me to arque in its favour; at any rate it will acquire a sharper 
configuration in the course of the chapter. 
Rather I it is irrportant to realize that - if the incontestable 
extensive presence of the AP in so many philosophical perspectives may 
render it easier to calculate its irrportance - this also explains why to 
present a precise, accurate definition of the AP is both a necessary and 
difficul t task to achieve. Having been taken for granted by so many 
1) For a contemporary re-assertion of the Aristotelian Postulate cf. Gadamer (1976]. 
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thinkers, the AP has hardly ever received enough attention to rise to the 
level not just of an effective debate,.' but even of an explicit formulation. 
Yet this latter is definitely necessary if the former is to be started. 
Turning to the individuation of the AP in the Aristotelian sentence, 
the AP has indubitably received an implicit, historically very influencial 
fonnulation in Aristotle. It is mainly the Aristotelian dictum that we find 
quoted when phi losophers want to refer to ''man's pure desire to )mow" and 
it is the Aristotelian intellectualism that has influenced so rrany 
epistaoological studies. This is not to say that Aristotle was the only 
Greek philosopher who had a conception of huran nature as that expressed by 
his famous dictum. On the contrary, Plato endorsed a very sirndlar view of 
the desire to know as a spontaneous tendency, although for different 
metaphysical reasons (cf. the Syrrpasill11).2 So that, if there is sare truth 
both in Whitehead's famous renark that Western philosophy is a series of 
footnotes to Plato and in Peirce's idea that, on the other hand western 
philosophy is sirrply the articulation of Aristotle's thought, we rray 
tmderstand why the hypothesis of a spontaneous desire for knowledge just 
for its own sake has been always assuned as un-cootroversial. It is one of 
the lOOre deeply rooted legacies of Greek philosophy. The reason why I wish 
to focus on Aristotle is only that Aristotle states such a notion lOOre 
clearly than any other Greek philosopher, ~ his influence in later 
medieval philosophy, together with his rationalism, make his position the 
roost interesting to analyze as a starting point. An analysis of the 
Aristotelian dictlm will certainly provide a pranising starting point 
al though it won t t be sufficient to reach a full tmderstanding of the 
Postulate. Part of the hermeneutic problan is reducible to producing an 
adequate fomulation of the AP based 00 the AGS while avoiding a too naive 
identificatioo with it. Thus, with this proviso borne in mind, in section 2 
2) That a large part of Ancient Greek philosophy before Aristotle was also strongly orientated 
towards a vision of man as internally moved by an interest for knowing has been well argued, 
scholarly speaking, by Mondolfo [1958], second, part, espe~iallY chap.II entitled ·~he.Will as 
the Condition for Having Knowledge and the ActIve ConceptIon of the Process of KnOWIng . 
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I shall begin by examining the Aristotel ian roots of the AP. Since the AP, 
as an artificial construction, cannot be simply id~tified with Aristotle's 
dictun, it is necessary to elucidate in what sense and how far the idea 
that 'man is interested in knowing the intrinsic nature of ER just for the 
sake of knowledge" is indeed Aristotelian. By analyzing Aristotle's 
position I will be able to point out sane first features of the AP that 
will later turn out to be relevant to its final definition. Since an 
analysis of the Aristotelian dictum, however, has been already supposed to 
be insufficient to produce an accurate and logically satisfying formulation 
of the AP, I shall proceed by retracing same further characteristics of the 
Postulate in the history of philosophy (section 3/5). Only after its 
historical source has been so reviewed will I be able to outline the 
theoretical contents of the Aristotelian Postulate and give an explicit and 
more rigourous articulation of it. This will develop into a proposal for a 
synthetic definition of the AP (section 6), which will finally lead to an 
evaluation of the role of the AP in the genesis both of the process of 
knowing and of the TRat.mltic Doubt (section 7). 
It is only after this process of refinement that the AP will became 
subject to radical criticism; these wi 11 be taken up in the next chapter. 
IV.2 ARISTOTLE'S DIC'I.Ui 
As I've stated above, Aristotle's dictum should be interpreted quite 
differently fran what we take it to be when we include it - tmder the label 
"Aristotelian postulate" - among the necessary conditions for the TRaumatic 
Doubt. The issue can be approached by considering the carroon translation 
(TC) of the AGS, that is: 
3) This section is in debt to Burnyeat's article "Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge", where 
many of the contents here stated can be found articulated with great insight. If not 
differently specified, when I refer to him I'm always referring to this article. 
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Te> "all men by nature desire to know". 4 
,I~--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
TC may be seen to contain all the reasons that can lead us to a 
prenature identi fication of the possible contents of the AP with what 
Aristotle is really saying and therefore to a wrong definition of the 
former. On one hand TC nay tum out to be rather misleading in rendering 
Aristotle's thought as this is expressed in his dichm, for it may give the 
impression that there is only a linguistic difference between AGS and the 
AP. And on the other hand, despite the fact that the asstllPtion of TC is 
already a good way towards the identification of Aristotle's dictum with 
the AP, Te still remains too far fram a full statement of the Aristotelian 
Postulate as this is needed in the formulation of the Traumatic Doubt. In 
other words, although in a different context TC is a sanewhat adequate 
translation of Aristotle's dictum, here it fails to be satisfying as far as 
Aristotle is concerned, and yet it does not achieve the task of being a 
good defini tion of the AP. 
The cause of this twofold inadequacy is to be drawn back to the 
meanings of the three Greek words eidenai, oregantai and phusei, generally 
translated respectively by "to know", "desire" and ''by nature". Each has a 
specific meaning in Aristotle's dictum, to the effect that only the first 
two can be supposed to be enployed in the AP with a reasonably similar 
meaning, while the latter brings such a value to the dictum as to represent 
the significant distinction that separates its the sense fram that of the 
AP. A clarification of the deceptive approximation both of Te to 
Aristotle's dicttm and, as a consequence, of this latter to the AP can be 
gained by a close investigation into the meanings of those same three words 
in question. In this way I shall introduce sane considerations relevant to 
the definition of the AP. Let me proceed in the exposition by following the 
Greek order of occurrence. 
4) Cf. Ross [1958], p.114 and his edition of The Works of Aristotle, 1960, vol. VIII 
(Aristotle's Metaphysics). 
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IV.2.a ElDE1fAI 
It is largely recognized that the Greek thought was deeply influenced 
by visual metaphors,S and this is especially true in the field of theory of 
knowledge, for 
One of the cannon Greek ways to claim that I know was to use the 
verb oida, which, literally taken, arrounts to saying that I have 
seen the thing [or event] in question.6 
To put it roughly, in Greek the verb eidenai, the infinitive of oida, 
meant to know on the basis of one's own observation, while it seems to 
maintain a strang echo of a visual image, its root being semantically close 
to the verb orao "to see". However accurate this interpretation of the 
Greek word may be, it has been very convincingly arguecf that, in 
Aristotle's case at any rate, the tenn must also be considered to contain 
sanehow the equivalent meaning of the English word "to understand". More 
precisely, according to Bumyeat [1978] there is not a unique 
interpretation of eidenai, and its meaning should be rendered either by "to 
understand" or by "to know", depending on the context. Then, at least as 
far as Met.!. I, 908a 21 is concerned, eidenai cannot be understood by merely 
referring to its philological meaning of '~owledge by acquaintance, or by 
direct visual apprehension". On the contrary, it has also been suggested, 
al though this time not too satisfactorily,S that we should 
straightforwardly opt in favour of "to tmderstand": 
5) Cf. for example Snell [1953J 
6) Hintikka [1974), p.58 
7) Cf. Burnyeat [1978], especially p.l04, where he says: 'We may indeed be tempted to 
associate the contrast (between 'to understand' and 'to know'] directly with the horizontal 
dimension of the schema, setting our verb 'understand' to represent epistasthai, our verb 
'know' to represent ghignoskein (and also gnorizein). Not only have no third verb which 
functions like eidenai, but it would in any case be misleading to think of eidenai as the 
expression of a third, generic concept to which the other two verbs are subordinated as 
species to a cOllllllOn genus; rather eidenai is to be regarded, according to context, as a 
synonymous replacement for epistasthai ['to know·] or for ghignoskein f'to understand']* (*) 
[Burnyeat's Note] Even this is a simplification (cf. Lyons [1963J) but It holds, I think, for 
the Aristotelian constructions we need to consider.'. 
S) Cf. Lear [198S) p.6. 
CHAPTER IV 139 
But if philosophy is the ultimate goal of our original innate 
desire, perhaps we have to re-think what that desire is. We are not 
satisfied to know, for exarrple, that the heavens move in such a way; 
nor wi 11 we be satisfied to mow a vast array of such facts about 
phenanena [my italics]. We want to know why the heavens rrove that 
way, why the phenanena are as they are. We are after JOOre than 
mowledge, we are after understanding. Aristotle was, I belive, 
aware of this. Al though "to know" is an adequate translation of the 
Greek eidenai, Aristotle used this tenn generically to cover various 
species of knowinif. One of the species is epistasthai (literally, 
to be in a state of having episteme) which has been often translated 
as "to mow" or "to have scientific mowledge", but which ought to 
be translated as "to understand" [my italics]. ~or Aristotle says 
that we have epistane of a thing when we know its cause**. To have 
epistane one nust not only know a thing, one rrust also grasp [my 
italics] its cause or explanation. This is to understand it: to know 
in a deep sense what it is and how it canes to be. 
*) [Lear's note] See M.F. Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Understanding 
Know 1 edge" . 
**) [Lear's note] See e.g. Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71bS-12 
According to Lear, Tc could be iI11?roved by adopting the following 
translation: 
Tl) "all men by nature desire to understand". 
Unfortunately - as Lear recognizes, though he fails to draw the 
necessary consequence9 - even if the equivalence: 
DI9) "eidenai x" =def. "epistasthai x" =def. "to have episteme of x" 
is correct, it remains the fact that, as he says, in order "to have 
episteme of x one rrust not only mow x, one JJJJSt also grasp its cause or 
explanation". This iI11?lies that, thouqh insufficient, ""to )mow" x" is a 
necessary condition in order "to have epistene of x". This is to say that, 
to shi ft on the other side of the meaning of eidenai (i. e. to adopt "to 
tmderstandn ) certainly won't help in maintaining the manifold sense of the 
Greek tenn, i. e. "to tmderstand", "to see", "to know by direct observation 
or acquaintance", that yet nust be incl uded in the term. 
This summarizes the state of scholarly work. If we refer now these 
remarks to our present task, I believe that in this context the best 
sol uti on may be on the one hand sirrply that of bearing in mind that eidenai 
has these different meanings, and on the other hand, having given up the 
9) But see (1988), chap. 2 parage 2 entitled 'Understanding and 'the why". 
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idea of producing a fictitious English equivalent, of adopting the device 
of labelling the conceptual area covered by eidenai by rreans of the 
expression "to know-why"lO thus: 
~o) "ei denai x" =def. "'to know-why x"; 
where "to mow-why" is supposed to rraintain the serrantic value both of "to 
know" and of "to understand", and in this latter sense in the same way as 
"to see why" means "to understand why". In this way we will have that TC is 
inproved thus: 
T2) "all men by nature desire to know-why". 
But what about the equivalences introduced by D19 ? First, let us 
interpret episterne not sinply as "scientific knowledge", as it is roore 
popularly proposed, but as "theoretical, rational knowledge", and then rrake 
equal "theoretical, rational knowledge" to "objective Jmowledge". This 
translation has its justification in the technical use made of "objective 
knowledge" introduced above (cf. loS.b), a use which I believe is closer to 
the Aristotelian aim than any distinction between scientific and non-
scientific knowledge, which inplies concepts unknown to the Greek 
philosophers:ll 
D21) episteme =def. theoretical, rational knowledge =def. objective 
knowledge; 
secondly, let us also endorse, tracing the sarre route, the following 
equi val ence: 
~2) in the same way as "eidenai x" =def. "to have episteme of x" so "to 
know-why x" =def. "to have objective knowledge-why of x"; 
then we will have that a better12 translation of Aristotle's dictun is: 
T3) "all men by nature desire to have objective knowledge-why" 
10) Eventually this proposal could be supported by what is said in Burnyeat (1978), p.112, see 
also Lear quoted above. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1,1 981a,25-981b 9. 
11) Cf. for example the classification of types of knowledge.in.Hetap?ysj~s l025b-l026a. 
12) Obviously this "better" is relative to the context of thiS investigation. 
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This is probably all that can be done in order to elucidate the 
meaning of the word. But eidenai, as an epistemic term, also raises the 
problem of its reference, or roore specifically the question of what the "x" 
in "eidenai of x" can stand for. It is necessary to make clear what for 
Aristotle may be the object of "objective Jmowledge-why", what we can have 
"objective knowledge-why" of, or about. 
It is well known that Aristotle and roore generally Greek 
philosophers,13 claim that it is possible "to have episteme" only of what 
cannot be otherwise. 14 This seans to support the translation above 
introduced. For the thesis would appear affected by a serious lack of 
intelligibility if we were to stick to an interpretation of "episteme" as 
"scientific knowledge", but it becanes roore acceptablJ5 if, following 
Bumyeat [1978) ooce JOOre, we regard "episteme" as also meaning 
"tmderstanding" , that is in this context (and according to D20/D22) 
"objective knowledge-why". As he says: 
'~nderstanding is constituted by knowing the explanation of 
necessary cormectians in nature (p.llO) [ ... ]. Aristotle too [the 
"too" alludes to Plato] has his vision of a carplete tmderstanding, 
and.it is this that finally supports the claim that one can have 
"epistelle" [i .e.knowledge-why] only of things universal, necessary 
and everlasting, not of things particular, perishable or accidental 
[ ... ). Aristotle is not saying, for exanple, that we cannot mow 
what accidental states of affairs obtain in the world. His 
contention is that the accidental falls outside the reach of 
systematic explanatioo and understandi~ (pp.112-113).16 
These few ranarks can be sl..lllOed up by re-translating Aristotle's 
dicttm thus: 
T4) "all men by nature (phusei) desire (oregantai) to have objective 
Jmowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise". 
We can now turn to the analysis of the second Greek term, oregontai. 
13) Cf. again Hintikka (1974J, chap.3. 
18) Cf. Posterior Analytics, A 2, 7lb 12, 15-16. . 
15) Yet not uncontroversial, as it is also recognized b~ Burnyeat hlms~lf (p.llS). Cf. ~lso 
what he says about the fallacy of deri vi ng a necessl tas consequentl S from a neceSSl tas 
consequentiae, on which the Aristotelian reasoning may be grounded (p.10S and ff., especially 
note 23). . 
16) Cf. Burnyeat's very interesting note 34, p.113 again.st Hintikka's interpretation of this 
same issue as it is exposed in (1973), chap.4 (but also In [1978] chapt.3). 
- .... 
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IV. 2. b OREXXWTAI 
In a very concrete sense the tenn orego - of which oregontai is 
simply the Present Indicative form, third person plural - rooans "reach", 
"stretch out for sanething", "stretch forth one's hand" I "grasp at". I t is 
because of this dynamic sense that it canes to have the CClTJ1'X)Il meaning of 
"to desire", which is that we find in Aristotle.17 Note that we owe to this 
analogy between rnental/spiri tual states and physical/dynamic states the 
term "enotion", which contains the root ''rootion'' wi thin itself. "Oregontai" 
refers to a ''movement of the soul". In covering the significance of "to 
desire" we ITllSt understand the Greek verb as iJl"l)lying a sort of 
metaphorical tension towards the object of the desire, an idea of IOOvement 
frClll man towards reality. The enormous significance of this dynamic analogy 
will be clarified in the last section and will be a matter of discussion in 
V.7. At the fl'01'lel'lt, let me just bring to light the Aristotelian 
connection18 between oregantai and its noun orexis or orektikan, "a general 
word for all kinds of appetency or conatioo {honne}" (Liddell, Scott 
(1940)19). In Aristotle: 
The appeti te (orektikan) is that facul ty of the soul which pursues 
(A. De A. 431 a) . It embraces the three functions of desire 
(epithymia), spirit, and which (ibid. 414b) and is, in conjunction 
with sensatioo (aisthesis) or intellectioo (noesis) the ultimate 
cause of motion in the soul (De An. Ill" 433a-b [ ... ]). Aristotle 
general treatment of orektikan is in the De Motu animo chapts. 6-8. 
(Peters [1967], p.146, ~ italics). 
According to these specifications, I will translate oregontai not 
sirrply as "desire" but by neans of a looger locution, viz. "have a conation 
which drives them towards", so to have: 
TS) "all men by nature (phusei) have a cooatioo which drives them towards 
the acquisitioo of objective knowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise". 
i7) Cf. Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, 111 3a 12. . 
18) For this connection in Aristotle, cf. Nichomachean EthlCS 119b 7j De Anima 414b 6. 
19) Cf. Aristotle De Anima 414b 2 and 433a 13. 
d 
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Once again, the reasons for adopting this rrore cooplex translation 
will be spelt out partially in sections IV.6/7 and chiefly in chapter five. 
At the nnnent we only need to focus on the last and most carplex term. 
IV.2.c PHUSEI 
Until TS we nay still be of the opinion that what we rrean by the AP, 
insofar as this is involved in the TRa1..l1'Btic Doubt, is in fact fairly 
represented by Aristotle's dictum. We nay still find in this latter a clear 
understanding of the theoretical hypothesis that is at the root of the 
genesis of the process of knowing and that gives its negative aspect to the 
Perpetual Check. It is only when we try to understand the meaning of phusei 
better that this conviction falters. For it is this term that makes the 
Aristotelian dictun inply sarething quite different fran the AP. 
Linguistically, the word has the same semantic extension of the 
English expression ''by nature", and yet in this context such a translation 
can too easily lead to think of "naturally", and fran this to underval ue 
the inportant role that the term plays in the sentence, as if by TS 
Aristotle were merely saying: "of course all men desire to know". This 
would be a very inadequate understanding of his thought. For in fact, by 
phusei Aristotle means to refer to the whole state of the world,20 as this 
is a complex set of ontologically interrelated elements fo~ng an 
intelligible universe, whose characteristics interlock harmoniously. Hence, 
by means of the phusei-clause Aristotelian metaphysics is called into play. 
The expression ''by nature" is to .be interpreted as meaning "according to 
the intrinsic harroonious features of an intelligible tmiverse". This has, 
at least, two enormous consequences. First, ''by nature" conveys the notion 
that "to be a Jmowledge-why-seeker" is a property which goes together with 
20) For this use of the dative of 'physis' cf. also Aristotle's Politics, 1253a 3, 'man bi: 
DAturJ (phusei) is a social animal', and also ibid. 1254a 15. 
0fAPI'ER IV 144 
that of ''being a hunan being". And secondly, "by nature" indicates that 
this property is just the denoting characteristic of an el E!I1'ent of the 
universe which therefore must be compatible with the rest of it. The point 
deserves a JOOre detailed investigation. 
IV. 2. d ARISTOTLE's PERSPECTIVE 
Some principal aspects of Aristotle's metaphysical perspective, those 
condensed in that phusei, have fotmd lively expression in Jonathan Lear's 
book. In his work on Aristotle which I've already had occasion to 
rnention,21 Lear synthesizes for us Aristotle's perspective thus: 
[in Metaphysics 1. I, 980a 21] Aristotle is attributing to us a 
desire, a force, which urges us on toward knowledge (p.1, my 
italics) . 
Man is by nature a questioner of the world: he seeks to 
understand why the world is the way it is, the world for its part 
reciprocates: it "answers" nan's question. (p.26, my italics» 
Man has the generalized ability to get at the bottan of things 
he encounters in the world: to find out what they are really like. 
It is the desire to understand that proopts nan to engage in such 
inquiry, and it is the deep lDlderstanding of the world that 
satisfies that desire. (p. 117, my italics) 
Han is not born with knowledge, but he is born with the capacity 
to acquire it. But the world nJ.1St cooperate with him if he is to 
exercise this capacity. (p.2, my italics) 
The world prarpts us to inqui ry by presenting i tsel f (to us) as 
puzzling, and then it obligingly yields up its truths in response to 
our patient investigations. The world as such is meant to be Imown 
(by beings like us) and it invites man to fulfil his role as a 
systematic undestander of the world. (p.7, (my italics]) 
[Aristotle's world] is essentially intelligible. It is a world 
that is so ordered, structured, saturated with purposefulness that 
it is meant to be understood in the sense that it is man's nature to 
inquire into the world's order and cane to understand it. If the 
world were not in this extended sense so mind-like, it would be 
irrpassible for mm to understand it. Our appreciation of 
purposefulness is not, for Aristotle, a projection of (human) rrdnd 
ooto nature; it is a projectioo of purposeful, intelligible, 
"mindful" nature onto the hunan mind. (p.4l [~ italics]). 
It is only because the world offers a course along which man's 
inquiries can run that his desire to know has any hope of being 
satisfied. (p.3) 
Imagine how frustrating it would be to be born with the desire to 
understand in a world which did not cooperate! (p.7) 
21) Cf Lear (1988). The title of his book Aristotle, The Desire to Understand is already 
unequivocally indicative, and in fact is an introduction to Aristotle's philosophy from the 
point of view of Aristotle's dictum. 
t 
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It is easy to spell out the theoretical course foIl owed by this 
collage of quotations: Aristotle attributes to us a desire to know, which 
is in perfect accord with what the world is made for, namely for being 
Jmown. This is clear fran the relation of the world with the httnan being, 
that of informing him about its own state. We just need to recall the 
inversion of the arrow operated by an Aristotelian/Thomdstic/Lockean 
opposer of the Perpetual Circle in III.4.b. If on one side there is the 
desire to Jmow that prarpts HKS towards ER, this desire is not disappointed 
by ER, for there is also a movement of the world towards man, at the level 
of perception. There is not even the shadow of a possible dualism between 
ERP and mn because there is no real distinction/opposition between subject 
and object, but only a virtuous circle .between knower and known. As Thanas 
Aquinas said, centuries later, still echoing Aristotle: 
Knower and known are not agent and patient to one another, they are 
two things frern which on~ principle of knowledge results. 
(Disputations, VIII, De Veritate, 7 ad 2). 
The conclusion, left to the last quotation fran Lear, is obvious: 
what would happen if the second arrow, that which goes fran ER towards HKS, 
should disappear ? If the banoony of the mUverse, the virtuous circle 
between reality and man, should collapse ? We already know the answer to 
the question: the crisis of the Classic picture of the world and of man's 
place in it will raise the Traumatic conception of the Perpetual Check of 
Reason. But how the harmmious Aristotelian tmiverse breaks into pieces 
will be referred to in due time (section IV.3). At the moment let me give 
the final translation of ADS: 
T6) "owing to the harroonious nature of the tmiverse, all men have a 
satisfiable conation which drives them towards the acquisition of objective 
Jmowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise". 
It should be clear now why I said that the ''by nature" clause 
introduces an element in Aristotle's dictum that is radically incompatible 
with the so called Aristotelian postulate. It is exactly because Aristotle 
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thinks that it is in the normal state of the world that HKS is interested 
in }mowing ER and ER, being fully intelligible, is ready to be known 
(exactly because Aristotle says phusei) that he can at the same time assume 
the hunan desire to mow and not to be faced by any form of Traunatic 
Doubt. cne of the ITOst irrportant int>licatians of the phusei clause is that 
it brings into the dictun the conception of a lTAltual, collaborating 
cotmection between the desire to know and the possibility of satisfying 
such desire, i.e. the intelligibility of ER. This is graphically shown by 
the two arrows representing the epistemic relation occurring between HI<S 
and ER. As long as this connection and both carponents are left untouched 
there can be no danger of a gap between man and reality, between two 
realities, and between the desire to know and the inpossibility of 
fulfilling such desire. 
other metaphysical aspects of Aristotle's perspective, retraceable to 
the introduction of phusei in Aristotle's dictllll will deserve a closer look 
in the next chapter I but now I shall turn to the crucial issue of the 
historical development of T6 . 
IV.3 ALBERT '!HE GREAT 00 ARISTOTLE' 5 DIC'lUf 
Every student of philosophy knows that in later medieval philosophy 
Aristotle is The Philosopher. This is a tmique phenanencn that will never 
occur again in the history of philosophy, and the edition of the 
Aristoteles Latinus22 gives an idea of the influence his thought may have 
had in those centuries. Obviously, to retrace the popularity of the 
Metaphysics and therefore the possible interpretations of his faroous 
incipit throughout the Middle Age is not a task that can be accQ1l>lished in 
22) Aristoteles Latinus is the scholar edition, started in 1939 of all the translations of 
Aristotle's works in the Middle Age, cf. Dod (1982). 
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this section, not even in a sumary way.23 Therefore, in this and in the 
following sections I will l~t myself to only two principal authors, both 
extremely relevant to the present analysis of the AP, Albert tbe Great and 
Thanas Aquinas. Their cannentaries on the Metapbysics contain inportant 
insights that will tum out useful for the final definition of the AP. 
There are two interesting points about AGS that can be evinced by a 
close study of Albert the Great's Ccmrentary:24 the first concerns the 
introduction of the possibility of a slight modification of the meaning of 
pbusei when this is translated into Latin, and the second concerns the way 
he tmcierstands the dictun, how he interprets its role in a theory of 
knowledge. Let me focus an them in tum by labelling them (A) and (B). 
A) The most ccmron Latin translatiort5 of the AGS is: 
TL) "ames hanines natura scire desi de rant " . 
As far as the terms "desiderant" and "scire" are concerned, TL is to 
be \mderstood in such a way that: 
(i) we consider "desiderant" as having the same meaning of the 
Greek/En9lish pair "oregantai/desire" above specified, that is as including 
the metapbori cal dynami c aspect of ''rooving towards sanething"; and 
(ii) we attribute to "scire" the same specific meaning attribute to eidenai 
in D20 , because, even if on the one hand "scire" may have the same degree 
of generali ty in Latin of eidenai in Greek and of "to know" in English, on 
the other hand "scire" rrust be presupposed as part of the Aristotel ian 
perspective, and therefore in strict connection with the concept of visual 
understanding and with the everlasting aspect of m as a reference (see 
23) For this study see Doig [1972], especially chapter 1, about the fortune and the history of 
the manuscripts of the Metaphysics. 
24) Cf. Albert the Great's Hetaphysica Libri Quinque Prjores published in [1960]. 
25) This is one of Albert the Great's way of rendering AGS. Cf. also Thomas Aquinas In 
Hetaphysjcam Arjstotelis Ca.DentariB, the TrBnslatio Anoni.a sive Hedia in Aristoteles Latinus 
XXV.2 and Translatio IBcobi sive 'VetustissiN' CUll Scholiis et Translatio Composita sive 
'Vetus', ibidem, XXV-I-I. 
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below section .rV.4.b for Thanas Aquinas' use of the roore specific verb 
intel1igere) • 
Up to this point TL can be translated into English by means of TS' It 
is the different Latin translations of phusei that turns out to be 
interesting, for they produce a slight difference in TL that can make it 
say something closer than AGS to our Aristotelian Postulate. For Albert the 
Great has three ways of rendering the Greek phusei: "natura", "natural e" 
and "nat ura li ter" ,26 and the latter is interpretable as a further step 
towards the Aristotelian Postulate. 
The use of "natura" is the roore correct. It is the ablative form of 
the noun "natura" and generally it can be 1.D'lderstood as standing for the 
longer locution: "in rel1.JTl natura esse", "it is in the nature of things". 
As for phusei, "natura" brings inside TL the Aristotelian metaphysics of a 
harm:mious universe enriched by "syrrpathies" arrong its carponents and 
spontaneous tendencies of potential states towards their actual 
fulfilmants. It nay be differently translated as "according to the natural 
course of events", "according to the way things happen" or ''by the nature 
of things". By using this abiativJ7 Albert the Great follows the Classic 
tradition. For example, Cicero says: 
Natura inest in mentibus nostris [ ... ] cupidi tas veri videndi 
(Tusculanae Disputationes, my italics). 
Which shows that, in paraphrasing Aristotle ("It is in the nature of 
things that in our minds there is an inborn desire to see the truth"), he 
uses the ablative "natura" to render phusei. 
The second expression "naturale" is an adjective that Albert the 
Great uses in connecticn with the noun "desideriun" in the expression 
"naturale sciendi desideriun" .28 The significance of this version can be 
disregarded as being due cnly to the Latin construction of the sentence 
26) Albert the Great, op.cit., Lib.I, Tract. I chapt.s 4 and 5. 
27) Cf. Albert the Great op.cit. 1,1,4, 36-37 and ibid. 5, 83-84. 
28) Cf. Albert the Great op.cit. both titles of 1,1, chap.s 4 and 5. 
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(literally "[man has] a natural desire of knowing" instead of "[man] 
naturally desi~e to know"). 
It is the last expression that is the roost interesting. 
"Naturali ter" , being an adverb, is the exact Latin equi val ent of 
"naturally". It occurs in a long sentence: 
Qmes igitur hanines, per hoc quod sunt hanines, per intellectun in 
specie et natura haninum canstituti, natyraliter scire desiderant; 
(I, I, 4, 80-82), [my underlining]. 
Let me label this Latin translation of AGS TL in order to remind us that is 
Albert's translation. In TL we have the Latin translation of AGS put in 
italics, and this shows that phusei is translated by means of 
"naturaliter". The irrportance of this translation is connected with what 
I've said above about the risk inherent in understanding phusei as merely 
meaning "naturally" or "of course", without taking into account the 
metaphysical background inplied by the expression. This shift seems now to 
be made even more possible by TL. For in TL the desire to know appears to 
be attributed to man as one of his principal properties without any 
connection with that second half of the issue, appropriately inplied by the 
Aristotelian use of phusei, that could render this attribution of the 
desire to mow to man nan-problematic, namely the "collaboration" of the 
universe to fulfil this desire. According to TL it is the desire to know 
that becanes natural (cf . Albert the Great's previous use of the Latin 
adjective). The natural desire to know characterises the peculiarity of 
that creature that is man in the sense that, as Albert the Great says, men 
desire to know "per hoc quod sunt hanines", "in so far as they are men" 
("qua men"), apparently no matter what the structure or the purpose of the 
rest of the universe is. It is worth noticing that it is proper to Latin 
(but not to Greek) to allow the translation of "naturaliter" as 
"spontaneously" . 29 
29) For Aristotle's concept of ·what is spontaneous· as "to automaton" Lear [1988], p.36. 
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On the basis of LA let me irrprove our tmderstanding of AGS by adding 
a new clause to T6: 
T7) "(owing to the harmonious nature of the tmiverse) all men have a 
(spontaneous and satisfiable) conation which drives than towards the 
acquisition of objective knowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise". 
The use of the brackets underlines the fact that in T7 the 
metaphysical perspective remains implicit, for T7 is getting closer to an 
anthropological statarent that defines only the nature of a hunan being, 
being at the same time "ontologically neutral". 
Although the fonnulation of T7 is certainly a way of forcing Albert 
the Great to say much more than he is really willing to say in TL, yet, TL 
does in fact increase the possibility of distinguishing between the desire 
to )mow as a property of hunan beings - or better as a prerequisite for an 
animal to be considered a human being - and the whole metaphysical picture 
in which this desire IIU.lSt be considered if it is not to give rise to the 
TRa\.l1Btic Doubt.30 Certainly the perspective fran which Albert the Great 
sees the relation between man and the tmiverse is still the Aristotelian 
perspective, but in TL it remains irrplicit, it merely underlies the vision 
of man, and in this way it nay cane to be disregarded, once the harTOOIlY 
between subject and object is broken by a cartesian desoon. 
B) The secaxi interesting indication that can be gained fran Albert the 
Great's Cooment en the Metaphysics concerns the interpretation that he 
gives of the "pure desire to know". This is defined by entitling the fourth 
chapter: 
De prilOO princ~p~o generativo scientiae ex parte nostra, quod est 
naturale sciendi desiderium (I,I, chap. 4, mY italics). 
In ccmnenting 00 AGS Albert the Great feels the necessity of 
introducing it as "the first principle of the genesis of Jmowledge fran our 
30) In agreement with this interpretation Albert th~ Great ends t~e four~h chapter by s?ying: 
'Sic igitur necessario concluditur, quod OIIn8S hOllunes natura SClre deslderant. Cum en1m hoc 
desideriulII sit omniu. quorUM in specie determinata est natura una, erit hoc desiderium 
naturale et naturam speciei consequens." (op.cit.,I,I,4,36-40, IY italics). 
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side". The idea is that the genesis of the process of knowing which leads 
to the production of objective knowledge Le. "scientia" lies in ht.lTlaIl 
desire to know for the sake of knowledge. In adding the proviso "ex parte 
nostra" ("fran our side") Albert the Great is probably thinking about the 
other caxtitio sine qua non for the production of knowledge, namely the 
presence of intelligible external reality. Albert the Great wouldn't take 
the mere presence of m as a necessary condition for the activation of the 
process of knowing, clairrUng perhaps instead the necessity of same sort of 
ontic contribution - maybe in terms of sane activity of ER on HKS'senses or 
an ontic disposition to be known by HKS - as the additional ratio essendi 
of the genesis of the process of knowing. However this nay be, it is 
interesting to note that he recognizes the Aristotelian dictum as 
presenting the subjective ratio essendi of the genesis of the process of 
knowing. I shall make serre use of this characterization in section IV. 6. 
Let us now turn to the other outstanding medieval philosopher we shall be 
concerned wi th, Tharas Aquinas. 
IV.4 THoms A~lINAS 00 ARISTO'l'LE' S DIcruM 
Most of what I've already said about Albert the Great is equally 
valid for his pupil Thcmas Aquinas. Hence, I shall presuppose T7 and use 
'I'hanas Aquinas' Coomentarr1 on Aristotle's Metaphysics to introduce only 
two additional considerations. 
The first consideration still concerns the line of development 
emerging fran phusei to "spontaneously" via "naturaliter". According to 
many interpreterS32 'l'haras Aquinas is to be understood as reinforciIl9 the 
31) Cf. Thomas Aquinas op.cit. 
32) Alcorta [1960), Coccio (1960), Rossi [1974), Neri [1974) specifically about Thomas 
Aquinas, but see also frOi a Neoscholastic point of view e.g. Van Steenberghen [1970], Part 
II, chap. 5, Maritain [1928J, Chap.2 and Maritain [1938J, and more objectively Gallagher 
(1982] which starts the discussion of the nature of philosophy of knowledge by (oddly) 
puttin~ the Aristotelian dictum in contrast with the Socratic awareness of being ignorant. 
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idea that man has a spontaneous tendency towards knowledge, quite apart 
fran the status of the rest of the universe. This "spontaneity" would make 
the conation towards knowledge resermle a sort of first self-lOOver: 
apparently the process of knowing, whose first genetic principle is the 
desire to know, would have a free, unforced start, at least in so far as 
the highest expressions of knowledge are concerned (this is to say, apart 
fran what is due to the animal "epistemic" interest that airrs to Irere 
physical survival). 33 "rhis concept of self-roover or, referring to the 
metaphor of the game of chess, the idea that HKS is playing with the white, 
has its distinctive expression in Aquinas' concept of vis cognoscitiva: 
Quanto enirn aliqua vis cognosci ti va est imnatel ior , tanto est 
perfectior in cognoscendo (Tharas Aquinas [1820], I,!, 6 [my 
italics).34 
A clear understanding of what may be rreant by this vis cognosci tiva'5 
can be gained in a very interesting passage by Van Steenberghen [1970], a 
Neoscholastic manual of Episteroology. Let me quote it at length: 
The knowing subject appears to consciousness as a real tendency or 
real appeti te for mowing, that is, for becaning, possessing, or 
being the objects as rruch as possible [this refers to the 
Aristotelian/Scholastic concept of ilaoorphic knowledge]. [ ... ] We 
have said that the "subject" or "self" it shows itself to be an 
element of consciousness which is not reducible to the "object", 
because it shows itself to be a conscious tendency an appetite, a 
desire, a need which has to be satisfied, a tendency which gives to 
consciousness a~.a.i.D irreversible direction or orientation fran 
the subject to the object, that is towards that which is alooe the 
content of consciousness, the tenn of knowledge [my italics]. This 
experiencing of a tendency is again a primitive, original 
33) This interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of mi nd as a 'self-mover' has been 
defended by Wedin [1988), chap. 6, section 3 ("Mind as a self-mover"). See below Section 
IV.S.c and also next chapter. 
34) 'The more a will/desire to know is immaterial, the better is its application in the 
process of knowing', where 'vis cognoscitiva' refers to the natural, human desire to know. 
35) The adjective 'cognoscitivus" is unknown to Classic Latin (cf. the Oxford Latin 
Dictionary) and it is not very common in Medieval Latin either: e.g. it is not listed in the 
Hediae Latinitatis Lexicon Hinus (Niermeyer [1976J). According to the Revised Hedieval Latin 
Uord-List fro. British and Irish Sources (Latham (1965J) it starts being used only in the XIII 
century in order to mean 'concerned with knowledge, cognitive' (cf. also the Revised Medieval 
Latin Uord-List from British Sources (Latham [1981), Fascicule II) which says that the term 
occurs for the first time in Robert Grossteste [1235-53J and then in Roger Bacon). In the 
Corpus ChristianorulJ Continuatio Hedievalis Lexico Latinitatis Hedii aevi (Blaise (1975) we 
find that 'Virtus or Facultas cognosci ti va" is first used by Thomas Aquinas. So, although 
Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274] used the expression vis cognoscitiva quite commonly {see below}, 
he was adapting Classic Latin to his purposes, giving rise to a sort of neologism. English 
translators render it by the expression 'cognitive power' . 
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irreducible and therefore indefinable datun. ''To tend" or "to 
desire" is a certail) "way of being" that I find in roysel f . It 
inplies a certail) "lack of being" and a .Qetl.aiD. ca~city for rrore 
being to fill up this privation. (p. 101) [ ... ]. [The presence of 
the object] does not exclude the subject's spontaneity. Its 
curiosity constantly tends to sarething beyond the object 
apprehended. (p.l02) [ ... J [But at the end] My knowledge is 
therefore an activity, and it is an innanent activity, that is a 
lOOVement which takes place in me and terminates in me. It proceeds 
fran me (fran my capacity, my tendency, my potency) [it goes out to 
grasp the object and caning back] it rerains in me (constituting me, 
making me myself) (p.l06-107, nur underlining). 
Apart fran the introduction of the vague clause "certain" precisely 
whenever we· would like to know rrore about the specificandun, and 
disregarding the questionable appeal to an analogical and descriptive use 
of language this 1009 citation throws a vivid light on the basic idea of a 
vis cognoscitiva and the d~c image that underlies it. If in Aristotle 
there still is a relaxed use of "orexis" as a synonym of "horme", in the 
Scholastic version the adoption of "desire" in terms of "vis cognoscitiva" 
points to a more specified use: the natural desire to know becares a 
spontaneous, alroost physically dynamic, tendency towards knowledge, a 
tendency which can be in fact no longer related to the general status of 
the rest of the uni. verse. 36 Knowing is a natural movement towards the 
kingdan of a-temporal, immutable truths. 
Certainl y I as in the case of AI bert the Great I sti 11 in 'l'haras 
Aquinas there is the optimistic background of a nutual relation between HKS 
and ER, of an agreement between Knowledge and Being. 'l'he metaphysical 
perspective is still that: 
"[ ••• ] C\ITl naturale desiderilm (for knowledge) vanun esse non 
possi t" (I, I , 4) .37 
36) So ThoMS Aquinas in Summa Theologiae states that 'Vis cognosc~tiva est .motiva" (I, 81 1 
and 2) and that "Yis cogooscitiva movet appetitivam representando 81 suum ob?ectum" (1,11,40-
8). A note to this text in the English edition of 1965 says: "We thu~ [I.e psychological 
tendency] translate extensio appetitus (which is the effect of the V1S cognoscitiva] and 
variants thereof: the movement spoken of is mental, psychic, immanent, at least essentially 
and primarily. It may be, and is a matter of course, followed by an actual physical or bodily 
movement. 1 (cf. Reid (1965], note b, pp.6-7, vol. XXI 1a2a,e 40.-48).1 . II 
37) "Since the natural desire for knowledge cann?t be Valn (I.e. unfulfl,llable] . The same 
position, almost word by word is already present 1n Albert the Great, op.Clt. 1,1,4, 20-25. 
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For Thanas Aquinas a htrnan being is such if and only if he has this 
striving for knowledge, only if he is a knowledge-seeker, for: 
Propria autem operatio homdnis inquantum hama, est intelligere. Per 
hoc enim ab amibus allis differt. Unde naturaliter desideriun 
haninis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequences ad 
sci endum , (I, 1,2).38 
Thanas Aquinas' translation of phusei by means of "natura" is still 
to be seen as referring to the Aristotelian sense "owing to the hanronious 
nature of the universe". 39 Yet, fran the Thanistic way of interpreting the 
Aristotelian dictum there seems to emerge almost a hypostatization of the 
free desire to know into a spontaneous vis cognoscitiva, of a mental 
tension into a physical force which, being rather independent of the state 
of the wriverse, almost physically constrains htrnan beings towards the 
acquisition of knowledge.40 
The second remark I wish to make concerns Thcrras Aquinas' use of the 
verb "intel1igere" .41 According to the quotation above, for Thanas Aquinas 
the roost hlllBIl of all acti vi ty is that of "intelligere". Now "intelligere" 
has a rrore specified use than "scire". "Intelligere" is used to rrean "quasi 
intus legere external reality" ("almost read into external reality") .42 In 
its etyroological sense "intelligere" is closer to ''tmders tanding " than 
sinply "scire", and Thanas Aquinas uses it in order to translate eidenai 
m:>reprecisely, that is in order to refer to "intellectual knowledge" .43 We 
know fran what I've said above in IV.2.a that man is supposed to be 
interested in ."knowledge-why". By using "intelligere" to render "eidenai/ 
38) ·The activity of knowing is proper of man in so far as he is a lIIan. For which he differs 
from all the others. Hence by nature the human desire is inclined towards knowledge and, as a 
consequence towards science" . 
39) This is for example the way Dante understands Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas in his 
Divina Commedia Inferno, XXVI, 118-120 (cf. Musa (1971]) and in 11 Convivio, 1,1. 
40) The danger' of such an hypostatization, still present in Aristotle, is very clear in 
Plato's theory of Love as a minor God or ·daimon· in the Symposium, 202d-205c. See VI.S.a for 
some remarks on Plato's position on this issue. 
41) Host of what I say is scholarly based on Doig [1972], Part III, section 2 ·Intellectual 
Knowledge· . 
42) Cf. Doig (1972), p.354, who refers to summa Thelogiae. 
43) By using 'intelligere· the result is that Aristotle's dictum would sound as a plain 
truism for all men desire to know (intelligere) what in itself is already knowable (i.e. a 
univer~e which is intelligible). The theoretical force of the 'phusei' clause couldn't be more 
evident. 
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knowledge-why", ThCI'IBS Aquinas can now be seen to stress a particular sense 
of this "Jmowledge-:-why". For "intelligere" conjoins the sense of lWving 
towards things with the idea of entering into them and seizing what really 
supports or explains sensible knowledge, as if there were a veil one should 
go through in order to grasp the intrinsic nature of ~. And this of course 
represent a sort of introduction to a dualism between how things may appear 
to be and how things real I yare. Even if 
it is very essential that we not mistake this view of knowl edge as 
iI1l>lying a return [sic] to the Kantian opposition between "thing in 
i tsel f" and "appearance". [for] When Aquinas speaks of lIDderstanding 
[i. e. "intelligere"] he wishes to say, not that we grasp sane 
superficial aspect of things, nor even sanething that is hidden at 
the centre of things behind the appearance [ ... ] [but rather to say 
that] to tmderstand is to seize whatever a thing may be. In other 
words to deny [sic] the legitimacy of the Kantian distinction. (Ooig 
[1972], p.355) 
yet it is undeniable that the introduction of "intelligere" creates the 
inpression of a hidden dual ism between intrinsic and apparent properties of 
external reality. The fact that lIDtil Kant this dualism will remain covered 
should not prevent us fran making a further step towards the fornulation of 
the Aristotelian Postulate by reading AGS thus: 
Ta) "( owing to the hanronious nature of the universe) all men have a 
(spontaneous and satisfiable) conation which drives them towards the 
acquisition of objective Jmowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of what 
cannot be otherwise". 
IV.5 DESCARTES AND ARISTOTLE' S DI~ 
By now it should be clear that the main difference between 
Aristotle's dictum and the Aristotelian Postulate remains the strict, 
harmonious conjmction occurring between the hunan desire to know and the 
intelligibility of external reality, represented by the "phusei" clause 
occurring in Aristotle's dictllll. I've already mentioned above that the peak 
of the crisis of this harmonious state of things occurred when the hanmany 
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was shattered by a Cartesian discord. There might be several reasons why 
the fracture between vis cognos.dtiva and the intelligible nature of the 
world reaches its critical stage, although certainly not its full 
developnent, in Descartes. A list of the min factors that have been 
certainly influential in this process should include the following 
considerations : 
i) it is in Descartes' century that the scientific revolution starts in 
terms of rrathernatization of the observed phenanena, and this will lead to a 
clear division between everyday reality and reality as it is known by a 
scientist .44 , 
ii) Descartes inaugurates the procedure of the methodological doubt, i.e. 
of radically challenging the reality of the external world on a purely 
logical basis (the hypothesis of a misleading derron) ;45 
iii) it is with Descartes that the tendency starts of considering knowledge 
as an indirect awareness of mental states; this will lead to a separation 
between mental and physical worlds; 
iv) after the crisis of the isaoorphic conception of knowledge, which is to 
be tied with that of the Aristotelian metaphysics fram Ockham to CUsanus, 
it is with Descartes that the Platonistic tendency of grounding knowledge 
m a subjective justification of beliefs according to epistemological 
internal criteria has a strong revival.46 
However, it is irrportant to underline that, strictly speaking, the 
nubsl agreement between vis cognoscitiva and knowability of external 
44) Cf. Koyre' [1944). especially pp.74-84 for Descartes' influence in the history of human 
scientific vision of the world. 
45) An articulated discussion of this aspect can be found in stroud (1984). chapter I. about 
the problem of the existence of an external world, and in Burnyeat [1982), a brilliant article 
on the MOre radical nature of Descartes scepticism in respect to ancient versions. 
46) I believe that iliv can be summarised by saying that the fracture between vis cognosciUva 
and knowability of the world starts when philosophy changes from being mainly metaphysi~al to 
being .ainly epistemological. but this of course is just a general statement of the 
perspective from where the issue could be analysed. and here I ~on't ~ttempt to be more 
detailed for all I need to state is how Descartes interprets ArIstotle s dictum and then 
whether the origin of the fracture can be referred to his position. 
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reality is still granted in Descartes. In one of his lmpublished works47 we 
can read the following dialogue: 
Polyander: [ •.. ] I shall regret my ignorance for the rest of my life 
if I do not learn anything through I1U' association with you. 
EPistsoon: The best thing I can tell you em this topic is that the 
desire for Jmowledge, which is call1al to all men, is an illness 
which cannot be cured, for curiosity grows with learning. [ ... ]. 
Eudoxus [Descartes]: Is it possible, Epist€lOOn, that you, with all 
your learning are persuaded that nature can cmtain a malady so 
universal without also providing a remedy for it ? For my part, just 
as I think that each land has enough fruits and rivers to satisfy 
the hunger and thirst of all its inhabitants, so too I think that 
enough truth can be known in each subject to satisfy arrply the 
curiosity of orderly souls. (Descartes [1984], p.402). 
This is the very beginning of the dialogue, and the parallel between 
the desire to know and hunger, and how nature has provided all the means to 
fully satisfy both of them, is only a ploy to introduce the "cogito ergo 
SllTl" as a rreans of justifying knowledge by internal criteria of clarity and 
certainty, as "the food" which will satisfy any "epistarologically hungry 
soul". But the purpose and the devel o~t of this introduction is not what 
interests us here. The central point is that this short passage shows what 
Descartes' attitude towards the desire to know is: the desire to know rrust 
be supposed to go together with the possibi Ii ty of knowing external 
real i ty . Al though Descartes means to save the harmony between the two 
elements, it is indicative that in this dialogue we encounter for the first 
time the possibility of a more problematic relation between the desire to 
know and the possibility of fulfilling it. It is as if Descartes were 
pondering the possibility of assuning the Aristotelian postulate without 
the metaphysical inplications contained in Aristotle's dicttrn (without 
taking into acccnmt the phusei) and in the end decided not to accept the 
possibility of a desire for knowledge independent of any natural tendency 
47) It is the ·Search for Truth by means of the Natural Light· first published in .1701 and now 
in Descartes [1984], vol.II pp. 400-20. Many conjectures have been made about the date of its 
composi tion, but si nee it has been dated any tillle from the ea~ lier to the later year.s . of 
Descartes' life it can be inferred that the contents of the dIalogue represent a posltlon 
which is not proper of a particular tillle in the development of Descartes' thought, but rather 
one that he shared all through his life. For more information about the dialogue see the 
Translator'S preface, p.400. As it is said there ·Eudoxus ( ... J is the mouthpiece of 
Descartes' own views·. 
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of the tmiverse to satisfy it. We know that IOOre generally Descartes 
hesitates on the verge of his dualism between ordo rerum and ordo idearum 
but still resolves it by means of an appeal to God, who won't deceive us. 
As in the Scholastic tradition, it is God who ensures that the desire to 
know will be satisfiable by the nature of external reality. And yet, it is 
Descartes who is preparing the field for the bankrupting of what will 
afterwards be called the anthropocentric conception of the universe. 
Al though not yet in Descartes hiIffiel f , it is wi th Descartes that the 
Perpetual Check of Reason begins to appear as the vital challenge for 
modern epistemology. As cassirer [1951] has put it: 
[in Descartes] Reason, as the system of clear and distinct ideas, 
and the world, as the totality of created being, can nowhere fail to 
harmonize; for they merely represent different versions or different 
expressions of the same essence. The "archetypal intellect" of God 
thus becanes the bond between thinking and being, between truth and 
reality in the philosophy of Descartes. [ ... ] In the developnent 
beyond Descartes all inmediate cormection between real i ty and the 
huren mind, between thinking substance and extended substance is 
denied and carpletely broken off. There is no tmion between soul and 
body, between our ideas and reality I except that which is given or 
produced by the being of God. (p.97)48 
When the "theological glue" melts lIDder the light of the 
"Enlightemlel'lt", the dualism between vis cognoscitiva and knowability of 
external reality, between mP and mIl, will be carried to the extreme. 
caton's interpretation is along these lines: 
Throughout this essay we have emphasized Descartes's agreement with Aristotle that 
philosophy (i.e. knowledge in its highest level] attempts to know things exactly as 
they are. But the ambiguHies of his position invite a KanUan interpretation along 
the following lines.* Descartes's methodological beginning signifies rejection of the 
ontological orientation that is intent upon knowing the world as it is; instead, one 
is content with an epistemological orientation whose criterion is certitude 
cOBtllensurate with the subjective conditions of knowledge. The doctrine of the 
creation of eternal truths is the metaphysical correlate of the methodological 
foundation. God might have created a ~orld whose principle is not extension, a world, 
therefore unknowable to reason. The creating God, a correlate of the creating mind, 
functions'as a limiting concept that enables reason to grasp the limits of knowledge 
with complete clarity; it accordingly enables us to embrace with equanimity the 
necessities of reason even though they are unfounded in the things in themselves. We 
have rejected this interpretation because Descartes associates the creating God with 
the anti -science of the biblical God, both of which are i ncolllpatible wi th the 
veracious God. It is nevertheless true that the ambiguities of the Cartesian 
48) Cf. also Cassirer [1963), chapter 4 "The Subject-Object problem in the Philosophy of 
Renaissance" . 
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foundation are truly such as to lead to the transformation of the veracious God or 
creatin9 God into an unknouable Din9 an Sich and the associated distinction between 
pheTlOflenon and noul!enon. 
*) [ Caton's note] Rosen has called attention to these ambiguities in Rosen (1969], 
pp. 29-34. 
(Caton (1973), p.201 [my italics]). 
What rrakes Descartes 'positiC?l1 different fran those classic and 
medieval is that his harmony between knower and known is assumed a 
POSteriori, is first challenged and then re-established, in other words is 
critically accepted as problematic. It makes all the difference to say that 
there is a strict hanoony between desire to know and intelligibility of the 
uni. verse because there is no real distinction between the two, because 
there is not even a clear distinction, let alone an opposition, between 
subject and object, because we smpl y don't think that things coul d be 
otherwise, and to say that on the one hand there is a vis cognosci ti va that 
rooves the hllTlall knowing subject, on the other hand there is a world that is 
the target of that vis and in the middl e there is an hanroniser God who 
coociliates the former with the latter and vice versa, granting the 
possibility of knowledge. This second position is that obtained after the 
application of the methodological doubt, and it has in itself its own end, 
for it already contains an internal tension which will split the hanoonic 
roonism into a dualism between knowledge and reality, the reality as we take 
it and the reality as it is in itself.49 For, although Descartes-Eudoxus 
still rejects the possibility of a vis cognascitiva intrinsically 
unsatisfiable by the cmtological status of the world, by taking into 
ccnsideratian the possibility of a vis cognoscitiva independent of any 
further ootological order of the world, he eventually opens the way to the 
Kantian dualism between reali ty in i tsel f and phenanenal reali ty , and 
therefore to the frustratim of the desire to )mow how things really are in 
49) No wonder then that Descartes is the main polemic reference of Neoscholastic authors like 
l1aritain (but see also the previously quoted Van Steenberghen (1970): ·With this theory of 
representational ideas the claims of Cartesian reason to independence of external objects 
reach their highest point: thought breaks with Being.( ... ] Here again Kant finishes Oescartes' 
work. If the intelligence when it thinks. reaches immediately only its own thought, or its 
representations, the thing hidden behind these representations remains for ever unknowable.· 
(Haritain [192SJ p.7S, my italics). 
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themselves. All throuqh the Jrodern age the process will be slow but 
continuous. For the harm:my between the desire to know and the 
intelligibility of the universe relies on the presupposition that there is 
sanething I ike a vis cognosci ti va operating in a HKS, that this vis 
cognoscitiva cannot be in itself unsatisfiable, and that in fact it is 
satisfiable because external reality in itself is knowable. But the 
knowability of external reality is a result of a certain epistaoology, and 
exactly that force, viz. the methodological doubt, which has brought 
episteroology to the level of philosophia prima, will also determine, 
through the radical Htrnian scepticism, the end of the harrronious state 
between vis cognoscitiva and intelligibility of external reality. When, 
with Kant, epistaoology will give up any attE!ITPt to defend the full 
knowabUity of external reality in itself, then the harm:ny between vis 
cognoscitiva and the nature of external reality will collapse and the 
desire to know will remain a hunan tendency towards an irrpossible knowledge 
of noumenal reality. After a tradition of more than two thousand years in 
which man has been supposed to be a satisfiable knowledqe-seeker, Kant will 
be forced to reinterpret the desire to know the intrinsic nature of 
external reality no longer in terms of an ontologically justified desire 
for knowledge but epistaoologically, in terms of a regulative use of the 
ideas of reason. This will open a carpletely different chapter in the 
history of philosophy.SO 
The final resul t of the fracture between vis cognosci ti va and the 
ontological status of the world is to be understood in terms of a further 
stress on the interpretation of pbusei/naturali ter as "spontaneously" . 
Husserl refers to the cartesian doubt as the way of putting into brackets 
the world as we take it to be, all our assumptions and the naive view we 
50) From the prospective of the dissolution of the harmo~y between knower and known, it i~ the 
. Kantian revolution that makes possible a new form of philosophy unknown to Greek or Medleval 
philosophers, namely German idealism and its developments, cf. Burnyeat (1980). 
<lmPTER IV 161 
have of external reality, in order to acquire a fresh starting point in our 
episteroological investigation. This action of "putting the world into 
brackets" can be taken now as being more than a mere metaphor. For TS 
really already bracketed both the "owing to the hanronious nature of the 
tmiverse" and the "satisfiable" clause. After the Cartesian revolutim, 
what we rerrain with is a pure desire to know, independent of how things may 
stand in the universe. 51 This is the Aristotelian Postulate as it works in 
the Traumatic Doubt how I shall define it in the next section. 
I V • 6 A DEFINITION OF '!HE ARISTOTELIAN POS'IULATE 
Let me first remind you the general context in which the Aristotelian 
PostUlate has to be placed. 
The Perpetual Check of Reason is due ontologically to the AntihLl'lBllist 
Principle, episteroologically to the Anthropocentric Predicament. When 
lmited to the Aristotelian Postulate the ~ give rise to the Tral.JTlatic 
Doubt. The fonner sections of this chapter have cast sane light on the 
theoretical posi tian maintained by the AP and at this point it has becane 
easy to give a satisfying fonmulatian of the Aristotelian Postulate. 
Recalling TS' it is sufficient to eliminate the clauses "owing to the 
hanoonious nature of the universe" and "satisfiable" and put "spontaneous" 
out of the brackets to have: 
~3) the Aristotelian Postulate (AP) holds that:. ':al.l men ~ve. a 
spaltaneous conation which drives them towards the acqw.sl.tl.on of obJechve 
Jmowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of what carmot be otherwise". 
Al though D23 furnishes a clear statement of the hypothesis supported 
by AP, it still maintains a strong Aristotelian taste, and according to 
different authors sane devices would be required in order to adapt the AP 
51) I suspect that Husserl 's assumption of the concept of intentionality as what remains after 
the "bracketing of the world" (BPoche ') Mirrors somewhat closely the assumption of the 
Aristotelian Postulate by our Traumatic Doubt. 
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to their epistemologies. In our case, since the Perpetual Check of Reason 
has turned out to be basically a post-Cartesian problan it"will be better 
to work with a JOOre updated version of it: 
~4) (a post-Cartesian version of) the Aristotelian Postulate (AP) holds 
that: "all men have a spontaneous conation which drives them towards the 
acquisition of objective knowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of external 
real i ty" .52 
I shall devote the rest of this section to sare prel iminary 
commentaries on D24. 
IV. 6. a EPISTEMOPHILIA 
In trying to explain what Aristotle means by his dictun, Lear refers 
to the desire of knowledge (or the cooatus'3 towards knowledge, according 
to D24) by means of the term epistemophilia or love of episterne. For the 
use of this term, which is higly apt,54 he is indebted to a farootis British 
psychoanalyst, Klein,55 and indeed the term seems a very useful one, even 
if probably for different reascns fran those appreciated by Lear. In 
psychoanalysis episteroophilia is used to refer to: 
52) The updated version (D24 ) is less different from the Aristotelian (D23 ) than it seems to be. This because in both cases what the AP is suggesting is that man is interested in what is 
the real nature of the last component of the world. The difference is that for an Aristotle-
like approach this is to be identified with what is immutable, while in our post-Cartesian 
case we can accept a position with a lower degree of theoretical implications, by leaving 
indeterminate what is this last essential core of ER. 
53) The Latin term conatus can have two different meanings, depending on whether it is used in 
an Aristotelian-like context, as here. or in a more inertially-orientated context. as in VI.3 
and ff .. Although a bit lisleading, I've decided to use the same terM in both cases in order 
to indicate a kind of continuity presents in the development of the conception of the genesis 
of the of P-knowing. In any case, some similar distinction would be necessary also for 
'impulse', as a force or influence exercised upon the mind by sale external stilllulus. and 
'impulse' as an incitement or stimulus to action arising frOM some internal stet of mind. For 
a brief summary of the development of the term cf. chapter VI. 
54) So Lear (1968]. p.3 and p.7 says: "fpistemophina [ ... J turns out to be a remarkably apt 
expression for the inner drive which motivates a child's first exploration of the world. But 
if the true content of a desire is revealed only by what ultimately satisfies it, then it is 
too constricting to conceive of epistetlOPhilia as innate curiosity or even desire for 
knowledge: the desire is for epistefle, or understanding.' [IY italics] 
55) Cf. Lear [1988J. note 7 where is quoted Klein [1981J. Klein was strongly interested in the 
psychology of children and it is in connection with this interest that she speaks of 
epi stemophi 1i B • 
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the love of knowledge; the impulse to investigate and inquire. [In 
Psychoanalysis] the irrpulse is believed to develop out of an 
interest in the sex organs, particularly during the phallic phase. 
{Goldenson [1984], p.263).56 
and according to FretJ7 in extreme cases the person who has an 
epistEfOOphilic irrpulse can be led to experience the reaching of a 
successful conclusion to a line of thought, for example the solution of a 
scientific problem, in terms of a sexual satisfaction. On the other hand, 
the 
"episteroophilic needs may also be warded off by defense mechanisms 
which lead to such syrrptans as obsessional brooding or 
depersonalization. (Eidelberg [1968], p.130). 
It is interesting to underline these aspects of the issue not because 
I mean to endorse a psychoanalytic view of the AP,58 but rather because 
they render explicit three inportant questions entailed by D24: 
i) first of all, in speaking of the vis cognoscitiva in terms of 
epistemophilia, we may cane to suspect that the Descartes-Epistaoon's 
position that "the desire for knowledge, which is carmon to all rren, is an 
illness" can have a roore reasonable ground than it seened above. In 
particular, we may cane to think that the attribution of a vis cognoscitiva 
to man is not an tmproblematic operation, but that it may irrply possible 
cotmter-indications. If the phenanenon of epistanophi lia may turn out to be 
a sort of cartesian malady the superficial attribution to man of a desire 
to know becanes roore controversial; in other words, we may feel in need of 
a roore careful anal ysis before asstl'lling the validi ty of the AP, before 
endorsing the view that the intrinsic nature of man is in fact that of a 
knowledge-seeker; 
ii) seccndly, the term epistEmOphilia, by inplying a general meaning of 
love of Jmowledge, raises the questiCil of how far this love of knowledge is 
56) In the same way Wolman [1973), p.125: 'love of knowledge and for the investigation into 
things' . 
57) Cf. Eidelberg (1968), p.130, and Freud [1953-), vol. 10, p.245 and vol.16, p.327. 
58) It is interesting to note that freud, in the pages previously quoted, elaborates the 
concept of epjstellJOphilja in conjunction with that of scopopMlia ('desire. to see') in a way 
that is very close to the Aristotelian explanation of why and in what sense 'all men by nature 
desire to know' (cf. next chapter, section 3). 
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distinguishable fran "curiosity", and fran an interest in knowledge due to 
the scope of mere. survival; 
iii} finally, by referring to an "inpulse to investigate and inquire", the 
te~ epistemophilia raises the question whether in the AP we are facing a 
real inborn inpulse, an unlearned drive, a spontaneous canatus, or rather 
an answer, an induced acti vi ty due to other factors, motivated by a 
previous process. In Aristotelian terrrnnology, whether knowing is a natural 
or a violent movement. 
The first question doesn't need any further explanations, but rather 
sane discussion, and this will be a concern for the next chapter. The 
second and third questions call for a clarification which I shall give in 
due course. In this way I'll be able to specify first in what sense the vis 
cognoscitiva is different fran curiosity and fran survival-interest for 
Jmowledge and then one of its main characteristic, narrely that of being 
presented as a spaltaneous conatus. 
IV. 6. b ANIMAL INSTINCI'IVE INTEREST IN KNCWLEDGE AND CURIOSI'lY 
It is easy to recognize that merrbers of the family of expressions 
regarding the desire to know like tou eidenai oregootai, 
intelligere/scire desiderant, vis cognoscitiva, spontaneous conatus, 
intellectual knowledge, lmowledge-why, episteroophilia - all refer to an 
interest in knowing which goes far beyond the basic level of animal 
instinctive interest in knowledge. This latter can be connoted as a vital 
interest of an animal in certain bits of informatioo necessary to its 
survival in an hostile envircnnent. The animal JTlJSt posses such an interest 
in all the empirical knowledge that is vital for his survival, because it 
is mly by means of this inborn tendency towards knowledge that he has sane 
chance to stand the natural selection. The animal world as we know it is 
the resul t of such an instinctive capaci ty to apprehend certain basic, 
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vital infonnation. But this instinctive interest in knowing goes only as 
far as the needs for a more ~ecure life require it, never beyond. It will 
never promote pure research for the sake of knowledge. Philosophy, to give 
a celebrated and circular exarrple, will never be the result of an 
instinctive interest in knowledge useful for survival. SUrely there is a 
certain relation between the hunan phenanenon of episteroophilia, as this is 
presented by the AP, and the anilTBl instinct, for both emerge as forces 
that drive the animal towar<J.s59 the acquisi tion of a certain kind of 
knowledge.60 Yet, what differentiates than is IT'llch more: the ends of the 
investigation, the kind of knowledge is sought, the way in which and the 
reasons why it is pursued. 61 
For these very same reasons, it is roore di fficul t to distinguish the 
vis cognoscitiva fran mere curiosity. For if in the former case it is 
already sufficient to call our attention to the distinction between 
''knowledge for )mowledge" and "knowledge for sanething else", this is not 
enough in respect to the concept of curiosity. This latter cannot be 
identified with practical interests and indeed very often, especially in 
psychology, curi osi ty and episteroophi lia are treated as the same 
psychological phenanenon.62 The only distinction that is drawn is rather 
59) The iJllpOrtance of the connection between the concept of conatus and that of i nsti net to 
survive, will be matter of some more detailed discussion in the last chapter, with a reference 
to Spinoza (VI.4.a). 
60) I think it is very telllPting to produce a sort of hierarchy of stimuli that motivate a 
human being to know, from the more natural, finalized to his survival, to the more 
intellectual, finalized to pure knowledge, via curiosity as a middle stage. Yet, this picture, 
however useful for heuristic purposes ay be, would be largely inadequate if taken too 
seriously. The three 'forces' are interwoven together, and it will be even difficult to 
distinguish their influence in each single case of knowing-activity, let alone to produce an 
abstract classification of their domains. Cf. again Hume [1967) (quoted above). 
61) Then we can read in Gregory (1987), p.410: "There is ·useless· knowledge such as which is 
the third or the thirteenth longest river of the world; on the other hand there is also 
knowledge that far transcends even what is necessary for immediate survival. It is on this 
latter that civilization's future depends, and in our possession of it we are, surely, outside 
the biological steam of natural selection." 
62) This is the case for example in Goldenson [1984), p .197, but see also the previous 
quotations frOM Van Steenberghen [1970] and the cartesian dialogue. A general survey of the 
psychological theories about the nature of curiosity is Voss and Keller (1983), see also Furth 
[1987] for a comparison of psychoanalytic and psychological approaches (although it does not 
mention the terRI epjst~hilia). The fact that in psychology the phenomenon of curiosity is 
also studied by leans of experiment about rats' behaviour indicates clearly enough the 
difference between this notion and that philosophical of vis cognoscitiv8. 
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theoretical, to the effect that curiosity is roore likely to appear in 
psychological studies while episteoopbilia in psychoanalytic ones. 
But once it is acini t ted that there is not a finn distinction between 
the two expressions, on the other hand it is certainly possible to 
\n1derstand the desire to know stated by the AP as a very particular kind of 
curiosity, and leave this latter word to cover a roore trivial area of 
interest.63 We nay, in other words, follow Plato in drawing a distinction 
between mere superficial curiosity and real epistemophilia: 
Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a 
strange being will have a title to the name. All the lovers of 
sights have a delight in learning, and must therefore be included. 
Musical amateurs, too, are a folk strangely out of place aJ'OOIlg 
philosophers [ ... ]. Now are we to naintain that all these and any 
who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of quite minor 
arts, are philosophers? Certainly not, I replied; they are only 
imi tation. He said: Who then are the true philosophers ? Those, I 
said, who are lovers of the vision of truth. (Plato, Republic V, 
475d-e) 
One way to interpret this passage is by using the two different 
German words for curiosity: liewier, which is used to refer to superficial 
curiosity such as that for new things (note the two components of the word, 
''Neu'' = "new", and "gier" which canes fran "Begier" = "desire" but also, 
with a stronger sense, "passion"); and Hissbegier, which is used for the 
desire to know, and has a meaning very close to that of epistemophilia 
(note the two carpanents '-Wiss" of ''wissen'' = "to know" [e.g. Wisse:nshaft 
means science), and the second carpcnent "Begier" as for the other word), 
and therefore to Plato's "visicn of truth". Following the German use, we 
can limit the meaning of "curiosity" to refer to that superficial inpulse 
63) A clear analysis of the nature and the differences between these two conceptions of 
curiosity is given by Hume (1967J, Book II, Part III, section 10 ("Of curiosity, or the love 
of truth"). For a comment on this section cf. Laird (1967), pp.205-12. Also the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment had an interest in distinguishing among the different meanings 
·curiosity·, cf. the long entrance "curiosite'" in the Enciclopedie ou Dictionnaire Raisonne' 
des Sciences des Artes at des Metiers [1751-1780], vol.4, p.577-578. Yet, also there the main 
distinction concerns superficial curiosity and epistetlOPhilia: "[ ... J j'aillle bien mieux me 
fixer a' la curiofite' digne de l'homme, & la plus digne de toutes, je veux dire 1e defir qui 
1 'ani.e a' etendre fes connoiffances [my italics: "the desire that the soul has to understand 
his R-knowledge): foit pour elever fon efprit aux grandes verites, foit pour fe rendre utile a 
fes concitoyens. I (p.S78, col.l). See also James' concept of scientific curiosity (our vis 
cogDOscitiva) in (1981], vol.II, p.1046 
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to investigate, observe or gather inforrration about novel or interesting 
rraterial, and only in so far as this activity does not require a long, 
tiring, mental activity but rather a certain amusement. Accordingly, we may 
. 
have curiosi ty for what the neighbours are doing, for the resul t of the 
football game, for the end of a crime story, but not for studying Hegel's 
revaluation of the ontological proof of the existence of God, nor for 
investigating the relation between Quanttrn Theory and the principle of 
bivalence. CUriosity as Neugier has more to do with the enjoyable, passive 
reception of information than with the active elaboration of new knowledge. 
Conversely, we can refer to this latter activity and to the interest that 
motivates it by means of that family of expressions sumarized under the 
label epistemophilia as Wissbegier. 
Obviously the Aristotelian Postulate does not concern the animal 
instinctive interest in knowledge or the concept of curiosity as Neugier, 
but the notion of vis cognoscitiva or epistemophilia as Wissbegier.64 How 
are we to understand this latter? 
IV. 6. c VIS CCXN)SCITIVA 
In D24 I've stated that the Aristotelian Postulate holds that all men 
have a spontaneous croatian towards knowledge just for its own sake. The 
vis cognoscitiva or Epistemophilia as Wissbegier can therefore be defined 
thus: 
n...
s
) Vis cognoscitiva (or Episteroophilia as Wissbegi.er) =def. a 
-L, t ·nbom inonulse to pursue knowledge for its own sake. spon aneous, 1 .. ~ 
'------~·:---·::t~l·S a too weak concept to give rise to the Perpetual Check of 
64) Curl'osity as NeugJer 1 . lId' ff f 
. d th hypothesis that "reall ty may be comp ete y 1 erent rom what we 
Reason: do we conSI e~. r problem just because this contrast with a certain feeling of 
take i.t. to be". a. ra _lc:ecognized as active in human beings - to know how things really are 
superfiCIal CUTlOSlty . 1 what is necessary here is the concept of epistemophilia as 
in themselves ? CertaIn Y 
Wissbegi~r . 
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The characteristic of "spcntaneity" was discussed when it was 
introduced in replacement of the "phusei/naturaliter" clause, but it 
deserves one final specification. "Spontaneous" in its Latin etyrrology 
canes fran spans ("will") and in this case it refers to the characteristic 
of man to activate his own mental processes independent! y of any other 
external cause. In this way it is opposed to the concept of inertia, the 
tendency of a being to remain in its own state as long as this is not 
m:xlified by sane external cause. When the vis cognoscitiva is defined as 
spontaneous this rreans that it is its own cause, a sort of WllOOVed rootor. 
This is made clear by the final clause "just for its own sake". The vis 
cognoscitiva drives man towards the acquisition of intellectual knowledge-
why. 
The characteristic of "inbomess" of the vis cognoscitiva still has 
sane relation to the "phusei/naturaliter" clause, and its sense is obvious: 
the vis cognoscitiva is not acquired, but is a sinple feature of that 
animal that is a hunan being. In so far as an animal is a knowledge-seeker, 
he posses a vis cognoscitiva or a sufficient degree of episteroophilia as 
Wissbegieri if a certain animal desires to know just for the sake of 
mowl edge , then such an aniIral is a hunan being (see Boethius' paradox in 
V.4). This is the picture we receive fran the classic tradition. The 
characteristic of being a knowledge-seeker is "natural" because it is 
inherited by all the htrnan beings through the chain of reproduction. 
Finally, the characteristic of being an "irrpulse" may assune three 
different senses, depending 00 whether we take "inpulse" to refer to: 
i) a force or inf 1 uence exerted upon the mind by sane external stim1l us, 
suggestion, incitement or instigatioo; 
ii) an incitement or a st~lus to action arising fran same state of mind 
or feeling: or 
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iii) a sudden or invol untary inclination or tendency to act, without 
premeditation or reflection.65 
In D24 "inpulse" smmarizes parts of the three nain significances thus: 
D26) the epi~tesrophi1ic irrpulse =def. an involuntary tendency, 
~derstandable 1.n teI1l\9 of state of mind, i. e. in teI'ITS of mentally 
1.ntemal tendency, which exerts an inci ternent upon the mind i tsel f to 
pursue knowledge, without premeditation or reflection. 
other specifications about the significance of the Aristotelian 
Postulate may be fel t necessary, and indeed sane IOOre ccmnents on its 
theoretical inplications will be nade in the next chapter. But, for the 
m::ment, let me conclude this section by integrating the final definition of 
the AP with the latter specifications: 
~7) (a post-cartesian version of) the Aristotelian Postulate CAP) holds 
that: "all man have a spontaneous, inborn episteroophilic inpulse (conatus) 
that drives them towards the acquisition of objective knowledge-why of the 
intrinsic nature of external reality". 
IV.7 THE GmESIS OF '!HE PROCESS OF KNCWING, '!HE PERPE'IUAL CHECK OF 
RFASCfi AND ARISTO'I'ELIAN-CARTESIAN MAN 
The incitement exerted by the vis cog.noscitiva upon the ~nd is the 
efficient cause that activates the process of )mowing. Accordingly, the 
epistemic relation occurring between HKS and ER is due at least also to the 
presence of cognitive processes on the subject's side of the relation. It 
is the episteroophilic irrpulse that starts the process of )mowing by 
addressing the cognitive processes towards the pure search for )mowledge. 
Then, as far as intellectual knowledge is concerned, AP is supposed to 
present the ratio essendi of the process of mowing as an active principle. 
This theoretical status of AP in respect to P-knowing may turn out to be 
puzzling. For it seems that, in interpreting metaphorically the same 
Aristotelian-like theory of mowledge, sometimes we need to attribute to it 
65) Cf. OED. second edition. 
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the conceptioo of hl..l1lal1 Jmowledqe as an active process, and sane other 
times a conception .of hunan knowledge as a passive process. This 
interpretative conflict is clear, for example, in the quotatioo given above 
fran Van Steenberghen [1970]. Is the humn mind a sirrpl e tabul a rasa ready 
passively to receive the external input forced upon it by the action of 
external reality ? If hunan Jmowledge merely consists in a passive 
organization of infonmation caning fran the external world, how is it that 
Aristotle also speaks of a force driving man towards the acquisition of 
Jmowledge? In the end, who or what is playing with the white in our chess-
game analO9Y ? 
Of course the key point of the issue lies in the distinction between 
active and passive roles in the process of knowing. And the answer to our 
perplexity consists in realizing the large inadequacy of such a 
distinction, at least before the cartesian revolution. Still in Scholastic 
philosophy (as it is possible to see above in the quotations fran Thcrnas 
Aquinas) there is no drastic separation between subject and object, which 
is the essential background of the antithesis "active/passive role in 
)mowing". I<nowledge is a matter of co-operatiaf6 between nan and reality, 
and in the same way as the vis cognosci ti va is ''natural iter" so is the 
inpressioo that external reality lives on our senses (cf. again the passage 
I've quoted fran Van steenberghen [1970], and the first passage fran Thcrnas 
Aquinas about the conjunction of Jmower and known in knowledge). If a 
clistinctioo should be drawn, this could be done by limiting the "passivity" 
to the cognitive processes at the level of perception (one of the 
canditicnes sine quas ncn of the P-knowing) and the "activity" to the 
desire to Jmow at the level of the efficient causation of the process of 
Jmowing. Yet, it rrust be bom in mind that, at least until Ockam, 
66) This is the expression used by Scholastic authors. cf. for .exa.mple De Wulf P956). who 
says (accepting the teaching of Keutgen (1868), pp.30 and ff.): ThiS representatlon [of the 
thing known in the knowing subject] is effected by the co-operation of the known with the 
knower. And this co-operation guarantees the real objectivity of our knowledge.· (p.128, my 
italics). 
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perception does not yet aJ'OO\D1t to full knowledge, and therefore that h1..lTlaIl 
Jmowledge is to he seen as ''rootivatt;rl'' by the desire to know, as a sort of 
potentiali ty to know, which only needs an actual stiITllI us to render actual 
in itself, as real knowledge, the external input.67 By means of an image, 
it is possible to say that nature gives the material for the building while 
man is both the architect and the builder: as a builder he receives the 
material, and as an architect he gives the orders whereby this material can 
hecane a real house. None of the two partners, man and nature, is passive 
or active in respect to the other, in the same way as we don' t apply this 
dichotany to two people who are shaking hands. 
Once we free our interpretation fran the misleading use of the 
passive/active dichotany, we are then able to disclose the real analogical 
reasoning that underlies the acceptance of the Aristotelian Postulate: that 
in terms of dynamdc movement. If we want to understand the nature of the 
vis cognoscitiva we need to cane back to that dynamic sense inplicit in the 
fonrulation of the AP since ADS, that sense to which I have referred 
throughout this chapter. The issue is of vi tal inportance: for a proper 
understanding of the Aristotelian Postul ate and the nature of the vis 
cognoscitiva we need to replace the canoon dichotany active vs. passive by 
the rrore adequate analogical distinction dynanic vs. inertia1.68 It is only 
according to this latter that man is said to have an inborn tendency to go, 
epistemically speaking, towards that part of reality which doesn't change, 
but that is imrobile in its perfectic:n. In this voyage towards the final 
knowledge (and here there may he also a strong eschatological sense) he is 
67) Although I believe this interpretation not very controversial it turns out from it that at 
least there is a strong connection (if not a real identity) between the concept of vis 
cognoscitiv8 and that, very problematic, of active mind. This latter, as perhaps 
distinguishable from a passive mind, introduces the famous debate about the presence of two 
minds, one active and the other passive, and their mutual relations, together with their 
ontological status. I will come back on this point in the next chapter, but I must premise 
that the issue cannot be pursued BlUch further in this place. I bel ieve some indications in 
this direction are given by Lear [1988], chapter 4, especially sections 3,4,5. 
68) There is a terminological problem in the formulation of this second d!chotomy, namely th~t 
after Newton the law of inertia governs both states of rest and of dynamlc movements. In thls 
context I shall use 'dynamic vs. inertial' in a non-technical way, as it were, pre-Newtonian. 
I shall be more specific in chapter VI. 
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helped by nature, which is such as to allow man to reach his target. 
Reality itself provides the highway to its own intrinsic nature: man needs 
only to journey fran his state of ignorance to that of full tmderstanding. 
Consistent with this image, very often Neoplatarist and medieval 
philosophers will identify the last stage of the epistemic journey with 
sane kind of intellectual cCl1Tl1JIlity with God and his amiscience, in a sort 
of final il hmination. 
All the various fOI11'll1 ations of the AP we have been discussing up to 
here share this interpretation of the principle of the genesis of the 
process of knowing as an epistemophilic motor that drives man towards 
knowledge. Knowing as a way of grasping what doesn't change (in our case 
the intrinsic nature of ER) is rrore than a metaphor, it really expresses 
the underlying dynandc image that chiefly sustains the Aristotelian vision 
of man. Like the stone that falls to the ground (its natural place), so man 
would follow his path to his natural place, his pure contemplative life in 
the kingdan of perfect, imrutable knowledge. The stone is not active nor 
passive in respect to his fall, it sinply follows a natural tendency. 
Likewise, man has a conation towards the kingdan of episteme, and tries to 
reach it by a movement that goes fran the awareness of his ignorance to the 
acquisition of epistemic knowledge of what is imrutable. 
The whole picture fits in with what has been said above about the 
characteristic of the epistemophilic impulse of being without pr~tatian 
or reflection. Since the desire to know is the principle of the genesis of 
the process of knowing it must be necessarily a- or pre-epistemic. It is 
not because [we know that we desire to know] that [we pursue knowledge], 
but that [we pursue knowledge] because [we desire to know]. We don't mow 
that we desire to mow (we are not aware of this driving force) until we 
have reached the end of the process - when the highest level of abstract 
and "for-lmowledge-sake-only" Jmowledge has been reached - i.e. when, 
within the philosophical discussion, we realize that what was driving us 
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towards Jmowledqe was this spontaneous, inborn epistaoophilic irrpulse to 
pursue knowledge. In other words, the vis coqnoscitiva practically 
manifests itself in the activation of the process of knowinq, but emerqes 
theoretically in its self-evidence, in a clear formulation, only at the end 
of the process, in philosophical discussions. 
It is also at the level of philosophical analysis that we understand 
the AP as beinq the third carpanent of the Traunatic Doubt. In fact what is 
supposed to be the ratio essendi of P-knowinq turns out to be also the 
third conditio sine qua noo necessary for the fomulation of the TO 
"reality in itself rray be carp1ete1y different frem what we take it to be". 
The traunatic taste that such a possibility seems to posses requir-es an 
Aristotelian-Cartesian sensibility to be appreciated. It is only the 
Aristotelian-Cartesian man who can cane to fornulate the Perpetual Check of 
Reason and at the same tirre renain scandalized by his own hypothesis. But, 
who is this Aristotel ian-Cartesian Iran ? 
Many characters rray be suggested, for he is a carposition of 
different typoloqies. He is Praneteus, whose love for knowledge and for 
rendering it public dri ves him to chall enqe the gods thE!SlBel ves; he is 
Ulysses, "this qray spirit yearninq in desire/To follow knowledqe like a 
sinkinq star, /Beyond the ut.Ioost bound of hllTBll thought", 69 a fiqure where 
the idea of an endless voyaqe towards new knowledqe receives its full 
representation; but probably he is more than anything else Faust. Goethe 
has rrade of him the typical fiqure of the knowledqe-seeker par excellence, 
and with sane sliqht modifications we can suppose him to play in this 
context the part of the Aristotelian-Cartesian 1tBIl. Faust spends his whole 
life in pursuing knowledge, he desires to know what the world is in itself, 
the last answers to the last questions,70 like in the case of the cartesian 
69) Lord Alfred Tennyson, Ulysses, 30. 
70) It is interesti n9 to note that I predictably eno~9h, .Freud uses Fa.ust 's t~P~109Y to r~f~r 
to the desire to know, in connection with the determlna.tlon of the eplstemophlllc-SCopophdlC 
impulses and the possibility of sublimation of the deslre to know. Cf. Freud on Leonardo vol. 
11, PP.74-7, 80-81 and 92; for the hypothesis of sublimation cf. vol. 11, PP.77-80: ·Because 
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negative dE!lTOIl, and with sane affinities with the case of the Platonic 
posi ti ve "dairron", he is tet1'pted and driven by Mephistophel es who premises 
hbm what will turn out to be a false image of life. In the end he will find 
the solutions both in a voyage to Greece, that we can read in terms of a 
reintroduction of the "phusei" clause, and in GOO, the veridical third 
element which ensures that ordo renm and orda idearun harmonize. It has 
been said that 
at the end of the great will to knowledge there is of necessity 
always "theoretical despair". The thinker's heart burns when he 
realizes that we cannot know what we "really" want to know. Faust is 
basically a desperate Kantian who tries to escape the caTpulsion to 
self-limitation through a rragical backdoor. The urge to go beyond 
the limit remains stronger than the insight into the limitedness of 
our knowledge. (Sloterdijk [1988], pp.178-9). 
It is the value of this Faustian irrage of marl 1 that will be 
challenged in the next two chapters. 
of his insatiable and infatigable thirst for knowledge Leonardo has been called the Italian 
Faust" (vol.11, p.7S). 
71) Needles to say. there is a illlllense literature on such a phenomenon of "Faustism", see 
Atkins (1973). 
CHAPI'ER V 
THE DEFENCE OF 'mE ARIS'rt:YrELIAN POSTULATE 
He that increaseth knowledge, 
increaseth sorrow" 
Ecclesiastes, I, 18 
v . 1 I NTROOOCTION 
In this chapter we shall examine the theoretical bedrock 
underlying the traditional attitude of acceptance towards the AP. In the 
course of the chapter I shall distinguish between three different kinds 
of "grounds" on which the acceptance of the AP nay be sanehow based. 
The first kind consists in same general philosophical perspectives 
whose assUlption may have prevented fran considering the traditional 
acceptance of the AP as problematic. These perspectives are the "AP-
favourable environments" in which the AP may flourish. They are the 
reason why, tradi tionall y , the assUlption of the AP has never been 
considered controversial. Philosophers working within these frameworks 
may have not cane to doubt the val ue of the AP for the sirrpl e reason 
that the AP was, or could be easily made, consistent with their general 
phi 1 osophical perspectives. 
The second kind of "ground" there nay be for the acceptance of the 
AP consist of a possible abductive argument that could be put forward 
for a positive defence of the value of the AP. 
The last kind of "ground" on which the ass1.llTption of the AP seans 
to lie is analogical. While th~ abductive has been explicitly endorsed 
by several philosophers, Aristotle and Thanas Aquinas among them, the 
analogical reasoning, which I suspect is also at work in the acceptance 
of the AP, has never been fully stated. The analogical ground are then, 
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inplicit, and therefore I shall rrake their existence a matter of 
historical conjecture. 
Roughly speaking, the AP holds that all men are philosophers. OUr 
ordinary evidence tells us that in fact the great majority of men most 
of the time really don't care about knowledge for its own sake, at least 
not so often, so extensively, or so earnestly as the AP would have us 
bel ieve .1 The ftmdamental thesis that I wi 11 support throughout this 
chapter is that our ordinary evidence definitely undermines the value of 
the AP. In order to argue against the assmption of the AP I shall 
follow the methodological principle whereby if no cogent argt.l1'lel1t can be 
put forward in favour of the AP, our ordinary evidence forces us to 
adopt a rrore econanic attitude towards the explanation of man's never 
ending search for knowledge. 
To summarize the contents of the chapter briefly, in section 2 I 
shall carment on the logical nature of the analysis conducted in this 
chapter, explaining why a historically detailed reconstruction and 
criticism of the ground on which AP has cane to be accepted would be an 
irrpossibl e enterprise. Wi th an eye to the methodological principl e of 
econany, in section 3 I will introduce and carment on a plan of the 
theoretical "environments" wi thin which the assUTption of the AP nay 
camouflage itself as uncontroversial. I shall stress the fact that the 
"AP-favourable environments" don't go any way towards the 
epistemological justification of the AP. It is not the case that they 
positively support the assUl1?tion of the AP; they sinply allow or 
encourage the uncritical assumption of the AP to slip into our picture 
of nan. As I see them, their historical task has been that of defending 
the AP indirectly, by enbedding it in philosophical contexts where its 
1) At this proposal it is sufficient to recall what effect had Socrates' investigation on 
how much his fellow citizens in Athens desired to know, cf. Plato's Apology, 21bd, 22d 
23b. Peirce's question 'How many people there are who are incapable of putting to their 
own consciences this question -'Do I want to know how the fact stands or not l' l' (2.635) 
should be answered 'too many!'. 
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problernaticity could rrore easily pass unnoticed. For this reason, 
despite the enonmous historical importance of the topic I won't devote 
toO much space to their critical analysis. 
Things are quite different with the abductive argunent, for in 
this case we are dealing with a position that requires a proper counter 
argurent. My intention is to show that (i) the AP is untenable and that 
(ii) even if the AP were acceptable, the abductive argunent is not 
strong enough to support it. The two points will be the topics of two 
different sections. Since (i) amrounts to an argument against the 
plausibili ty of the AP in general, I shall E!!"I'Ploy it to bridge the 
sketch of the background conditions for the acceptance of the AP with 
the proper confutation of the abductive argument. So in section 4 I will 
focus on the paradoxical concl usion to which the adoption of the AP, 
whether defended or assumed, would give rise, namely that rrost men and 
wanen are not to be considered ''Hunan Beings" because they lack the 
essential property of being "EpistemJphilic Beings". In section 5 I will 
argue that, quite apart frem whether or not such an astonishing 
conclusion is acceptable, the abductive argument is not powerful enough 
to defend the AP. 
In in section 6 I will be concerned with the analogical reasoning 
that it seems l.n1derlies the assl.llT(>tion of the AP: a carparison between 
)mowing and JOOving, and an understanding of the relation between vis 
cognoscitiva and activity of )mowing as if it were that between rrover 
and rootion. Being analogical, this basis on which the AP could be 
accepted requires critical comment rather than confutation. Two 
hyotheses about same further implications of the whole hypothesis on the 
analogical grol.n1ds in favour of the acceptance of the AP are introduced 
in section 7. Since I believe that for sane of its aspects the 
analogical reasoning represents a fruitful way of discussing the genesis 
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of the process of knowing, I will turn to its modification in the next 
chapter. 
Finally, in section 8 I sunup the conclusions of the chapter. 
Because of the absence of any cogent argunent in favour of the AP and 
because of the presence of an overwhelming evidence fran our daily life 
about rran's lack of interest for knowledge, the AP should be replaced by 
a better principle. We shall be left with the question of what could 
actually replace it. The search for an answer to this question will be 
the concern of the next, and final, chapter. 
V.2 LOGICAL VS. HISTORICAL CRITICI9-tS OF THE AP 
The chapter concerns only an abstract reconstruction of the 
various theoretical grounds on which the acceptance of the AP may lie 
and therefore anly a logical rejection of the AP. The logical and 
abstract nature of the approach is due to the fact that, tmforbmately, 
a full scholarly criticism of the AP, such as radically to uproot it 
fran its historical roots, would be an illi>ossible enterprise. Given what 
has been said in the previous chapters, it should be obvious that the 
whole initiative of surveying and opposing all the possible grounds on 
which the Aristotelian Postulate may have been assumed would amount to 
nothing less than a critical analysis2 of a large part of the western 
tradition in the philosophy of knowledge. If the history of epistemology 
can be read as a list of atterrpts to solve the Traunatic Doubt, we have 
also seen how roost of the solutions of the Perpetual Check of Reason 
presuppose the truth of the AP. An obvious consequence of this state of 
affairs is that a historically detailed discussion of the AP should also 
take into accOlmt all the specific reasons that each of those hypotheses 
2) I n this' case the terms 'deconstruction' and 'archeology of knowledge' would probably 
help in describing what I mean, if it were not for the radical conceptual implications 
they carry with them. 
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may have had to assume the AP. Furthenrore, as if the difficulties 
irrplied in such a "restricted" perspective were not already formidable 
(and alanning, for what pertains to the academic limits of the present 
investigation), matters would be even rrore ccmplex once our 
investigation widened to include the role of the AP in the history of 
our cu1 ture. To the intimidating difficulties inplied in a critique of 
the AP in respect to the history of epistemology, we should add all the 
problems deriving fran a close study of the connections occurring 
between the AP and the anthropological self-description of man in the 
history of western cul ture. It is obvious that a refusal of the AP on 
the grotmds of a historical investigation is si1'TPly an tmrealizable 
project. A significant eXaITI'le will shortly illustrate the point more 
specifically. 
The remarkable exanple concerns the shift that the concept of vis 
cognoscitiva underwent in the seventeenth-century from being understood 
as "an epistemic desire to collaborate with nature" to caning to rrean 
"an aggressive, dominating will of mastering nature". The critical 
lTKl1"lel1t in this shift can be historically identified, quite accurately, 
in Bacon.3 In his wor~ nan as a knowing subject, once again 
characterised as the philosopher, is conceived as facing the adventures 
of the intellect in the same way as Bacon's coeval sailors were facing 
the dangers of the seas, and seemingly for the same reasons, vz. the 
search for scxne kind of power. If it is true that Bacon still reccmnends 
that one listen to what reality says, it is also true that such a 
listening is for the purpose of a better mastery of nature. The vis 
3) For B-~;;;;7o"~~-pt--;t;;~ c~, Wallace [1967J especially chapter 7, Unfortunately the 
book leaves quite untouched the Issue of the "desire to know" and its connection with the 
concept of "knowledge as power", .' . , 
) 't'on is condensed in hls Dlscourse In Pralse of Knowledge (vol.l, pp.123-4 Bacon's pOSl I . 
126), in Bacon's Letters and Llfe [1858-74J, 
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cognosci ti va shall have no restraints, and its maxim is 'pl us ul tra" . 5 
As SteadTan has Stmnarized: 
For Bacon and his seventeenth-century successors [ ... ] Science 
has already begun to conquer (he suggests), and may continue to 
conquer, new real i ty beyond the Pi 11 ars of Hercul es, farther 
than the greatest mythical ,heroes had penetrated. Since 
know1 edge is power, the natural phi 1 osopher , the student of 
nature, nay subject greater natural forces to his ccmrand than 
the strongest of classical worthies, accooplish nobler acts of 
benef,i t for the publ ic good than the ancient benefactors [ ... ] 
(p.8). As the century advanced [ ... ] it becanes increasingly 
aware of the practical as well as the theoretical benefits 
pranised by the "new science". With Bacon's insistence that 
"Jmowledge is power" and Descartes' assertion that it could 
"render ourselves the lords and possessors of nature'o* the 
philosopher acquired (it would appear) a rrore valid title to 
heroic errUnence than the warrior. [ ... ] The d~nion he promdsed 
was, rooreover, both intellectual and physical; his aTl'ire of the 
mdnd conferred positive control over nature. 
*) [steadman's note] Basil Willey, The Seventh-Century 
Background, (New York, 1953), p.96. 
(steadman [1971], p.45 [my italics]) 
After the scientific revol uti on of the seventeenth century the 
conception of a human, inborn vis cognascitiva is transformed, for it no 
longer appears as a vis epistemophilica (or more sirr(>ly philo-sophica) 
but rather as a vis heroica, or technocratica. Certainly a debate about 
the former could not avoid an extensive study of this latter and then 
references to the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
The enoITOOUS inportance of the cuI tura! and historical roots of 
the AP emerges so conspicuously fran this indicative exanple - but many 
others could easily cane to the reader's min<f - that, in correlation, 
the unsurpassable difficulties inherent in a global, historical debate 
of the topic should appear rrani£est. In fact, along the lines of these 
brief historical considerations, the Aristotelian Postulate turns out to 
be at one with that dignitas haninis ("dignity of man") so II1lch exalted 
5) The maxim comes from 'non plus ultra' ('not further') which signed the limits of the 
known world, during the Classic period, on the est side (the Pillars of Hercules)' Cf. 
Steadman [1971], p,4-5. 
6) Another very important example I can think of is the debate (which very often became a 
real war) between Gnosis and Christianity on the role of knowledge (and therefo~e of the 
desire to know) in the redemption of man. Cf. Rudolph [1983], pp.88-204, especlally pp. 
113-118. 
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during the RenaissancJ and so infl uential all throughout the western 
philosophical tradition. The Aristotelian Postulate is so tightly 
interwoven wi th our cuI tural history that to individuate its historical 
roots and challenge its validity by means of a scholarly investigation 
would amount to giving a very serious, if not fatal, blow to the image 
that man has al ways had of hirnsel f. Accoopl ishing such a "revol utionary" 
mission of reconstructing, challenging and eventually roodifying one of 
the basic assmptions of philosophy of Jmowledge since Aristotle by 
means of historical and scholarly investigations is impossible. At any 
rate, producing a similar shift in our epistanological paradigm (to 
continue wi th a Kuhnean language) is by no JreaIlS an acceptabl e task for 
a chapter of a thesis. This is why I will rather configurate the 
"grotmds" underlying the acceptance of the AP in the same way as I have 
fomulated the AP in D27' as logical constructs, whose real occurrences 
should be eventually examined in their own characteristics, case by 
case. I will formulate the different factors that may have contributed 
to leave the AP unchallenged for so long as conjectural syntheses of 
richer and lOOre articulated historical positions. And consequently, I 
will criticize the assumption of the AP an a parallel logical basis. If 
someone should be interested in giving a full account of the history of 
the AP and the various "forces" that may have worked in favour of its 
acceptance, he would have to locate the logical reconstructions provided 
in this chapter in particular authors, adapt them in respect to specific 
theories of Jmowledge and anthropologies, and connect them roore closely 
to the real versions of the AP that different philosophers may have 
advocated.8 The aim of this chapter is only that of making logically 
7) The theme of the di9nitas flominis in its more technical use belongs to the philosophy 
of Renaissance, but generally speaking it summarizes the high self-conception that western 
cuI ture has formulated of the nature of man. For a very good introduction cf. Tri nkaus 
(1973) who however concerning only the Renaissance's concept of dignitas flominis does 
not fo~us too closeiy on the AP. Hore relevant to the analysis of the AP may result 
Kristeller (1972], first essay, and Gentile [1968]. . . . . 
8) It seems obvious that the relation between certaln reasons for bel1evlng 1n the truth 
of the AP and the real contents of a certain formulation of the AP are mutually 
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persuasive the necessity of a shift in our episterrological paradigm fran 
an Aristotelian to an anti-Aristotelian Postulate. 
V.3 A MAP OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXTS FAVOORABLE 'ro THE ACCE'PTANCE 
OF THE AP 
There are various philosophical "envir~ts" in which the 
acceptance of the AP could be consistently framed and then flourish. 
Although for reasons extraneous to proper epistemological support of the 
AP, favourable contexts may have contributed to its traditional 
acceptance as a justified principle. Scme of than may have been 
sufficiently coopelling as to let the controversial nature of the 
Aristotelian Postulate pass unnoticed. Sare others may have been 
sufficiently inert as to make a philosopher endorse the AP uncritically. 
None of them can be shaped into a proper argune.nt in favour of the AP, 
and any attempt to give a logical assesment of their justificatory value 
would be pointless. Such philosophical contexts can be presented as 
interesting environments within which the AP may have been allowed to 
prosper, but they could be felt rrore or less persuasive only if we were 
to disregard the obvious evidence fran our everyday observations. Once 
we stick to our ordinary evidence the "justificatory character" they 
seem to bring to the assumption of the AP disappears. What we are left 
with, at the end of the survey, is only a deeper understanding of the 
evolution of the acquescient acceptance of the AP through the history of 
phi 1 osophy . 
'l'he four families of contexts that may have favoured the 
uncritical assumption of the AP are that teleological (Ctel.)' 
i nterdependent. Certain reason;-f~;' believing thrt-what ~he "A"P ~a;;-is tru;"'wi i~ gi~;-;: ~se 
to a certain version of the AP, and conversely, a certaln verSlOn of the AP wIll reqUHe 
the acceptance of certain reasons as good reasons to believe that what that version of the 
AP says is true. 
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concerning the aims of Nature (lay teleology) or God's plans (religious 
teleology); that theological (Ctheol.) concerning the relation between 
God and man; that pragmatic (CPrag.) concerning man's moral behaviour, 
intellectual happiness or conterrplative life (eudainxmia); and that 
psychological <Cpsyc.) concerning hunan rational nature, or man's 
awamess of himsel f . 
This organiztion of the "philosophical territories" where the AP 
has the best chances to take root follows the academic organization of 
philosophical topics and it is merely rational. To same it may look, in 
different degrees, arbitrary. Personally, I find it heuristically 
helpful, but what really matters here is that any other possible map 
would be acceptable provided it would cover in effect the whole 
extension of typologies of the most important contexts where the 
assl.llTption of the AP could appear uncontroversial. In what follows I 
shall examine each of the families of "AP-favourable environments" in 
order to articulate same of their principal contents. still in terms of 
a nap-analogy, let me add that I shall disregard any articulated picture 
of networks of "AP-favourable environment". At the end of this section I 
shall make same general carments on certain fatures ccmron to the whole 
nap. As I've pointed out above, the "acquiescent endorsment" of the AP 
arising in the various "philosophical territories" faces the inevitable 
difficul ty represented by our ordinary evidence. I shall discuss this 
crucial aspect in the next section, tmder the label of "Soethius' 
Paradox". 
ctel.> The teleological contexts within which the acceptance of the AP 
'ly occur unquestioned can be traced to the Aristotelian use may more eas~ 
of the phusei-c!ause. They can be distinguished in lay and religious 
contexts, depending on whether they presuppose Nature or God as the 
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ordering principle of reality. In both cases, a philosopher who believes 
that 
(i) the universe is ordered in such and such a way; that 
(U) the universe follows a certain direction in its develo:tmmt; and 
therefore that 
(iii) each part of the universe, let's say of a certain importance, has 
its own role within the universe itself; 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for Jmowl edge , may be led to favour, uncritically, the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because the search for knowledge 
for its own sake is one, if not the principal, specific vocation of man 
within such an ordered universe. Such a "vocation" can be in turn 
differently characterized according to further metaphysical assumptions 
such as the necessary fulfilment of a sort of rational/aesthetic order 
in the universe or, IOOre idealistically, the metaphysical process of 
self-tmderstanding led by the Ahsolute - which would "use" man's 
cognitive activity in order to raise Nature to the level of awarness of 
the Self - or again man's role as a cognitive master of reality, (see 
below Bacon's position and the conjunction of the. vis cognosci ti va wi th 
a will to power). 
ethel.) The thealogical contexts that nay encourage the acceptance of 
the AP are IOOre various. First of all, a philosopher who believes that 
i) there is a creator God; that 
ii) such a God is arniscient; and that 
iii) man has been made in God's image; 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for knowledge, may be led to favour, uncritically, the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because man is made in God's image 
and, althouqh not amiscent has at least an inborn vis cognoscitiva, a 
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spontaneous tendency which drives him to search for a state of full 
Jmowledge similar to that of God. 
Secondly, and in relation to this first approach, a philosopher 
who believes that 
i) there is a creator God; that 
ii) at the beginning of the creation man was with God in the heaven and 
he knew God; and then that 
iii) there was the original fall; 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for knowledge, may be led to favour, l.ll1critically, the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because the vis cognoscitiva is in 
part what has remained of the original state, as a striving for perfect 
knowledge just for the sake of knowledge, man is not made for this 
earthly life but tends cognitively towards the heavens. This cognitive 
tension would show itself in man's search for knowledge just for the 
sake of knowledge. 
Thirdly, a philosopher who believes that 
i) man is in a condition of sin because he has fallen; that 
ii) knowledge, in a broad sense of the term, is the only way man can 
recover his previous happy status; and that 
iii) by means of a cognitive ascension towards God ma.n will reach a 
perfect intell ectual conjtD1ction with God; 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for Jmowl edge , may be led to favour uncritically the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because man is a knowledge-seeker 
who strives for knowl edge for its own sake because the more he knows the 
closer he gets to God. If only the sapient has a place close to God, 
then knowing becanes an eschatologic process of salvation, and the 
ass\.l1'Ption of the presence of a vis cognoscitiva in nan would be rather 
consistent with the whole theological picture. 
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«;'rag.) The pragmatical contexts through which the acceptance of the AP 
may have slipped into our picture of man without being radically 
challenged are of two kinds. 
According to the first kind, a philosopher who believes that 
i) man has a spontaneous tendency to act roorally; that 
ii) man errs only because he misjudges what is really good for him; and 
therefore that 
iii) any ht.ll1BIl action moral 1 y deprecabl e is due to sane sort of 
ignorance about what is the best thing for man, that is if man could 
always know correctly what is good he would always act according to that 
good and never make a JOOral mistake (Socratic intell ectualism); 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for knowledge, may be led to favour, uncritically, the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because man has an inborn desire 
for knowing the states of affairs in which he finds himsel f, and that 
the continuous fulfillment of this desire can allow him to avoid states 
of ignorance and therefore rooral errors. The defence of a Socratic 
intellectualism in ethics can be helped by an uncritical assumption of 
an Aristotelian intellectualism in the analysis of the genesis of the 
process of knowing. 
According to the second kind of pragnatic context, a philosopher 
who believes that 
i) man desires happiness; that 
ii) man reaches the maxinun degree of happiness in a contE!llPlative life; 
and that 
iii) the contemplative life is a result of a cognitive activity; 
in facing the question why there is a phenanenon like the human never-
ending search for knowledge, may be led to favour, tmcritically, the 
traditional answer provided by the AP because the activity of knowing is 
sanething good in itself and that in man the search of knowledge for its 
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own sake is at one with the desire for happiness. Actually, the search 
itself may came to be seen as human happiness, no matter whether or not 
it culrrdnates in a final acquisition of knowledge-why. 
~syc'> Finally, we have the psychological contexts where the AP may 
receive an uncritical welcome. A philosopher who believes that 
i) the highest form of life for man is conscious life, as this is 
expressed by the Delphic Oracle's maxim "know thyself"; that 
ii) man wants to achieve this status of full consciousness; and that 
iii) this status can be better reached if man is engaged in a purely 
theoretical activity of knowing; 
in facing the question why there is a phenomenon like the human never-
ending search for knowledge, may be led to favour, uncritically, the 
tradi tional answer provided by the AP because a pure desire for 
intellectual knowledge may contribute in developing man's awamess of 
himself.9 
The historical inportance of these foregoing philosophical 
perspectives can hardly overstated. Consider for exanple the strict 
relation that has always occurred between the idea of a Faustian man 
interested in mowing the intrinsic nature of external real i ty just for 
the sake of knowledge and the conception of man as a rational animal. 
Although the exaltation of Reason certainly belongs more properly to the 
phi 1 osophy and rhetoric of the Enlighteznent, rati onali ty and 
epistemophilia have been always united in a single vision of the nature 
of JIBIl, at 1 east since Greek phi 1 osophy . The acceptance of the 
Aristotelian. Postulate goes together with the Aristotelian definition of 
man as a rational aninal. To a greater or lesser extent, philosophers 
have for centuries discussed the relation between happiness and 
9) Cf. Alexander of Aprhodisias' On Aristotle Hetaphysics, I, 1, 5. 
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contenplative life; between these two and hwan Jmowledge of God; 
between salvation, faith and knowledge; between Adam's eating the 
forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge, as it is reported in Genesis, 
and the original sin of pride; between eschatological perspectives and 
neoplatonistic or gnostic visions of man as cognitively ascending 
towards the One. And even nowadays we discuss whether ethical 
propositions need a particular kind of knowledge, and if morality is 
grounded on knowledge. In all these vital philosophical issues the AP 
has occurred as uncritically accepted, playing very often an influential 
role, as a key assUl"fption that only very rarelylO has cane to be 
discussed as controversial. 
Within the contexts above outlined the AP would more hardly appear 
worthy of a full cd ticism. Rather, on the grounds of other 
philosophical considerations extraneous to the epistemology of the 
genesis of P-knowing, (Ctel. )/(~Syc.) may have directed the 
phi losophical investigation towards an acquiescent acceptance of the AP. 
It is only by representing to ourselves this extensive typology of 
philosophical environrrents, together with their theoretical prestige, 
that we can assess how it has been possible that almost everything in 
philosophy has been challenged but the alleged episteroophilia of man. 
Sane features of (Ctel. )/(<;'Syc'> deserve at least a brief 
comment. The clauses listed by (i)-(iii) in (Ctel.)/(CPsyc.) are those 
which actually stJ11llarize the philosophical environments whithin which 
the acceptance of the AP may have been \IDcri tically encouraged. Such 
"AP-favourable philosophical environments" represent the philosophical 
highway through which the traditional acceptance of the AP has cane to 
us, stenghtening itself along the way. Two remarkable features evidently 
10) Two interesting exceptions are ancient pyrronhism (cf .. Burnyeat [1980]) and the 
Neoplatonic Negative Theology started with Dionisus the Areopaglta, cf. next chapter. For 
some information about the Platonic-Paolin negative characterization of the desire to know 
see the history of the motto ·Noli alta sapere· (·don't desire to know the high things·) 
and its connection with the motto ·Sapere aude· in Ginzburg [1986]. pp.107-132. 
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unite all the "AP-favourable philosophical environments": they all tend 
to praise the pure search for knowledge as if it were sanething 
ethically cCmnendable; and they all fundamentally rely on metaphysical 
asst.1l7ptions. Such different features are rich in consequences relevant 
to the present investigation, and we need to dwell on than if we want 
tmderstand the basis on which the AP has cane to be traditionally 
accepted. This is the task of the following to sub-sections. 
v . 3 . a THE ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AP 
The ethical understanding of the vis cognoscitiva is E!Tbedded in 
the positive eval uation of the AP. A phi I osopher who works wi thin 
(Ctel . )/(<;'syc.) is likely to be led to assune three additional views 
concerning human never-ending search for knowledge, namely that: 
i) each person has in prospect a (relative to her life) never-ending 
cognitive investigation of the universe; hence that 
ii) each person virtually tends to (contribute to) the elaboration of 
the final library of the universe; and finally that, 
iii) each person contributes to the elaboration of the universal 
library, if not in agreement, at least not in contrast with reality 
(this is an attenuation of the Aristotelian phusei clause). 
These supplementary characterizations of what is iJTi>lied in the 
conception of the vis cognoscitiva introduce another fundamental aspect 
of the acceptance of the AP. Fran a close look to the "AP-favourable 
environments" we can understand that the acceptance of the AP is 
grounded, in a very significant respect I on the idea that knowing is a 
praiseworthy pleasure in itself, and that it is an activity that leads 
to the acquisition of the higher state of being a learned person. 
Irrplicit in the assutption of the AP is the view that a man who is busy 
in the acti vi ty of knowing enjoys himsel f in the course of such a 
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process and is a better man than one who doesn't know or who is not 
involved in sane learned activity. Hence, it is very likely that the 
same philosopher who is led to accept (i)/(iii) will also assume that: 
iv) the vis cognoscitiva is something good in itself. 
Note that this ethical aspect of the desire for knowledge is 
already implicit in the metaphysical translation undergone by the clause 
"for its own sake" in each context. Historicall y , fran (Ctel.) to 
(~syc.) there seems to be a crucial identification of "the search for 
knwoledge just for the sake of knowledge" with "the search of knowledge 
for the sake of sane kind of metaphysical ends", and then with "the 
search of knwoledge not for the sake of sare errpi ri cal or utilitarian 
reasons" . 
An irrportant consequence of uncovering the "ethical" aspect of the 
notion of vis cognoscitiva is that, correspondingly, the botmdary 
between lU1derstanding the AP as a descriptioo of the essential nature of 
man and lU1derstanding the AP as a prescription to men of a certain way 
of Ii ving , becares rruch I ess firm. We rray now wonder whether, when a 
philosopher asStD'TleS the AP, he is actually recognizing man as 
essentially a knowledge-seeker, or he is saying that JTBJl ought to be a 
knowledge-seeker. ll When the AP itself defines rran as a knowledge-seeker 
is it describing a vi tal aspect of hunan nature or prescribing how man 
should behave? Consider the farrous speech that Dante put in Ulysses' 
rrouth: "Consider who you are: /You were not born to Ii ve like brutes/but 
to seek virtue and knowledge" .12 It is difficult to decide whether we 
should understand Ulysses' words merely as a sort of invi tation to 
follow a certain way of life or as a description of the more intrinsic 
nature of man. 
i1) Such a distinction is very clear in Locke, see next chapter VI.S.b. 
12) 'Considerate la vostra semenza:/Fatti non foste per viver come brutilma per seguir 
virtute e conoscenz8.· Dante A., La Divina Commedia, Inferno, XXVI 'Ulisse", 118-120. 
Commentators commonly interpret the speech has having been directly suggested to Dante by 
Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on Aristotle's Hetaphysics. 
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The eli fference between these two interpretations becanes a real 
contrast once we refer back to our ordinary evidence as the touchstone 
for assessing the epistaoological value of the AP. Given that the 
majority of men are not knowledge-seekers in the sense stated by the AP, 
then the AP cannot be taken as a description of man, at leat not at its 
face value. Then either the AP rrust be interpreted as an ethical 
statement, or it needs to appeal to sane further and "deeper" notion of 
man. If the AP turns out to be a mere precept, praising a certain kind 
of life, its epistem:>logical ircportance becanes very marginal. If its 
value depends on sane particular, metaphysical doctrines, then its 
probl ematici ty becanes JOOre and JOOre evident. In both cases, it 
definitely requires an articulated justification. The ethical nature of 
the AP is sanething we don't need to be concerned wi th in this context 
since I will briefly discuss it in the next chapter. In the next sub-
section I shall consider the metaphysical grounds for the acceptance of 
the AP. 
V. 3. b THE METAPHYSICAL GROONDS FAVOORABLE ro THE ACCEPI'ANCE OF 'mE AP 
The second characteristic that associates all the "AP-favourable 
philosophical environments" is that. (Ctel. )/ (Cpsyc.) consist of 
metaphysical views about certain states of the universe. This is not 
surprising. In the previous chapter I've been delineating the 
Aristotelian postulate as a powerful hypothesis about the essential 
nature of man, the genesis of the p-Jmowing and the interpretation of 
the Perpetual Check of Reason. Al though I've said that it represents the 
anthropological caTpOl1ent of the TraUlBtic Doubt, we may understand the 
AP as a metaphysical statement. By asserting the presence of a 
spontaneous, inborn, episteroophilic inpulse (conatus) in the hUlBD mind, 
the AP appeals directly to a certain description of a state of affairs 
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in the universe. Once we have individuated the AP as a metaphysical 
hypothesis concerning the nature of nan, we may expect to find it 
errbedded in similar metaphysical grotulds, such as the (i)/(iii) clauses 
of (Ctel.)/(cpsyc.)' The fact that the traditional acceptance of the AP 
occurs in metaphysical descriptions of the universe is perfectly 
consistent with the fact that the AP is supposed to be an answer to the 
question about the genesis of the process of knowing, and therefore to 
represent a logical13 appeal to a hypothetical pre-epistemdc state of a 
hunan mind. Stating a pre-condition of the existence of episternic 
states, the uncritical acceptance of the AP is more likely to slip into 
metaphysical contexts concerned with the description of certain aspects 
of the lIDiverse. 
Fram the primarily metaphysical nature of the philosophical 
environments within which the uncritical acceptance of the AP may occur, 
we can infer that JOOSt of the time the acceptance of the AP may be 
motivated siIT()ly by its coherent agreenent with sane global, 
metaphysical picture of the status of the universe. Most of the time the 
AP rray turn out to be accepted on grotmds that are not really arguable, 
but nuch Jrore matters of speculatiCll or faith. This leads to the 
conclusion that the metaphysical environments" favourable to the 
asSlITption of the AP cannot be turned into episteroological argunents for 
the justification of the AP. It is one thing to explain why the AP has 
been traditionally accepted as uncontroversial, quite another to provide 
it with an episteroological support. If they were taken as supporting 
arguments in favour of the AP, the philosophical contexts mapped above 
could be liquidated simply by means of the crude observation that they 
would be trying to support the dubitll1 per (what is at least as nuch, if 
nor more) dubius. The persuasive force of (ctel.)/(CPsyc.) in favour of 
13) Here 'logical" means "not psychological or concerni ng the real state of aff ai rs 
according to which human knowledge develops'j it is rather to be understood as 
"conceivable without contradiction' . 
OIAPTER V 193 
the acceptance of the AP would lie totally on their metaphysical 
assumptions stated in the (i)/(iii) clauses. But these latter call into 
play whole metaphysical Weltanschauungen that are even more questionable 
than the AP. The assurrption of (ctel. )/(<;'syc.) can encourage the 
assurrptian of the AP, but that the capacity of (ctel. )/(~Syc.) to 
sqpport the AP epistemologic~lly is null. By saying this, I'm supposing 
that we are not ready to rrake any concessi on to the supporter of the AP 
in terms of radical metaphysical doctrines which could turn out to be of 
vital importance for the justification of the AP. The supporter of the 
AP must lindt himself to either empirical or logical argument, without 
evading the issue by recourse to trascendent condi tians. 
To saneone this requirement and the following dismissal of 
(Ctel.)/(Cpsyc.) as means to justify the acceptance of the AP, may not 
be entirely clear. On the contrary, saneone may consider it hasty, and a 
little unfair towards the importance of (Ctel.)/(~syc.)' The objection 
may run like this. First of all, (ctel.)/(cpsyc.) show that behind the 
AP there is a whole metaphysical field of interpretations of the nature 
of the universe and of man's role within it. We should not underestimate 
- the objection may continue - the fact that each metaphysical context 
favourable to the acceptance of the AP has a different degree of 
justificatory force connected with the degree of force of its 
metaphysical assumptions (i)/(iii). Hence, there may be obvious inter-
connections occurring between the various contexts favourable to the 
acceptance of the AP. The stranger this network of AP-favourabl e 
metaphysical contexts is, that is the easier we are convinced by the 
value of a certain metaphysical picture, the easier it will be to accept 
the AP as justified on its basis. The objection may end by pointing out 
that, as soon as we try to explain the reasan why man sometimes seems to 
take an interest in Jmowledge just for the sake of knowledge, we 
necessarily step out of the epistemological field of arguments to enter 
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into the metaphysical domain of descriptions. The metaphysical shift is 
inevitable, and once we have admitted this then all the metaphysical 
contexts (Ctel.)/(cpsyc.) should lead us to the assumption of the AP. 
The objection deserves a careful consideration because it throws 
sane new light on the issue. It may he that the metaphysical shift is in 
fact inevitable, as the objection suggests. It may be that in order to 
solve the problem of why man seems to show same interest in knowing we 
need to step into a metaphysical description of certain states of 
affairs. The objection is, however, misguided. Its supporters 
mistmderstand the nature both of this metaphysical step and of the 
methodological application of the econanic principle to which I've 
appealed above. In the former case, the metaphysical step nay be 
required only insofar as a description of the principle of the genesis 
of the process of knowing is concerned, but not its justification. We 
face the problem of explaining the phenomenon of the human never-ending 
search for knowledge. We put forward a hypothesis which consists of a 
certain description of a possible state, property or tendency of the 
hunan mind. SUch a description can be tmderstood as being metaphysical. 
But we support the assumption of this hypothesis epistemologically, by 
appeal ling to sane logical or empirical reasoning or evidence. 
Simdlar reasoning is available for the second point of the issue. 
Interpreted a' la Peirce1 4 the Ockam's razor does not deny any value to 
metaphysical hypotheses, but it rather tends to limit the assmptions we 
should consider to be available. Certainly for a justification to be 
metaphysically grounded is not sirrply equivalent not to being a 
justification at all, so far so good. The objection goes wrong in 
14) I'm here referring to the common vi.e~ attributed to Ocka~ w~ereb~ "entia non. sunt 
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" (entitles must not be multiplled wlthout necessity). 
Peirce [1958], vol. VIII, p.23, note 6, specifies that the principle expressed by that 
sentence was due to Durand de St. Pourcain. We shall meet this author again in section 7. 
For Peirce's law of parsimony, cf. for example (1958), 7.92. In a certain sense, it would 
be possible to adopt ockam's razor literally, as far as the vis cognoscitivB is 
hypostatized into a mental force or entity, cf. next chapter VI.3.a. 
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asslllling that this position is in contrast with Ockarn's econanic 
methodology: to reduce to the minirrun the appeal to metaphysical 
hypotheses for which could be substituted rrore E!fii>irical and obvious 
equivalents. In our case, the elimination of a certain description of 
the genetic principle of the process of knowing, the vis cognoscitiva, 
is going to be replaced by another metaphysical description, what I 
shall define the inertial conatus. By subrrdtting it to Ockam's-Peirce's 
econanic test, we can hope that the conjectural presence of an inertial 
conatus in the htmm mind will be epistemologically better grounded. 
The presentation of (ete1. )/(~syc.) aims only at rraking us aware 
of the origins of the AP in the history of philosophy. We can reasonably 
believe that the critical discussion of the AP has been left aside and 
delayed until now rrainly because of these "friendly environments". 
Although the relation between philosophical contexts favourable to the 
asSlll'ption of the AP and the AP itself could be presented in terms of 
inferential reasonings fran reasonable premises (i. e. descriptions of 
states of the mriverse) to equally reasonable conclusions (the 
acceptance of the AP, i.e. another description of another state of the 
universe), it would be pointless to argue against the value of the 
epistemological relation between the former and the latter. For it would 
amount to rrUstaking the metaphysical contexts of the acceptance of the 
AP for the grounds of its epistemological justification. 
V.4 THE Ao:EPI'ANc:E OF THE AP AND "BOETHIUS' PARAOOX" 
The AP can be consistently embedded in different metaphysical 
pictures. Within such favourable contexts the AP perfectly. succeeds in 
explaining the phenomenon of the human never-ending search for 
knowledge. These two factors should not be esteemed sufficient, 
epistemological reasons to make us accept the AP against the evidence we 
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have from our everyday life. The fact that, contrary to what is held by 
the AP, the great majori ty of men an~ not interested in knowing just for 
the sake of lmowledge makes the AP so suspect as to give us the right to 
ask for a proper and valid justification of it. It may be that the 
phenanenon of the hunan never-ending search for knowledge can be 
explained by a rrore roodest explanation concerning the human mind and its 
drives. Because of the paradoxical conclusion to which it leads, the 
assumption of the AP turns out to be in need of a strong epistemological 
justification. The fact that the AP is a possible explanation of the 
developnent of human knowledge throughout the centuries is not enough to 
overcane the outstanding difficulty. As the analysis of the issue 
unfolds, we shall see that no argunent can really succeed in rendering 
the AP less questionable. This will be the topic of the next section. 
One of the more effective ways of putting the plausibility of the 
assUll'tion of the AP into question is by focusing on the contrast 
between its most direct consequence and our ordinary evidence. From the 
acceptance of the AP we can draw the conclusion that man in himself has 
to be defined as an episteroophilic knowledge-seeker: hunan beings (HE) 
can be distinguished from animals (A) according to whether or not they 
have the property of being epistemophilic (E): 
D28) for every A if A has aIOOllg his property that of being E then he is 
also a HB, otherwise he is just an A. 
SUch a definition of man is tailored by philosophers on the 
prototype of rnan1 5 as a philosopher. Although strictly speaking it does 
not appear in this fomulation, being inplici t in the assmption of the 
15) As before in the text, in what follows I shall adopt the simpler and common use of 
referring by means of "man" both to men a~d to women. ~san Haack, however, ~as made ~e 
realize that such a device could be sometlme problematIc as far as Greek phIlosophy IS 
concerned, given the lower anthropological s~~tus "enjoied" by wome~ in an:ient th~ugh~. 
It may be that when Aristotle said "anthropo! he ~~s merely refernng to male beIngs, 
although for this purpose he could have used androl . 
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AP, D28 is differently endorsed by all the philosophers we have met in 
the previous chapter, Aristotle, Albert the Great and Thanas Aquinas. 
It is immediately obvious that the problem with D28 is that if we 
relate it to our ordinary evidence then we obtain the paradoxical 
conclusion that: 
P} most of the time the great majority of men do not actually satisfy 
the conditio sine qua nan (i.e. having the property E) for being 
considered lOOre than animals (A). 
The conclusion that most of the time the great majority of men 
are, or behave like, animals because they are not philosophers is hardly 
tenable. Through D28' the assumption of the AP turns out to lay down 
such a strict conception of man that the majority of men are left out of 
it. 
The outlines of the problem are well recognized by the supporters 
of the AP, frem Aristotle to Thcmas Aquinas. The author who probably 
came closest16 to the paradoxiacal formulation given above is Boethius 
of Dacia.17 In his short work De Smmo Bono, he writes: 
"Although all men naturally desire to know, yet very few of 
them, and this is a pity, abstain dedicate themselves to the 
search of wisdan, all the others being prevented fran such a 
great good by their disordered desires"(lines 110-112, p.373, my 
italics) ,18 
And the straightforward implication of such assertions had already been 
stated three pages before: 
Against whan (i.e. those who don't follow their natural desire 
for knowledge] the Philosopher says: 'Be careful, all of you men 
who are counted among the beasts, you who don't understand what 
is divine in yourself' (lines 19-21, p.369-370, my italics).19 
16) What Boethius has in mind. however. is no more than very close to our paradox. This 
because of the context. which is an ethical discussion of the highest good for man, 
identified in God's knowledge. Obviously it is one thing to say that all men are sinners 
also because they forget about their highest good and another thing to say that the 
majority of human beings is not to be called. properly speaking. human because of a lack 
of the epistemophilic characteristic. Boethius is interested in the former, ethical 
condemnation of humanity, not in the latter. 
17) Cf. Boethius (1976J, pp.369-377 and Wieland [1982J. p.681. 
18) 'Cum enim omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant, paucissimi tamen hominum. de quo 
dolor est, studio sapientiae vacant inordinata concupiscientia eos tanto bono impediente·. 
19) 'Contra quos Philosophus dicens: ·Vae vobis homi nes qui computati estis in numero 
bestiarum ei quod in vobis divinum est non intendentes··. 
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The desire for knowledge is described as inborn and natural. And 
against those who 1 ack any interest in knowing, Boethi us echoes the 
Aristotelian20 execration: they are like animais that don 't understand 
the highest quality of man. 
There are different reasons why "Boethius 'paradox" was not taken 
to be a strong cotmter argunent against the assl.lTFtion of the AP i tsel f , 
ei ther by Boethi us himsel f and by other phi 1 osophers in the same 
tradition. First of all, we need to recall that philosophers accepting 
the AP are likely to work within one of the AP-favourable contexts. This 
could already cast doubt on the paradoxical conclusion implicit in the 
aceptance of the AP. In many cases the AP is a mere appendix to more 
crucial metaphysical issues. Second, for an Aristotle-like approach or 
more generally for a Greek philosopher, to set high standards in order 
to consider scmeone a real rran might not be an inconvenience at all. In 
an elitist society where men can be made slaves P might not sound very 
paradoxical. On the contrary, it helps to maintain a clear distinction 
between a restricted cl ass of peopl e, who can afford to study, and the 
great majority of the population who have to work to survive. We should 
not underestimate the fact that Aristotle considered leisure and the 
possibility of having free time the first, necessary condition for 
phi I osophizing.21 This second consideration, however, is sanewhat more 
problematic as far as a medieval philosopher like Boethius (but see also 
Albert the Great and Thanas Aquinas) is concerned. A medieval 
philosopher cannot share the same Greek aristocratic vision of men, at 
1 east not without taking into account the notion of man's freedan and 
that of equality aroong htmm beings. In their ccmnents on Aristotle, 
Boethius, Albert the Great and Tbanas Aquinas actually feel the 
20) Th~ ·Philosophus· in the second passage is Aristotle, and this quotation occurs very 
often in Latin philosophers, yet it has not been possible to retrace whether, and if so 
from where in Aristotle it has been taken (cf. the Latin commentary to the sentence just 
quoted, p.369, note 19-21.) 
21) Cf. Lear [1988], p.2 and note 2 for the Aristotelian references. 
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necessity of justifying the presence of this apparent contradiction: why 
a tendency towards virtue and Jmowledge which has to be supposed natural 
and spontaneous cannot in fact be considered canoon to all rren. The 
answer is the same in the three authors, and we have seen in the second 
quotation fran Boethius that it basically refers to the negative 
influence of physical or mundane passians.22 Man would be prevented fran 
pursuing knowledge just for the sake of knowledge by the desire for 
other minor pleasures, like sensual experiences, that are easier to 
obtain. It is very interesting to note that among these poor and 
inferior pleasures there is also perceptual knowledge in tenns of 
sensations. This is a bit odd because in the next section we shall see 
that perceptual knowledge and the pleasure connected to it is considered 
by Aristotle a sign of episteroophilia, and eventually a proof in favour 
of the validity of the AP. For the time being, however, we are told by 
medieval philosophers that this physical knowledge could be one of the 
origin of the difficulties faced by man in following his otherwise 
natural and spontaneous vis cognoscitiva. By shifting fran Greek to 
medieval philosophy, an elitist vision of man including a positive 
understanding of sensations is substituted by a more equal vision of man 
as a free person, yet connected with a more suspicious interpretation of 
sensations. Despite the differences, both visions endeavour to maintain 
the value of the AP against the paradoxical conclusion that it implies. 
They ground the assumption of the AP within strong metaphysical contexts 
and strengthen the conception of man as an episteroophilic Jrnowledge-
seeker by means of an ethical conception of the vis cognoscitiva. Fran 
Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas fran Fichte to Gadamer, the AP individuates 
a potentiality in man of becaning a philosopher. The actualization of 
22) Cf. Boethius' inordinata concupiscientia (De Summo Bono, 112), Albert the Great's 
viol entia passionum (Hetaphysica c.S, 6) and Thomas Aquinas' voluptatibus (Commentaria, 
I. I.4). Thomas Aqui nas, however, is the one who gives the most articulated typology of 
reasons (ibidem). 
(]{APTER V 200 
such a potentiality is preached as leading to a higher "ethical" state 
of hunani. ty . 
This is 1n agreanent with what I said before about the two 
alternatives left open to the supporter of the AP. Once a philosopher 
supporting the AP faces "Boethius 'paradox", he can either decide to 
consider the AP as a sort of prescription or, if he still wants to take 
it as a description, he will need to put forward a "deeper" 
understanding of the nature of man in order to bypass the problem raised 
by our ordinary experience. In order to repair the damage made by the 
striking conclusion of , the supporter of the AP is forced to introduce 
sane additional, ad hoc clause. For exanple, he may object that in "p" 
the "actually" clause plays an irrportant role in attenuating its 
paradoxical aspect. He accepts that as long as man does not behave 
philosophically he is not a real man, the real hl..lllal1 nature being 
eXEllTplified by the philosopher. But he could argue that despite our 
ordinary evidence, the majority of human beings have the possibility of 
becaning real men, that is philosophers. Unfortlmately, we already know 
that ad hoc clauses, such as this appeal to the developnent of a 
potential i ty , refer to the metaphysical contexts wi thin which the 
assmption of the AP finds sane favourabl e grounds. And the appeal to 
metaphysical grounds in order to show that D28 is still acceptable 
despite the paradoxical conclusion P, does not attenuate the disruptive, 
episterooiogical force of "Boethius 'paradox". Not only because a 
metaphysical backing of the asst.llPtion of the AP does not CO\IDt as an 
episteroological justification, but also because it brings into 
consideration still roore controversial notions, whose acceptance, in 
turn, would need considerable episteroological justification. The 
tenacity in maintaining the value of the AP shows only how much of 
ordinary evidence the philosopher in question is ready to sacrifice in 
order to stick to his picture of the world and of man within it. 
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An irrportant consequence of "Boethi us' paradox" is that it makes 
clear where the burden of proof lies. The description given by the AP to 
explain the h\.J1'lal1 never-ending search for knowledge refers to the 
presence of a desire for knowledge for its own sake in the human mind. 
Fran an enpirical point of view such a vis cognoscitiva is far fran 
being evident. Let us remember that we are not speaking of a tension 
towards vital inforrration necessary for survival (not even if we 
understand this latter in a very broad sense, so to include, for 
exanple, those pieces of knowledge necessary to be able to use a 
telephone in a roodern society) or of mere curiosity, such as that 
concerning scrneone else's business. Rather, the AP refers to 
intellectual knowledge and to the pure love of investigation into the 
real nature of things, just for its own sake. How many people do we 
know, even amoIl9 those who actually seem to pursue knowledge for its own 
sake, would still do what they are doing if they were alone, if they 
were the last person on earth, and yet with a11 the ccmforts that our 
age may provide? I believe not many, certainly not most of them. The AP 
is a controversial explanation of the search for knowledge. OUr ordinary 
evidence makes the AP Iargelly questionable and in want of an 
epistemological justification. 
The location of the burden of proof has an obvious link with the 
econanic principle of Ockam (if in doubt eliminate the vis cognoscitiva) 
and it is very important for the solution of the Traumatic Doubt, the 
problem which underlies the necessity of giving a critical analysis of 
the AP. For if there are no good reasons to accept the AP as a principle 
of the genesis of P-knowing, and there are good reasons to believe that 
the AP is untenable, then a fortiori there is no reason to maintain its 
problematic assumption within the context of the genesis of the 
TraUTatic Doubt. But then this latter might be solved by simply 
realizing that the eventuality that "reality in itself may be catpletely 
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different fran what we take it to be" may not be a real problem. This 
aroounts to the procedure of errptying the Doubt of its TratlIBtic val ue, a 
possibility whose value it is the final goal of the second part of this 
work. But this is already anticipating the cantent of the next chapter. 
At the nnnent we need to consider the argunent in favour of the 
assmption of the AP. 
v . 5 AN ABOOCI'IVE JUSTIFICATION OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF 'IHE AP 
We have seen that there are various "AP-favourable environments" 
that can disguise the ass1.llTption of the AP as unprobl erratic. We have 
also seen that the acceptance of the AP gives rise to such a paradoxical 
conclusion that, unless properly supported by an epistemological 
argunent, it is untenabl e . We are now going to see how the 
epistemological argument in favour of the acceptance of the AP equally 
fails to support the AP against our ordinary evidence. 
Above, I referred to the different attitudes the supporters of the 
AP can show towards the phenanenon of "pleasure in sensations". On the 
one side, it is presented as a rreans of answering to "Boethius' 
paradox"; on the other side it is thought of as constituting the premise 
for a possible argunent in favour of the AP. In this latter sense, 
considerations about the phenanenon of "pleasure in sensations" can he 
condensed into an abductive justification of the AP. On the whole, this 
represents the second type of groW1ds on which the assmption of the AP 
can be based, and as such it deserves all our attention. 
The general formulation of the abductive justification of the AP 
can be first found in Aristotle himself,23 In explaining his dictl..ln, 
Aristotle endeavours to give sane reasons why he believes that all men 
23) cf. Metaphysics, 1,1, 980a 1, 980b 24. 
0iAPI'ER V 203 
by nature desire to know. For this purpose he says that a sigd4 of 
episteroophilia is that men enjoy perceptual activities, especially 
sight. The argument can be enriched by adding that many people seem to 
enjoy intellectual activities, like solving puzzles, which are 
completely gratuitous. All these can be further signs, this time perhaps 
at a more speculative level, that in fact man naturally tends towards 
the acquisition of knowledge for no other reason than the pleasure he 
takes in knowing. The reasoning may be put this way (where AJ stands for 
Abductive Justification of the acceptance of the AP): 
AJ) as a matter of fact, man enjoys (i) sensations for their own sake 
and (ii) purely intellectual activities for their own sakes. Since (i) 
and (ii) are signs of the presence a vis cognoscitiva in the hunan mind, 
then there is a tension (vis cognosci ti va) in the hunan mind that 
renders man a knowledge-why-seeker. An appeal to such a tension explains 
the other htmm phenanenon of a never-ending search for knwoledge. 
The fonnulation of the AJ tries to cope with the problem arosen 
fran ''Boethius' paradox". Unfortunately, the goal of an episterrological 
justification of the AP remains largely lIDfulfilled. There can be two 
interpretations of the AJ, one irrproper and the other proper. On a 
closer analysis, the proper interpretation of the AJ turns out to be too 
weak to be able to support the ass1..l1"Ption of the AP against our ordinary 
evidence. Let me first dwell on the inproper one. Its discussion will 
introduce the second kind of interpretation of the AJ. 
The first interpretation of the AJ is improper because it fails to 
recognize the abductive nature of the AJ accusing it of running into a 
logical fallacy. According to it, the AJ would suggest that we rrust 
accept that if there is a phencrrenon like hunan epistesrophilia this 
would necessarely manifest itself through other phenomena like (i) and 
(ii); however, since there are indeed phenanena like (i) and (ii) and we 
have accepted that (i) and (ii) are necessary signs of a vis 
24) Aristotle's Greek word is precisely semeion. that both Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas translated as signum. 
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cognoscitiva, then we rrust also admitt that there is a vis cognoscitiva 
that counts as their source, and hence that the asstmption of the AP is 
justified. This interpretation misunderstands AJ 'for a the following 
falacious deductive argunent: it is necessary that [if (there is 
something like a vis cognoscitiva) then (there would be (i) and (ii) as 
signs of it)]; it were derivable the conclusion that: there are (i) and 
(ii) and so it is necessary that there is a vis cognoscitiva. This is a 
classic fallacy. 25 SUppose we say that the possession of the 
philosophers' stone has as a necessary sign that of making its owner a 
rich person. It is more than reasonable to assume that if someone were 
in possession of a stone that transforms every metal into gold then that 
person would necessarily be rich, and that this latter condition would 
be a consequence of the former, and therefore that the possession of the 
philosophers' stone would also be manifested by the fact that its owner 
would be transformed into a rich person. All this, however, is far fran 
justifying the inverse reasoning, that if John is rich this is an 
inconfutable, necessary sign that he owns the philosophers' stone or, 
less strongly, that if John is rich this is a very good reason to 
believe that he has the philosophers' stone. This kind of inference is 
just a nan sequitur due to a simple fallacy concerning the position of 
the modal qualifier. 
If the former irrproper interpretation of the AJ can have any 
positive effect at all, it can do so only by underlining the importance 
of a correct understanding of the rrnddle clause of AJ attesting that (i) 
and (U) are signs of the presence of a vis cognoscitiva in the hunan 
mind. The justificatory force of the AJ in respect to the assllTption of 
the AP lies not on the deductive and necessary relation, but rather on 
the probabl e connection between on the one hand a pI easure in sensations 
and in the satisfaction of both a desire for a playful mental activity 
25) This is a version of that fallacy, already mentioned in chapter IV note, due to the 
shifting from a necessitss consequentiae to a necessitss consequentis. 
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and of curiosity, and on the other hand the possibility of there being a 
vis cognoscitiva in the human ~nd. Properly understood, the AJ can only 
support a more or less probable relation between these phenanena and 
their possible source. If we can assume that a certain sign-something is 
generaly the only and most important sign of the presence of a certain 
source-sanething, then given such a sign-scmething we are allowed to 
presuppose with the highest level of probability the presence of its 
source-sanething. However, in the need for a justification of the 
assl.D'Iption of AP exactly the connection between (i) and (ii) as actual 
signs of the vis cognoscitiva is at stake. And the AJ can efIl>loy the 
vis cognoscitiva to explain the never-ending search for knowledge only 
because it presuposes the vis cognoscitiva as the source of the pleasure 
in sensations. Although (i) and (H), logically speaking, could be signs 
of the presence of a vis cognoscitiva in a human mind, this is far fran 
saying that they are in fact evident signs of it. Although there may be 
sane t ruth in reasoning that if there were sanething 1 ike a vis 
cognoscitiva it would be reasonable to suppose that this would express 
itself also through a pleasure in sensations, in the satisfaction of our 
curiosity and of our desire for playful mental activity, this is far 
fran saying that the indubitable presence of these "phenanena" should 
count as a sign of the rrore questionable presence of a vis cognoscitiva 
as their unique source. The pleasure we take in sensations and in 
solving puzzles could be easily explained without any reference to the 
AP. So all we need to concede to the supporter of the AJ is that there 
is a logical possibility that (i) and (ii) can be signs of 
epistemophilia. The supporter of the AJ, an the other hand, must admdt 
that it is controversial when (i) and (ii) can count as real signs of 
the presence of a vis cognosci ti va, and indeed it is very doubtful 
whether they can be in fact signs of it at all, and whether we need to 
appeal to the notion of vis cognoscitiva at all in order to explain 
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them. Given what is suggested by our ordinary evidence, the AJ cannot be 
esTI?loyed to defend the ass'l.l1'ption of the AP. The AJ can introduce the AP 
as a satisfYIng hypothesis which succeeds in explaining phenanena like 
the ht.tnan never-ending search for knowledge, hUlTaIl edonism, hman desire 
to play mentally, or human curiosity. But the contention is that the AP 
is too strang an asst.l'TPtion. The AP seems to be an urmecessary and 
unjustified hypothesis which is too powerful because in order to do its 
explanatory job it needs to pose the presence of a vis cognascitiva in 
the human mind, creating ex nihilo a hunan episteroophilic tendency. And 
in this respect the AJ is largelly ineffective for the justification of 
the asst..rrption of the AP which cazmot resist the opposite "pressure" 
caning fran our ordinary evidence. The AJ relies on the assmption of 
the AP, it cannot support it. 
Once again, the adoption of the AJ within an "AP-favourable 
environment" can have contributed to the uncritical acceptance of the 
AP, but it is thoroughly ineffective once the value of the AP starts 
being seriously challenged. 
V.6 THE ANALCXHCAL GROONDS FOR THE Ao:EPTANCE OF THE AP 
Since the beginning of the last chapter (cf. IV.2.b) I said that 
it was irrportant to translate the Greek "oregontai" occurring in 
Aristotle's sentence by means of "to have a conation which drives x 
towards y" in order to tmcover what I suspect is the image-analogy that 
underlies the acceptance of the AP. Time has cane now to focus on this 
last type of "grounds" on which a favourable attitude towards the AP may 
have been allowed to flourish. Al though I presune that the analogical 
reasoning has been historically very infl uential in the acceptance of 
the AP, there are no explicit statements in the philosophers so far 
taken into consideration to which I could appeal unquestionably. 
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Therefore, the present and the next sections present only a series of 
conjectures. I find them largelly justified, but I cannot guarantee them 
to go unchallenged. Since it is impossible to discuss all the 
implications of the issue in detail, I will be very sketchy. 
An irrplicit analogy between knowing and IOOving, an association 
between the nature of dynamic, driving forces occurring within the 
physical world and the concept of a vis cognoscitiva might have favoured 
the acceptance of the AP as an explanation of the never-ending search 
for knowledge. Let me explain. The Aristotelian Physics may have tacitly 
contributed to the uncritical acceptance of the AP insofar as this 
latter can be interpreted in terms of an anthropological vision of the 
hll1BIl mind pushed towards a never ending acqul.si tion of knowl edge-why by 
her own vis cognoscitiva. It will be remerrbered that in the third 
chapter I introduced many different theories of knowledge by means of 
sinple graphic schanes. Those have been elaborated basically in tenns of 
arrows connecting HKS and ER. This dynamic image of knowledge as a 
bridge which goes fran the subject to the object is connected to my 
analogy of a chess game, where a HKS pl ays the whi te and ER the bl ack. I 
believe that such a vision of intellectual knowledge as a dynamic 
movenent fran HKS towards ~ is rrore than a mere rranner of speaking. It 
is a dynamic image that fundamentally characterizes knowing as "extro-
verted" in the phi 1 01 ogical meaning of this adjective (I've writen it 
with a hyphen in order to underline this particular use), that is, fran 
the perspective of the hman knowing subject, knowledge would be a 
movement primarily directed fran the knower to the Jmown because it 
would be due to a dynamic genesis internal to the HKS.26 
A first generic interpretation of knowing as a rroverrent towards 
reality and what is known is strictly connected with the idea of 
26) To this image is strictly connected that of "knowledge" as a more or less subjective 
or idealistic projection of mental contents on external reality, 
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discovery and travelling. It is once more the idea of Ulysses as the 
prototype of the cartesian nan. It is not by chance that Bacon's 
favouri te image to represent the enterprise of knowledge was the voyage-
metaphor. He even transformed it into a visual emblem in the Instauratio 
Magna. On the title-page of the book there is a ship sailing between the 
Pillars of Hercules into the open sea with the motto '~ulti 
pertransibmt & augebi tu sci entia " .27 According to the Baconian analogy, 
the "extro-verted image" of knowing inplies that it would be man who 
"epistemically attacks" reality, and reality which "defends" itself. 
It wouldn't be necessary to take into accmmt this general and 
nowadays rather obvious metaphorical interpretation of knowing as a way 
of "going towards" if it were not because it throws light on one of the 
factors which have helped to maintain the acceptance of the AP 
unquestioned. For such a general analogy between knowing and travelling 
introduces us to a deeper and more controversial association between the 
hypothesis maintained by the AP and the physics of dynamic movements. 
According to the Aristotelian Physics certain movements are 
natural and others violent. Those natural don't require any external 
cause because the moving body has within itself an intrinsic principle, 
acting either as an efficient cause, like the "soul" in the living 
things, or as a principle producing characteristic spontaneous motion in 
a particular environment, as in the motion of bodies towards their 
"natural places" .28 Everything has its natural place in the universe, a 
natural place which therefore everything is trying to reach. On the 
other hand, the basic principle of Aristotle's dynamics insofar as 
"violent" motion is concerned is that "whatever is in motion has been 
moved by sanething else" ("ame quod movetur ab alio movetur"): motion 
is not a state (as for Newton) but a process, and a moving body would 
cease to move unless continually acted on by a moving force. 
27) Cf. steadman [1971), p.35 
28) Cf. Crombie (1959, p.61. 
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The analogy I suspect to be at work between man being naturally 
driven towards Jmowledge and the movement of a body29 refers to these 
two conceptions of the genesis of motion. The notion of natural movement 
nay have suggested, analogically, that rran has his "natural place" 
within the kingdan of full knowledge. "Knowing" could be just a 
spontaneous motion of man going towards the realisation of full 
knowledge as his natural place. Considering the AP I have the irrpression 
that the metaphorical travel I er is moved in his investigation by a 
spontaneous tendency to reach a place which belongs to him, a position 
which only represents the full develo{:mellt of his hurran natUre. The 
notion of violent motion, on the other hand, may have suggested another 
interesting analogy between the vis cognoscitiva and a force of motion 
exercised fran one part of the mind on the other. Once again, the AP 
seems to suggest, almost visually, that during the process of knowing 
man, who according to the nature of "natural motion" is proceeding 
towards his natural place, is continually pushed further by the vis 
cognoscitiva, which is what activates the cognitive processes. The vis 
cognascitiva is the metaphysical force that determines the epistemic 
voyage. 
The picture that derives frcm these two perspectives is that, 
analogically, the epistarophilic inpulse described in D26 and that is 
supposed to be active in every man has two "dynamic" faces: on the one 
hand ''knowing'' represents a "natural rootion" of nan towards external 
reality and its knowledge, where "natural" is to be interpreted "in full 
harrocmy with the rest of the universe"; and on the other hand the vis 
cognoscitiva is a sort of mental motor which drives the whole process of 
knowing, so that the principle of the genesis of the process of knowing, 
29) In~is int;~pretation-all the Aristotelian thou9ht about topics like the passage from 
potency to actuality and the theory of change, and also as this was received by medieval 
philosophers I is involved. For a more specific discussion I can only refer once more to 
Lear [1988] I especially chap.s 1-3. For a survey of the main themes of the science of 
motion in medieval philosophy cf. Weisheip} [1982). pp.521-536. 
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is cancei ved as a dynamic principl e tending towards external reali ty. 30 
The analogical reasoning (AR) that may tmderlie the acceptance of the AP 
can be fOIl1l.l1 ated thus: 
AR) ''knowing'' is a process; as such it entails the rrodification of 
sanething, the knower, which through the process of knowing rroves fran a 
state of ignorance to a state of cognisance, which in turn is the 
natural state rrore suitable for the man-philosopher. But if knowing is a 
way of moving either towards the Jmown or sirrply towards knowledge, then 
it must be due to same sort of driving force. This later is identifiable 
in the vis cogn os ci ti va, which is both a spontaneous and a natural 
tendency of reaching intellectual knowledge and a sort of unrooved roover 
of the cogni ti ve processes. 
The conjecture suggests that a philosopher working with an 
Aristotelian picture of the physical world and of its forces and an 
Aristotelian explanation of the nature of IOOtion, may have been roore 
easily led to accept the AP tmcritically, because of the conceptual 
closeness of this latter to the fonner. We would find, I suspect, that 
many philosophers have been rrotivated by various understandings of such 
an analogy. I have the irrpression that the large success of the AP has 
also been due very often to the siJ1l)le analogy on which it seerrs to be 
irrplicitly grounded: the idea of knowing as a way of stretching our 
hands towards, of reaching out to the objects of Jmowledge, of getting 
closer to reality, of IOOving towards the roore objective aspects of the 
world, of escaping fram the subjective state. 
I shall tum to the nature of the dynamic analogy in the next 
chapter. There I will introduce the fonmulation of an anti-Aristotelian 
Postulate by focusing on the developnent of the analogical reasoning 
once the concept of inertia canes to play a central role in the 
explanation of rootion. I think it is plain that if the analogy 
knowing/moving can do any good work, heuristically, then it would be 
pointless to argue against the Aristotelian picture. Eventually, all we 
30) Without this specification there may be some ~onfusion in ~he, next chapter whe~ I will 
be speaking of a static and a dynamic ~nterpre~atlon,of, the prlnc~ple of the genesl~ of P-
knowin9. Also the latter optio~ is stIll ,",O,rk,lng w1thln the motlon-analogy, and 1t only 
objects a9ainst the interpretat10n of the orlgln of the movement, 
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need to do is sint>ly replace it by a roore updated version, say a 
Newtonian interpretation and note the changes. Hence, for the time being 
I will limit myself to investigating further sane crucial iITFlications" 
contained in the general conjecture put forward in this section. This 
may also help to indicate its value. 
V. 7 '!HE DYNAMIC IMAGE OF THE PROCESS OF KNGlING AND OF ITS GENETIC 
PRINCIPLE 
The uncovering of the analogical reasoning, as an additional 
grotmds on which the acceptance of the AP might have been favoured, has 
an enormous consequence for our understanding of the historical roots of 
the AP. For the analogy between knowing and rooving se~ to have a very 
central role not only in the understanding of the conception of man as a 
knowledge-why-seeker, but also in the interpretation of the Aristotelian 
distinction between a passive and an active mind, and of the medieval 
roots of the concept of intentionality. The three issues, i.e. the AP, 
active/passive mind and intentionality, may all have a canron analogical 
background. Indeed, they may belong to the same conceptual scheme. And 
this would imply that a modification in our conception of the principle 
of the genesis of the process of knowing could not I eave untouched our 
understanding of the concept of intentionality and of the Aristotelian 
distinction between the two Nous. Although obviously this hypothesis 
cannot here be fully articulated, in this section I wish to sketch at 
least two further conjectures. 
The first conjecture concerns the possibility of interpreting the 
evolution of both the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions in 
epistemology as already containing within themselves the possible 
prevalence of what I've called above the "extro-verted" conception of 
the process of knowing, and therefore as tending, in the long run, 
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towards the elimination of the ontic contribution of ER to the 
occurrence of the process of knowing, an elimination finally carried out 
by the cartesian revolution. The "extro-verted" interpretation of the 
dynamic image of knowledge is very popular in western philosophy. So 
much so that with an eye to the final praninence it reaches in modem, 
post-Cartesian philosophy, the Platonic and Aristotelian epistemological 
traditions can be seen as gradually developing towards the final 
"purification" of the conception of hunan 1mowlegde fran any "passive", 
"intro-verted" (that is "caning fran external reality") or "ontic" 
understanding of the initial stage of the process of knowing, 
represented. by perceptual knowledge. The Platonic tradition, on the one 
side, strongly stresses the responsability of HKS to reach a valid 
knowledqe of reality by means of an internal investigation of the truths 
already present in his mind. As Agustine said ''Noli foras ire, in te 
ipsllTl recti, in interiore hcmine habitat veritastl31 . The role of a 
possible external input is very much lU'lderestimated. On the other side, 
the Platonic tradi han solves the apparent probl em represented by a 
"passive" conception of perceptual knowledge - a stage in which ER would 
semn to "go towards" HKS - in two ways, by reinterpreting perceptual 
knowledge either as irrelevant to the understanding of the nature of 
hunan knowledge, or by rendering it actually IOOre "active" than it would 
appear at a first sight. In the former case perception becomes a sort of 
background condition for intellectual Jmowledge. As such it doesn't 
represent an instance of real knowledge, and the fact that in perception 
ER, and not HKS, seems to play the chess-game with the white, is 
disregarded in favour of a noetic approach. Hunan knowledge is primarily 
mental Jmowledge of ER, and in so far as rrental or intellectual 
knowledge is concerned, HKS plays the first and roost inportant role, 
al though we nust wait unti 1 Bacon to consider it an aggressive one. In 
31) ·Don't go out. Come back into yourself. Truth lives inside man·. Augustinus, De Vera 
Religione, 39. 
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the latter case, especially fran PlotinuS32 on, perceptual knowledge 
starts being interpreted as a way of being acti ve in terms of being 
selective or anticipating. Perception is no longer a mere reception of 
an external input, but it becanes another way of going towards ER by 
means of the senses which, in search of sensations, would operate a 
first, cnde selection and anticipation of information concerning the 
external world. 
The hypothesis that the history of epistemology before Descartes 
tends, in the long rtUl, to encourage a conception of knowledge as a way 
of going towards ER may sotmd lTllch IOOre controversial as a way of 
interpreting the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. It could seem odd to 
interpret the tradition that goes up to Locke and which supports the 
conception of a human Rdnd initially passively receiving brute 
information fran outside, as if it were also striving to support a 
purely "extro-verted" dynamic image of knowledge. Nevertheless, just as 
in the Platonic tradition, also in the Aristotelian tradition we are 
faced by a distinction between perceptual knowledge and intellectual 
knowledge, and then by a re-interpretation of the former on the basis of 
the "extro-verted" characterization of the latter. First of all, as I 
tried to nake clear in chapter 3, the Aristotelian tradition does not 
assign the title of ''knowledge'' to the first, perceptual step of the 
cognitive process, that which is made by ER in irrpressing a first 
empirical input on the knower's Rdnd. Perception is not yet knowledge, 
for knowledge is only intellectual episteme of eternal truths. 
Therefore, in so far as this tradition endorses an "intro-verted" 
dynamic image of perception (Le. the process of }mowing would start 
with a IOOvement fram ER to HKS) this latter is not praninent for the 
tmderstanding of knowledge. Secondly, and I would say IOOre inportantly, 
32) Plotinu5 made the greatest step in this direction by taking seriously the idea of 
interpreting perceptual knowledge not just as merely passive, but as depending on an 
active disposition of the HKS to receive information from outside. 
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the first enpirical input caning fran outside is considered a second 
step, made possibl e by an al ready actualized potentiality. As Lear 
clearly explains: 
[According to Aristotle] our ccm:i.ng to'LU1derstand the world is 
based on our interaction with nature, an interaction which 
occurs according to basic natural principles of causal 
interaction. But there is no way to explain this interaction an 
the basis of our (passive) mind and physically embodied form 
alone. Active Mind is the prior actuality needed to explain how 
thinking occurs in the individual. ([1988], p.139). 
It may even be said that the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition supports 
an internally extro-verted dynamic image of knowledge. In perceptual 
know 1 edge HKS doesn I t go towards ER but he is supposed to go towards the 
irrpressions ER has left on his mind, rather in the same way we would be 
prepared to meet saneone half-way, going towards him.33 
Hence, not only in the Platonic tradition, but also in the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition we find the possibility of 
interpreting ''knowing'' as a way of ''moving towards", and therefore the 
possibility of a dynamic interpretation of the principle of the genesis 
of P-Jmowing, of the vis cognoscitiva as a spontaneous, inborn driving 
force. The two traditions join together in the project for an internal 
foundation of knowledge represented by the cartesian foundationalist 
enterprise in Epistarology, a project that has engaged so many 
epistesrological studies in rrodem and contenporary philosophy. When 
33) Although it refers principally to the capacity of determining physical self-movement 
in animals, this interpretation is expressed rather clearly by Wedin (1968]: 
'So even though the object of desire, the ~rekton, is required as an unmoved mover, the 
animal remains in some sense a self-mover.* C ... ] Another and, I think, a more important 
reason [explaining the fact that an animal is a self-mover] is that conformity with 
natur alistic causal pr i nciples provides a general and. plausible explanat?ry fr amew?r k. 
Here the fact that objects of desire and perceptIon are external 1S an ObVIOUS 
desideratum. In particular, we save the principle that what produces 7hange is something 
actual, the object of desire [i.e. in our case 'knowable extern~l reallty']. Non:theless, 
because the object is something like a final cause the soul ltself, more preclsely the 
faculty of desire, refllains the efficient cause of the animal'~ mo.vem~nt.. It is precisely 
in this sense that animals are self-movers. ( ... ] I am, then, dIstIngUIshIng between self-
mover and unmoved mover. Mind at the intentional level is a self-mover, not an unmoved 
mover. It is only productive mind [i.e. our Active Mind), located at a lower level in the 
system or better, what it produces that is the analogue to the unmoved mover.**·. (p.2l7, 
my italics). (*) [Wedin's note) For more on this see Furley (1978): (**) (Wedin's note) 
That Aristotle extends the principle to thought is clear from [De Anlma] 431al-4. 
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Descartes starts working on the possibility of providing a foundation 
for his mental representations that could reassures him on the their 
trustworthness, the Platonic "internal ism" is joined to the conception 
of an Aristotelian "active mind" busy in producing and justifying her 
own representations, and all this in total dissociation fran the 
intrinsic nature of external reality, hence fran any eventual 
"suggestion" caning fran outside. The second half of the Classic and 
Medieval conception of knowledge, the harroonic partecipation of ER into 
the production of a fair picture of the world, is finally lost together 
with the Aristotelian metaphysics. What renains for the moder 
philosophers is an internal driving force, the vis cognoscitiva, 
thwarted of any access the intrinsic nature of ER. According to the new 
Cartesian picture, all hunan knowledge is interpreted as a body of 
bel iefs whose gr01.md must be found wi thin the mind of the knower, thanks 
to certain ''mental properties" such as clearnes, distinction, certainty 
and the like. Knowledge as a bridge between HKS and ER finds its deepest 
foundation in the subjective side. The cogito, fran this perspective, 
could have been fOIJTl.llated perfectly well in terms of vis cognoscitiva: 
natural iter scire desidero, ergo Stm. This, together with a veridical 
God is thought to be enough to lay down the foundation of knowledge. 
Fran Descartes on, knowing remains a sort of IOOvement fran HKS towards 
ER that is thwarted of any guarantee to be abl e to reach the final 
target. This ''roovanent'' is internalized in a foro interno; "knowing" as 
''nvving'' can be interpreted as an internal I'OOvement of part of the mind 
towards the data received fran the external source and scrnehow stored in 
another part of the mind. So just at the historical point when science 
begins to obtain significant resul ts, increasing the conception of 
knowledge as a powerful way of darrdnating/menipulating external reality, 
philosophy at the same time loses its faith in the possibility of 
knowing reality in itself, for it has already lost any notion of a 
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possible ontic contribution of ER to the final cognitive product. The 
evolution of knowledge into an aggressive instrunent of calculation, 
prevision and rrodification of reality at the same time extinguf~hes the 
last ranains of a notion of the process of knowing as a collaborative 
enterprise between HRS and ~. The higher hunan knowledge raises her 
voice to proclaim her power, the IOOre difficult it becanes to conceive 
of any possible contribution to the epistemdc entrprise camdng fram ER. 
Broadly speaking, we could say the same force that shattered the 
harrnoic picture provided by the Aristotelian metaphysics, i. e. 
Naninalisrn, was also responsible for the break down of the idea of an 
"episteroological collaboration" between HKS and ER. By raising 
perception and cognition of particulars to the status of proper 
knowledge, Naninalism praooted in the long nm the dichotcmy between 
subject and object, without being able, at the same time, to resist the 
pressure caning fran the "extro-verted" vision of the process of knowing 
to interpret perception as also subjectively detennined. If there is 
nothing in ccmnon between ER and hl.lTaIl mind, if matter has its own 
properties which have to be discovered without thinking that in the 
process of knowing the hunan mind - by actually becaning these forms -
has already acquired the mUversal forms according to which matter is 
ordered, then we seem to lack any bridge between the two kingdans of 
mind and reality. 
The possibility portraied by the Traumatic Doubt becomes an ever 
greater challenge. The full success of an "extro-verted image" of the 
process of knowing had not been possible without the cartesian schism 
between man and reality, between the necessarely subjective state in 
which the hwan mind seems now to find hersel f, and which incl udes al so 
physical perceptions, and the states of the world outside the 
antbropological "prison". It is worth noticing that if the Aristotelian 
project of canbining a "worldly mind" and a ''mentally-pervaded world" in 
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one harmonic picture faltered under the N~nalist attack, the Platonic 
metaphysics, with its separated worlds, may have helped in the 
consti tution of the final Kantian dichotany between phencmenal and 
nounenal realities. Fran Kant an we are left with the serious 
possibility that the Traumatic Doubt may turn out to be true: reality 
may be coopletely different frem what we take it to be. 
I believe that, if there is any truth in this general 
understanding of one of the directions followed by the developnent of 
the epistemological tradition, then one of the key issues in the whole 
picture beccmes the possible developrent of the distinction between 
Active and Passive Mind, in the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, into 
the concept of intentionality.34 In this way we cane to the second 
conjecture, that concerning the possibility of retracing a development 
in the evol uti an of the notion of an active mind driven by her vis 
cognoscitiva towards reality into the conception of the intentional 
property of the hunan mind of being directed towards rrental or physical 
objects. This second conjecture calls into question such a large part of 
the history of our philosophy that here, once again, I can only sketch 
its main lines. To start with, I would suggest that if the Active ~nd 
is what makes the process of knowing starting or better "moving", then 
as such the vis cognosci ti va may be seen as a part of it. Despi te the 
passive conception of perceptual knowledge, the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
tradition individuates the first spark of that carplex IOOtor that is the 
process of knowing on the hunan side of the relation, not on the 
external side of reality. We have just seen that in the long run the 
perceptual input fram outside may terndnate as merely the occasion for 
the actual generation of knowledge. The further conjecture I'd like to 
suggest is that, once the distinction between Active and Passive Mind 
34) For the terminology and a scholarly explanation of the distinction cf. again Lear 
(1988), chap. 4, sect. 4/5. 
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became ohsolete, the very sirrple idea that knowledge had its first 
primordial origin in a spontaneous, natural, inborn extro-verted effort 
of the hunan mind, was slowly inherited by the concept of 
intentionality. Same facts about the history of the development of the 
concept of intentionality are well known. On the one hand, we need to 
remarrber that a great deal of conterrporary philosophy deals with the 
concept of intentionality. The major figure in the revival of 
intentionality was Husser! and despite irrportant differences his ideas 
can be traced to Brentano. In turn, Brentano's work has its origins in 
the Scholastic concept of "intenti0" , and probabaly in his study of 
Aristotle's psychology.35 On the other hand, if we proceed fran the 
debate on the acti ve/passi ve mind towards the introduction of the 
concept of intention we notice that Averroes speaks indifferently of 
intellectus activus and vis cognoscitiv.i6; that the concept of 
"intentio" was first introduced by Durandus de Saint-Pourcain37 who was 
also one of the first medieval philosopher to refuse to admit the 
presence of a Passive Mind beside the Active Mind. The peak of this 
process was reached during the Reinassance, just before the cartesian 
Revolutim, and is represented by Francesco Patrizzi, a philosopher who 
carbined Platonism and Aristotelism. In his philosophy the idea that the 
mind, which is now only the Aristotelian Active Mind, is driven towards 
knowledge by a sort of episteroophilic inpulse, and this concept is 
joined to the notion of a desire for knowledge just for the sake of 
35) Things can be made more complex. For, Chisholm, the strongest supporter of a 
foundationalist and internalist (and therefore Neo-cartesian) approach to the analysis of 
knowledge in terms of Justified True Beliefs, has studied Brentano's philosophy (he is the 
editor of Brentano's work in English) and devoted particular attention to the possibility 
of distinguish between intentional from non-intentional phenomena (cf.Chisholm (1984)). 
And Brentano, in his turn, had devoted a particular attention to Aristotle's psychology 
and his concept of Active Mind (cf. Brentano [1977», while Husserl, on the other hand, 
was very interested in the Cartesian discovery of the cogito, as this is clear from one of 
his posthumous work. The Cartesian Meditations. An additional twist to the complex nature 
of the issue will be given in the next chapter (see also note 43 of the next chapter). 
36) Cf. Gilson [1955) pp.223-5 
37) Cf. his OUestio de Natura Cognitionis. Gilson [1985], pp.473-6 is extremely clear on 
this point, and his introduction to Durandus' thought supports my thesis (cf. also note 
66, pp.774-6). 
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knowledge and then to the concept of intentionality as "intentio 
cognoscentis in cognoscibi Ie" . 38 
If it is historically possible "to suppose that rruch of what was 
incl uded in the concept of an Active Mind had been inherited by that of 
intentionali ty, the theoretical aspects of the issue seem to confirm 
this possibility. As Brentano says: 
The cammon feature of everything psychological [ ... ] consists in 
a relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been 
called intentional; it is a relation to sametping which may not 
be actual but which is presented as an object. 
*) A suggestion of this view may be fO\IDd in Aristotle: see 
especially Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15, 1021a 29. The 
expression "intentional", I ike rrany other terms of our roore 
inportant concepts, canes fran the scholastic. ([1969], p.14, 
including note 19) 
The ccmnent39 indicates that Brentano should not be taken as saying that 
intentional objects must exist, for the objects of psychological 
attitudes need not exist. What Brentano means by an intentional property 
of our psychological activity is precisely just that sort of 
"directedness", as Husser140 will call it later, which is absolutely 
free and not determined by the actual presence of an object apprehended. 
According to Husser I : 
If an intentional experience is actual, carried out, that is, after the manner of 
the cogito, the subJect "directs" itself within it tOHards the intentional 
object. To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "91ancing-towards' the object, a 
di rectedness which froll1 another side spr i ngs forth from the "Ego", which can 
therefore never be absent. This 91ancing of the Ego towards somethin9 is in 
harmony ",ith the act involved, perceptive in perception, fanciful in fancy, 
approving in approval, volitional in volition, and so forth. (Husserl, (1969], 
p.l2l, my italics). 
And in Thomas Aquinas Aquinas we finally read the following definition: 
38) For the illlPortance of Patrizzi's work cf. Cassirer [1963], p.~34! althoug.h Cassirer 
interprets this philosopher quite differently, For Francesco PatTlZZl, cf. h1S Nova de 
Universis Philosophia, fol.31, where he says "Cogniti~ igitur ~uid n~m est sui na~ura ,? 
Videtur sane, non aliud quid esse, quam convenS10, et 1ntens10 cognoscent1s 1n 
cognoscibile, studio veritatis adipiscendae". 
39) Cf. Brentano ([1969], p.14 
40) Cf. Husserl (1969), Second Section, Second Chapte~, Paragra~h 36 and 37 ("I~t~ntional 
Experience", and "The 'directedness' of the pure Ego 1n the C091 to, and the notIc1ng that 
apprehends" ). 
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Intentio, as the name itself sounds, means "tending towards 
sanethinq else"; and so both the action of rooving and the 
roovement of what is rooved tend towards sanething (Sum. theol., 
I-II, q.12, aa.I,5;q.I,a.2).41 
From the Aristotelian epistemophilia and the Scholastic vis 
cognoscitiva, through the Renaissance's intentio cognoscentis in 
cognoscibil e, up to Descartes-Eudoxus I mabdy and Husserl' s intentional 
directness towards reality, the desire for knowledge is gradually enpted 
of its ontological aspect and becanes a one-way tension of man towards 
external reality and its knowledge, without any necessary corresponding 
roovement of real i ty towards nan. 
Let me now sumarize the content of this section. I've very 
briefly sketched the hypothesis that one of the reasons underlying the 
acceptance of the AP is the interpretation of the process of mowing as 
a way of going towards reality and the dynandc representation of the vis 
cognosci ti va as the dri vinq IOOtor of this process, present in the huren 
mind. On the basis of sane interesting evidence I hypothesized that such 
a dynamic analogy may be at work throU<}hout all our epistaoological 
tradi tion. The idea that man has a spontaneous tendency towards external 
reality and its mowledge can be recognized as inplicit both in the 
concept of an intellectus activus, and of that of intentionality. SO I 
have conjectured that there might be a continuous line of developnent 
fran the former to the latter. It seems very likely that also the 
concept of intentionality is influenced by the dynamic analogy and by 
the "extro-verted" interpretation of the genesis of the process of 
knowing. But then, as for the vis cognosci ti va, it woul d be interesting 
to investigate why there is this sort of "directedness" of 
consciousness, and especially whether "to be intentional" is a first, 
inborn characteristic of psychological states or rather a supervening 
4'iT-'Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, significat in ali quid tenderei in aliquid autem 
tendit et actio moventis et motus mobilis'. 
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and/or a constrained attitude. The shield is naturally directed towards 
the sword but its "directedness" is to be ·-..lerstood uuu as a response, 
induced by a previous action caning fran outside. The fact that 
sarething can be identified as a "shield" if and only if it is a shield 
against sanething else, or even that sanething cotmts as a shield only 
if it is in a "shield-relation" in respect to scmething else doesn't 
explain why there must be a shield at all. The same could be said about 
the intentionality of cognitive states. 
Although it would be extremely interesting to pursue the investigation much 
further, I must stop here. Any further remark would definitely fall beyond the already 
broad 1 imi ts of this chapter. I shall come back to the issue in the next chapter, to add 
same additional specifications, yet the development of the details of 
the hypothesis must be left for a future work. 
v . S CONCLUSION 
It will be remembered that the problem we started fran was the 
attempt to give a clear understanding of the prima facie Traumatic Doubt 
"reality in itself may be carpletely different fran what we take it to 
be" and of its possible solutions. In the first part of this work I 
argued that the doubt has three carponents, epistemological (lUlti-
R DIS) ontological 
ep. ' 
(R DIS) and anthropological-metaphysical 
onto 
(~27) ; that sol utions of the Perpetual Check of Reason have been 
suggested fran epistemological and fran ontological perspectives; and 
that it may be interesting to see whether also 
the 
anthropological/metaphysical side can be a pranising source of 
solutions. In this second part of the work, I've first given an analysis 
of what we may understand by the anthropological-metaphysical component, 
i.e. the Aristotelian Postulate. Then in this chapter I've discussed the 
theoretical bedrock on which the traditional acceptance of the AP may 
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lie. l've supported the objection that none of the grounds on which the 
AP has cane to be traditionally accepted as lmcontroversial really 
consitutes reasons so carpelling as to rrake us accept the AP against out'· 
ordinary evidence. At this point, the fact that none of the reasons for 
accepting the AP is really cogent against our ordinary evidence may be 
fel t to be still not a sufficient reason to make us withdraw our assent 
to the AP. It may be thought that as long as the AP remains the only 
conceivable explanation of the genesis of the process of knowing, 
perhaps we should try to find a proper justification for it. After all, 
saneone nay want to argue that, al though it has turned out to be rather 
controversial, without the assll'l'ption of the AP we are 1 eft wi th the 
serious problem of explaining real phenanena like that of philosophical 
research. A supporter of the AP may go so far as to say that if the AP 
were not true it would be impossible to explain the existence of human 
culture. The AP may be still in need of a proper epistemological 
justification, but it nay be the only explanation we have for the never-
ending search of knowledge. As such, we should stick to it. 
The answer that I'm going to articulate in the next chapter is 
that since the AP seems to apply to few men (let us call them vaguely 
the "philosophers") while in fact it renders the remaining majority of 
them - who do not desire knowledge for knowledge - an exception, then 
any alternative hypothesis should be welcome which renders the 
"philosophers" an exception and grounds its mderstanding of hunan 
nature an the majority of people. The fact that if the Aristotelian 
Postulate were abandoned we would be left with the problem of solving 
the apparent puzzle of those few cases in which nan indeed seems to 
pursue knowledge for its own sake, is not a good enough reason to nake 
. t' 11 42 us accept the AP mcn 1ca y. 
42) Methodologically this implies that som~time i~ is better to remain with a theoretical 
problem then to accept an inadequate solutlon of It. 
CHAP'I'm VI 
THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE PElU'E'IUAL CHECK OF REASON 
Fran Ignorance our Contort fl ows , 
the only wretched are the Wise 
Matthew Prior [1692]1 
V I • 1 I NTROOOCl'ION 
After the analysis of the theoretical contents of the AP and 
the discussion of the grounds on which it nay have care to be 
accepted, it is now possible to turn to the original question that 
was at stake in this second part of the investigation: whether it is 
possible to give a solution of the Trauratic Doubt by means of a 
reinterpretation of the Perpetual Check of Reason. 
Man carries on his search for knowledge largely beyond the 
!imi ts both of the acquisition of knowledge essential for his 
survival and of mere superficial curiosity. What is the origin of the 
hunan never-ending search for knowledge ? Positing a desire of 
knowledge for its own sake has been coornonly considered the best 
answer. The alleged phenanenon of epistefOOPhilia would be the ratio 
essendi of the p-knowing in so far as this latter concerns 
intellectual knowledge-why. In the first part of this work we have 
seen how the assUJption of the AP is responsible for the fomulation 
of the Traumatic Doubt as one of its three essential cooponents. 
Moreover, in the previous chapter I considered the difficulties 
created by any attempt to give an effective, compelling justification 
of the acceptance of the AP. I ended the chapter by saying that the 
only possible, final reason left for assuning the AP could be that 
1) In M. Prior [1971], pp. 108-9, lines 35/6. 
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the AP is merely supposed to be the only satisfying answer to the 
question concerning the genesis of the P-knowing. This has now to be 
counter-argued in a positive way. The methodological principle I will 
follow is that we should always prefer a ccrrpeting hypothesis that 
can (i) explain the genesis of the process of knowing, but that (ii) 
does not endorse the paradoxical cone I usion supported by the AP, 
being more consistent with our anthropological evidence. The 
al ternative perspective introduced below by the Peirceish Postulate 
can allow (i) an interpretation of the genesis of the process of 
knowing and of the huran never-ending search for }mowledge consistent 
with our ordinary evidence, (ii) an explanation of why sane rren seem 
to be real "philosophers", and finally (iii) a non-tral..lTatic and 
therefore non-problematic reading of the Perpetual Check of Reason. 
In trying to solve the Traumatic Doubt by operating on its 
anthropological side, the anthropological strategy attempts an 
alternative answer to what is the ratio essendi of the genesis of the 
P-knowing such that, contrary to AP, it is also consistent with our 
ordinary evidence and at the sarre time it does not 1 ead to the 
Perpetual Check of Reason. This is the task of this final chapter. 
The chapter consists of seven more sections. Sections 2-6 make 
up the first stage of the chapter through which the Peirceish 
Postulate (Pp) canes to be fOIlTlllated. In section 2 I discuss a 
tri vial version of the anthropological solution of the Tral..lTatic 
Doubt. The failure of this trivial version will indicate the 
direction that an anthropological strategy should take if it must be 
effective. In section 3 I begin to delineate a better fonmulation of 
the anthropological strategy fran the point of view of the dynamic 
analogy seen in V.6. I shall develop an alternative analogy between 
moving and }mowing by briefly discussing first the physical concept 
of inertia and then that 'philosophical of . inertial conatus. This 
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latter intrcxluces Section 4, where I focus on a more philosophical 
elaboration of the Peirceish Postulate. In Section 5 I deepen our 
understanding of the Peirceish Postulate by joining the hypoth~is of 
a mental inertial cooatus with the conception of a mental state of 
rest in terms of nescience. In Section 6 I insert the PP within a 
"philosophically PP-favourable environment", namely a Peirceish 
Epistemology. In section 7 I put to test the value of the PP in 
respect to both our ordinary evidence and the 'I'D. In Section 8 I pose 
six questions that constitute the theoretical task attending a 
future, articulated developnent of the hypothesis, whose value and 
importance I hope to have successfully advocated here. 
VI.2 A TRIVIAL VERSION OF THE ANTHROPOLOOICAL STRATEGY (AST ) 
As for the epistemo/antological strategies, we may expect that 
also in the case of the anthropological strategy there could be 
different proposals to solve the P.C.R. by working in different ways 
on the anthropological side of the problem. Sane of them can be very 
interesting and fruitful. In order to expose what I consider one of 
the best versions of the anthropological strategy, let me begin by 
intrcxlucing a trivial version of the argument that the 
anthropological strategy may be thought, at first, to support. 
Having seen that the AP is largely unjustified, saneone may 
want to solve the TD by el~nating its anthropological component in 
the following way (where ASr stands for "trivial anthropological 
strategy) : 
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ASr) one of the reason that causes the TO is the assl.lTFtion of the 
AP; but since it is reasonable to assune that (i) men generally do 
not not care about knowledge of the intrinsic nature of eternal 
reality just for its own sake, it follows that (ii) the assUlll>tion of 
the AP is not justified; and the abandonrrent of the AP irrplies that 
(~ii) the possibility that reality in itself may be completely 
different fran what nen take it to be (Le. the TO) is not fel t as a 
real problem by men, and hence that the TO is solved as not being a 
real probl em for men. 
AS.r is very defective as a proper sol uti on of the TD. As far as 
this latter is an interesting problem it is also left completely 
lUltouched. AS.r is stating only that roost of the time the great 
majority of people would not care about the TD. Unfortunately, whilst 
this is obvious, it adds no further insight to the debate. For ASr 
cannot correctly concI ude fran this that therefore the problan 
represented by the TO is not a real problem. Al though our ordinary 
evidence can make us suspicious about the "statistical" val idi ty of 
the AP, the key role played by the AP in the mechanism of the TO 
cannot be argued statistically, as if the whole issue could be 
reduced to different answers to the question whether or not people in 
general care about the philosophical problem of the value of hl..l'llall 
knowledge. The mere fact that roo~t of the people roost of the time 
don't care about certain problems presented by mathematics, for 
example, doesn't prove that these problems are not real problems. The 
simplest objection conang to the rrdnd is that, despite the ordinary 
evidence obtained fran the cammon attitude of the human population, 
many philosophical problems are real problems; either in the sense 
that they are real problems even if only a restricted number of 
people recognized them as such, or in the sense that in any case they 
are real problems for a certain number of people, however restricted 
this latter may be. The answer we require is one that addresses the 
problem itself, not merely the context of discovery, to use 
Reichenbach's phrase. Instead of dealing with the problem ASr merely 
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pretends to rrake it irrelevant, and this despite the fact that the 
problem has been already posed as important. 
What ASr can teach us is that the anthropological strategy must 
deal with the AP theoretically not just as a statistical report. The 
anthropological strategy must try to show not ITerely that fran an 
inductive point of view the AP is tmtenable, but that once we have 
started dealing with the general question about the relation between 
knowledge and reality, it is philosophically possible to join an 
epistemological anti-realist view with a rrUnimal ontological realism 
in a non-problamtic interpretation of the intellectual task of the 
process of Jrnowing and of the intellectual reasons governing its 
genesis. The anthropological strategy must show not that the TD is an 
irrelevant question because the AP is untenable, but that as a 
philosophical issue the TD can be solved by eliminating its 
problematicity, which is due to the assumption of the AP. 
Al though this theoretical enterprise can be carried out in 
various ways - for there is a continuous gradation of possible, more 
or less positive interpretations of the gap G occurring between ERP 
and ~ as it is produced by (Anti-Rep. DIS + Rant. DIS) - we may well 
distinguish two extreme positions within which all the others can be 
supposed to range. 
According to the weakest alternative (ASw) the possibility of 
the occurrence of G, and therefore of an ontological dualism, would 
turn out to be an unfortunate but inevi tabl e coroll ary of the nature 
of hl.l11all knowledge, a consequence we must learn to live with. It will 
be rernerrbered that this approach has been presented as Kant's in 
III.S.c. Unfortunately, ASW is not radical enough. The point can be 
briefly illustrated by referring to a certain obvious feeling of 
regret still implied in such a position. ASW seems to accept the idea 
that it would be marvellous if man could Jrnow mIl, but that, since he 
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carmot, he should accarmxiate himself within the limits of his 
knowledge. In other words, A~. still largely accepts th AP -W e , 
although, with an air of resignation, it is forced to recognize that 
the desire for knowledge of the intrinsic nature of ER is pointless 
and tmsatisfiable. A Kantian-like ASw has to be tmderstood still fran 
the perspective of a sad and yet necessary loss of realism in terms 
of identi ty between ERP and rnn. 
On the other hand, according to the strongest alternative 
(ASs), the sarre dualist outccme could be interpreted as a positive 
result. Like ASw, ASS accepts the ontological dualism. Contrary to 
ASw, ASS rejects the AP more drastically, reversing our conception of 
what a sotmd form of realism should amount to. Such a "revolutionary" 
anthropological strategy rejects the validity of the AP since it also 
rreans to shift the interpretation of what the task of knowledge is 
fram that of rrdrroring reality to that of coping with it in terms of 
"defence". ASS interprets "coping" in a very strong sense, in terms 
of whatever procedure may be successful in preserving and protecting 
a fundamentally static peace of mind. As we shall see, on this basis 
the constitution of a dualism between ERP and ERO can be interpreted 
positively, as the proper task of the process of knowing. The human 
nand would cope with external reality by trying to leave it outside 
her internal world, as much as reasonably possible. The substitution 
of the AP with a more inertially-orientated postulate is required if 
the main aim of the process of knowing at an intellectual level is to 
be no longer identified with the discovery of the intrinsic nature of 
external reality, but rather with the inertial preservation of a 
peaceful nescience. The characteristics of this manoeuvre will emerge 
more clearly as the chapter progresses. 
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VI.3 THE LAW OF INERTIA AND THE ANALOOlCAL-DYNAHIC INTERPRETATION 
OF THE GENETIC PRINCIPLE OF THE P-KNClrHNG 
We have already seen that one of the central assmptions in the 
history of epistemology rrdght have been the analogical conception of 
knowing as a sort of spontaneous motion of HKS towards ER. Fran this 
perspective the AP rrdght have found a possible justification insofar 
as it presents the vis cognoscitiva as a sort of internal motor of 
this process, as the dynamic, "extro-verted" driving force that would 
render htman knowledge possible by activating and addressing the 
cogni ti ve processes. The first propaedeutic step towards the 
developnent of ASs consists in a reworking of this analogical 
reasoning. We could follow the introduction of the concept of inertia 
in the dynamics of bodies in order to int>rove our understanding of 
the "dynamics" of knowing. In the same way as the Aristotel ian 
Physics - in terms of natural places, spontaneous and violent 
movements and of motion as a process - has been replaced by a 
Newtonian Physics of inertial states, so the dynamic image of the 
principle of the genesis of the P-knowing (vis cognoscitiva) could be 
replaced by an inertial conception of the same (inertial canatus). 
Since sirrdlar analogical reasonings are very often rrdsleading, 
especially in philosophy, we need to be generally prudent about their 
adoption. SUpporting a transforrratian in the conception of the 
process of knowing and of its genesis sil1'Ply on an analogical basis 
nay be judged an erroneous procedure. Methodologically, it is highly 
questionable to proceed by describing an analogy between A and B, 
then drawing sane further conclusions in respect to B, and finally to 
came back to A in order to apply the same conclusions in the same way 
within a ccrrpletely different context. However, such a concern for 
the use of the analogy-as-justificatian is misplaced in respect to 
the use of the analogy-as-heuristic device that I'm proposing in this 
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context.2 All I'm suggesting is that if the analogy knowing/rooving 
has any value, then this lies in its ability to provoke the thought 
that what has happened in physics could also happen in the "dynamics" 
of knowing. The shi ft fran a natural irrpetus to a static force may 
lead us to investigate the possibility of a similar shift in our 
understanding of the genetic principle of the P-knowing, fran a 
dynamic vis cognoscitiva to an inertial conatus. The great advantage 
of errploying analogies, colourful images or metaphors is that as 
heuristic devices can be very helpful as means of sugesting new lines 
of research. We only need to bear in mind that, in the present as in 
the next section, we are working with a mere "analogical" suggestion. 
This will open the way to a further, more theoretical analysis of the 
proposal so introduced. 
In order to operate the shift in the analogical conception of 
the genetic principle of the P-knowing I need to touch, though as 
briefly as possible, on the thought of Ockam, Buridan and Newton in 
relation to the conceptual development of the inertial interpretation 
of physical JOOtion. I will later consider this interpretation fran 
the point of view of Spinoza, frem which the thoughts of the other 
philosophers will appear as components of one, larger mosaic. 
VI. 3. a OCKHAM'S RAZOR 
In V.2 I said that my policy against the vis cognoscitiva would 
have followed the econanic principle implicit in Ockarn's razor. Ockarn 
was actually the first philosopher who radically criticised the 
Aristotelian physics of natural JOOvements, and I believe that, 
2) For this-terminol~gical distinction cf. Ruse [1986], pp.31-37. Ruse quotes Mill who 
states the point very clearly: " [ ... ] there is no analogy, how:ver faint, which may 
not be of the utmost value in suggesting experiments or observatlons that may lead to 
more positive conclusions ([1884J, p.368)". 
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mutatis mutandis, what he says about the Aristotelian natural and 
spontaneous forces can be easily applied also to the conception of a 
vis cognascitiva. According to Crombie [1959]: 
It has been claimed [ ... ] that by rejecting the basic 
Aristotelian principle expressed by the phrase Qme quod 
movetur ab alio movetur, Ockham took the first step towards 
the principle of inertia which was to revolutionize physics of 
the 17th century. certainly by asserting the possibility of 
rrotion tmder the action of no motive power, a possibility 
formally excluded by the Aristotelian principle, Ockam opened 
the way to the principle of inertia and to the 17th-century 
definition of force as that which alters the state of rest or 
uniform velocity, in other words that which produces 
acceleration (p.78). 
It is worth reporting a passage fran Ockham quoted by Cranbie 
(ibidem, p.77) for it deepens our understanding of the analogy 
rrotion/knowing: 
I say therefore that which moves (ipsum mavens) in motion of 
this kind, after the separation of the moving body fran the 
original projector, is the body rroved by itself (ipsum motum 
secundt.m se) and not by any power in it or relative to it 
(virtus ahsoluta in eo vel respectiva), for it is inpossible 
to distinguish between that which does the moving and that 
which is moved (movens et mottrn est peni tus indistinctum) 
[ ... ]"*. 
Ockham's Cannentary on the Sentences, book 2, question 26, M, 
quoted by Crombie 
*)[Crambie's note] Translated fram the Latin text published by 
Anneliese Maier, Zwei Gnmdproblane der Scbolastischen 
Naturphilosopbie, Rome, 1951, pp.157-158. 
As Crambie informs us, Ockam arrplifies this conception with an 
application of the principle of economy in the so-called Tractatus de 
SUccessivis edited by Boehner, asserting in part I (p.45): 
'~otion is not such a thing wholly distinct in itself fram the 
pennanent body, because it is futile ,~o use more entities w~en 
it is possibl e to use fewer [ ... ] (Ockam, quoted by CrombIe, 
ibidem, p. 77). 
Al though Ockham presents only a destruens criticism, we can 
take him to have al ready I aid down the possibi I i ty of managing 
without any metaphysical force in the explanation of motion.3 And 
3)"1-believe ockham would not be happy with the .subst.itution ?f ~he Aristoteli~n 
forces and tendencies with the Newtonian force of Inert1a ~s th1S is underst?od 1n 
Newton's manuscripts (see below), which to ?ckham may st,lll s~e~ rat~er llke .an 
entification of a mere potentiality. The read1ng of Ockham s posltlon I m endOrSIng 
here is rather in line with Newton's Principia. 
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this position, if we rely on the analogy motion/knowing, already 
amounts to an elirrdnation also of the vis cognoscitiva as a necessary 
driving rootor of the process of knoWing, Along the line of the 
analogy knowing/moving, we can expand Ockarn's criticism, relative to 
the field of the physical conception of motion, to the understanding 
of the genetic principle of the P-knowing. And accordingly, we can 
already imagine that, together with the virtus absoluta or respectiva 
in physics, also the vis cognoscitiva could be replaced by a lOOre 
inertial principle. We can begin conceiving of the genetic principle 
of the P-Jmowing in terms of an inertial tendency of HKS' rrdnd which 
would persist in its state until a change, brought by an external 
action of ER on it, occurs. 
The study of dynamics, however, and with it we may imagine the 
analogy between moving and knowing, did not develop imnediately in 
this way. 
VI. 3. b BURIDAN'S IMPE'IUS 
For, notwithstanding Ockham's radical critique of Aristotelian 
physics, Jean Buridan was the one who produced the most influential 
new dynarrnc theory in the 14th centurf, consisting in his theol;"y of 
impetus. This was still based on the Aristotelian principle that what 
moves ITIlSt have been moved by scrnething else. It was still the notion 
of virtus impressa that played the central role in the explanation of 
persistent and accel erated motion of bodies. As he wrote': 
"Therefore it seEmS to Ire that we must concl ude that a mover, 
in rooving a body, irrpresses an it a, certain ,inpet,us a, cert~in 
paoler capable of IOOving this body ,ln ,the dlre,ctlon l.n w~ch 
the IOOver set it going [ ... ]. this lJ"('petUS lS an endunng 
thing (res naturae permanentis), distinct fran local rootion, 
4) Cf. still Crombie [1959J, p.SO. 
5) Ouaestiones super Octo Ubros Physicorum, Book 8, question 12, quoted by Crombie 
[1959J, p,81. 83. 
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by which the projectile is moved [ ... ] And it is probable that 
this irrpetus is a quality designed by nature to IOOve the boc1y 
on which it is irrpressed [ ... ]". 
The cause must be commensurate with the effect and so Buridan 
believes that the mover il1i'resses on the moved body a certain 
inFetus, a IOOtive power by which this latter continues to IOOve tmtil 
affected by the action of other independent forces. Buridan's theory 
of impetus represents the final result of the Aristotelian physics. 
As such, it is still far fram the notion of inertia, but it deserves 
to be rrentioned for two reasons. 
On the one hand Buridan's conception of the inpetus, together 
with what has been said about Ockham's polemic attack against his 
conterrporaries, makes still more plausible the idea that the 
interpretation of the "dynamics" of the P-knowing has been indeed 
tailored for centuries on that of physical bodies, according to the 
idea of a spontaneous Jrovement produced by sane internal driving 
force. Vis cognoscitiva, intentio, virtus absoluta or respecti va , 
virtus inpressa and inpetus really seem to belong to the same mental 
framework, to a theoretical perspective that lacks precisely the 
concept of inertia in the interpretation of pbysical dynamicJ and so 
in the analogical interpretation of the "dynamics" of the process of 
knowing. As long as nature has been conceived rich of intrinsic 
powers that make things roove, provokes changes, and modify potential 
states into actual ones, it is not surprising that the p-knowing, 
once it was interpreted as a sort of motion, should also be 
interpreted as due to an internal rootor, driving man towards the 
final end of omniscience. 
On the other hand, Buridan's theory proves that - apart fran 
Ockham's intuition - tmtil the 17th century the cannon understanding 
of physical rootion was grounded in Aristotle, that is until that 
6) For the presence of a biological version of the law of inertia in Classic and 
Medieval thought and the problem this may raise see below 4.c. 
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revolutionary period which goes fran Descartes', through Galilei's, 
to Newton's researches. We shall see in a moment that echoes of the 
'Aristotelian physics and of Buridan' s theory of inpetus are 
recognizable even in the first of Newton's expositions of the law of 
inertia. The absence of a fully elaborated concept of inertia first, 
and then the slow appreciation of its importance within the analogy 
between IOOving and knowing later, may have contributed to the 
rraintenance, still in m:x:lern philosophy, of the well established 
picture of the genesis of the process of knowing as due to a dynamic, 
extro-verted vis cognoscitiva. 
VI .3. C NEWl'ON' S LAW OF INERTIA 
The final overthrow of the Aristotelian interpretation of 
IOOtion is linked with the publication of Newton's Principia, where 
the first law (or law of inertia) states that: 
Every hOOy continues in its state of rest or tmiformed IOOtion 
in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state 
by forces inpressed upon i e . 
This law was subject to many reformulations, as we discover 
fran Newton's manuscripts. It is extrenely important that we take 
into consideration the previous versions of the law of inertia8 
because in his manuscripts we find Newton using vari ous terrrs to 
express the force of inertia that are very significant and have 
important consequences for the roodification of the analogy 
knowing/rooving, roodifications at which I'm aiming at in this chapter. 
I shall divide my observations into two groups and develop the second 
7) 'Corpus omn~ perseverare in statu suo quiesciendi vel movendi uniformiter in 
directum, nisi quatenus illud a viribus impressis cogitur sta.tuu~ suum mutare' (Newton 
(1972), vol.I ('Axiomata sive Leges Motus', Lex I), p.54, my Ital:cs). 
8) Cf. Herivel (1965), pp.26-28 which refers to Newton's Hanus~fl.ptS: MS.V.I, Oef.5 and 
Oef. 8; MS.IXa, Def. 2, Def.12, Oef.13; MS.Xb, Oef.3; MS.XI (OrIgInal verSIon), Def.5. 
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at length in the next section, for it finally lies within a 
philosophical debate of the issue. 
In Newton's manuscripts we find a terminology very close to 
that we have already encountered in the descriptions of the 
dynamic/epistem:>philic irrpulse9 . Since Herivel [1965] has expressed 
this point very clearly let me quote it at length: 
A cursory examination of these [previous] definitions [of the 
I aw. of inertia in Newton's manuscripts] reveal s nothing of 
particular interest beyond the obvious identity of the various 
terms vis insita, vis cor,poris, vis inertiae, or inertia [that 
Newton uses indiscriminatel y] . Achni ttedl Y , there is the 
qualification of this force fran .MS.Xa onwards as a power by 
which the inertial state of rest or motion is maintained, and 
fran MS.Xb onwards this power becanes a power of resistance. 
But a closer eXarrUnation of Newton's description of the 
circumstances 1.n1der which this power is exercised reveals a 
remarkabl e transi tion in his view of vis i~.tg. or ineI.ti9. Up 
to and including MS.Xa this is the force or power by virtue of 
which a body maintains its inertial state of rest or lOOtion; 
in vulgar parlance, the inpetus of the body, as noted in Def. 
13 of MS. Xa. [my italics] . That this was Newton's actual 
bel ief is confirmed by the corresponding enunciation of the 
principle of inertia, each of which contains a reference to 
~ .. j~i~. In HS.Xa occurs the first hint of an irrpending 
transition in his thought. There he states that the vis insita 
is exercised in proportion to the change in state. In HE.Xb 
the transitioo is carplete. Now the .Y~.~.lit is exercised 
only (soll.l1'JOOdQ) in changes of state. It would seem, 
therefore, to have been reI egated to a species of 1?.!2t.e.nti.al 
force, having no effect as long as the state of rest or of 
tmifonn IOOtion cootinued, being called into action only in 
changes of states. [my italics] That this was indeed Newton's 
new view of the matter is proved conclusively by the absence 
of any reference to vis insi ta in the emmciation of the 
principle of inertia from MS.Xb onwards. In these manuscripts 
we therefore have before us the record of how Newton, on 
reflection, freed 1rirt5elf fran what was apparently his 
previous, essentially medieval belief in the necessity of sane 
interior force or iJq:letus to maintain an inertial state of 
uniform lOOtioo. [my italics] From now on such a state of 
rrotion (or rest) was a true state. in. the car:tesi~ sense, 
entirely self-sufficient, and the prlnclple of lnertl~ a true 
principle, scmething which had to.be regarded ~. glven, a 
natural fact, having no explanahan and reqt1lnng none. 
(pp.27-28, ~ italics, all the underlining in the text). 
9) For more precise information, also on Newton's use of "vis insita" in previus 
formulations of his law of inertia see Herivel [1965], pp.1-64 and Cohen [1971], 
PP.62-68. 
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It is exactly in the transition fran the Manuscripts to the 
Principia that the Aristotelian qualitative and vital cosmos of 
spontaneous forces is definitely lost in favour of a roore formalized, 
inertial universe. Such a transition can also represent the locus 
where a dynarrdc and extro-verted conception of the mental conatus is 
replaced by a more inertial one. 
VI .4 SPINOZA' S CONA'IUS AND THE PHILOSOPHIC'AL INERTIAL INTERPRETATIOO 
OF THE GENErIC PRINCIPLE OF THE P-KNCMING. 
Both in his Manuscripts and in the Principia, Newton uses the 
term canatus to describe the force or tendency - otherwise called vis 
insita, vis corporis, vis inertiae, or inertiJO - that regulates 
every body. The difference is that in the ~uscripts he still uses 
it with the sense we have already encountered in the fonnulation of 
the Aristotelian postulate. Within the context of a dynamic 
interpretation of the -vis cognoscitiva, "canatus" is associated to 
the notion of a spontaneous tendency to reach or achieve a certain 
state. At this proposal it is worth noticing that the Latin term 
"conor", fran which canatus derives, means also "to atterrpt to go" 
and "to exert oneself", fran where my use of "extro-vert" is derived 
in order to define the tendency of the vis cognoscitiva. In the 
Principia Newton uses the verb "conor" in order to express the new 
concept of a vis inertiae, no longer a vis motrix. "Conatus" 
10) HS.VI, Def. 6: "COn8tu~. est. vis impedita sive vi~ ~uaten~s resisi~ur" (quoted b~ 
Herivel (1965), p.52, my Ital1cs)j De Hotu, Def.2. Et VIm corpOrlS seu corpor! 
insitam (appello] qua id conatur perseverare in motu suo secundum lineam rectam" 
(quoted by Cohen [1971], p.66, my italics). As it is clear from the Latin quotation of 
the law from the Principia, Newton still employs the verb-form of conatus (i.e. 
conatur) in the final version of the Principia. It is also worth noticing that Cohen 
[1971] makes exactly the same remarks about the possibility of translating vis insita 
or vis insUa lfIateriae in terms of "'naturally inborn', and hence 'innate' or even 
natural' as commonly used even in classical Latin" (ibidem, p.67) that I've made about 
the phusei-clause in Aristotle's dictum. 
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eventualy refers to a desire for the maintenance of the status quo. 
It is the shift in Newton's use of this term that bridges the 
analogical reasoning to a more "phi I osophical understanding of the 
inertial interpretation of the genetic principle of the P-knowing. 
For "conatus" as a vis inertiae is an irrportant technical expression 
in the Spinozian system. So much that - with an eye to the 
philosophical debate - its new sense may be called "post-Spinozian". 
Conatus appears for the first time with a post-Spinozian sense in 
Newton's Prinicpia, as an inertial tension to maintain a certain 
state. The passage fram the manuscripts to the Principia is precisely 
the theoretical place where the shift between the two conceptions of 
"conatus" occurrs. Through this shift in the conception of the mental 
conatus we can try to introduce the law of inertia also into our 
understanding of the "dynamics" of knowing. Still on a mere 
analogical ground, the human genetic principle of the P-knowing could 
beccme (although not necessarily, see section VI. 4. c) a desire to 
maintain the status quo ante of a certain peace of ndnd, a desire to 
avoid any puzzling and mentally unpleasant cognitive situation. Man 
would continue in a state of intellectual nescience if it were not 
because external reality compels him to be involved in the process of 
knowing, beyond the limits of knowledge essential for survival or 
merely superficial curiosity. As far as the irrprovenent of already 
elaborated R-knowledge is concerned, the p-knowing would stop as soon 
as the general target of an acceptable restoration of the status quo 
ante is achieved. 
Al though still vague, this possible alternative to the AP has 
already a sanewhat Peircean flavour. And I will finally turn to 
Peirce to provide it with an epistemological background. For the time 
being, however, our interest in such a hypothesis can be reinforced 
by considering Spinoza's philosophical conception of canatus. 
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V I • 4 . a A PHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF SPINOZA' S CONA'lUS 
It is well known that the doctrine ot' the conatus, "the very 
nerve of Spinoza's doctrine of action and passion,,11, plays an 
extremely iJ1lX)rtant role in Spinoza's philosophy12. He states and 
discusses it at length in propositions VI/IX of his Ethic;3: 
P. VI) Everything, in so far as it is in i tsel f , endeavours 
[canatur] to persist in its own being. [ ... ] 
P.VII) The endeavour [conatusJ, wherewith everything 
endeavours to persists in its own being, is nothing else but 
the actual essence of the thing in question. [ ... ] 
P. VI I I ) The endeavour [ cana tus], whereby a thing endeavours 
[canatur] to persist in its being, involves no finite time, 
but an indefinite time. [ ... ] 
P. IX) The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct 
ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours 
[canatur] to persist in its being for an indefinite period, 
and of this endeavour [conatus] is conscious. [ ... J 
(Spinoza [1951], vol. II, pp.136-137).14 
There are three principal ways of understanding such a notion 
of canatus. All of them are relevant to our present task. 1S 
The first posible interpretation of "conatus" is by means of 
the closeness between it and the principle of inertia. According to 
this "physical interpretation", we have al ready seen that in Newton 
the canatus of an entity can be understood in terms of that entity's 
inertial tendency to maintain its present state of rrotion or rest 
11) Martineau [1883], p.237. 
12) Cf. for example what is said by Boscherini [1977), p.98, or by Curley [1988], 
chapter II I . 
13) These are the most classical reference of Spinoza's theory of conatus, although a 
first introduction of the theory is in Ethics II, Proposition XIII, Corollary to Lemma 
3 and was first mentioned in the work Principles of Descartes' Philosophy (see below). 
According to Martineau [1883], p.237, note 3 the origin of the doctrine of conatus was 
first pointed out to be in Cogitata Metaphysics, II, 6, sub fin. by Trendelemburg's 
Hist. Beitr. Iur Phil., II, p.82. 
14) "(p,vI) Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est. in suo esse perseverar~ ~onatur, [ .. ,J 
(P.VII) Conatu5, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nIhIl ~st praeter 
ipsius rei actualemessentiam. C ... ] (,P,VIII) Cona~us, ~u~ una~uaequ~res In suo esse 
per sever are conatur, nullum tempus fl ni tum, sed 1 ndefl nl tum 1 nvol v~ t. ( .. ,J (P, I~) 
Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas, quam ~uatenus co~fusas ,habet Ideas, conatu: !n 
suo esse perseverare indefinita QUadam,dur~tlone, et hU1US SUl conatus est conSCla . 
(Spinoza [1913], vol.I, pp.127-128, my ItalICS). . ' 
15) A clear understanding of the complexity and ampl1tude of the concept of conatus In 
Spinoza can be firstly gained by consuItin,g the ~exicon Spinozanum (Boscheri~i 
[1970]) The three different senses that I pOlnt out ln the text are the three maIn 
labels ~nder which the entrances of 'conatus" there listed can be grouped, 
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\ll1changed \ll1l ess acted upon by an external force. This is the idea of 
conatus as "conatus ad motllll".16 Obviously, once the interpretation 
of the genetic principle of the P-Jmowing is given in terms of 
conatus then this latter bridges the genesis of dynamic states and 
that of the P-knowing on an unique basis. The "physical 
interpretation" of the theory of conatus, either as a dynamic or as 
an inertial genetic principle, is what I've supposed underlies our 
view of the nature of the P-knowing and of its genesis.17 The fact 
that the concept of conatus has deep roots in the interpretation of 
the dynamics of bodies canes as no surprise and confirms once more 
the strict relation between interpretation of the process of knowing 
and that of the process of motion. 
The two concepts, however, should not be sinply identified.18 
Spinoza himself recognized that the conatus se IrDvendi was only a 
limi ted interpretation of the concept of conatus and that this latter 
referred to scrnething more than the law or the nature of motion. 19 
The most irrportant of the differences for us, is that the canatus of 
sc.mething is to be understood as a more general principle whereby 
everything endeavours to maintain its own being. It is only when this 
being is interpreted in tenns of physical states of motion or rest 
that then the conatus becares a rrere translation of the force of 
inertia. Futherroore, generally speaking the notion of conatus implies 
a resistance, a power of opposition, alroost a dialectic of 
16) ·Per 'Conatum ad molum' non intellegimus aliquam cogitationem ~ed t~ntum, q~od 
pars materiae ita est sita, et ad motum incitata, ut revera ess~t allquo Itura, .s~ a 
nulla causa impediretur· Spinoza's Principles of Descartes' Phllosophy, proposIt1on 
III, definition III. . . . ., , 
17) We find a similar use of ·conatus· in the descrIptIon of dynamIC sta~es 1n ~lCO s 
De Antiquissima Italorum SapienUa 1.I.c3i Leib.niz's ~e Vera H~thodo Phllosophlae et 
Theologiee in Opera Phil osophiea , pp.11l; and flnally 1n Hobbes 0:- cor~ore c.1S.a.2. 
Notably, this latter was very influential for the development of Spinoza s thought. 
18) Cf. Lecrivain [1986], pp.46-48. . 
19) This in Cogitata Metaphysica, 1, 6, where SpInoza draw~ an analogy betw7en 
Descartes' first law of nature and the eonatus of sel:-p~e~erva~lon. A~out the m~aOlng 
of ·conatus ad motum· or ·conatus se movendi· cf. Prlnclpla Phllosophlae Carteslanae, 
III, Def. 3. (Quoted by Wolfson [1934], p.201). 
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contraries, whereas the principle of inertia, from an Oc~st point 
of view, can be considered a conservative attitude of things, a pure 
potentiality. 
VI. 4. b A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SPINOZA'S CONATUS 
The very close sirrrilarity between Spinoza's concept of conatus 
and Newton's principle of inertia raises an historical question: why 
do we find the exposition of this latter anticipated by ten years?° ? 
A siITple answer is that both Spinoza's conatus and Newton's inertia 
have a ccmron source in Descartes' pioneering work. This further 
insight in the history of the concept would not be relevant to the 
present investigation if it were not that it raises further problems 
for the approach I've adopted. Let me proceed gradually by first 
laying down the historical facts. 
Descartes had introduced a very similar formulation of the 
principle of inertia in his Principia Phi 1 osophiae/1 as a special 
case of a general philosophical principle rrcirroring the immutability 
of God.22 As Herivel [1965] has definitively argued, Newton's first 
enunciation of the principle of inertia in MS.II Axioms 1 and 2 were 
20) $pinoza's fthica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata was published postumous. the same 
year of Spinoza's death, in 1677 (cf. Spinoza (1951], vol. I, p.xxi), while Newton's 
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Hathematica were published in 1687. Cf. again 
Lecrivain (1986], pp. 46-48 for a critical acceptance of the similarity from a 
Cartesian point of view. 
21) "I.Any particular thing, in so far as it is simple and undivided, remains always 
to the best of its ability in the same state, nor is ever changed (from this state] 
unless by external causes. II. If [a body] is at rest we do not believe it is ever s~t 
in motion unless it is impelled thereto by some [external] cause. Nor that there 1S 
any more ~eason if it is moved, why we should think that it would ever of its own 
accord, and unimpeded by anything else, interrupt this motion." Descartes [1984], pp. 
177-291, Art. 37, Part II. 
22) From the perspective of the Newtonian studies H~rive~ [1965] ~cc~p~s th~t the ~ost 
important statement of the law of inertia is that gIven .In the Prlncl~la ~hllosoph~ae, 
published in 1644. Whereas, according to the perspectIve of the S.Plnoz1an stud1es, 
Lecrivain [1986], p.46 stress that Descar~es had already estabhshed the law of 
inertia in 1633, in The lJorld: An Essay on Llght. 
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directly taken fran Descartes' work.23 As for Spinoza, in 1663 he had 
published a work entitled Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae, where 
we can find the same Cartesian principle discussed by Spinoza under 
the probl em of the causes of rootion and the laws of its 
cCllmJIlication.24 This is sufficient to settle the question as far as 
the historical nature of the theory of canatus is concerned. 
As I said, however, this answer I eads to a further chain of 
philosophical questions. If the concept of an inertial principle was 
well }mown before Newton, isn't possible that it was also known to 
ancient or medieval philosophers? And if it was known, why didn't 
they ever apply it to the analysis of the genesis of the P-knowing ? 
Are we sure that the inertial interpretation of the genesis of the P-
knowing was not a hypothesis al ready attempted and perhaps dismissed 
by ancient philosophers as merely unfruitful ? These questions raise 
the suspicion that the hypothesis I've been following up to here may 
be wrong. Before answering these suspicions in section 4.c, we should 
consider a second perspective fran which we can appraise Spinoza's 
theory of conatus. This perspective is ''biological''. This will also 
help to articulate the interpretative difficulty better. Al though 
ancient philosophers had a biological lD1derstanding of the law of 
inertia, they never employed it to criticize the Aristotelian 
Postulate. 
The ''biological'' interpretation, held e.g. by Kristeller [1984] 
among others, refers to the principle of canatus as to 
( ... ] nothing else but (sic] the (vital) irrpulse of self-
preservation (bonne) which occupies a central place in the 
stoic system of ethics* (Kristeller, [1984], p.S) 
*) [Kristeller's note] stoicorun Vetenrn Fragmenta, ed. H. von 
Arnim, stuttgart, 1964, III, p.43, fr.178, p.44, fr.183. 
23) See Herivel [1965], chapters 1 and especially 2 ("The. Influence" of Galileo. and 
Descartes on Newton's Dynamics"). In chapter 3, p.54, Herlvel sa~s It seems llkely 
that Newton's fi rst views on conatus or endeavour resulted from hIS study of Parts 2 
and 3 of Descartes' Principia Phi 1 osophiae. " 
24) Spinoza's Principles of Descartes' Philosophy II, Proposition XIV. 
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By referring to the Stoic concept of "honne''', Kristeller is 
once roore confirming the hypothesis followed in this chapter. For a 
fragment in Von Arnim [1964], II, 458, defines "home'" as "the first 
movement [kinesis] of the soul towards or away fran sanething". The 
instinct of self-preservation {"oikeiosis"} is only a particular kind 
of "honne '" .25 
A very interesting reconstruction of the whole connection 
between the biological aspect of the principle of conatus and that of 
natural appetite or self-preservation has been given by Wolfson 
[1934] .26 As he says, at the level of biology the principle of self-
preservation was well known in the antiquity. In a very schem3.tic 
list we have the principle stated: 
- by the stoics: "an aniwa I first irrpulse (hormen, appetitionern) 
[ ... ] is to sel f-preservation" ;27 
- by Cicero, according to whan this view is nothing IOOre than a 
repeti tion of Peripatetic view: "Every natural organism aims at 
{ vul t} being its own preserver" ;28 
and then in the middle age 
- by Augustine "all things in nature wish to exist (se esse velle) or 
to conserve their existence (suun [ ... ] esse conseurent),,;29 
- by Tharas Aquinas, "every natural thing aims at [appetit] self-
conservation" ;30 
_ by Duns Scotus, "every natural being desires (appetit) with a 
t OO 0 t e" .31 natural desire to con lnue 1n eX1S enc , 
25) Cf 0 Pembroke (1971]. . , .. . 
26) Cf. Woflson (1934), pp. 195-208. A large part of the informatIon I m gIVIng In the 
o k Itho h thO 0 completely extraneous to the more general text comes from thIS wor ,a ug IS IS 
framework within which they are inserted. 0 • 
27) Oiogenes Laertius Oe Vitis Dogmatibus et Apophthegmatlbus Clarorum Phllosophorum, 
VII, 85. 
28) De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, IV, 7, sect. 16. 
29) De Civitate Dei, XI, 27. 
30) Quaestiones Oisputatae de Potentia, Ouaest. V, art. I, 13. 
32) Ouestiones in Libros Physicorum, Lib.I, Quaest. 22, No.6. 
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- by Dante, "everything which exists desires (appetat) its own 
existence" .32 
- by Tel esius , who sirrUlarly sets forth self-preservation as that at 
which all things aim (appetens). 33 
So that it is reasonable to conclude with Wolfson that: 
At the time of Spinoza the principle of sel f-preservation 
became a canoonplace of popular wisdan, so rrruch so that in the 
Hebrew collection of senoons by his teacher Rabbi Saul Levi 
Morteira, one of the senoons begins with the statement that 
"Nature, roother of all created beings, has irrplanted in them a 
~ill and ilTi'ulse to strive for their self-preservation"* 
) [Wolfson's note] Gibe' at Sba'ul, XVIII. 
(Wolfson [1934], p.196. 
Admdttedly, there is a close sirrdlarity between Spinoza's 
conatus and the principle of self-preservation. And again there is 
rrore than one aspect of such sirrdlarity that deserves our attention. 
The first observation that is worth making concerns a terminological 
question. still following Wolfson's interpretation, we are informed 
that: 
In all the quotations [given above], it will have been noticed 
that, self-preservation is spoken of as a sort of wish or will 
or desire expressed by such tenns as vult, velIe and appetit. 
These terms may be all traced to the Greek bonne which is used 
in the passage before. But bonne, as we shall see, can also be 
translated by canatus. (Wolfson [1934], p.196)34 
If now we recall that Aristotle used the term borme as a 
negligent form for orexis and orexis is the noun for oregontai, the 
tenm occurring in Aristotle's dictum, then we may recognize a further 
connection, al though feebl e, between Spinoza' s conatus interpreted as 
home - that is as a sel f-preserving tension - and the Aristotelian 
fundamental striving for knowledge. In both cases the theory attempts 
to individuate an original force or source of actions.35 Both authors 
32) De Monarchia, I, 13 (or 15). 
33) De Rerum Naturae, IX, 3, beginning. 
34) Wolfson supports this translation by referring to Cicero's De Natura Deorul1I, II, 
22, sect.S8; II, 47, sect. 122; and to Hobbes' Leviatha~, I, 6., , 
35) Things are made even more complicated by taking into conSIderatIon what ~olfs~n 
says about the closeness between conatus, horllle, and n~tural love ~ Splnoza s 
t 1 k L' fd) e l'bl'd·~ P 197 The issue is connected WIth the PlatonIC concept na uur y e 1 e e, se 'Pm.. , , 
of eros, but unfortunatelY it cannot be investigated further In thIS context, 
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are, so to say, working an the same point at the same level. Indeed, 
we shall see in a m::rnent that a particular ~aning of conatus in 
5pinoza is very close to the vis cognoscitiva of'the AP. 
Another observation I wish to make concerns the relation 
between the stoic bonne, above ~tioned by Kristeller I and the 
concept of conatus. Al though the former applies only to anirrals, 
while the latter to whatever exists,36 there is a strang dynamic 
interpretation present also in the stoic doctrine of bonne. So the 
main difference between the Stoic bonne and Spinoza' s conatus has 
very lTllch to do with the "physical" origin of the idea of conatus as 
an inertial force,37 in contrast to the IOOre "biological" 
understanding of the Stoic bonne. To be added to our general 
understanding of the issue is the stoic doctrine according to which 
there is also a strict connection between the concept of botIDe and 
that of apatheia, or freedem frem passions. At the rocment this is 
nothing more than a hint, but its relevance to the whole discussion 
of the AP will be clearer below, when I discuss the IOOre intellectual 
notion of ataraxia'S in pyrronhism. 
The last irrportant observation worth making in this context 
concerns the association generally occurring between the idea of a 
conatus-borme and the denial of the presence of a natural desire for 
self-destruction. This latter is seen as the mere counter-part of the 
former, and it is already stated by Cicero and Diogenes Laertius. 39 
36) ibidem, p.199-200. . 
37) This is only in part Wolfson's opinion, for he rather tends to connect thIS 
aspects with some sort of pantheism and vitalism present in Spinoza and other previous 
authors like Telesius and Campanella, ibidem, p.200-1. 
38) The common tendency is to maintain almost an identity between the two c~ncep~s. of 
apathia and that of ataraxia, cf. for example Dal Pra [1975J pp.74-80, that IdentIfIes 
apathia, ataraxia, and Zeller (1962J, p.525, note 1, who iden~ifies under one concept 
aphasia, akatalepsia, epoche, arrepsia, and agnosia (for thIS term see b~low) tes 
alethes. In this context I shall follow this common tendency, although I belleve that 
the first state enjoyed by a mind is one of apathia ('apatheos' = 'unaffected' 
"healthy' "not suffering or having suffered' 'without experience') and only a mature 
mind can ~njoy one of ataraxia ("calmness', "impassiveness from something') after she 
has positively reacted against external reality. 
39) De Finibus, III, 5, sect. 16; and De Vitis, VII, 85. 
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In Spinoza it has an irrportant place in Prop. IV and V of the Ethics. 
In a metaphysical reading of the process of knowing this 
specification is of vi tal illl>ortance for understanding the mental 
conatus as a resistance against the alienating pressure that external 
reality can exercise on the rrdnd itself. Such alienation, in terms of 
the stoic allotriosis, would amount to nothing more than rrdnd loosing 
her own nature because of the acquisition of "extraneous" 
characteristics.40 
V I . 4 . c A MENTAL I NTERPREI'ATION OF SPINOZA' S CONA'IUS 
Both the physical and the biological readings of the conatus 
cast a clear light on the last possible interpretation of Spinoza' s 
doctrine, namely the "mental" interpretation, which is also the most 
important for the task of developing an anti-Aristotelian Postulate. 
According to a certain interpretation of the mental conatus, the 
human rrnnd would be governed by an inertial tendency to remain in a 
state of nescience as long as external reality doesn't force her into 
the process of knowing. 41 In order to articulate this position, I 
need to deal with the interpretative problem that arose above. 
40) The issue i; strictly connected with the Aristotel ian-Scholastic hypothesis of 
isomorphism and Cusanus-Chisholm's criticism of it (cf. Chisholm [1964], (now in 
[1982], pp. 177-178) to which I've already referred in chap. III. 
41) An interesting aspect of the issue is the strict relation between Spinoza's 
concept of conatus and Freud's concept of libido. As Hampshire [1956] says: 'There is 
an evident parallel between Freud's conception of libido and Spinoza's conatu5. The 
importance of the parallel, which is rather more than superficial, is that both 
philosophers conceive emotional life as based on a universal unconscious drive or 
tendency to self-preservation; both maintain that any frustration of this drive must 
manifest itself in our conscious life as some painful disturbance.' (p .107). On the 
other hand, Hessing [1977J informs us that 'Freud's teacher, Franz Brenlano 'was 
engaged in writing a treatise on psychological methods which anticipated many of 
Freud's latter ideas, in particular Freud's emphasis of the i ntenti onal, or meani ng 
content of an individual's action as the central focus of psychological inquiry.' 
(Hessing is quoting Reeves [1976J in his 'Freud's relation with Spinoza' (p.230)). 
Obviously the whole issue is tied up with the development of the concept of 'intentio' 
I mentioned in V.7. 
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I said earlier that the physical interpretation of the concept 
of conatus and the necessary historical shift in the origin of the 
concept of inertia can raise sare doubt concerning the original i ty 
and frui tfulness of the approach adopted in this chapter. The 
biological interpretation seems to reinforce such doubts. The 
objection may be finally put this way: if in the antiquity the idea 
of a conatus in terms of a desire for maintaining a certain state as 
unchanged as possible was well known - at least in its biological 
clothes - then why did so many philosophers speak only in tel~ of a 
vital dynarrric force driving man towards knowledge? Better, did Greek 
or medieval philosophers thaTlSel ves ever think about investigating 
the possibility of an inertial interpretation of the genetic 
principle of the P-knowing, in terms of a mental tendency to 
persevere in a certain static state of rrrind, namely that of 
nescience? And if not, why didn't they ? There are two possible 
answers to these questions, only the second of which is satisfactory. 
The first, rather unconvincing answer, is that ancient 
philosophers may have been following lOOre a physically than a 
biologically analogical interpretation of the P-knowing. They may 
have been lOOre interested in understanding knowing as a sort of 
motion than as a sort of change in being. In this case the idea of 
self-preservation would have not suggested that of an inertial state 
of mind. Rather, the metaphysical views about rootion would have 
played the central role in presenting a lively representation of the 
nature of knowing. This answer is not completely satisfying for the 
obvious reason that e.g. in the outstanding case of Aristotle, we 
know that the idea of motion is after all reduced to that of physical 
change. Put in this way the biological version of the force of 
inertia should have suggested the possibility of a different reading 
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of the genetic principle of the P-knowing via the analogical 
association change-metion-knowing. 
The second answer is IOOre acceptabl e. According to a vague I y 
inertial interpretation of physical, biological or mental change we 
only state that a certain entity will continue in its own activity or 
state of rest \Dlless acted upon by an external force. Note that 
nothing is said about the original state of this entity, that could 
be either one of activity/rrotion or one of rest; in any case, the law 
of inertia attests only that the entity will continue to be in that 
state tIDl ess sarething happens to it. Hence, we can perfect I y imagine 
that even a stoic philosopher could have reasoned thus: 
i) according to the biological law of rraintenance of a status quo 
ante by a certain entity as long as possible, everything aims to the 
preservation of its present state; 
ii) because of such an inertial canatus, a mind will continue in his 
acti vi ty as long as it is not acted upon by an external cause; 
iii) since the nonnal, undisturbed activity of a hU"llaIl mind, when 
concei ved in a sort of ''metaphysical vacuun", is that of thinking, 
and more particularly that of knowing; 
iv) then, also in accord with an inertial interpretation of the 
genetic principle of the P-knowing, a hunan mind will continue to 
know and proceed towards the endless acquisition of further 
knowledge, unless disturbed by sane external factors. 
According to this reasoning, the humn mind is like a piece of 
iron near a nagnet: leave it alone and it will be naturally (phusei) 
attracted by, and roove towards this latter. 
The point that speaks in favour of this interpretation is that 
it becanes JlIJch easier to tmderstand Albert the Great's and Thanas 
Aquinas' considerations about the unfort\mate states of sane men who 
indeed are not engaged in the natural search for knowledge. What they 
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say can be interpreted, almost literally, as the description of the 
sort of "mental attritions" the vis cognoscitiva may find in its 
otherwise natural and direct movement/development towards knowledge. 
It is exactly because many philosophers started fran the idea that 
man is originally interested in the acquisition of knowledge-why that 
even an "inertial" interpretation can conclude that, without 
contingent obstacles but left to himself, man would pursue knowledge 
for its own sake. In others words, if we associate Jrnowing with 
motion and nescience with rest then, even supposing a biological, 
ante li ttt:;?rarn inertial reading of the genetic principle of the P-
knowing, this would have been grounded on the idea of a perseverance 
in motion, i.e. in knowing, not in rest, i.e. in nescience. This is 
actually Spinoza's position. 
Spinoza claims that: 
i) the conatus of sanething is not a different thing fran that 
sc.mething ( this in 1 ine wi th Ockham' s razor) but is rather to be 
identified with the essence of that sanething (Ethics III, P.VII); 
ii) the concept of ponatus applies to the mind as well as to the body 
(Ethics P. IX); 
iii) ''When related to the mind alone, the conatus is called will 
(voluntas), but when it is related at the same time both to the mind 
and to the body is called appetite (appetitus)" (cf. wolfson [1934], 
p.203; Ethics P.IX, Note); 
iv) when the appetitus is conscious then the conatus is .called desire 
( cupidi tas) (Ethi cs P. IX, note); and 
v) since mind's highest good is the knowledge of God (Ethics, IV, 
P.28); therefore 
vi) "the mind, in so far as it reasons [Le. it follows its natural 
activity] desires nothing beyond understanding [in our terminology 
intellectual knowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of reality], and 
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judges nothing to be useful for itself, save such things as conduce 
to understanding" (Ethics IV, P.27); so that in conclusion 
vii) the highest aspiration of mind's natUral cognitive activity is 
the ful fi lrnent of its desire for knowing. Mind has a cupidi tas 
cognoscendi and this is fully satisfied only when it reaches an 
intuitive knowledge of God, the last Being on wham the existence of 
all the other beings depend. 
The fact that even Spinoza, the philosopher of the canatus as 
an inertial force, endorses a verslon of the vis cognoscitiva shows 
that an inertial interpretation of the genetic principl e of the P-
knowing is not strong enough to make us avoid the acceptance of the 
AP. We also need to assume that the ''mental inertia", as the genetic 
principle of the P-knowing, is a conservative tendency exercised on a 
cogni ti ve state of "mental rest", that is a tendency to maintain a 
state of nescience. The basic idea is that if man were left alone, 
deprived of any external compulsory force, he would immediately stop 
inquiring just for the sake of knowledge in itself. Only the 
conjunction of an inertial interpretation of the mental effort with a 
static interpretation of the initial state of mind can make possible 
a reading of the genesis of the P-knowing substantially different to 
that endorsed by the AP. 
The inversion of perspective that we need is very radical. 
Within the general picture just given, man begins to be portrayed as 
a knowing subject who has a fundamental conatus, i.e. a mental 
property, tendency or attitude, to persevere. in his own state of 
intellectual nescience. A first, IOOre specific formulation of this 
hypothesis can be tailored on D27' For reasons that will be evident 
in section 7 I shall label this postulate the Peirceish Postulate 
(the pp): 
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D29) the Peirceish Postulate (the PP) holds that: "man has a 
spontaneous, inborn and inertial, mental conatus that makes him 
persevere in his own state of intellectual nescience" unless he is 
~ompelled to change that state of mental rest by some external forces 
lI1i>ressed upon his mind". 
------------------------_._---
The PP is Peirceish in the same way as the AP is Aristotelian. 
That is to say that the PP is not to be taken as a scholarly 
interpretation of Peirce's thought, but as somehow retraceable to it. 
This point will be made more precise in section 1. A second remark 
concerns the use of ''mind''. Being a postulate on the nature of mental 
states I believe this reference is not prahl ematic. By using ''mind'' 
in 029 I don't mean to endorse any kind of posi hon about the 
ontological state of this latter. 
The next two sections are dedicated to the improvement of our 
ln1derstanding of D29' By means of sane considerations about 
Aristotle, Locke and Ancient pyrronhism we shall leave behind the 
analogy with physical motion and enter into the discussion of the 
epistemological features of the anti-Aristotelian Postulate. 
VI.5 THREE PHILOSOPHICAL INDICATIONS FOR A STATIC AND INERTIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE GENETIC PRINCIPLE OF THE P-~ING. 
Let me smmarize the main resul ts we have achieved up to here. 
I started by arguing that if an anthropological strategy against the 
Perpetual Check of Reason has to be. really effective it RUSt be 
developed by anteposing a proper al ternati ve to the AP at the 
theoretical level. It cannot amount to a mere statistical refusal of 
the whole problem tout court (AST). I then suggested that we could 
start elaborating the anti-Aristotelian Postulate by approaching the 
anthropological carponent of the TO fran the analogical side, 
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following the hypothesis that since Aristotelian Physics has been 
replaced by Newtonian Physics we could consequently consider the 
replacement the vis cognoscitiva by a oore inertial principle. This 
proposal has 1 ed us to consider sane aspects of the developnent of 
the concept of inertia first in the physical and then in the 
philosophical field. The outccme of these considerations has been 
that in order to recarmend an anti -Aristotelian Postulate it is 
necessary but not sufficient to endorse an inertial view of the 
genetic principle of the P-knowing. To this it nust also be added an 
understanding of the nature of the ht..mil1 mind as naturally tending to 
a state of rest I intending this later as a state of cognitive 
inactivity or nescience. This is probably the roost that could be 
heuristically gained fram the analogy knowing/moving. Hopefully, we 
are now on the right track to develop a sound anti-Aristotelian 
PostUlate, al though we are still left with the task of finding a 
philosophical basis for it. In this respect, as the label "Peirceish 
Postulate" explicitly states, the final manoeuvre will consist in 
referring to Peirce's episteroology in order to provide a "friendly 
environment" to the roore detailed description of the PP. Yet, before 
this I shall consider sane interesting indications that can be 
derived fran Aristotle, Locke and Ancient Pyrronhism. The remarks on 
Aristotle and Locke will help us in understanding roore deeply what is 
involved in an inertial description of the genetic principle of the 
P-knowing. Ancient Pyrronhism will help us in understanding how it is 
possible that such an inertial description could also be anchored to 
a static vision of man's nature in respect to knowl edge I that is to a 
vision of man being happy and ethically justified while remaining in 
a state of nescience. Needless to say, once again I'm looking for 
suggestions, not for scholarly interpretations. 
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VI. 5. a THE INERTIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN MIND: ARISTaI'LE 
At fi~st sight it may seem strange to refer once more to 
Aristotle in order to obtain same additional indications for a better 
understanding of an inertial, anti-Aristotelian Postulate. But, apart 
fran sane terminological contrasts, this procedure is not really 
problanatic. We find in Aristotle a means of shedding light on the 
PP, r do not suggest that he would support it. Furthenmore, this fact 
cl ari fies what I had in mind when I said that the AP is not 
Aristotelian in a scholarly way. In the same way, for example, Ockam 
appealed to the Aristotelian text "There is no such thing as motion 
over and above things" (Met. 200b 34) in order to support his anti-
Aristotelian physics. Aristotle merely meant that there is no special 
category of ''Irotion'' over and above those ten discussed in the 
Categories, but by this quotation Ockham wanted to deny that motion 
is a distinct reality over and above the body in motion. 42 Likewise, 
I'm going to refer to another passage of the Metaphysics to see how 
it can be canbined both wi th the AP and wi th the PP. 
Just a few pages after the faroous incipit, we find Aristotle 
saying: 
For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at 
first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the 
obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and 
stated difficulties about the greater matters [ ... J. And a man 
who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself nescient [agnoeinJ [ ... J therefore since they philosophized in order to escape 
fram nescience [i.e. a state of agnoian], evidently they were 
pursuing science in order to know and not for any utilitarian 
end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when 
almost all the necessities of life and the things that make 
for canfort and recreation had been secured, that such 
knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it 
for the sake of any other advantage [ ... ]. (Metaphysics, I, 
982b , 10-25, mf italics). 
Ross' translation, modifying the verb into an adjective, has 
" 
' "d th " . ce" for the Greek "agnoel' n" and 19norant an en 19noran 
42) Cf. Weisheipl, [1982), p.530-1. 
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"agnosian". I've used "nescient/nescience". The Greek tenninology is 
not so cl ear cut as Ross'. As ". " a noun, agnola can sirrply rrean 
"absence of knowledge", "want or lack of knowledge", and as a verb, 
"agnoein" can sirrply mean "not to perceive or recognize", "to fail to 
understand", "to make a false step". Both as a noun and as a verb, 
and in its practical as well as in its theoretical meanings, "agnoia" 
does not necessarily carry with it the negative specification of the 
state so described I that, on the contrary, is nowadays irrplicit in 
... .. , I f 19norance . Ross coup e 0 terms has a strong eval uati ve sense. 
When a person is negatively described as ignorant in respect to a 
certain subject this is because she should not ignore, but should 
mow about that certain subject. The distinction is clearly drawn in 
scholastic philosophy, where nescience is defined as "sirrple negation 
or ahsence of knowledge" (si.nple.x negatio seu absentia scientiae) 
while ignorance is defined as "privation of knowledge" (privatio 
scientiae) .43 An indirect consequence of translating "agnoia" as 
"nescience" is that "sophia" could then be translated as "sapience" 
better than as "wisdan", as it is normally done. 44 When scmeone 
doesn't have sapience he is not-sapient i.e. is nescient (or 
insipient) , not ignorant. Accordingly, Socrates' famous statement is 
to be considered a case of nescience not one of ignorance.45 Al though 
I carmot deny that, by means of "agnoia", Aristotle may have wanted 
43) Cf. fnciclopedia Filosofica, vol.4, p.988, which refers to Thomas Aquinas' Summa 
Theologica, I-II, q.76, a.2. 
44) 'Sapience' maintains a cognitive sense that is totally lost in 'wisdom', but which 
is present in the Greek use of sophia, as the end of human searching, cf. Het. 981-982 
and Ross [1958], p. 115. The use of 'sapience' instead of 'wisdom' is supported by the 
Latin translation, cf Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica, Lectio III, where he says 
'philosophia vel sapientia', although for philosophical reasons he also uses 
'ignorantia' to translate "agnosia' cf. his Commentaria, Liber 1, Lectio III. The use 
of 'wisdom', on the other hand, is well established also because of the English 
translation of the Bible, where sophia or sapientia are translated by means of 
·wisdom' (see also the use of ·wise' in the quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter) . 
45) Cf. for example Lalande [1962], p.33. We should be careful in speaking of 
"agnosia. as interchangeable with ·nescience·, because the former has also an 
important meaning in psychoanalysis and in the psychology of perception (cf. Gregory 
[1987], p. 19). 
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to convey a negative impression of such a state of want of knowledge, 
we will see that in this context it is better to adopt a more neutral 
translation. 
Turning to its philosophical significance, the passage is 
apparently introducing an interpretation of the first principle 
governing the origin of the process of knowing as differing somewhat 
fran the AP. At first, we may casually believe that Aristotle is 
stating that man is pushed towards knowledge by a negative feeling of 
puzzlement, an unstable and painful mental state of lD1easiness due to 
his nescience. Accordingly, we may also believe that Aristotle would 
then recognize both an end for the process of knowing, vz. that of 
solving or putting at rest such a feeling, and the haneostatic!6 
nature of the process. That is to say that, -as soon as the mental 
state of puzzlanent reaches a resolution, no matter how, then the 
process of knowing would proceed no further, and man would avoid 
deepening his epistemic relation with external reality any further. 
Notwithstanding the appearances, however, this is not what Aristotle 
has in mind. For clearly he still maintains the idea of "knowledge 
only for the sake of knowledge" ("pursuing science in order to know 
and not for any utilitarian end") and that of the process of pursuing 
knowledge as a never-ending enterprise. But then, what does he rrean 
when he says that "i t is owing to their wonder that men both now 
begin and at first began to philosophize" ? In that passage of the 
Metaphysics, only partially quoted above, Aristotle is attempting to 
cope with at least two tasks.47 First, he is presenting a solution of 
46s-A-h~;;~st;tic-mod;~i~~jin social psychology, the assumption that all people are 
motivated by the need to maintain or restore their optimal level of environmental, 
interpersonal,and psychological stimulation. Insufficient or eccessive stimulation 
automatically causes tension and sets in motion the motive and usually the behaviour 
required to achieve equilibrium· (Goldenson [1984], p.346). For a very interesting 
introduction to the concept of homeostasis cf. also Stagner in Wolman [1977], Pp.395-
400. Bernard [1977J, p.63 and Cook [1986), p.194 speak about Spinoza's concept of 
conatus in terms of homeostatic model. 
47) For a more scholarly reading of the first few pages of the l1et.aphysics cf. the 
outstanding work of Mondolfo [1958J, chap.2, who also refers to Jaeger (1923] (English 
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the methodological impasse, fonnulated by Plato in the Meno, that the 
search for knowledge is thwarted by an ilT1?ossibility; the 
impossibility that we cannot search for something without previously 
know that scmething. Aristotle's answer is that we just build up 
knowledge on previous foundations, and therefore that the whole 
scientific enterprise grows out of previous errors, and has no proper 
end. The second task is an explanation of the genesis of the process 
of knowing fram the point of view of the individual. In this respect 
what Aristotle really says is not that knowledge is pursued as long 
as there is a mentally painful phenomenon of agnoia (nescience), but 
rather that it is the very intellectual consciousness of being 
nescient that drives a man towards the search for knowledge. The 
"therefore" clause is to be referred to "thinks himsel t", not to "is 
puzzled and wonders". Hence, Aristotle's reasoning can be surrrrarized: 
i) the fulfilment of man's potential nature is reached when man is in 
a state of knowledge; for this reason 
ii) man desires to know; but then 
iii) mm wonders because he wants to know; and so 
iv) he tries to satisfy his desire for knowledge by investigating 
external real i ty and by asking whether he knows scrnething, and if so 
what is it that he mows; 
v) upon realizing his state of want concerning knowledge, man will 
then pursue Jmowledge until reaching the state of full knowledge, and 
this only because of the desire for Jmowledge for its own sake; 
vi) since hunan knowledge can always been inproved, man's search for 
knowledge in virtually a never-ending process. 48 
.. - .. ----.--~ .... ~.------
t~-. (1960]) for the interpretation of the Aristotelian methodology as endorsing a 
vision of science as an endless investigation always in fieri. 
48) At this proposal, I find Lear's interpretation ('We canr.ot remain content - we are 
literally discontented - until we have an explanation as to why the heavens are as 
they are. This discontent is of a pi.ece with the des.ire t~ know: it propels (~ic] us 
toward exploration and the formatIon of explanatlons. (1988) p.3) a blt too 
·Peircean' . 
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Aristotle is not contradicting his previous dictum, he is 
sirrply ITBking it more plain. The process of knowing starts because 
the actualization of man's potential nature, his intellectual nature, 
is in knowledge. For this reason man desires knowledge for its own 
sake. That he desires it because he doesn't have it, for if he had it 
he wouldn't be searching for it, is only a backgrotmd negative 
condition, as Putnam might say,49 not the real effective cause of his 
quest for knowledge. For Aristotle, the explanatory circle between 
the property of knowledge being desiderable, the actual desire of 
knowledge and the absence of knowledge as the absence of sanething 
that is desiderable and desired, can be synthesized as following: 
(i) knowledge is a desideratum in itself, 
(ii) S desires knowledge because of (i). This is the efficient reason 
why S desires knowledge; and 
(iii) S desires knowledge because he does not possess it, i.e. 
because knowledge is still desiderable. This is the negative 
backgrotmd reason why S desires knowledge. But then, the state of 
wonder and puzzlement that rran feels in respect to the absence of 
knowledge is to be referred to the desire for sanething that is not 
already possessed, so that: 
(iv) ''tmeasiness'' is sirrply a way of describing (iii). 
By introducing the clause "in order to escape fran nescience" 
(i.e. [iii]) Aristotle is merely giving a secondary, negative reason 
for the origin of the search of knowledge. No matter how urgent this 
negative tmeasiness may be, it is not the principal reason why man 
searches for intellectual knowledge. This is clear fran what 
Aristotle says about the "purity" of such an interest ("evidently 
then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage"). To 
escape a state of \.Uleasiness, inherent to that of agnoia, is not the 
~-------------.-------49) Putnam (1987), p.97. 
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real purpose of the genesis of the process of knowing. Or at JOOst, it 
could be onl y in the sense that the state of agnoia is interpreted as 
a frUstration of the desire to know. For Aristotl e it is the 
actualization of human nature in the state of perfect knowledge, and 
therefore the desire to fulfil the natural episterrophilic irrpulse 
towards such an actualization, that really drives man towards the 
acquisition of intellectual knowledge.SO 
Although Aristotle seems to go very close to an inertial 
interpretation of the genetic principle of the P-knowing, he still 
subordinates it to his metaphysics of potentiality and actualization. 
V I • 5 . b THE I NERTIAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN MIND: LOCKE 
Although still working along Aristotelian lines, Locke presents 
us with a slightly different picture. In the Essay the phenomenon of 
uneasiness plays a fundamental role in the deterrrdnatian of the will, 
anticipating, in same aspects, Peirce's theory of doubt and belief. 
Let me first paraphrase what Locke says about this point in the 
Essay. 
The rrdnd deterrrnnes the will towards action but the will should 
not be confused with the desire. Rather, the will is nothing but a 
power in the mind to direct the operative facul ties of man to JOOtion 
or rest, as far as they depend on such direction. [Essay, book II. 
chap. XXI, par. 29) As a power, it is an active capacity of rraking a 
change in a certain physical or mental state [ibidem, par .1/2). In 
turn, it is wrong to beli-eve that it is sane desiderable good that 
50) The same comments are valid for Albert the Great's and Thomas Aquinas' 
interpretations of Aristotle. It is interesting to note that where we lack a 
metaphysics of potentiality and act, like in Plato, the process of hypostatization of 
the vis cognoscitiv8 is more accentuated, cf. Plato's char~cterization of t~e daimon 
who is "never in want and never in wealth; and further, he IS a mean between Ignorance 
and knowledge" (Symposium, 203e). 
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dete~nes the will to action [ibidem, par.31]. For what moves the 
rrdnd, in every particular instance, to dete~ne its general power to 
will towards this or that particular state of IOOtion or rest is a 
sense of tmeasl' ness [ ;b;dem, par 29] This "un . " ~ ~ .. easlness we can 
approximate "desire", fran which it is scarcely distinguishable. such 
"desire" is an "tmeasiness" of the mind for want of sane absent good. 
[ibidem, par. 31]. Even better, Locke says, we may define desire a 
particular state of uneasiness [ihidem, par.32]. Among the states of 
uneasiness we may count all that disquiet the mind. [ibidem, par.31J. 
80 that when a man is perfectly content with the state he is in, that 
is when he is perfectly at ease, then the only determination of will 
which is left is to continue in that state. [ibidem, par.34]. The 
motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present 
satisfaction in it; while the motive to change is always a feeling of 
uneasiness. [ihidem, par.29] .51 
Accordingly, the scheme I've given above for the Aristotelian 
view, in Locke becanes: 
a) 8 desires knowledge; 
b) knowledge is a desideratum because of (a). This is the efficient 
reason why knowledge is a desiderat\J1l; and 
c) Jmowledge is desired because 8 does not possesses it, i.e. because 
Jmowledge is still desiderable. This is the negative reason why 
Jmowledge is a desiderat\J1l. But then, for Locke, the state of wonder 
and puzzlanent that man feels in respect to the absence of knowledge 
is the first origin of the search for knowledge, so that: 
d) uneasiness is a way of describing both the positive cause (a) and 
the negative cause (c) for desiring knowledge. 
Locke is not so clear about this double carponent of the state 
of tmeasiness because he wants both to identify desire and uneasiness 
51) For the rei'~tion between Locke and Newton cf. Gibson [1960], pp .250-3. 
0IAPI'rn VI 259 
straight away and yet to render the state of lDleasiness a more basic 
rootive for action. However, because of the shift of the 
"Aristotelian" logical order between S' actual desire of knowledge 
and knowledge being desired, Locke is finally able to describe the 
desire for knowledge as an option: 
There is no Body, I think, so senseI ess as to deny, that there . 
is pleasure in Knowledge: And for the pleasures in Senses, 
they have too many followers to let it be question'd whether 
Men are taken wi th them or not [here Locke is drawing the same 
distinction I've made in V.3.a between desire for knowledge 
and a sort of Epicurean edonismJ. Now let one Man place hi·s 
satisfaction in sensual Pleasures, another in the delight of 
Knowledge: Though each of them carmot but confess, there is 
great Pleasure in what the other pursues; yet neither of them 
rraking the other's de light a part of his happiness, thei r 
desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the 
other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the pursuit 
of it. [book II, chap. XXI, par. 43] [ ... ]. 
In endorsing such a position, Locke goes closer to Plato than 
to Aristotle. For Plato said: 
No god is a phi losopher or a seeker after wisdan, for he is 
wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. 
Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom; for herein is the 
evil of ignorance, that he who is neither a man of honour nor 
wise is neverthel ess satisfied wi th himself: there is no 
desire when there is no feeling of want. (Symposium, 204a). 
Note, however, that what Locke is really accepting is just the 
reasoning that in order to pursue something, the recognition of that 
scrnething as worth of being pursued is not sufficient. In addition 
what is required is a fundamental unease together wi th a need to calm 
that unease. Fran a mere descriptive point of view, there is nothing 
surprising about the fact that someone may, for example, value the 
search for knowledge while not in fact participating them:;el ves in 
that search. What we are presented with is the anti-intellectualist 
idea that unless man feels mentally \D1canfortable in his state of 
nescience he will persist in that state. Unfortunately, Locke doesn't 
go any further. On the contrary, far fram being tolerant with man's 
normal appreciation of his state of nescience, Locke still considers 
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the desire for the acquisition of intellectual knowledge the precise 
duty of any man who can afford to study: 
How Men, whose plentiful FortWles allow them leisure to 
improve their Understandings I can satisfy thesrsel ves with a 
lazy Ignorance [our nescience], I cannot tell: But methinks 
they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who layout of their 
Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to 
procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge; who take great care 
to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would 
think thesrsel ves miserable in coarse Cloths, or a patched 
Coat, and yet contentedly suffer their Minds to appear abroad 
in a pie-bald Livery of coarse Patches, and borrowed. Shreds, 
such as it has pleased Chance, or their Country-Taylor, (I 
mean the cammon Opinion of those they have conversed with,) to 
cloath them in. [Essay, book IV, chap. XX, par.G). 
Certainly, man persists in his mental state of nescience as long as 
he doesn't feel any tmeasiness in it, but on an ethical ground, man 
ought to be ashamed of feeling comfortable in a state of nescience. 
Locke recognizes that the search for knowledge may be not motivated 
enough by man IS intell ectual understanding of what is good for him, 
but once also man's intellectual "sensibility" has failed in making 
him feel uneasy in respect to his nescience, then the search of 
knowledge is linked to the prescription irrt>licit in the Aristotelian 
Postulate. If the majority of men do not consider knowledge a 
desideratum, yet they should still consider it a desiderandum. There 
is no mention of any external pressure on the hman mind that forces 
it to acquire knowledge, nor of any sort of P-knowing as a reaction 
against such a pressure. 
VI. 5. c THE STATIC VISION OF THE HUMAN MIND: ANCIENT SCEPTICIs-r
2 
The conclusion is that man undertakes a task only when he feels 
uneasy in a certain state, but that in the case of knowing, man ought 
to pursue intellectual knowledge even if he does not feel uneasy 
52) I own ~~h-~f--;--under standi n9 of some epistemological issues in ancient 
philosophy to Burnyeat [1978], [1980], and [1982]. 
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about his state of nescience. If we wonder about what justification 
there can be for this prescription, we need to refer to the AP .. A 
man involved in the activity of knowing is a better man than one who 
lives happy in his nescience. So in Locke the "invitation" to follow 
a roore "philosophical" life is still based on the Aristotelian 
picture. The time has carne now to consider a different vision of the 
hunan nature such that it does not inply the former ethical 
prescription. Could man be "ethically" justified in enjoying the 
relaxation peace of rrdnd, being unconcerned with or uninterested in 
pursuing knowledge for its own sake? 
Ancient scepticism is certainly the main source for a positive 
answer to this question. Here it is not the case of arguing in favour 
of a neat separation between ancient and modern scepticism,53 and for 
the sake of simplicity I will refer to the former as to pyrronhism. 
Pyrronhism, as with all philosophical Hellenistic doctrines, 
was chiefly a practical doctrine of life. The principal aim of 
philosophizing was to establish what the correct attitude of man 
towards the world should be.54 Pyrronhism finds its particular 
solution in the sceptical alternative of withholding epistemdc 
beliefs about external reality. SUch a strategy consisted in bringing 
into conflict differing opinions, concluding that they had equal 
strength (isostheneia) and therefore that they were undecidable, 
53) For a distinction between ancient and post-Cartesian scepticism see the very 
interesting article by Burnyeat [1982]. The hypothesis could be advanced that the AP, 
which was rejected by ancient sceptics, after having had a brilliant development in 
the Christian philosophy of the Middle Age, didn't come again under the attack of the 
Cartesian/Humean scepticism because this latter was no longer a way of approachi ng 
life (as pyrronhism was), but much more a methodological instrument. I believe the 
hypothesis is justified by what Burnyeat [1980J, and by Stroud [1984], especially the 
first chapter, said and by the fact that in Montai~ne's scepticism, which is a way of 
life, there is still a taste of adversion towards the intellectualism of the AP. The 
hypothesis is also consistent with the fact that, in order to have the Cartesian, 
epistemological shift the sceptical challenge had to be taken seriously on the 
methodological side, but completely disregarded on the anthropological side. 
54) Cf. for an introductory survey Sedley [1980), pp.1-17. 
0fAPI'ER V I 262 
hence in the suspension of judgment (epoche) , all this in order to be 
able to gain a final state of mental tranquillity (ataraxia).55 
Since the Pyrranhist concept of ataraxia is the firial element 
necessary for a better fo~lation of the Peirceish Postulate, let me 
now interpret it with an eye to the concept of a static cenatus 
discussed above in reI atien to Spinoza, and to the 1 ine of thought 
I've been following in discussing Aristotle's and Locke's theory of 
uneasiness. 
Spinoza tell s us that the mind has an original tendency to 
persevere in its state, whatever this may be, as long as it is not 
disturbed by some external factor. Aristotle plays with the idea that 
it may not be knowledge as a desiderandum that moves the mind but 
actually some sort of uneasiness. Locke advances a bit further 
admi tting that, although man does not feel uneasy in his original 
state of nescience, yet the search for knowledge is 17Wl'S 
rational/ethical duty. The pyrronhist can now add a further 
connotation to the whole picture. For he suggests that knowledge and 
the desire for knowledge, far fran being a solution, may even be the 
cause for the lass of ataraxia. The pyrronhist theory is not so 
straightforward, but it can be reasonably understood as reversing the 
relation between uneasiness and acquisition of knowledge. Not only 
does man feel uneasy because he is still trying to pursue a final 
Jmowledge of the real essence of the world that in fact cannot be 
acquired - that is, not only is tmeasiness the outcane of such a 
desire, or better, as Spinoza would say, is it that desire itself -
but the actual possession of knowledge could be the source of a deep 
55) As 8u;~y~at writes:~T~~~rguments bring about epoche. suspension of judgement and 
belief, and this, it seems, effects a fundamental change in the character of man's 
thinking and thereby in his practical life. Henceforth he lives adoxastos, without 
belief, enjoying, in consequence, that tranquillity of mind (ataraxia, freedom from 
disturbance), which is the sceptic spelling of happiness (eudaimonia) C •.. J·. ([1980], 
p.2S). In the text I have avoided all the references to the proper ioel of the 
PyrTonhist theory that can be obtained from Burnyeat's article. 
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uneasiness. The more we know or we believe to know, according to the 
Pyrranhist, the more we are stressed. The Pyrranhist would agree with 
Descartes' Epistaoon that the desire for knowledge is an "illness" or 
an "universal malady" which grows with learning (cf. IV.5). If we 
could give up knowledge altogether we would have reached that state 
of mind that is ready to receive the gift of ataraxia.56 Stretching 
the Pyrronhist thought to its extreme, we may say that giving up the 
intellectual enterprise of the search for knowledge restores tbe 
previous ataraxia that such desire for knowledge had destroyed. By 
radically accepting the aim of "peace of mind at any cost" as the 
central pole around which all the other prescriptions should turn, 
the Pyrronhist justifies the abandonment of any intellectual 
enterprise. Never again, in the history of philosophy, will knowledge 
be so depreciated, Montaigne belonging to the same stream of thought. 
Man reaches the fulfilment of his nature only when he obtains a state 
of mental tranquillity: if knowledge, as the pyrronhist mainly 
thought, is an obstacle to this target then knowledge, and the desire 
for it, must be eliminated. The roost natural and basic tendency of 
the h\..l1laIl mind is towards a physical and mental "well-being", not 
towards the actualization of intellectual potentialities. In so far 
as the mental "well-being" is concerned, peace of mind is all man 
requires in his life. This is obtainable as long as the mind is not 
troubled by epistemological doubts and uncertainties. The Pyrronhist 
recognizes such a need and elaborates a solution in terms of epocbe 
and the following ataraxia. 
At this point three interesting aspects of the pyrronhist 
doctrine are worth consideration, each with a different degree of 
appreciation. 
,------------~-----56) For the stress on this passive reception of the mental tranquillity cf. Burnyeat 
[1980J and below in the text. 
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First, it is worth noticing that the Pyrronhist also uses the 
same kind of knowing/lOOtion analogy to deal wi th the issue of the 
genesis of the P~knowing: the state of ataraxia is explicitly 
understood in tenns of the dynamic analogy. Ataraxia is a 
katastematic pleasure, literally a pleasure not-in-movement (i.e not 
kinematic) but such that it coincides with the soul being at rest.57 
The second aspect concerns the vision of man as happy and 
carpletely ''hunan'' in his state of agnosia or nescience.58 For the 
first time since beginning this investigation we have that, if the 
maintenance of a state of agnosia were possibl e, a man wi thout 
knowledge would probably enjoy a better mental life than that of one 
who still pursues, or even has same knowledge. The point, as we shall 
see in due course, is extremely important for the articulation of the 
PP. 
The last ccmnent regards the Pyrronhist fallacious conviction 
that nan can actually do without intellectual knowledge, that is, can 
actually live a happy life relying only on beliefs but not on 
epistanic bel iefs. This point has been well analyzed by Burnyeat 
(1980), and can be basically anchored to the Humean accusation 
contained in the Enquiry:59 the Pyrronhist cannot in fact live his 
scepticism. The question more relevant to the present context is that 
it is rather ohscure why the procedure of presenting opposing 
arguments, of producing confusion in the rrrind of the listener, the 
whole process of putting his epistemic beliefs in J1l.ltual contrast, 
should end by inducing him into a state of epoche and then of 
tranquillity instead of acute anxiety.60 It is very indicative that 
57)u. wh~t-Diogenes Laertius says about Epicurus in his Lives of Philosophers, X, 
136. 
58) Cf. Sidley [1984], especially p.IO. 
59) Cf. Hume [1975], chap. XII, 128, quoted by 8urnyeat (1980], p.20. In an non-
trivial sense 8urnyeat agrees with Hume's criticism, cf. the conclusion of p.53. I 
believe that the objection I move in the text is in agreement with Burnyeat's 
position. 
60) Burnyeat [1980], p.S1. 
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the state of ataraxia is not positively or actively gained by the 
Pyrronhist, but merely occurs when the mind has been cleared of 
epistemic bel iefs. The passi vi ty of the who I e procesg61 is expressed 
by Sextus Empiricus in a famous passage: 
The SCeptic, in fact, had the same experience as that related 
in the story about Apelles the artist. They say that when 
Ape I I es was painting a horse, he wished to represent the 
horse's foam in the painting. His attempt was so unsuccessful 
that he gave it up and at the same time fhmg at the picture 
his sponge with which he had wiped the paints off his brush. 
As it stuck the picture, the sponge produced an image of 
hoarse's foam. So it was with the Sceptics. They were in hopes 
of attaining mental tranquillity, thinking that they could do 
this by arriving at same rational judgement which would dispel 
the inconsistencies involved in both appearances and thoughts. 
When they found this irrpossible, they withheld judgment. While 
they were in this state, they made a chance discovery. They 
found they were attended by mental tranquillity as surely as a 
body by its shadow. (Sextus Empiricus OUtlines of Pyrronhism, 
in [1985J, p.42). 
Both ana I ogi es are indi ca ti ve. Al though sext us ElTi>i ri cus 
initially admits the casual nature of the connection between the 
feeling of Wleasiness and that of ataraxia (it doesn't happen very 
often that by throwing a sponge at a picture we produce that perfect 
image of hoarse's foam that we wanted) he then concludes by 
describing a necessary link between the two, identical to that 
occurring between a lxxiy and its shadow. The objection to the 
Pyrranhist theory of ataraxia is that in fact, by merely cleaning up 
our minds of every judgment or episternic beliefs, we are more likely 
to be assail ed by a feeling of bewilderment rather than by one of 
tranquillity. So, although the Pyrronhist seems to be right to stress 
man's preference for peace of rrdnd, in respect to the possession of 
knowledge, as the principal and fundamental target of human beings, 
he al so seerrs to go wrong when he supports the thesis that in order 
to re-gain a state of original ataraxia man needs to eliminate 
knowledge itself. We nay sirrply answer to the pyrronhist that perhaps 
it would be wonderful if knowledge could be elirrdnated, but that 
61) ibidem, p.42, especially note 38. 
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sol uti on does not lie wi thin our powers anyway. Knowledge exists 
already, and consequently we are not at liberty to live out the 
cooplete scepticism required in practice. Instead, the view that I 
will support is that the best way of attaining mental peace, the one 
actually followed by the human rrdnd, is by means of the acquisition 
of ,strang, approximate beliefs or prejudices, hardly to be shaken by 
any counter-argunent. Al though a nescient ataraxiJ2 is the 
regulative goal of any hunan mind, this has to be gained by acquiring 
sane kind of knowledge. And we shall see that such an acquisition of 
knowledge gradually decreases the degree of nescience still 
defendable, tmtil the whole process reaches a haneostatic 
equi libri lIT\. 
There is a counter-argunent that is worth considering before 
turning to the next section. The sceptic may want to protest that by 
his proposal, he is actually praising a procedure whereby those who 
are al ready in a final state of uneasiness because of their search 
for knowledge may re-gain sane peace of mind. The sceptic's proposal 
would regard only the philosophers (for Sextus Empiricus, the stoics) 
that are involved in the search for an epistemological foundation of 
their beliefs. The procedure of contrasting epistemdc beliefs against 
each other would help to re-gain same peace of mind for those who are 
no longer satisfied by their knowledge. The sceptic may want to say 
that for those who fail to be happy with their strong, cannon 
beliefs, the only alternative is to make them contrast each other 
62) Note that---by--this expression I don't mean to imply any particular relation between 
the state of nescience and that of ataraxia (as in 'green tree'). The expression 
"ataraxjc nescjence', although less happy, would express my thought equally well. The 
transformation of one of the two terms in an adjective is just a way of combining the 
two terms in one expression. 
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tmtil the secondary effec&3 of ataraxia arises. There are at least 
three answers to this objection. 
First of all, if the sceptical strategy turnS' out to concern 
I onl y the small number of phi 1 osophers, then it looses nuch of its 
power of irrpact. The sceptic is forced to admit that not onl y are 
! most of the people, all those who are happy with their crude beliefs, 
perfectly justified in holding them as strongly as possible, but also 
that all these people have to be left alone. By his own admission, 
the sceptic is not allowed to rrake scmeone else doubt, unless this 
saneone is already uneasy about his beliefs. Scepticism would be like 
knowing the precise dates of death of each single man who is alive. 
Silence would be appreciated. 
Secondly, the sceptical counter-argument takes for granted that 
the philosophers are those who can never re-gain their peace of rrdnd 
in any other way than by withdrawing their epistemic beliefs. They 
are characterized as people whose mental capacity of doubting 
surpasses their desire for peace and the capacity too of feeling 
satisfied by sirrply gaining a di fferent level of beliefs. SUch a 
conviction is grounded 00 a very artificial distinction between 
"people" and "philosophers" that carmot be really sustained. It 
sirrply does not take into account the fact that very often 
philosophers are precisely those who have very strong opinions on 
many vital topics about which, on the other hand, "carmon people" 
would be more cautious. In this sense every philosopher is a crusader 
fighting his own holy war. After Nietzsche,64 it would be difficult 
to maintain a vision of the philosopher as the man who devotes his 
63) This is the termi nology used by Elster [1983] and it concerns certain ViCiOUS 
processes like that of trying to stop thinking by thinking we should stop thinking, In 
this case ·stop thinking" is a secondary effect and can be gained by means of some 
distraction. 
64) Cf. Nietzsche [1966], 'On the Prejudices of Philosophers·, 
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life to the pure research for knowledge, without having an axe to 
grind. 
The final and most irrportant objection is that even if we 1'1mi t 
the number of people concerned by the sceptical proposal only to the 
philosophers, the sceptic still has to show us first, that the 
procedure of put ting the epistanic bel iefs in I1lltual contrast is 
really effective, and secondly, that even if it is effective and 
sanetimes can lead a person to acquire her desired ataraxia, it does 
it more easily, more quickly and more commonly than the process of 
searching for a belief that may convince that same person. This last 
objection is obviously linked to the previous one. If a philosopher 
is only a man with same special theoretical interests, then he will 
be looking for peace of mind exactly in the same way as anybody else. 
Experience told Hume that the sceptic cannot live his scepticism. Now 
experience tells us that in pursuing his peace of mind man follows 
the strategy of sticking to his beliefs as long and as strongly as 
possible, not to the sceptical procedure of putting all his epistanic 
beliefs into a nutual contrast in the vain hope that ataraxia will 
arise out of their isosthenia. 
V I • 5 • d THE Tmx:>RETlCAL I NTERPRETATlOO OF THE PEIRCEISH POS'IULATE 
By means of the previous analyses we have accumulated 
sufficient material to produce a full articulation, and hence a 
further revision of the Peirceish Postulate. According to D29' a 
first approximatioo of the PP would hold that: ''man has a 
spontaneous, inborn and inertial, mental conatus that would make him 
persevere in his own state of nescience, unless he is coopelled to 
change that state by sane external forces irrpressed upon his mind". 
DrawiIl9 now the conclusion of the previous sections, we have that the 
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PP endorses the following epistemological picture: (as far as 
intellectual knowledge is concerned) 
i) the initial"static state of a mind is one of agnosia or nescience; 
such a state implies at least also a pleasant mental state of absence 
of uneasiness or anxiety, if not more positively, one of full 
tranquillity. I've called this cQ'1'i)lex state of peace of mind one of 
nescient ataraxia; 
ii) resting in an quite state of nescient ataraxia, the mind has a 
spontaneous, inborn and inertial conatus to persist in that state, 
unless she is compelled to change that state by same external force 
inpressed upon her ;65 
iii) if, for same reasons, an external pressure forces the rrdnd into 
an unnatural state of uneasiness, the rrdnd activates the process of 
knowing in order to restore as soon, and as nuch as possible of its 
original state. This process is carried on in the most effective way: 
by pure assurrption of prejudices, of lD1justified beliefs or of 
scientific hypotheses. The "secretion" of further R-knowledge is a 
"reaction" to the tmbalance produced by a state of tmeasiness, and 
its aim is the restoration of a state of rrental peace at a higher 
level of hcmeostatic equilibriun between pressure and correspondent 
epistemic answer. When the equi libritrn is restored the rrdnd stops 
being involved in the process of Jmowing. This latter is reactivated 
65) for a discussion of the Spinozian concept of conatus as connected with that of 
'peace of mind' (' acquiescientia animi' or 'acquescientia in se ipso') cf. Hampshire 
(1956]. chap. 4; and Hallett [1957J. pp.l03-105. From the strict point of view of 
epistemology, the idea that the final target of mind is that of conceiving reality 
from the point of view of eternity ('sub specie aeternitatis') and therefore of 
reducing the mere contingent to its dependen~e on the necessary and absolute is 
somewhat echoed in Dewey. This latter argues against any Epistemology that assumes the 
possibi 1 i ty of havi ng a final approach to problems concer ni ng human knowledge from the 
perspective of 'God's eye'. A middle way between Spinoza and Dewey would to assume 
that the mind starts from her own contingent state of nescient ataraxia, and that once 
reality has forced itself in her internal world (Dewey), then the mind strives for 
detaching herself from the real world. and therefore for acquiring a detached vision 
of external reality (Spinoza). 
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whenever the external pressure increases, overcorrdng the defense the 
mind has already accumulated in terms of established R-knowledge. 
According to the PP ", hunan intellectual R-knowledge is a by-
product of man's reaction against external reality. Like a pearl, 
despite its great beauty, it must to be considered the final result 
of a disturbance provoked by an external factor into the aninal' s 
life. It would be a cOOl'lete misunderstanding of the nature of the 
"intellectual knowledge-pearl" if we were to consider it a 
spontaneous and happy product of the ''mind-oyster''. 
Such an analogy nay remind us of how much of the neo-Kantian 
tradition is still included in the Peirceish Postulate. Very 
interestingly, Vaihinger [1965] writes: 
Just as Heleagrina margariUfera, when a grain of sand gets beneath its 
shining surface, covers it over with a self-produced mass of mother-of pearl, 
in order to change the insignificant grain into a brilliant pearl, so, only 
still more delicately. the psyche, when stimulated, transforms the material 
of sensations which it absorbs into shining pearls of thought. into 
structures (p.7) 
Unfortunately, Vaihinger errploys only half of the explanatory 
power of the analogy. For he is caught half way between considering 
mowledge as reaction against an external disturbance, and the idea 
that the external input is only the occasion for the production of R-
mow 1 edge, while being in itself insignificant. This is also the 
reason why Vaihinger cannot escape a Kantian version of relativism. 
still sharing a faith in the vis cognoscitivj6 and undervaluing the 
nature of the external pressure suffered by the mind, Vaihinger ends 
by considering the production of knowledge alrrost like a free mental 
exercise, like an aesthetic activity, enjoyable in itself. As we 
shall see, this is not the approach assuned by the Peirceish 
Postulate.67 
66) cf. Vaihinger [1965] I p.l71 and chapter XXXVII. 
67) Vaihinger was known to Peirce for his commentary on Kant's Critique of.Pure 
Reason, cf. Peirce [1931-58],5.84. 
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Turning to this latter, it is easy to recognize the different 
components of its interpretation given above. The description of the 
static state of htman mind is derived fran the discussion of the 
Pyrranhist idea of a state of nescient ataraxia preceding and 
possibl y succeeding the process of knowing. The description of the 
inertial canatus is obviously derived fram the discussion of 
Spinoza's, Aristotle's and Locke's positions on this point. The 
description of the genetic principle of the process of knowing as an 
homeostatic principle is due to the conjunction of the descriptions 
of the two previous elements. The whole picture is partially drawn on 
the basis of an analogy with dynamics, but it is also easy to see 
that when the action of mind ccmes to be concerned then the 
parallelism is more with the biological field. The three phases in 
which the genesis of the P-knowing is tmderstood - (i) the static 
state (ii) the inertial tendency (iii) the restoration of the static 
state - give rise to a sort of dialecti&8 of the process of knowing 
according to which - and contrary to what happens if we accept the 
Aristotelian Postulate - the mind plays a reactive role, one of 
answering, and to external reality is left the role of starting the 
whole process. In the next section I will articulate this picture of 
an anti-Aristotelian postulate and the three theses involved in it by 
embedding the PP in a Peirceish EPistemology. 
VI.6 ASS: A PEIRCEISH EPISTEMOLOOY FOR THE INERTIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
THE GmETIC PRINCIPLE OF THE p-1<NCHING. 
Peirce is the philosopher whose work is most relevant to an 
articulated analysis of an anti -Aristotel ian hypothesis. His 
68) It is not a --P;;p~~elian dialectic movement because there is not final 
resolution of the oppositions, but rather an appreciation of dualism. 
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pragnatism provides the most favourable "environment" wi thin which 
the PP can be tmderstood and developed. This is possible only because 
of the very particular position Peirce enjoys within the history of 
philosophy. On the one hand, the great majority of, if not all, the 
philosophers who have been interested in studying the nature of human 
knowledge have also been convinced, at least inplicitly, of the 
virtues of the AP. On the other hand, those philosophers who have 
been rrore "sceptical" about the episterrophilic nature of man, have 
also been rrore interested in other philosophical issues than those 
epistemological, and hence are also the phi 1 osophers froo whoo we 
cannot expect very much in tems of discussion of the AP. Hobbes and 
Nietzsche are two good exart'l>les. 69 It follows that we can find sane 
suggestions on the nature of an anti -Aristotel ian position only in a 
philosopher with a strong interest for a pragmatic, realistic, almost 
cynical tmderstanding of intell ectual knowl edge as one of the 
manifestation of human beings. Peirce is such a philosopher. He has 
the same interest that pyrronhism had in el iminating the 
intellectualist picture of man as spontaneously and irresistibly 
driven towards knowledge (Peirce's anti-intellectualism is one thinat 
one with his anti-cartesianism, see for eXaJl1?le 5.264-5), while he 
doesn't share the same negative conception about the goodness of 
hunan knowledge and the possibilities of its developnent. It is 
precisely the kind of disenchanted vision of man we need to follow in 
order to ground the previous interpretation of the PP . 
.. ---_._--
69) According to Sorell [1986J, p.29, • [although] Human beings cannot live well 
without science. [ ... J yet science does not come naturally to human beings' (. The 
whole chapter, entitled 'Knowledge and Power in Fallen Ma,n' is re:evant to this 
investigation). For Hobbes scientific knowledge has to be gal ned despl te man nature, 
Yet Hobbes seems to have a positive attitude towards what he calls the 'delightful 
appetite of knowledge'. He identifies it with curiosity and therefore he accepts the 
AP (cf. Hobbes [1940], vol. III (Leviathan), p.44. 67. 87, 92; vol. IV (Three 
Discourses) p.50 (Answer to Sir William Davenant's Preface before 'Gondibert '), 
p.453). For 'Nietzs~he cf. (1966). Part One, 'On the Prejudices of the Philosophers'. 
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The first three questions that need to be answered before 
outlining a Peirceish epistemology are: to what extent is it possible 
to attribute a "peirceish epist€.lOC)logy" to peirce himSelf ? Did 
Peirce know about the Aristotelian dictum? And if so, what was his 
posi tion in respect to it? 
If it is doubtful whether or not it is always possible to make 
an experiment contino our scientific hypotheses, yet it is certainly 
far too easy to make a philosopher say what one wishes, and so fit 
him within one's own hamework. Given the nature of Peirce's work, 
largely unpublished and left "in progress", it wouldn't be difficult 
to produce such an image of Peirce higly favourable to the Peircesih 
Postulate. Consequently, we need to provide same evidence in order to 
establish the legitimacy of the claim that the PP is indeed sanewhat 
Peircean. In addressing the first question, I appeal to Peirce's 
theory of doubt and belief70 as this is expressed by the mature 
Peirce in "The Fixation of Belief" (1877) (5.358-387), in ''How to 
make our ideas clear" (1878) (5.388-410) and in "The Logic of 1873" 
(editorial title; 7.313-361). It is not my intention to present my 
hypothesis as a scholarly interpretation of Peirce's thought or as 
being supported by Peirce's authority. The label "Peirceish" states 
clearly enough that I enploy Peirce only as a means of providing a 
guide-line, and to Peirce's epistemology only insofar as it provides 
the most favourable context for the development of the PP. 
About the second question, a positive answer could be 
misleading. Certainly Peirce knew Aristotle very well, as this is 
adequately testified by his scholarly work (cf. for exanple 1.325; 
70) Peirce revised them in 1909-10 planning to make a book out of them (for more 
information cf. vol.7, p.194, editorial note 1). See also the relation between 
curiosity and doubt in 8.270. The quotations in the text are from other works, since I 
presume the main contents of these articles are known to the reader. All the texts 
quoted are from the collection of works published by Harvard University between 1931 
and 1958 (the only exception is Peirce's HS 165, see below). I.'ve listed some of the 
principal aspects of Peirce'S thought, those that I belleve prevent us from 
identifying my Peirceish position with Peirce's, in Appendix II. 
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and 7.233-255).71 As far as the dictum is concerned, we find it 
quoted in Greek and translated in English in MS 165.72 And he must 
have had it in mind when he wrote 7.579. Peirce, however, did not 
refer to Aristotle in order to criticize him on the same basis 
assumed in this work. On the contrary, he quotes the incipit of the 
Metaphysics in connection with the pure desire for scientific 
knowledge for its own sake, a position that Peirce endorses in many 
places and in different times (cf. again Appendix II.ii).73 Thus, it 
must be kept in mind that in the collection above mentioned there is 
no explici t Peircean opposi tion of the AP as such. Having specified 
all this, let me now turn to the outlining of a Peirceish 
epist€fOOlogy. 
Peirce canbines a strong ontological realism with a pragmatic 
interpretation of the role of knowledge. Brute reality, facts, 
things, the external world oppose the rrdnd canfrantatianally and the 
mind aTploys knowledge to defends itself frem the non-mind, or fran 
what is dead-mindJ4 Throughout Peirce's work we find that reality 
forces itself upon human rrdnd, almost violently: 
[ ... ] The real is that which insists upon forcing its way to 
recognition as sanething other than the mind's creation. [ ... ] 
The real is active; we acknowledge it, in calling it the 
actual." (1.325) ;75 
A hard fact [ ... ] is scmething which is there, and which I 
cannot think away, but I am forced to acknowledge as an object 
71) Peirce thought of himself as 'an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching 
Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism' (5.77, 
footnote). As I've already said, contrary to Whitehead, Peirce was convinced that 
western philosophy was fundamentally Aristotelian (cf. [1.1J). As for Peirce's 
knowledge of this latter, note his careful translation of Aristotle's episteme as 
·comprehension of the matter· (7.249] or just 'comprehension' and its justification 
[7.250) . 
72) 'A Practical Treatise on Logic and Methodology', winter 1869-70, published in 
Peirce [1986-] vol.2, p.350 and ff. 
13) On the contrary, Peirce the philosopher of science regards himself as an 
Aristotelian, cf. 1.618. 
74) See the concepts of external dead thing, of action, passion and process, and their 
relation with mechanics in 1.359-61. For the partiality of this interpretation cf. the 
Appendix II.iii. 
75) Cf. also 1.320 and 1.431. 
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or second beside rnysel f, the subject or nunber one, and which 
forms material for the exercise of my will. (1.358); 
We are continually bumping up against hard facts {1.324);76 
[ ... ] you are .canpelled, brutally cClTl'elled, to admit that 
there is such an element in the world of experience as brute 
force. What then is brute force, or what does it se6T5 to be ? 
[ ... ] A brute force is only a complication of binarities. It 
supposes not only two related objects, but that in addition to 
this state of things there is a second subsequent state. It 
further supposes two tendencies, one tending to change the 
first relation in one way in the second state; the other, of 
the other relate, tending to change the same relation in a 
second way. Both those changes are in sane way canbined, so 
that each tendency is to sane degree followed, to scrne degree 
roodified. This is what we mean by force. It is almOst purely 
binari ty. The bruteness wi 11 consist in the ahsence of any 
reason, regularity, or rule, which should take part in the 
action as a third mediating element. Am:>ng the inner shapes 
which binarity assumes are those of the doubts that are forced 
upon our minds. [ ... ] If we did not struggle against doubt, we 
should not seek the truth. (2.84). 
The border where brute fact and the mind clash against each 
other is the sphere of perception and experience (cf. 7.437-43): 
[ ... ] Perception represents two objects reacting upon one 
another [ ... J. That, of course, is the doctrine of Immediate 
Perception which is upheld by Reid and Kant, and all dualists 
who understand the true nature of dualism, and the denial of 
which led Cartesians to the utterly absurd theory of divine 
assistance [ ... J (5.56). 
Experience is that determination of bel ief and cogni tion 
generally which the course of life has forced upon man. One 
may lie about it; but one carmot escape the fact that scrne 
things are forced upon his cognition. There is the element of 
brute force, existing whether you opine its exists or 
not.[ ... ] (2.138).77 
In the perceptual stage of knowledgel8 brute reality enters 
into the mind, and in having experience the mind reacts against 
perceptions. It is in the passage fran doubt to belief that the 
mental uneasiness brought about by experience is fought. Al though 
Peirce is not sure about the dynarrric characterization of the 
opposi tion between reality and m:i nd/9 he believes that: 
76) Cf. also 2.22. 
77) Cf. also 2.139. 
78) Cf. 1.335-6 and also 1.175. For Peirce's theory of perception d. 7.615-636 and 
7.642-681. 
79) .[. .. J as far as the element of struggle is concerned, there is. no difference 
between being an agent and being a patie~t .. It is the r~sult that decides;. [.:.J The 
sense of shock is as much a sense of reSIstIng as of beIng acted upon. So lt 1S when 
anything strikes the senses. (5.46J "r would limit it (volition] to the rr.omentary 
direct dyadic consciousness of an ego and a non-ego then and there present and 
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The inportant point [is] that the sense of externality in 
perception consists in a sense of powerlessness before the 
overwhelming force of perception. Now the only way in which 
any force can be learned is 'by sanething like trying to oppose 
it. That we do sarething like this is shown by the shock we 
receive fran any unexpected experience. It is the inertia of 
mind, which tends to remain in the state in which it is. [my 
italics] [ .. ] . The passive and tmintentional volition that 
gives the shock of surprise and the sense of externality [is 
to be classed like a] mode[s] of [ ... ] consciousness, that is, 
of awareness, at once and in the same awareness, of an ego and 
nan-ego [ ... ] (1.334). 
The HKS deals with reality by means of knowledge, on the basis 
of a reactive conservatorism: 
[ ... ] There is active volition and passive volition, or 
inertia, the volition of reform and the volition of 
conservatorism. That shock which we experience when anything 
particularly unexpected forces itself upon our recognition 
(which has a cognitive utility as being a call for explanation 
of the presentiment), is sirrply the sense of the volitional 
inertia of expectation, which strikes a blow like a water-
harrrner when it is checked; and the force of this blow, if one 
could measure it, would be the measure of the energy of the 
conservative volition that gets checked. Low grades of this 
shock doubtless accarpany all unexpected perceptions; and 
every perception is roore or less unexpected. Its lower grades 
are, as I opine, not without experimental tests of the 
hypothesis, that sense of externality, of the presence of a 
non-ego, which accarpanies perception generally and helps 
distinguish it fran dreaming. (1.332). 
Hence, man is engaged in the process of inquiry precisely in 
order to eradicate the feeling of doubt that is at the origin of the 
inquiry itself. As Peirce says, in the development of the inquiry 
Every nan is busily at working to bring to an end that state 
of things which now excites him to work" (1.392). 
The justification for all this cognitive activity is the 
defence of our mental world fram external influences: 
We live in two worlds, a world of fact and a world of fancy. 
Each of us is accustaned to think that he is the creator of 
his world of fancy; that he has but to pronounce his fiat, and 
the thing exists, with no resistance and no effort [ ... ]. For 
this reason we call the world of fancy the internal world, the 
world of fact the external world. In this latter we are 
masters, each of us, of his own lTllScles, and of nothing more . 
..... _ ..__ .. _--.-_ ... -.... _-._ .. __ ... 
~;acting each ~pon the other. In one the action is generally more active, in the other 
more passivei but precisely what this difference co~sists . in I do n?t feel su~e. I 
think, however, that the will to produce a change 15 act1ve, the wlll to res1st a 
change is passive [ ... J.. (1.334] 
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But man is sly, and contrives to make this little roore than he 
needs. Beyond that, he defends himself fran the angles of hard 
facts by clothing himself with a gannent of contentment and 
habituation. Were it not for this gannent, he would every now 
and then find his internal world rudely disturbed and his 
fiats set at naught by brutal inroads of ideas fram without. I 
call such forcible nxxlification of our ways of thinking the 
influence of the world of fact or experience. But he patches 
up his garment by guessing what those inroads are 1 ikely to be 
and carefully excl uding fran his internal world every idea 
which is likely to be so disturbed. Instead of waiting for 
experience to came at untoward times, he provokes it when it 
can do no harm and changes the government of his internal 
world accordingly. (1.321). 
So that summarizing: 
Facts are hard things which do not consist in my thinking so 
and so, but stand tmrOOved by whatever you or I or any man or 
generations of men may opine about them. It is those facts 
that I want to know, so that r may avoid disappointments and 
disasters. Since they are bound to press upon me at last, let 
me know them as soon as possible, and prepare for them. This 
is, in the last analysis, my whole rootive for reasoning. 
Plainly, then, I wish to reason in such way that the facts 
shall not, and cannot, disappoint the pranises of my 
reasoning. Whether such reasoning is agreeab1 e to my 
intellectual impulses is a matter of no sort of consequence. I 
do reason not for the sake of my del ight in reasoning, but 
sol ely to avoid disappointnent and surprise. [my italics] 
Consequentially, I ought to plan out my reasoning so that I 
evidently shall avoid those surprises. That is the rationale 
of the English doctrine. It is as perfect as it is sirrple." 
(2.173). 
Obviously, according to this approach the only justification 
for reasoning or searching knowledge 
[ ... J is that it settles doubts, and when doubt finally 
ceases, no matter how, the end of reasoning is attained [my 
italics]. Let a man resolve never to change his existing 
opinions, let him obstinately shut his eyes to all evidence 
against them, and if his wi 11 is strong enough so that he 
actually does not waver in his faith, he has n? rootive ~or 
reasoning at all, and it would be absurd for him to do lt. 
(? 324 )80-
As is well )mown, in The Fixation of Belief Peirce lists four 
ways of obtaining the cessation of doubt, the settlement of opinion 
and hence the acquisition of a state of mental ataraxia: tenacity, 
authority, a priority and scientific inquiry. According to Peirce the 
first three methods, in the long run, inevitably fail to keep the 
80) See 5.372. -Sam;- di;~~~ is valid for the absence of moral consciousness, cf. 
8.45. 
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hunan mind safe fran unwanted surprises. Only when he has reached the 
scientific method can men then cope with reality in the best way. At 
this point, an aspect of Peirce's theory of knowledge turns out to be 
controversial. 
I believe that, unfortunately, Peirce is either too optimdst an 
the open-mindness of our HKS, or too sceptical about the 
potentialities of the three first methods, especially tenacity and 
authority.a! Peirce's excessive confidence in the fact that tenacity 
and authority quickly fail to resist the test of life may be due to 
two reasons. 
The first reason is that the type of knowledge he has in mdnd 
is timeless Jmowledge, ideally speaking, the final picture of the 
world that all hunan knowing subjects will agree on. So far, I 
believe Peirce is right when he says that in the long run non-
scientific methods will be certainly replaced by the scientific. This 
latter provides the best "reaction" against reality. No "defence" 
could be more effective against external reality than the scientific 
method. Yet, exactly the fact that it is an ideal picture of the 
development of h1.J1lall knowledge makes his position sanewhat suspect. 
Sanetirres, Peirce still exhibits a residual version of the AP in 
describing the nature of the scientific investigation. This may be 
the second reason why he is so confident concerning the developrent 
of the scientific method. Because of his faith in an epistemophilic 
impulse (cf. his notion of Gnostic Instinct in 7.58), Peirce seems to 
oppose the idea both that man could be ethically justified in 
disregarding the scientific method and then that man could enjoy a 
happy life in this world despite his nescience. Note that, according 
to Peirce, there is no dichotany between errpirical and scientific 
81) Cf. for example 2.655. 
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knowledge,82 and the dialectic doubt/belief applies to the fonner as 
well as to the latter. The scientific "defence" of man against 
reali ty represent the best answer to genuine doubts. Yet, we need to 
recognize that, notwithstanding the homeostatic picture of science, 
in the backgrolIDd there is still a perceptible vision of man as 
spontaneously tending towards the acquisition of knowledge just for 
the sake of knowledge. When he cernes to speak of the nature of the 
scientific inquiry, Peirce can hardly resist the ethical appeal a' la 
Locke of the notion of epistemophilia. 
The fact that Peirce still exhibits a residual notion of the 
vis cognoscitiva in respect to scientific knowledge, casts a clear 
light on an irrportant aspect of his thought. We know that Peirce's 
pragmatism represents a radical break fram the Cartesian tradition. 
Peirce reacted against the Cartesian epistemological tum probably 
also because he was well aware of a roore medieval ima.ge of the 
process of knowing, as a rrutual relation between knower and known. In 
this sense Peirce's pragmatism is also a break fram the notion of a 
Cartesian vis cognoscitiva that is enptied of its ontological 
correspondence. Al though in 1 arge part Pei rce doesn't sirrpl y go back 
to a pre-Cartesian approach, as for example Neoscholastic 
philosophers do, yet there are, without doubt, Scholastic influences 
at work, at least insofar as they provide a means of escaping the 
Cartesian picture of knowledge. Certainly, in re-acquiring a notion 
of knowl edge as the result of an interplay between man and real i ty 
Peirce's theory of doubt and belief goes beyood Descartes, for his 
theory of doubt and belief is definitely not a revival of medieval 
episteroolO9Y. Yet, it is due to his knowl edge of what epistemology 
was before Descartes that Peirce could realize the importance of the 
82) Compare for example 6.452-493 - where Peirce argues that scientific knowledge is 
more than a Rlere quest for mental satisfaction, and 2.754, where Peirce accepts a 
continuity of knowledge from animal instinct to scientific theories. 
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cartesian tum and eventually individuate its error. So we may 
conjecture that Peirce's notion of a Gnostic Instinct and his ethical 
conception of the desire for knowledge, both emerging sanetimes in 
his conception of scientific mowledge, represent the price he had to 
pay to the medieval image of man, for having irrplici tly used medieval 
philosophy as the lever to unhinge Descartes' epistemology. 
If I'm right, then the Aristotelian residue in Peirce's theory 
of knowledge can be eliminated. Man pursues knowledge only for the 
sake of his mental peace, and science can be considered only a more 
effecti ve instrument for obtaining the same goal (any other 
consideration about other drives of the process of knowing like vital 
needs, curiosity, social position, wealth etc. being equal). As 
Peirce himself says: 
Hence the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opInIon. 
We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, 
not rrerely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy 
to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm 
belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the 
belief be true or false." [5.375]. 
According to the more original core of Peirce's epistemology, it is 
not that science describes reality better than any other non-
scientific rrethod, but that it answers its questions in a more 
effective way. Likewise, it is not that Achilles' shield rrdrrors any 
better the essence of his enemies' weapons, but that it is the best 
shield against them.83 Quoting Peirce once more, we don't search for 
knowledge just for its own sake, 
On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely to 
believing, but to believing just what we do believe. [5.372]. 
83T-These- remarks "imply---;;;;;-rather radical visions about a number of epistemological 
issues, especially the nature of truth. In a different context I would endorse a 
version of theory of truth which could allow. me to spea~ of. adequacy of true 
statements to the reality they refer to, yet not In terms of mirroring correspondence, 
but rather in the same way as an answer is "adequate" (or correspond) to a question, 
and it tries to cope with it. 
0IAPl'ER VI 281 
According to this "purified" Peirceish perspective, we can 
irrprove the previous versioo of the Peirceish Postulate by saying 
that: 
r D3O) a-~t-car~-~ian versioo of the Peirceish Postulate (the pp) 
holds that: ''rran has a spootaneous, inborn and inertial, mental 
c£natus that would make him persevere in his own static state of 
nescient ataraxia, unless he is ccnpelled to change that state by 
sane external force iJT'{>ressed upon his mind. Such a conatus is the 
conservative force that activates the process of knowing at the 
intellectual level. It makes the hunan mind react against the 
ontological pressure coming fram the cootrasting presence of external 
reality. Its goal is the restoratioo of a homeostatic, peaceful state 
of ataraxia, by lTlPans of the production of R-knowledge." 
____________ _ ______ --____________________ ----.J 
Unfortunately, the Aristotelian residue has an important 
function within Peirce's epistemology. It is the background condition 
whereby Peirce can eventually disregard, as non problematic, 
questions about the few cases in which man really seems to be 
pursuing knowledge just for the sake of knowledge. By eliminating any 
Aristotelian residue, D30 faces the cl~cial problem of how we account 
for these few cases. The PP seem:; to have an iJ11?Ossible task. 
Although ppD30 is perfe-ctly consistent with our ordinary evidence 
that men d<Xl't search for knowledge for its own sake, it still leaves 
unanswered the questial cCl'lcernill9 those few cases in which there 
seems to be a pure search for knowledge for its own sake. 
In the last chapter I mentioned the problem of explaining the 
existence of indifference towards the search for knowledge if we 
accept the AP: such inch f ference seems to be cotmter evidence to the 
AP, and coosequent I y presents the PoP wi th a chall enge. Simi 1 arl y, an 
Anti-Aristotelian Postulate that defends an inertial and static 
interpretatim of the qenetic principle of the process of knowing, 
faces the problem of explaining those instances which seem to 
manif~t an interest in knowledge purely for its own sake, for they, 
likewise, appear to be counter evidence to that thesis. I believe the 
solution of the problem lies in the fact that D30 qenerally refers to 
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the simple relation occurring between the human rndnd and reality. In 
this way it misses an il1l>ortant distinction between what may count as 
external real ity for the htrnan mind and what may cOlIDt as external 
reality for a hunan mind. In the fonner case, it is the physical 
world that faces the human mind, in the latter case, it is the 
physical world and all the previous products of other hwan minds 
that face an individual htrnan mind. D30 speaks of intellectual 
knowledge as a reaction of the rrUnd against reality as the physical 
world. In order to understand how cultural phenomena like philosophy 
may occur, we need to focus on the notion of intellectual knowledge 
as the reaction of a single mind against anything that could count as 
external and extraneous to her, fran a desk to a painting, fran a 
scientific theory to a poem. 
The introduction of this final distinction can cover the 
explanatory role that in Peirce's epistemology may be played by the 
Aristotelian residue. By means of it the Peirceish Postulate can came 
to explain also what is that intellectuals, philosophers and 
scientists, and in a nrinor measure all men, are actually doing when 
they seem to be pursuing knowledge for its own sake. In fact, they 
would be reacting not only against the external physical world, but 
also against the external world of culture. The process can be easily 
S1..l1YrBrized in the following logical stages: 
i) at the beginning the human mind emerges fram the physical world by 
reacting against the natural pressure that this latter exercises on 
it; 
ii) such a reaction is concretized into R-knowledge; 
iii) R-knowledge produces h\.lTlaI1 history and cuI ture; 
iv) each single nrind finds herself within a gradually more and more 
catplex physical and cuI tural environment to which she reacts by 
producing additiooal R-knowledge hence roore history and culture. 
CHAPTER VI 283 
The process of knowing-reacting against external reality comes 
to include any sort of reality external to a single rrdnd. According 
to this last adjustment, we can modify the fomulation of the PP 
thus: 
D31) a post-Cartesian version of the Peirceish Postulate (the pp) 
holds that: "each person has a spontaneous, inborn and inertial, 
mental conatus that would make her persevere in her own static state 
of nescient ataraxia, unless she is compelled to change that state by 
same external force ilT{>ressed upon her mind. Such a canatus is the 
conservative force that activates the process of knowing at the 
intellectual level. It makes the hunan rrdnd react against the 
pressure caning fran the contrasting presence of physical and 
cuI tural realities. Its goal is the restoration of a haneostatic, 
peaceful state of ataraxia, by means of the production of R-
knowledge." 
According to D31 man does not bear any kind of reali ty too 
nruch, including historical reality, the kind that he is both the 
maker and master of. The origin of the search for knowledge is not 
the cartesian rralady, but a mental disturbance due to erpirical or 
cultural factors. 84 When there is something like a desire for 
knowledge, this is a sign that such atpirical or cuI tural 
disturbances are in action. Analogously, the intellectual process of 
knowing can be interpreted as a sort of "cognitive therapy'€5 against 
physical and cultural reality, and the production of historical and 
cuI tural real ities are a by-product of such a mental reaction. The 
search for knowledge in its purest aspect, disregarding any practical 
reward, is not for the sake of knowledge but for the sake of the 
well-being of mind. As soon as the individual rrdnd can, as soon as 
her "wounds" have becane "scars", she dedicates herself to activities 
other than "searching for knowledge". 
The conservative principle of the genesis of the P-knowing 
leads to the homeostatic tranquillity of beliefs, not to the 
Aristotelian always-growing encyclopedia. Then, if by "philosopher" 
84) Cf al~o the ph~nomenon of "Doubting Mania" (Lalande [1962], p.250). 
85) ci. what Curley (1988), p.130 and ff. says on Spinoza's interpretation of 
knowledge as a cognitive therapy. 
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we tmderstand "saneone who loves knowledge just for the sake of 
knowledge" then no man is a philosopher. But if by a "philosopher" we 
rrean "sClTleOne who loves knowledge because, al though it requires the 
difficult activity of elaboration/ acquisition, it is the only 
defence against reality", then the intrinsic nature of man is 
philosophical. The PP makes clear that what the single mind likes is 
not the search for knowledge for its own sake, but the relief that 
the acquisition of knowledge brings to her at the end of the road of 
inquiry, once external disturbances are finally settled. Men are 
forced to know and to keep the process of knowing open by the 
external pressure of natural and historical realities. It is only 
because of the dialectic between reactive conservatorism and desire 
for a mental peace free fran any pressure, both ontological and 
cuI tural, that the botmdaries of hurran knowledge are always 
advancing. In this sense the search for knowledge is a never-ending 
process because man keeps on trying to settle his doubts once and for 
ever. New hunan minds create their own cultural armour against the 
external world, both physical and cultural. other future human minds 
will be forced to keep the defensive process in action also by the 
pressure of the same armour built by previous minds. The search for 
knowledge progresses because different human minds melt and re-rrel t 
the iron of the annour that they tend to build arotmd themselves. Man 
has a ftmdamentally conservative mind, he does not like to have too 
many ideas and of those few, he doesn't 1 ike to change them, un! ess 
saneone is abl e to show him that the new ideas could be nuch more 
useful. The majority of men are "strong-minded" in this sense. Once 
and for all they have "made up their minds" on an inrneasurable amount 
of topics. By means of knowledge, men "close their minds" in the most 
effecti ve way against any further intrusion of external real i ty. 
Luckily enough, nan is narrow minded in respect to real i ty and most 
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of the culture, both humanistic and scientific, and its theoretical 
di I emnas. Man doesn't bear very rrruch any kind of real i ty, and so his 
mind is so made as to enable him to leave the greatest· part of 
reality outside of her business. As Peirce says: 
The problems that present themselves to such a mind are 
matters of routine which he has learned once for all to handle 
in learning his business" [5.368J .86 
Yet, sanetimes, sane individuals feel JOOre than others new 
problems caning both fran the natural and the historical-cuI tural 
environments. Fran the point of view of the PP, their being JOOre 
"open minded" than others, their less developed capacity of "settling 
their minds", is a miserable state that, however, enables than to 
feel the restriction of the cuI tural walls within which rran could 
otherwise soon enclose himself. It is a "miserable state" because, 
al though an oyster which is more likely to he penetrated by external 
reality will be also more likely to produce a beautiful pearl, this 
"openness" of the oyster will be a disadvantage for the animal, the 
pearl still being the result of a reaction against a disturbance. 
Then the "open minded" are those who irrpede the final fixation of 
beliefs. Once JOOre, not for the sake of knowledge in itself, or 
because rran as such is not strong-minded enough to carryon the 
enterprise to its end, but because for them the pressure caning fran 
history and culture is still great enough as to provoke further 
reactions. SUch a process explains why, despite all the other 
favourable factors that daninate the developnent of culture in 
advanced societies, there are phenomena like neo-analphabetism. In a 
"cognitively protected environment" the hunan mind tends to a state 
of nescience, and people may even forget how to write. In an advanced 
86) In psy·~hoT~9Ythisphe~;enon has been studied under the label of 'Rigidity' or 
"Einstellung". It is defined as 'a mental set or relatively inflexible attitude; a 
propensity to react to or perceive a situation in an established way, e.g. the 
tendency to apply formerly successful techniques to th,e solution of new problems' 
(Goldenson (1984J. p. 384). The, proble~ ~a: b~e~ inter,pr,eted in terms of a sort of 
mental inertia. cf. Gorman's art1cle on R191ty 1n CorS1n1 (1984J, pp.244-245. 
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society, individual minds can IOOre easily remain in a state of 
cognitive acquescience. 
Certainly the second-stage reaction can be felt less urg~ltly, 
since after all there is al ready enough "knowledge-reaction" as to 
defend each single rrdnd against a first attack fram reality. In fact 
the pressure can decrease so lTl.lch as to induce at a certain point, 
some people, e.g. the professional philosophers, to believe that the 
search for knowledge is a pleasure pursued by every men just for the 
sake of knowledge. 87 In a developed culture a philosopher can reach 
such a point of forgetfulness as to believe that the wall between the 
mind and real i ty is a prison for the former, not a defence agaisnt 
the latter. To the "open minded people" is left the hard task of 
making the history of cuI ture grow, without being stifled by its own 
li~ts. Although fram this point of view the search for knowledge is 
not a pleasure,88 it can be seen as an onerous duty. The egoistic 
desire to survive pushes each single hl..lTlaIl mind to appreciate the 
fact that there is a process of knowing whereby her and all the other 
minds can defend themselves ontologically fram the world and fram 
their respective products. 
This is the general picture of man's interest in knowledge that 
we receive fram the formulation of the Peirceish Postulate. We can 
----_ ...... _---87) All this co~ld explain where Heidegger went wrong. His discovery that metaphysics 
is always a modification of the Being into entities does not imply that such an 
epistemic reaction against what there is in the world should be surpassed. His wish is 
like that of the Kantian dove that is convinced he could fly better if there wasn't so 
much air impeding his flight. It is only the rational process of kno~ing and the 
dialectical accumulation and overcoming of R-knowledge that makes possible human 
history. I believe that a tho~ght to what Nazism was in terms of 'closeness' to the 
vital force of nature, is unavoidable. Man must be seen responsible of his own 
history and as standing on his own feet, not subjected to any 'destiny of Being'. 
Someone'may think of a revival of a Metaphysics of Being only because there has been 
plenty of ontological reaction against reality. 
68) Then locke is right both in being tolerant with men who are not interested in 
searching knowledge for its own sake .and in praisi~g the search for knowledge. He is 
only wrong in rooting this latter 1n the necess1ty of the occurrence of a free, 
epistemophilic impulse instead of a rational duty of Kantian taste. 
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turn back to the principal issue and see whether, and if so, what 
difference the substitution of the AP with the PP can make within the 
Tra\.lllatic Doubt. 
VI.7 ASS: THE APPLICATION OF THE PEIRCEISH POS'IULATE TO 'IRE TRAUMATIC 
DOOBT 
It wi 11 be remembered that the theoretical contents of the 
Perpetual Check of Reason were provided by the conjunction of the 
episteroological anti -realism as defined by DIS' with the minimal 
ontological realism as defined by DIS' but that (Anti-Rep. DI5 + 
RontD18) could be really seen as the proper logical analysis of the 
TrallTlatic Doubt "reality in itself may be carpletely different fran 
what we take it to be" only if we were to add to them the 
Aristotelian Postulate (APD27). In chapter III I asked whether it was 
possible to have an anthropological strategy that could solve the 'I'D 
by working on the Aristotelian Postulate. Such a possibility has led 
the investigation to a detailed reconstruction of the contents of the 
AP and a discussion of the grounds for accepting it. A large part of' 
this chapter has been taken up by the elaboration of a better 
Postulate that could replace the AP. The anthropological strategy 
consists now in attaching to (Anti-Rep. + Root) the PP instead of the 
AP. 
If we interpret the principl e governing the genesis of the 
process of knowing in teJ:TrS of the action of a conservative conatus 
for peace of mind rather than in terms of the action of a desire for 
knowledge for its own sake, we have that the Doubt is no longer 
traumatic. On the contrary, it represents a possibility that the HKS 
can rather welcome. Let me be more specific. 
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Thanks to the Peirceish approach we can admdt a strong version 
of ontological realism while assuncing that the principal task of the 
episternic relation occurring between HKS and ER is one of defence of 
the htlT'aI1 mind against ER. The process of knowing has the goal of 
producing a barrier that limits the pressure of ER upon the mind. In 
this sense the clause "anti" in "episteroological anti -realism" refers 
to the conception of knowledge as an epistemic reaction against ER. 
Whatever the nature of ER may be in itself, not only is HKS not 
interested in grasping it, but HKS is keen on leaving it outside his 
mind, on reducing or subjugating it to his rrental schesres. It is not 
merely that it doesn't matter if, in establishing his reign over 
reali ty , man unfortunatel y loases the possibi I i ty of knowing the 
intrinsic nature of this latter. Rather, the hypothesis is that the 
scope of knowledge is that of neutralizing ER, of leaving reality 
outside, in transforrrUng what it is in itself into something which is 
what it is onl y because of himsel f . There may be more or less 
effective ways to cope with this task, and we may call the most 
efficacious the scientific: the result doesn't change. The gap 
occurring between ERP and mIl has to be interpreted no 1 anger as an 
inescapable and unfortlUlate event, but as the real target of the 
process of knowing. It is only in the struggle for positing a gap 
between brute fact and hersel f that the mind emerges. By maintaining 
such a hiatus between reality in itself and its knowledge the mind 
can manage to survive. The scope of the process of knowing is not in 
grasping the whole nature of reality, forcing the mind to the lethal 
risk of an "ontological over-exposure", but letting reali ty drip into 
the internal world as peacefully as possible. 
If we find this option acceptable, then I believe there is some 
irony in the so-called Tratl'Tatic Doubt. For, according to the 
Peirceish Postulate, to say that reality in itself may be completely 
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different fran what the HKS takes it to be, would be like warning the 
garrbler that he nay have wan his bet or the warrior that he rray have 
defeated his enemy. If we did, that would sinpl y mean that we didn't 
understand what the purposes of their actions were. 
I 
As for the strategies sketched in chapter III, this can be 
represented by a graphic scheme: 
ERn I (D18 ) 
Roi(D1S) (ontological pressure) 
Rexist. 
1 
I ERPl(DlS) ! (epistemological reaction) Re(DlS) _________ HKS __ -----.J 
Visually, the mind doesn't "go", epistemically, towards 
external reality, but it is rather external reality that "goes" 
towards the rrdnd. Reversing the Baconian image, it is the rrdnd that 
attE!fTl>ts a cogni t i ve defence against the intrusiOn of external 
reality into her internal world, not nature that has to defend itself 
against the scientific aggression of the hunan mind. Accordingly, in 
the scheme ~ appears to exercise an alienating pressure an HKS that 
would be successful, as it is in the animals, if it were not for this 
latter cognitive reaction. This produce ERP, which can be identified 
in part with R-knowledge as culture, that is with the aCCUllllation of 
knowledge el aborated through the last few thousands years of htrnan 
civilization, and in part with R-knowledge as enpirical knowledge, 
that is the product of each individual ht.rnan rrdnd (the perspective 
here is still very Kantian). The philosopher~, the intellectuals and 
the scientists are those who persistently react against updated 
versions of ERP. Every reaction creates fresh R-knowledge against 
I 
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whose pressure one day same future generation will have to react. And 
those generations will, like ourselves, have to balance the tasks of 
providing a boudary against brute reality, and not making that 
boudary so inflexible that it becomes a cage for the rrrind. 
As I anticipated in IlI.S.c, it is now understandable why I 
said that, according to this Peirceish perspective, the chess-like 
game of knowledge played by ER and HKS ends with a draw appreciable 
by the HKS. None of the two players succeed in assindlating the other 
to itself cctTI>letely, the non-mind to the mind or the mind to the 
non-nUnd. But for the human mind such a draw amounts to winning the 
game, for she is playing with the black, that is she is defending 
hersel f. The Perpetual Check is that of Reason or the mind escaping 
its capture by external reality, not the other way rotmd. The fact 
that it is "perpetual" indicates the never-ending developnent of the 
process of knowing, which always produces new R-knowledge. 
I started this investigation by a gentle take-off, the several 
distinctions necessary to understand our use of mental dichotanies. I 
mean to end it now by a gentle landing, a little piece of prose. 
In chapter IV I identified the Aristotelian man in Ulysses or 
Faust. Peirce has now suggested to us an anti-Ulyssean or anti-
Faustian hero. Unfortunately, the literary tradition, as far as I 
know it, does not provide us with a good character for such a role, 
so let me call it, in anteposition to Ulysses, Aeneas. In the war of 
Troy, Aeneas is an the other side, he is wi thin the wall and wants to 
keep the enemy outside. He is a man of religious faith. He will be 
the mythical fotmder of Rare, and the Ranan cuI ture is a rruch JOOre 
prac;JTBtic than the Greek. Finally, like Ulysses, Aeneas will be 
forced to travel around the world, but tmlike Ulysses (at least as 
far as the post-Renaissance's images of Ulysses are concerned), 
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Aeneas is looking forward to settling down in his new city, a new 
camunity, and he doesn't like intellectual adventures. Aeneas is 
searching for his peace of mind, is not curious at all and wants 
final answers to his doubts and dilenrnas, not new questions. Our 
Aeneas represents the new hero emerging fran the PP. We can 1 et him 
meet a version of the Cartesian Mephistopheles or a Nagelian 
Neurologist89 and see what happens. 
Suppose Aeneas is in his tent, near the Tiber, on one of the 
seven hills where Rane will be built. It is dark, he is sitting in 
front of the fire, having had a very tiring day. He sees sane 
shadows, he realizes that they are not real objects and then he 
starts wondering whether the entire world as he knows it could be 
just a mere production of his mind. Like Descartes, he starts 
doubting about everything. At once he says to himsel f: "real i ty may 
be carpletely different fran what I take it to be". But after a brief 
pause he adds: "So what ? Thanks to the gods I have my knowledge 
which keeps brute facts outside of my mind. As long as this filter 
works reality has to be different fran how I know it. It is only if 
reality should cane too close to me that I should be worried. My 
knowledge is an instrunent useful for dealing with epistemic 
prahl ems. "Knowing" is the onl y way I can defend mysel f against 
reality. Without the process of knowing 'facts would stay in ~ rrdnd 
Wltil they nm it .90. That my vision of the world is just mine in so 
far as I'm a hunan knowing subject, does not trouble me. Knowledge is 
for life, and the world willy-nilly has to withstand my epistemic 
reaction, for at least this is sanething it cannot overcane". 
We J1l.1St suppose now that a Cartesian-l ike hypothesis of the 
deceptive derron enters into his mind. Furthenrore, as Strawson has 
89) Cf. Nagel [1986J, pp.71-3. 
90) Cf. the quotation in the page-title 
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interestingly underlined,91 a sceptical challenge is not radical 
enough if it is not logically possible to suppose that, at a certain 
time, there will be a sort of shift in the appearance of things, e.g. 
fran being blue to becaning green. So let us imagine Aeneas yet more 
tired, still wondering: ''1-1y pragrratic position seems unassailable, 
and yet all my life could be a dream, and the gods could just been 
anusing thE.!'nSel ves in rraking me believe what in fact it has no 
reality at all. But even if it were so, would this affect my life? 
This cup contains what I think is wine. It tastes like wine, it looks 
like wine, it has exact 1 y the same effects as if it were wine. But 
then, whatever this liquid may be in se ips1..lTl, as long as it has all 
the properties of wine it is wine. And if the gods should show me 
that what one day I considered wine is no 1 anger wine but water, and 
water is now wine, then from that day on I will call the water wine 
and the wine water. And I wi 11 wash mysel f wi th what was wine and now 
is water, and I will drink to the gods with what was water and now is 
wine. For an the one hand, if what is in fact water should for all 
the times in the future behave 1 ike wine and what is wine in se ips1..lTl 
should nevertheless behave like water, then is this a problem ? 
Certainl y not, because I wi 11 never be surprised to find water in my 
barrels, and I will always be able to predict my drunkenness as one 
of the ef feets of that 1 iquid that once and for all the gods have 
deeided to rrake behave like what 1 considered wine. And if, on the 
other hand, one day all the world should change, and the water should 
behave like wine and wine like water then ei ther I won't be abl e to 
realize this change, and so my knowledge will still cope with brute 
facts, or I wi 11 detect this change, in the same way as I real ize 
that the three has lost its leaves; And I will say 'It is no longer 
stmner, and winter is approachinq, the tree was green and now is 
-------::---. -----
91) Strawson (1985J 
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brownish'. 'What could enable the mind to know physical things which 
do not physically influence it and which it does not influence ?,92 
Language is what allows me to deal with the world, and language is my 
own creature, it is sanething r, as a rnamer of this carm.mi ty , am 
the master of. There is no demon who can inpede my mind to detach 
herself from the brutal reality by means of language, unless such a 
deroon wants at the same time to destroy my mind. But although I 
cannot irrpede this last event to happen, yet mens faber realitatis 
suae, and wi thin her kingdcrn my mind is the only god I recognize". 
VI.8 AN OPEN CONCWSION: SIX QUESTIONS FOR A Ft.mJRE GNOSEOLOGY 
Annng the different objections that could be moved against 
there is the accusation that the substitution of the AP with the PP 
is a strategy that can work only because it is too powerful. That is 
to say, it is only because the introduction of the PP changes in fact 
the rules of the game that the game can be won. By adopting the kind 
of Peirceish epistemology outlined above, I nay be supposed to have 
overstepped the limits within which the problEm had to be fonnulated: 
it is too easy to sol ve an epistemological prohl em by means of a 
metaphysical description like the one implied by the interpretation 
of the process of knowing in terms of action/reaction. Furthenmore, 
saneone tTay want to say that the anthropological solution of the TO 
aroounts to the basic reasoning of the fox concerning the grapes. 
Since she cannot reach thEm she declares they are still sour. It is 
because, according to the TO, knowledge of mn cannot be obtained 
that I have tried to argue that there isn't any desire for it. 
There are two answers to these general objections. First, I've 
already adni tted that rraybe the ftmdamental problems in epistemology 
92) Peirce, jbjdel, 5.341 
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are insoluble without partially overstepping into same kind of 
hypothetical, ontological description of what the relation between 
man and reality may be. In the previous chapter I also made a 
distinction between metaphysical description and epistemological 
justification. The Peirceish Postulate seems to fulfil both 
conditions. I've actually argued in favour of this point in a 
previous work, where I supported the necessi ty of a phi losophical 
theory of the genesis of the process of knowing in terms of a 
metaphysical description of such a relation. In that work I called 
this special branch of philosophy that lies on the border between 
ontology and epistemology, Gloseology (see Preface). 
The second answer refers to the 1 imi ts of the present work. 
This last chapter relies on a theory of knowledge that presupposes a 
strang metaphysics. The particular Peirceish EPistemology that 
under! ies the anthropological strategy has only be outlined above. 
The target of the present work has been that of supporting the 
substitution of the AP by the PP as an interesting and fruitful 
hypothesis, not that of giving the full developrent of a Peirceish 
Gnoseology. Yet, at the end of this work, it is worth presenting 
eight key-questions prClTpted by the assmption of the Peirceish 
Postulate, six of which represent the central issues any future 
Gnoseology that shares the approach advocated in this work will have 
to face. 
What is the actioo (roove with the white) performed by ER on 
. ale f" " ted HKS r mind ? We have seen that Pel.rce spe s 0 a pressure opera 
by brute facts 00 the mind. This refers, not by chance, to a pre-
Cartesian philosophy of knowledge. It has rruch to do with the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic idea of a strict relation between reality and 
man in the constitution of knowledge, and with the idea that the mind 
actually becanes what she knows, and this at the level of perception. 
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An answer to this first question could be one in tetmS of an 
investigation of a theory of perception as far as an isanorphic model 
of enpirical knowledge is concerned. 
What is the kind of action perfonned by historical/cutural ER 
on IlKS' mind ? Is it different fran (i) ? It seems that any possible 
answer to this question should take into account the possibility of a 
cammon theoretical basis where the alienating action of human 
cuI ture/history on a single mind, the anxiety it produces and ht:rnan 
mind's defence of her self-identity can encounter. 
What is the nature of Jrnowledge as a mental reaction (trove with 
the black) against external reality? Newton says that the reaction 
is always adequate to the action (corpus ame tantt.ITI pati reactione 
quantlll1 agit in altertlll) .93 I believe that a future Gnoseology should 
investigate (a) what is the fonmal relation between perceptual action 
of reality on mind and (b) the mental reaction in tenns of beliefs 
which are justified and true, by investigating (c) the various 
understandings there have been of the notion of truth as adequatio 
rei et intellectus. 
What is the relatioo between knowledge-reaction and both 
Janguage and logic ? An answer to this question could still be 
developed wi thin a Peirceish semiotics, where language and logic 
could be treated as two different symbolic "weapons" used by man in 
his defence against ~. 
What is the nature of the state of nescient ataraxia that mind 
is supposed to be striving for, and how is it connected with all the 
other aspects of human mental life? And, if knowledge is a cognitive 
reaction to reality, is this connected with the problem of dualism 
mind/brain, and if so, how? Both questions could be solved within a 
93) Cf. Herivel p.31 
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theory of mind which should also explain the relation between 
mowledge and the rest of the activity of thinking. 
Precisely, what does the dialectic development of human culture 
in terms of action and reaction between reality and knowledge consist 
of ? To answer this question can be seen the task of a philosophy of 
history. 
Are there lOOral concI usians to be drawn fran the whole picture 
given by the Peirceish Gnaseology ? Of course, if there are any, 
their investigation belongs to the field of Ethics. 
The conspicuous irrportance of these questions show that, even 
if ale should have sane doubts on whether it is the best strategy 
against the Traumatic Doubt, still the anti-Aristotelian approach to 
the genesis of the process of knowing ITl.lSt be certainly recognized as 
an interesting program of research, rich in important consequences. 
In this thesis I've tried to support the value of such an approach. I 
hope in the future to be able to answer all the previous questions. 
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Appendix I 
Al though I have tried to follow the seven rules given by Peirce 
for an Ethics of Terminology [2.219-2.226] I'm afraid that the reading 
DB)" not be very easy because of the various technical devices. I list 
here the principal abbreviations, technical expressions, definitions, 
fomulas, and translations used in the work. 
Acknowled~t: any "technologically non-productive" epistemic or 
doxastic operations of a HKS. 
An-question: whether or not there is an external reality. 
AP: see Aristotelian Postulate. 
Aristotelian Postulate: see AP, 021' 022' °23' 024' 025' 027 and AGS, 
TC' TIlTS' TL, TL· 
cc: see Closure Clause. 
Epistemological Realism: Philosophical realism concerning the value of 
hunan objective knowledge as defined in 03' °9, °12' A, C. 
EPistemophilia: see Vis Cognoscitiva and 025' 026' 027' 
m: External Reality. 
General objective knowledge: any form of public, potentially 
propositional knowledge that, liable of sane consideration concerning 
its values of truth and that can be supported by sane logical argunent. 
Historical or artificial (reality): resulting fram the presence of the 
animal haw sapiens an the earth. 
HKS: Htrnan Knowing Subject. 
Ingenuous Realism: see 012 013' 
Knowl edge It: knowl edge as the resul t of the process of knowing; see 
resu . R-knowledge, Process of knowlng and 08' 09' 014' 031' 
H: Mind. 
Natural (reality): ''belonging to the physical world" in a non teclmical 
sense of physical. 
Ontological Realism: Philosophical realism concerning the :xistence of 
the physical world, see 01 02' 02.1' D2.2' 02.3' 04' 04 1 0S, °5.1' 
DS. 2 ' D5.3 and 06' 012' 0lS' A, B. 
Boethi us Paradox: see P. 
PP: Peirceish postulate. 
P.C.R.: see Perpetual Check of Reason. 
Peirceish postulate: see 029' °30 1 D31' 
I 
Perpetual Check of Reasan: the logical reconstruction of the contents of 
the Trauratic Doubt, (Anti-I? + minimal R ). '~p. onto 
P-knowing: see Process of knowing. 
Pr~s. of knowing: the process of knowing consists of a symnetric 
ep1stamc relati~ (Re) occurring between an ideal HtIllall Knowing Subject 
and Ext~rnal Reall. ty; the occurrence of the process of knowing produces 
a certal.n resul t called R-Jmowledge, see ~. 
Quamod~question: if there is an external reality, what· sort of 
existence it has. 
Re: Epistemic Relation, see Process of knowing and 'D-] and DIS' 
Rep.: see Episte.roological Realism. 
R-knowledge: knowledge as the result of the process of knowing, see 
knowl edgeresul t, Process of knowing and 08 , D9 , D14 , D31 • 
Rj,n.: Ingenuous Real ism. 
Roi : Ontological Independence, see D2•3 • 
Ront .: see Ontological Realism. 
'I'D: see TrallTBtic Doubt. 
TralllBtic Doubt: "Real i ty in itself may be carpI etely different fran 
what we take it to be". 
Vis cognascitiva: see D25' 
Wissbegier: see Vis Cognoscitiva. 
* * * 
~) Philosophical realism concerning the existence of the physical world 
=def the philosophical position according to which there is an external 
rea ity and its nature (Le. existence and properties) is mind-
independent. 
~2) Ront . =def. the philosophical.~ition according to which (i) there 
1S an external reality m; and (11) a portion (greater than null, but 
not necessari 1 y equal to all) of ER enjoys a mind-independent nature 
(i.e. existence and properties). 
D2 1) D2-(i); and (ii) a portion (greater than null, but not necessarily 
eqUal to all) of ER has a nature (i.e. existence and properties) that it 
is not affected by the presence or absence of a mind (M). 
D2 2) D2-{i); and (ii) a portion of ER has a nature (Le. the existence 
aDd properties) that is ontologically independent of H. 
02.3) 02-(i); and (ii) [Roi (ER,M»). 
03) P~losophical rea~i~ conce~ng the va~ue of human knowledge =d~f. 
the philosophical pos1han according to which a (normal) htrnan knowlng 
subject (in the best case) has a perfect object~ve ~~ledge of . the 
intrinsic nature (i.e. the intrinsic existence and lntr1ns1c propertl.es) 
of external reality. 
II 
~4} Root. = def. the, phi I osophical , ~i tion according to which (i) there 
18 an exte~l reahty ER; and (11) a portion (greater than null, but 
nc;>t necE7sanly equal to all) of ER enjoys ,a minds-independent nature 
(1.e. enstence and properties); " 
J?s~ Root. =qef. the philosophical position according to which (i); and 
(11) a por~lon (different fran nothing, but not necessarily equal to 
all) of ER 1S such that its nature (i.e. existence and properties) 
DS .1 ) woul d be the same even if there weren't hunan beings wi thin it· 
I?s.2} would be the same even if hUTaIl beings were cCflPletely diffe~ent 
fran what they are now; 
DS. 3} wouldn't be affected by the disappearance of hunan beings. 
~6} Rant. =def. the philosophical position according to which (i) there 
18 an external reality ER; and (ii) a portion (greater than null but 
not necessarily equal to all) of ER has a nature (i .e. existenc~ and 
properties) independent of hunan acknowledgment. 
OC) the same portion of ER selected by (ii) in D6 is such that if its 
temporal nature (i.e. its existence and properties) can partially depend 
an same ulterior factor, it can only depend on a previous human physical 
activity or human technologically-productive knowledge. 
0.,) {[Re (HKS,ER)] =def. process of knowing} =def. P-knowing. 
De) [Knowledgeresult] =def. R-knowledge. 
Dg} Rep =def. the philosophical positian according to which the process 
of knowing is such as to make possible the production of HKS' perfect 
objective R-knowledge of the intrinsic nature (i.e. the intrinsic 
existence and intrinsic properties) of ER. 
DIo} (Ontological Anti-realism =def. non-Rant.> =def. Anti-Rant.' 
DI1) (Epistemological Anti-realism =def.non-Rep .> =def. Anti-Rep. 
D12) [Rant. + Rep.l=def. Ingenuous Realism =def. Rjn. 
~3) Rjn. =def. the phi I osophica,l, positi,on ~cc~rding to w~ch (i~ there 
18 an external reality ER; and (11) the lntrlnslc nature (l.e. eXlstence 
and properties) of ER, both in its historical and in its natural 
aspects, is on the ontological side carpletely independent of HKS' 
aclmowledgment and on the epistemological side perfectly knowable by 
HKS, thanks to the nature of the process of knowing. 
D14) Anti-R-,. =def. the philosophical position ,according to whi?h the process of lfuowing is not such as to make posSIble the produ~hon of 
IlKS' perfect objective R-knowledge of the intrinsic nature (l.e. the 
intrinsic existence and intrinsic properties) of ER 
DIS) Anti-R
e 
. =def. the philosophical ,pos~tion ac?o~di~ to which (i) 
hiJian cognitfve processes (i .e. the subJechve conditlo s~ne qua non for 
there being sanething an epistemic relation between HKS ~ ER) are such 
as to make possible ooly a roodifying episterrological relahon Re between 
HK.S and ER; and (ii) Re' in tum" is .su:h as never to ~able HKS to c~ 
to grasp episteroologically the 1ntnnsIc nature of ER, Re can ~rov1~e 
IlKS 001 y wi th a grasp of ER as this is according to HKS' ep1stenuc 
perspecti ve. , " t' - ER ~6) ER with its intri~ic existenc~ and 1ntnns1c proper =Ies -def. 
as it is in itself (or In se or an sleb) =def. Noumenal ER def. ~1. 
III 
-- . 
DJ.,) ER as it is known by H1<S =d f m as it is for HKS = p'Len~"''''l 1m =def. ERP e . def. II ........... -
~a) Rant. =def. the ,philosophi~l position according to~which (i) there 
~s ~ ~xterna reallty, ER; (11) the portion of ER which enjoys an 
~tnnslc nature (i .e. intrinsic existence and intrinsic properties) ~dent of hll1lall acknowledgment is only conceivable as existent but 
1t 1.S not knowable (ERn); (iii) the portion of ER which is knowable is 
mer-:ly ~henanen~l , and, in a significant degree its nature depends on the ~Jec~lve conditlo slne qua nan of the P-Jmowing (ERP); and (iv) it is 
lIIposslble to estimate how different the nature of ERP is fran the 
nature of ~, 
~9) "eidenai x" =def, "epistastbai x" =def, "to have episteme of x", 
~) "eidenai x" =d "to know-why x", ef, 
~l) episteme =def theoretical, rational Jmowledge =def. objective 
knOwledge, ' 
~2) in the same way as "eidenai x" =def "to have epistt::fre of x" so "to 
kJiOw-why x" =def, "to have objective knoWledge-why of x", 
023) the Aristotelian Postulate (AP) holds that: "all men have a 
spc:ntaneous conatioo which drives than towards the acquisition of 
objective Jmowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of what cannot be 
otherwise" . 
D?4) (A post-Cartesian version of) the Aristotelian Postulate (AP) holds 
t1iat: "all men have a spontaneous conation which drives them towards the 
acquisition of objective knowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of 
external reality", 
D25 ) Vis cognoscitiva (or Episteoophilia as Wissbegier) =def a 
Spaltaneous, inborn irrpulse to pursue knowledge for its own sake. ' 
026) The episteroophilic irrpulse =def an involuntary tendency, 
understandable in terms of state of mind, i.e. in tenns of mentally 
internal tendency, which exerts an incitement upon the mind itsel f to 
pursue knowledge, without premeditation or reflection. 
D,7) (A post-cartesian version of) the Aristotelian Postulate (AP) holds 
tEat: "all men have a spontaneous, inborn episteroophilic inpulse 
(conatus) that drives them towards the acquisition of objective 
knowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of external reality". 
D,a) For every A if A has arrong his property that of being E then he is 
arso a HB, otherwise is just an A. 
D29) The Peirceish Postulate (the PP) holds that: ''man has . a 
spcmtaneous, inborn and inertial, mental canat~ that makes ~m 
persevere in his own state of intellectual nesCIence, unless he 1S 
carpelled to change that state of mental rest by sane external forces 
inpressed upon his mind". 
030) A post-Cartesian version of the Peirc~ish ~ostulate (the PP) holds 
that: "man has a spontaneous, inborn and 1nertlal, mental, conatus t~t 
would llBke him persevere in his own static state of nesCIent atarana, 
UIlless he is coopelled to change that state by sane ~xternal force 
irrpressed upon his mind. Such a canatus is the conservatlve force that 
IV 
activates the process of knowing at the intellectual level. It makes the 
ht.man mi,nd react against the ontological pressure caning fran the 
contrastlng presence of external reality. Its goal is the restoration of 
a homeostatic, peaceful state of ataraxia, by means of the production of 
R-Jmowledge. 
D31 ) A post-Cartesian version of the PeirceishPostulate (the PP) holds 
that: "each person has a spontaneous, inborn and inertial, mental 
conatus that would make her persevere in her own static state of 
nescient ataraxia, unless she is c~lled to change that state by sane 
external force ill1?ressed upon her mind. Such a conatus is the 
conservative force that activates the process of Jmowing at the 
intellectual level. It makes the human rrdnd react against the pressure 
c~ng fram the contrasting presence of physical and cultural realities. 
Its goal is the restoration of a haneostatic, peaceful state of 
ataraxia, by rreans of the production of R-knowledge". 
AJ) as a matter of fact, man enjoys (i) sensations for their own sake 
and (ii) purely intellectual activities for their own sakes. Since (i) 
and (ii) are signs of the presence a vi~ cognoscitiva in t~ human 
mi nd, then there is a tension (vis cognoscitiva) in the hunan mind that 
renders man a knowledge-why-seeker. An appeal to such a tension explains 
the other human phenomenon of a never-ending search for knwoledge. 
AR) ''knowing'' is a process; as such it entails the m:xlification of 
sanething, the knower, which through the process of knowing JOOves fran a 
state of ignorance to a state of cognisance, which in turn is the 
natural state JOOre suitable for the man-philosopher. But if knowing is a 
way of IOOving either towards the known or sil'1'Ply towards knowledge, then 
it must be due to same sort of driving force. This later is identifiable 
in the vis cognosci ti va, which is both a spontaneous and a natural 
tendency of reaching intellectual knowledge and a sort of unmoved mover 
of the cognitive processes. 
~) one of the reason that causes the TD is the ass1..11TPtion of the AP; 
but since it is reasonable to assume that (i) men generally do not not 
care about knowledge of the intrinsic nature of eternal reality just for 
its own sake, it follows that (ii) the assmption of the AP is not 
justified; and the abandonment of the AP il'1'Plies that (iii) the 
possibility that reality in itself may be completely different fran what 
men take it to be (i.e. the TO) is not felt as a real problem by men, 
and hence that the TD is solved as not being a real problem for men. 
P) roost of the time the great majority of men do not actually sati~fY 
the conditio sine qua non ( i .8. havi ng the property E) for belng 
considered rrore than animals (A). 
* * * 
{[Re (HKS,ER)] produces [knowledgeresult]}: p-knowing produces R-
know I edge; see ~ and D8' 
A) R .. + R_ = the IOOSt general form of naive or metaphysical or 
d on~. :.~p. ognat~c reahsm. , 
B) Ron . + Anti-Re . = a general version of Kanti~ rea~=sm.. " '_ C) Antr-R + R P = interpretable as Berkeley s antl reallsm ( anh on~. ep. , . 'd I' ") IlBterial ism or "sUbJech ve 1 ea lsrn. , ' , 
D) Anti-R + Anti-Re = a radical scep,tlcal poSltlon, such as that 
resul ting ~iCrn the Cart~ian-DeJoon hypothes7s. , " 
AGS) "pantes anthropoi tou eidenai oregon tal phusel 
v 
TC) "all men by nature desire to know" 
T1) "all men by nature desire to Wlderstand" 
T2) "all men by nature desire to know-why" 
T3) "all men by nature desire to have objective knowledge-why" 
T4) "all men by nature (phusei) desire (oregontai) to have objective 
kriowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise" 
TS) "all men by nature (phusei) have a conation which push them towards 
the possession of objective knowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise" 
T6 ) "owing to the harmonious nature of the Wliverse, all men have a 
satisfiable conation which push them towards the possession of objective 
knowledge-why of what carmot be otherwise" 
TL) "Qmes hanines natura scire desiderant" 
T7) "(owing to the harmonious nature of the universe) all men have a 
(spontaneous and satisfiable) conation which push them towards the 
possession of objective knowledge-why of what cannot be otherwise" 
TS) "(owing to the harmonious nature of the universe) all men have a 
(spontaneous and satisfiable) conation which push them towards the 
possession of objective knowledge-why of the intrinsic nature of what 
cannot be otherwise". 
VI 
VII 
APPENDIX I I 
The are nany aspects of Pei rce ' s phi 1 osophy whi ch cannot be easi I y 
reconciliated with the picture I've endorsed in the thesis: 
i) a behaviouristic approach to the dial ectic of doubt/be lief ("the essence 
of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are 
distinguished by the different modes of action to which tehy give rise 
~~.398]"), in contrast with my more metaphysical or mentalistic approacl't; 
11) an acceptance of the AP that scrnetimes emerges in his conception of 
scientific knowledge (1.43-5; 1.55; 1.235; 1.636-648; 3.34; 6.428)2; 
iii) the refusal of any form of dualism, either cartesian or Kantian, in 
favour of a more harroonious vision of reality and man (cf. what he says 
about Aristotle's concept of energeia and the hanrony between active and 
passive roles of HKS and reality in 1. 325), in contrast with my 
appreciation of dfialism; and more specifically 
iv) the denial of any value to the Kantian concept of a noumenal unknowable 
reali ty (cf. 1.405 and 5.311 where he says "There is nothing then, to 
prevent our knowing outward things as they really are"); 
v) the acceptance of a more classic and medieval vision of reality as dead-
mind in the sense of ''mind-like'' (cf. 6.102-8). In the text I used the 
expression "dead-mind" with the opposi te sense of "what is in i tsel f a 
negation of the mental". According to Peirce, "nature syllogizes fran one 
major premise" (6.66) and it is pervaded by thought (4.551 and 4.553, n. 2; 
see also end of 1.351). About this aspect he argues in a way very close to 
that Lear when he explains the nature of Aristotle's metaphysics ("It seems 
incontastable that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the carprehension 
of the world; at least, so far as this goes, that certain conceptiOns, 
highly inportant for such a carprehension, naturally [my italics, cf. 
Aristotle's phusei] arise in his mind; and without such a tendency, the 
mind could never have had any developnent at all" [6.417]. Cf. also .5.591 
and 5.493 for the inter-action between internal and external world.)3; 
vi) his partial disapproval of the unconscious mental state of ignorance as 
equivalent to a "death of thought" (cf. Box IB2-II (22) sheet C, quoted by 
Wennerberg [1962], p.60). 
However, about each single point it wouldn't be difficult to find 
Peirce expressing positions closer to that exposed in the thesis (where 
more indications about passages in Peirce's work have been given): 
a) about (i) cf. Peirce's metaphysical interpretation of the dialectic 
between Ego and Non-Ego and the relevance of the homeostatic model for a 
behaviouristic approach; 
b) about (ii) cf. his theory of perception; 
c) about (iii) cf. his theory of "Struggle" and of Ego-Non Ego [for eXaJ'Till e 
in 5.45-58], of a dualism occurring between knower and known [5.539] and 
the acceptance of the PP as far as €l11?irical knowledge is conceme;d. The 
main difficulty seems that Peirce didn't compound the ideal of ~ des~r~ f?r 
knowledge with the cynical view of man's desire for peace of nund. This 1S 
very clear for exarrpe fran the different understandings he has of the 
l'fCf~"Alm~der[1980f:pp~i:;3, but see p. 12, note 23, on Ayer's mentalistic interpret.ation. 
2) Cf. Reilly (1970), chapter II entitled "The scientist IS concern: Knowledge for 1ts own 
sake" . 
3) The problem of Peire's commitment to a version of realism and of idealism has bee~ largelly 
discussed, I'm afraid largelly applying this couple of term in a rather post-Carteslan sens7· 
See Almeder [1980), chap. IV. Although I haven't seen the article, from w~at Almeder says 1n 
.note 24 I believe my interpretation of Peirce is much closer to that of Rlley [1968) than to 
his own. 
• 
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concept "conservatorism" [cf. for exarrple 1. 50 and 1.148]. So that Peirce 
can still appreciate an Aristotelian vision of man despite his homeostatic 
interpretation of the relation between doubts and beliefs. This is rather 
clear in chapter 5 vol I; 
d) about (i v) cf. his Kantian background and his distinction between first 
impressions of sense percepts and perceptual facts4;and 
e) about (v) cf. his concept of polarity (cf Feibleman [1970] pp.245-6) and 
of opposition (cf. 1.457); 
f) his appreciation of conscious mental states of ignorance, as the "birth-
stage of thought" (c. Wennerber, [1962]). 
A further difficulty is that when Peirce speaks of knowledge in terms 
of action/reaction he refuses to accept a neat distinction between the two 
roles of acting and reacting plaied by the knower and reality (cf. 5.46 and 
1. 334 quoted in VI. 6, note 79). When he speaks in terms of firstness, 
secondness etc. he applies reaction to reality and action to man [ef. 
7.531-4], but when he speaks of the psychology of belief and doubt, it is 
reali ty which acts and man who reacts [7.369 and 437-43]. So that there 
seem to be two levels (but cf. 1.431): one is the relation action-reaction 
and the other is the relation doubt-belief. The former serves to accept 
ontological realism, the latter to accept rational behaviour in respect to 
the autonomy of the external world [cf. 7.313-345]. I believe that all this 
is in agreement with Peirce's anti-Cartesian vision of the harmonic 
relation between reality and man. 
What follows is a list of same other passages connected with the 
general hypothesis sustained in this thesis: 
VOLUME I 
24 brute reality; 
212 caT4?ulsion hie et nunc; 
321 internal and external world; 
322-324 struggle and action/reaction; 
332-4-6 shock; 
419 brutal facts; 
457 to say that a table exists is to say that it produces certain effects 
upon us; 
457-8 opposition; 
460; 329 reaction; 
611-15 the aim of reasoning is a state of rest. 
VOLUME I I 
28/29 the process of thinking starts presumably at the level of acqucisition 
of perpcepts and is not knowable; 
29 truth is compulsory (maybe in the same way as external reality?); 
47/50 compulsion and subconscious; 
84; 138/39 the concept of force; 
113 wishful believing; 
140/141 pre-thought perception as unknowable; 
140/142 compulsion to know; 
146 on the nature of pre-cognitive perception; 
, I . t' t f ratl'onality as there is for 160 there is probably no specla lns lnc or 
IOOrality; 
179/185 unconscious, reasoning and logical justification; 
336 cart>usion hie et nunc; 
763 the end of man (end of p.487); 
4)CT""Feible;;;;1i970], chap, II, pp,32-46, 'The Stimulus of Kant', 
APPENDIX IX 
773 subconscious. 
VOLUME I I I 
154-61 the process of knowing as action and reaction; "stimulation and 
irri tation" . 
VOLUME IV 
64 the state of practically perfect belief; 
157 inner/outer world, adaptation of mand. 
VOLUME V 
250; 283 whether we can think without signs 
310 and ff. the incognizable is inconceivable; 
549-573 Truth as correspondence; 
582-3 the Will to learn. 
VOLUME VI 
95 knowledge of things in themselves; 
414-8 rrdnd and nature. 
VOLUME VI I 
58 scientific knowledge for its own sake and Gnostic Instinct; 
186 on the distinction between science and beliefs 
190 it is evolution (phusis) that has provided us with emotion [emotion of 
surprise] ; 
269 the growth of science occurs through the breakening of habits; 
326 every inquiry presupposes a passage fram doubt to belief; the relation 
between sensation and doubt; 
335 observations are the resul t of the action upon the mind of outward 
things; 
369 matter acts upon rrrind and mand responsively acts upon matter; 
381 the supervenince of mand; 
531-4 action and reaction (where reality is reacting against man); 
541,note 9 reacting against the outer world. 
604-606 belief has nothing to do with science; 
VOLUME VI I I 
78 on cogni ti on and dynami cs; 
103 brute action; knowledge and compulsion; 
138 list of different possible aims; 
251 £ai th, belief an reason to be careful in making up our mands; 
315 action passion and dynamics; 
317/318 dead matter; 
330 experience generally is what the course of life has carpelled me to 
think. 
